

GL 335.43

KEN



106448
LBSNAA

एत्री राष्ट्रीय प्रशासन अकादमी

Academy of Administration

मसूरी

MUSSOORIE

पुस्तकालय

LIBRARY

अवाप्ति संख्या

Accession No.

6472 106448

वर्ग संख्या

Class No.

335.3

पुस्तक संख्या

Book No.

Ken

A SHORT HISTORY OF
Communism
in Asia

By the same author:

The Military Side of Japanese Life
Some Aspects of Japan and her Defence Forces
The Changing Fabric of Japan
The Problem of Japan

A SHORT HISTORY OF
Communism
in Asia

Captain Malcolm D. Kennedy

**'There is no doubt that the road to
World Revolution lies through the East
rather than through the West.'**

ZINOVIEV *in* 1925

**WEIDENFELD AND NICOLSON
7 CORK STREET LONDON W1**

© *Malcolm D. Kennedy 1957*

First published in Great Britain 1957

PRINTED IN GREAT BRITAIN
BY EBENEZER BAYLIS AND SON, LTD., THE
TRINITY PRESS, WORCESTER, AND LONDON

Contents

Foreword	vii
List of Abbreviations	ix

Part I The Birth Throes of Nationalism and Communism

I	Revolution in the Making	3
II	Nationalism as the Prelude to Communism	15
III	The Far East Stirs	26
IV	The Pan-Asian Setting	35
V	The Eve of Revolution in South-East Asia	45
VI	Ferment in India and Malaya	54
VII	Communism Comes to China	66
VIII	From Socialism to Communism in Japan	78
IX	Russian Internationalism and Leadership	91
X	Czarist and Soviet Imperialism in Asia	100
XI	The Development of Asia as a Key Factor	112
XII	Moscow and Asia	132

Part II Revolutionary Developments Between the Wars

XIII	The Lesson of Revolution by Alliance	147
XIV	The Chinese Revolution Enters a New Phase	158
XV	Sino-Soviet Relations and Comintern Bungling	165
XVI	The Communist Movement in Japan	171
XVII	The Development of National Socialism in Japan	182
XVIII	Revolutionary Trends in Korea and South-East Asia	194
XIX	British Rule and Rebellion	213

xx	Evolution of Chinese Communist Policy	231
xxi	Chinese Communist Armed Strength and Hostility to Japan	244
xxii	Soviet Foreign Policy and Soviet Imperialism	250
xxiii	Moscow, Manchuria and Japan	261
xxiv	Internal Struggle and International Leadership	270

Part III The Pacific War Period

xxv	Some Aspects of Japan's Rise and Fall	289
xxvi	Nationalism and Communism in the British Sphere of Greater East Asia	301
xxvii	Nationalism and Communism in other South-East Asian Countries	311
xxviii	The Chinese Ferment and Japanese Communist Aid	320
xxix	Soviet Plans and Calculations	330

Part IV Post-War Developments

xxx	The Aftermath of War	341
xxxi	The Coming of the Cominform	358
xxxii	The Chinese Path to Power	368
xxxiii	The Chinese Model	380
xxxiv	Japan and Korea	393
xxxv	Indo-China and Siam	419
xxxvi	Burma and Malaya	440
xxxvii	Indonesia	456
xxxviii	The Indian Sub-Continent	475
xxxix	Conclusion	498
	Bibliography and Note on Sources	517
	References and Notes	522
	General Index	539
	Index of Persons	551

Foreword

To the peoples of the West, it is perhaps only natural that events in Europe should appear to be of considerably greater importance and concern than happenings in the distant parts of Asia. In some respects they may be right; but in these days of the Cold War it is as well to bear in mind that, ever since the Bolshevik seizure of power in Russia in 1917 made the implementation of Lenin's thesis on Imperialism a practical proposition, Asia has been a major factor in the struggle for World Revolution. Its importance as such was emphasized time and again by Lenin himself and by other outstanding Communist leaders in the early days of the Comintern, and Zinoviev's assertion that 'the road to World Revolution lies through the East rather than through the West' remains as firm an article of Communist faith today as it was when it was made in 1925. In the pages that follow, an attempt has therefore been made to indicate something of the background to Lenin's thesis and to trace the developments stemming from its application to the problems and circumstances of South and East Asia, an area which, for the purposes of this book, may be said to comprise roughly the Far East, South-East Asia, and the Indian sub-continent.

With this object in view, I have sought to outline the main developments in the rise of nationalism and in the spread of Communism in this area, to indicate how and why these developments came about, and to interpret Communist tactics and strategy in these strategically important and heavily populated regions in the light of world affairs in general and of Russian politics and policies in particular. For this last purpose it has been necessary to stray at times rather far from the purely Asiatic side of the picture; but without some reference to events in Russia and to those in the international field at large, the causes of Communist successes and set-backs in South and East Asia cannot be seen in their proper setting.

The book has been divided into four parts, each representing a specific phase. Part I therefore covers what may be called the formative period, from the second half of the nineteenth century, which saw the birth throes of nationalism, down to the early 1920's, when Communist parties first came into being in the countries of South and East Asia and Asia itself became a key factor in the cause

of World Revolution. Part II carries on the story down to the close of 1941, when the outbreak of the Pacific War brought about a revolutionary change in the situation in this area, which had hitherto been largely under Western domination. Part III aims to show how Japan's fatal attempt to dominate South and East Asia served to create a situation which, on her ultimate defeat, played into the hands of the directors of world Communism. In the fourth and final part are examined the main developments during the first ten years after the close of the Second World War.

As Part I aims primarily at sketching in the background to the emergence of nationalism and Communism in the area as a whole, and as the initial appearance of these two factors varied in the different countries concerned, some overlapping with the period covered in Part II has been inevitable. This, however, has seemed preferable to fixing a definite date as the dividing line between the phases covered by these two sections.

Finally, a word concerning sources. These, including the principal documentary material used, have been listed in the bibliography at the end of this book. In addition, in order to avoid cluttering up the main text with footnotes distracting to the general reader, references to specific sources of information have been collected together in a separate appendix under the heading 'References and Notes'. This, it is hoped, will serve both as a guide to those who may wish to follow up the information given and as an acknowledgement to the authors and publishers of the works indicated.

MALCOLM D. KENNEDY

East Twickenham
February 1956

POSTSCRIPT

Since this foreword was written, Communists throughout the world have been subjected to a blow which, psychologically, can best be likened to that of a nuclear explosion. It is still too early to assess the full effect of the revelations concerning Stalin made by Khrushchev at the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU, but enough is already known to show that it has been very considerable. Beyond adding two or three qualifying footnotes in the concluding chapters, however, it has not been thought necessary to alter anything that has been written in these pages.

July 1956

M.D.K.

List of Abbreviations

AEBUS	Anti-Enemy-Backing-Up-Society
ACFL	All-China Federation of Labour
ACFTU	All-China Federation of Trade Unions
AITUC	All-India Trade Union Congress
BCP	Burma Communist Party
BWPP	Burma Workers and Peasants Party
CCP	Chinese Communist Party
CER	Chinese Eastern Railway
COCA	Commission of Overseas Chinese Affairs
CPI	Communist Party of India
CPR	Chinese People's Republic
CPSU	Communist Party of the Soviet Union
CPSU(B)	Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolshevik)
FEB	Far Eastern Bureau of the Comintern
GEA	Greater East Asia
IKKI	Executive Committee of the Comintern
ISH	International of Seamen and Harbour Workers
IUS	International Union of Students
KMT	Kuomintang
KUTV	Communist University of Toilers of the East
MCP	Malayan Communist Party
MOPR	International Red Aid
MPR	Mongolian People's Republic
NCNA	New China News Agency
NEP	New Economic Policy
PKI	Indonesian Communist Party
PLA	People's Liberation Army
PNI	Indonesian Nationalist Party
PPTUS	Pan-Pacific Trade Union Secretariat
RCP	Russian Communist Party
RSDLP	Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party
VOKS	All-Union Society for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries
WFDY	World Federation of Democratic Youth
WFTU	World Federation of Trade Unions
WIDF	Women's International Democratic Federation
WPC	World Peace Council

PART I

**The Birth Throes of
Nationalism and
Communism**

CHAPTER I

Revolution in the Making

CONTRARY to Marx's theory that the World Revolution would first triumph in the most highly capitalized and industrial countries of Western Europe such as Britain and Germany, it was in backward, semi-oriental Russia that the leaven first began its deadly work; and it was not long before the insidious doctrines enunciated in Moscow were making headway among the unorganized, ignorant, illiterate and credulous masses of Central Asia, the Far East, and what is now known compendiously as South-East Asia. There, and not in the advanced countries of the West, was the most fertile soil for Communism found. There the desire to be free from foreign rule, the desire to end the traditional standards of poverty and backwardness, and the resentment born of the white man's assumed superiority over the coloured races, provided the best possible soil for planting the seeds of world Communism.

Marx himself does not appear to have given much consideration to the possibilities of exploiting the grievances of Asiatic subject races in the cause which he had so much at heart. On the contrary, he had looked to class strife at home, with international support, as the only means of revolution. The racial issue he repudiated. It remained for Lenin, by refurbishing J. A. Hobson's *Imperialism* and Hilferding's *Finance-Capital*¹ and adding certain practical political conclusions of his own [1],² to emphasize the fundamental bearing of imperialism on capitalism and to link the demand of subject races for the right of self-government with the anti-capitalist campaign for World Revolution. Having recognized that this demand for the right of self-government was anti-imperialist, it followed logically

¹ Deutscher (*The Prophet Armed*, p. 186) characterizes Hilferding as 'the master-mind of Austro-Marxism', who made the first real attempt since Marx's death to bring the theory of *Das Kapital* up to date when he published *Finance-Capital* in 1910.

² The italic figures [in brackets] in the text refer to the sources of information noted on pages 522-535.

that he should advocate the struggle for the liberation of the colonial and semi-colonial peoples. Not only, he reasoned, would championship of Asiatic nationalism serve to rally the peoples of Asia to the cause of World Revolution; it would also, by fostering national liberation movements, provide an invaluable means of weakening the capitalist nations of the West, whose economic strength depended so greatly on their colonial dependencies, as basic markets for their manufactured goods, as sources of raw material, as fields for the investment of surplus capital, and as almost inexhaustible reservoirs of cheap native labour.¹

Lenin's mind had clearly been working along these lines as far back as 1900 when, in an article dealing with the Boxer Rebellion and its causes, he accused 'the European capitalists and the European governments which are obedient to the capitalists' of plundering and making war on China.

'This policy of plunder,' he wrote, 'has become known as colonial policy. Every country in which capitalist industry is developing has to seek colonies, i.e. countries in which industry is weakly developed, in which more or less patriarchal conditions still prevail, which can serve as a market for manufactured goods and a source of high profits. In the interests of a handful of capitalists, the bourgeois governments have waged endless wars, have kept regiments of soldiers in torment in unhealthy tropical countries, have squandered millions of money extracted from the people, and have brought the people in the colonies to a state of desperate revolt or to death from starvation' [2].

In this passage, it would seem, is to be found the germ of the idea which led Lenin in 1916 to enunciate his epoch-making thesis on imperialism, which centred on the right of self-determination and the closely allied demand for colonial liberation.

The right of self-determination, which he so skilfully exploited in this thesis and which President Wilson did so much to popularize from 1916 onwards, had been recognized at the International Socialist Congress held in London twenty years previously (1896). It had, moreover, been the basis of Russian Social Democratic Labour Party policy on the national question ever since its first congress in 1898. Lenin himself, early in 1907, had come out with the argument that the demand for the self-determination of colonial

¹ Although differing from Lenin's thesis in some of its contentions, a similar analysis and indictment of imperialism had appeared three years previously, in 1913, in Rosa Luxemburg's treatise, *The Accumulation of Capital*.


or dependent peoples was no less necessary in the interests of the working class of the metropolitan country of the colony, and he quoted Marx to the effect that 'a people which oppresses others cannot be free' [3]. Stalin also, in those formative years, was enlarging upon the theme of self-determination, though he differentiated between the circumstances in which self-determination was justified and those in which it was not. The right of nations to determine their own destiny, he argued in 1913, was valid in battle against the opponents of Communism, but not when in conflict with Communist struggle for power [4].

This subtle differentiation was to be made on a number of occasions in later years, in Europe in the cases of Finland, Georgia and the Ukraine, and in Asia in the distinction drawn between Outer Mongolia which, it was argued, should not be subject to China, and Tibet, which should be.

It was not until 1915, during the early stages of the 1914-18 war, that the doctrine of self-determination was applied specifically to the colonies and semi-colonies in Asia. The first definite instance of this and of what it implied appeared in an article by Lenin in October of that year. If the proletariat obtained power, he declared, they would propose peace 'on the basis of the liberation of the colonies'; if the proposal was rejected, they would rouse the colonies and dependent countries in Asia to insurrection. Proletarian victory in Russia, he added, would create very favourable conditions for the development of revolution in Asia [5].

At the time this declaration was made, Lenin himself was in exile and the world in general was far too engrossed in the war, which had been raging for the past fifteen months, to pay much attention to this warning by a fanatical revolutionary, whose name was not even known to more than a handful of experts and specialists outside his own country—though it was to become a household word before another two years had elapsed.

It was only a few months after this pronouncement that Lenin propounded his famous thesis on 'Imperialism as the Highest Stage of Capitalism' which, before long, was to be 'placed at the base of the programme of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and of the programme of the Communist International' [6]. In this, in addition to emphasizing the fundamental bearing of imperialism on capitalism, Lenin argued that if the colonies were to throw off the yoke of imperialist servitude, the capitalists in the metropolitan



countries would be hit so severely that they would have to cut wages drastically and discharge large numbers of workers. The resultant wave of unemployment and discontent could then be exploited to precipitate revolution.

In producing his thesis on imperialism, Lenin charted the way for a fundamental change in the strategy and tactics of World Revolution. The Bolshevik seizure of power in Russia little more than a year later enabled this change to be brought about. As a result, Asia became a key factor in the revised Communist plan, with anti-imperialism, anti-feudalism and liberation of the colonies as the battle-cries, and with racial hatred given pride of place even over class hatred as the main emotion to be whipped up into blind, unreasoning fury.

The colonies and semi-colonies—China being the most important of the latter—were viewed as the Achilles heel of the capitalist system, and it seemed that if the indigenous peoples of those territories could be goaded into revolt and helped to liberate themselves from their Western overlords, the whole capitalist system would suffer a mortal blow and collapse. ‘Liberation of the colonies and of all oppressed peoples’ has therefore been one of the main slogans of world Communism ever since.

While Lenin’s original idea was that championship of Asiatic nationalism could be used as a means for helping on the cause of World Revolution, he quickly developed this into the assertion that ‘the victory of the World Revolution was impossible without a revolutionary alliance, a revolutionary bloc, between the proletariat of the advanced countries and the oppressed peoples of the enslaved colonies’ [7]. Not only, therefore, was Asia to be regarded as a useful adjunct to the cause of World Revolution; it was to play an essential part in it. Just how important and how essential this part was considered to be was aptly crystallized in Zinoviev’s aphorism of 1925 when, at a session of the Executive Committee of the Comintern, he declared: ‘There is no doubt that the road to World Revolution lies through the East rather than through the West.’

The significance of this extension of the Communist creed to the East is underlined by the fact that of the 2,650,000,000 people on the earth’s surface at the present time, 1,380,000,000—or rather more than half—are in Asia. The totals in Marx’s time, and even at the time when Lenin stated his thesis in 1916, were, of course, smaller; but the proportion was much the same. The great majority of these

Asians were, until very recently, subject to Western domination and, for the most part, they still consist of poverty-stricken peasantry. Their desire to be free of foreign rule and, more particularly, to end the traditional standards of poverty and backwardness, which unscrupulous agitators claimed would quickly disappear with the removal of foreign rule, provided the Communists, therefore, with grievances easy to exploit. Where legitimate grievances were absent, the Communists, with their habitual skill, invented new ones with which to stir up discontent and armed rebellion against their imperialist rulers.

That so large a proportion of these colonial and semi-colonial peoples were peasantry may explain in part why it was that Marx had overlooked the important role that Asia and its peasant masses could be made to play in the cause of World Revolution. Both he and Engels, like Trotsky after them, distrusted the peasantry, whom Engels described contemptuously as 'the barbarians of civilization'. It is true that Marx in a letter written to Engels in 1856, when Germany was still essentially a peasant country, said, 'The whole thing in Germany will depend on the possibility to back the proletarian revolution by some second edition of the Peasants' War' [8]. This recognition of the peasant as a potential ally did not, however, prevent his regarding the peasant as being interested in revolution only so long as it promised to enable him to rid himself of oppressive landlords and to seize their lands for himself and his friends.¹ Having thereby become a land-owner himself, he in effect entered the capitalist-class and became solely interested in retaining what he had acquired.

While it is true that Herzen had argued in the 1860's that the Russian peasant was a potential socialist and revolutionary, and while Marx himself had formulated the prescription of 'initially' taking up the cause of the peasant by promising him the land to till in order 'ultimately' to take it away from him again [9], the general view was that of Plekhanov, who vehemently contended that the peasantry was fundamentally un-revolutionary and that the peasant commune could only develop into petty bourgeois capitalism.

It was Lenin who first recognized the peasants' worth, just as it

¹ That this view of the peasant still holds good was shown by an article in the Cominform journal of 15th October 1954, in which Aidit, secretary-general of the Indonesian Communist Party, remarked contemptuously that the peasants 'cannot understand an agrarian revolution in any form other than that the lands of the landlords should be distributed to them as their own private property'.

was Lenin who first recognized the important role which the colonies and semi-colonies with their peasant hordes could be made to play in the cause of World Revolution. By 1904, in the course of preparing for the abortive revolution of 1905 in Russia, he had extended the term 'dictatorship of the proletariat', which Blanqui had evolved in 1848, into the formula, 'the dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry' [10]. From then onwards, although pride of place remained with the proletariat, the peasant was to be regarded by the orthodox, within certain limits, as the valued ally of those working for World Revolution.

The qualification, 'within certain limits', requires to be emphasized, as the peasant question has always been something of a thorn in the flesh for Communist theorists and planners, who have recognized that the peasantry have their limitations even as allies. The official *History of the CPSU(B)* lays stress on the fact that the 1907 Revolution in Russia failed because, although the peasants rose against the landlords and were ready to ally themselves with the workers against them, they failed to see that 'the landlords could not be overthrown unless the Tsar were overthrown' [11]. Stalin, on his part, pointed out that 'the revolutions in France in 1848 and 1871 came to grief chiefly because the peasant reserves proved to be on the side of the bourgeoisie', though he added proudly that 'the October Revolution (in Russia) was victorious because it was able to win these reserves to the side of the proletariat' [12].

Despite these jubilant words, however, Stalin himself felt compelled eventually to resort to collectivization as a means of settling the peasant question once and for all. Lenin's solution, on the other hand, followed subsequently, if somewhat sporadically, by the Chinese, had been to divide the peasants into three categories—rich, poor, and intermediate [13]. This idea he had put forward in 1908, when he concluded that the poor peasantry had a common interest with the proletariat in revolution, a conclusion which he repeated in August 1917, when he classified them as 'semi-proletarians' [14]. Rather more than a year later he was to issue the slogan, 'Learn to come to an agreement with the middle peasant, while not for a moment renouncing the struggle against the *Kulak* and at the same time firmly relying on the poor peasant' [15].

In regard to the Far East and South-East Asia, nowhere has the position of the peasantry in the Communist scheme of things been better defined than in the 'Thesis on the Revolutionary Movement in

the Colonies', which was adopted by the Sixth World Congress of the Comintern in 1928. In this it was stated:

'The peasantry, along with the proletariat and in the character of its ally, represents a driving force of the (colonial) revolution. The immense many-millions peasant mass constitutes the overwhelming majority of the population even in the most developed colonies (in some colonies it is 90 per cent of the population). . . . The peasantry can only achieve its emancipation under the leadership of the proletariat, but the proletariat can only lead the bourgeois democratic revolution to victory in union with the peasantry.'

An echo of this could be detected in a speech twenty-two years later by Li Li-San, at that time Chinese Communist Labour Minister, who, in an address on 8th March 1950 in Peking to the first All-China Conference of Labour Bureau Directors, declared:

'If the workers were to choose to improve their own livelihood by increasing the burden of the peasants and exploiting them, the peasants would oppose this, causing a breakdown in the alliance of the workers and peasants and impairing the foundations of the new democratic régime. If, on the contrary, the workers want to improve their own conditions, those of the peasants and of the whole nation must be improved also. This shows that the interests of the working class and those of the whole nation are, and must necessarily be, completely in unison' [16].

While both these statements make it clear that, for the successful carrying out of revolution in South and East Asia, the urban workers are as dependent on the peasantry as the peasants are on their proletarian brethren, Stalin himself more than once emphasized that revolution in the colonial and dependent countries of Asia is essentially peasant revolution. Mao Tse-tung, the veteran Chinese Communist leader, underlined this in his thesis on 'New Democracy'¹ when, after referring to Stalin's dictum that 'the problem of colonies and semi-colonies is in essence the peasant problem', he went on to say:

'The politics of the New Democracy is in essence the political transfer of power to the peasantry . . . therefore the peasant problem becomes the fundamental problem of the Chinese Revolution and the peasantry becomes the main force of the Revolution.'

• In this thesis, Mao was, of course, referring specifically to China;

¹ Written towards the end of 1939 and published on 19th January 1940.

but ten years later almost to the day Moscow, through its Cominform mouthpiece [17], formally directed the Communist parties of all South and East Asian countries to look to China as their model, China having proved by then that 'imperialism, feudalism and monopoly capitalism' could be eliminated through peasant revolution. Concerning this directive and its important effects, more will be said later.

Enough has been said above to stress the all-important part played by the peasantry in the Communist plans for revolution in Asia. It is necessary now to turn back to the period preceding the formulation of those plans.

Just as it was Lenin who first recognized the peasants' worth, so it was he who, in his thesis on imperialism, recognized the national bourgeoisie as a revolutionary factor in the struggle against their rulers in the colonies and dependent countries. In this he had the support of Stalin who, however, foresaw the eventual split of the national bourgeoisie into a revolutionary petty bourgeoisie and a compromising big bourgeoisie. Developments in India, Burma and Indonesia after the grant of independence many years later, were to prove the soundness of his conclusion. In the struggle for liberation there proved to be a close resemblance between the peasant and the bourgeois nationalist as revolutionary factors. The peasant was ready enough to fight in order to improve his own standard of living; but, having obtained land for himself, he was apt to lose interest in further revolutionary activities. Similarly, the main object of the bourgeois nationalist was to achieve national independence. Having once rid himself of foreign domination, he had no further interest in revolution; in fact, revolutionary activities then became anathema to him and his one great desire was to suppress them.

Recognizing these shortcomings in the peasantry and national bourgeoisie, Stalin took steps to ensure that, once these two important revolutionary factors had served his purpose, they should, in their turn, be as firmly suppressed as the imperialists whom they had helped to overthrow. For this purpose, it became a fundamental principle that the main control and direction of the revolution should always remain in the hands of the proletariat and that stern measures would be taken—as they were taken at times—against any Communist leaders guilty of allowing control to leave their hands.

Where the national bourgeoisie was concerned, it was laid down that, when the eventual split took place, the proletariat, who had

hitherto exercised control in the background, should come forward openly and take the leadership. This, Stalin contended, would help the work of linking the national liberation movement in Eastern countries with the proletarian movement in Europe and the West, and of welding both movements together with world Communism.

In regard to national bourgeoisie and peasantry alike, the Communist idea was to follow a policy of divide and rule. At that stage of the revolution when the big bourgeoisie had achieved their object of ridding their country of foreign domination, everything possible was to be done to stir up the petty bourgeoisie against them and to exploit the resultant split. Between the three grades of the peasants a similar discord was to be encouraged.

In subsequent chapters will be found a brief historical survey of the rise of nationalism in South and East Asia and of its subsequent alliance with Communism; but before turning to this subject, a few more points may be added to round off this attempt to indicate how the embryonic plans for utilizing Asia and its vast masses in the cause of World Revolution were brought into being.

As is well known, Communists played an outstanding part in the resistance movements which sprang up in the various countries of Europe and Asia under enemy occupation during the Second World War. In South-East Asia the dangerous developments which followed that war were largely the outcome of this Communist activity during the war years. Burma, Malaya, Indo-China, Indonesia and the Philippines, all suffered from the aftermath of this war-time activity. The explanation of how it came about that a mere handful of Communists was able to play so outstanding a part in these movements is, of course, that organization, discipline, secrecy and intrigue are the very life and breath of the Communist and these qualities are essential to successful guerrilla leadership and tactics.

It is to Lenin and Stalin that we must look once more as the instigators of these outstanding features of the Communist movement, features which account for its great qualitative strength. It was Lenin who, in 1902, realized the need for a centralized, disciplined party and a revolutionary theory to make a revolution. It was at this time, too, that he enunciated the principle that the Party should follow behind the revolutionary movement, not lead it [18]. Three years later, in April 1905, he added the rider that armed insurrection must be planned and offensive, not spontaneous and defensive [19]; and it was he who, in July 1903, insisted that, for revolutionary purposes,

the aim should be to have a small *élite* party of trained revolutionaries rather than a mass party embracing large numbers of sympathizers as well as active revolutionaries [20]. This insistence on quality rather than quantity, which in 1903 split the RSDLP into Bolsheviks and Mensheviks, has been a fundamental principle of all Communist parties, which are the offspring of the Russian Bolshevik Revolution of 1917.

Stalin does not appear to have committed himself either to the Bolshevik or the Menshevik group at the start, despite the conflicting claims of his official biographers on the one hand and Trotsky on the other; but by the close of 1904 he was 'zealously agitating for Bolshevism', and on New Year's Day 1905 he published an article in which he stressed the need for a party, small and *élite*, of 'fighting proletarians' with 'unity of views on programme, tactics and organization'—a party with a 'coherent centralized organization'[21].

The overriding importance of organization had already been emphasized by Lenin in his 'One Step Forward, Two Steps Back'. 'In its struggle for power,' he had declared, 'the proletariat had no other weapon but organization. . . . The proletariat can become, and will inevitably become, an invincible force only when its ideological unity round the principles of Marxism is consolidated by the material unity of an organization which unites millions of toilers in the army of the working class.'

These principles, enunciated by Lenin and Stalin in the opening years of the present century, are fundamental to Communist parties in all countries. They apply as strictly to those of South and East Asia as to those of Europe and the West, and, to quote but one example, were the subject of special comment and special emphasis by the Chinese Communist leader, Liu Shao-Chi, in his report on the revision of the party's Constitution on 14th May 1945 [22]. They must be borne in mind in any attempt to understand the developments recorded in the pages which follow.

CHAPTER II

Nationalism as the Prelude to Communism

By the close of the nineteenth century, most of the countries of South and East Asia had fallen wholly or in part under Western domination. India, Ceylon, Burma and Malaya were by then under British rule. The Dutch held sway over what is now called Indonesia and the French administered Indo-China. Hong Kong and Macao were British and Portuguese respectively and the Philippines had exchanged Spanish rule for American. Siam, though one of the few states to retain its independence, had diminished in size. Korea was a bone of contention and the mighty Empire of China had been reduced to semi-colonial status. Not only had it suffered considerable dismemberment but, with foreign settlements and concessions in its midst, its tariffs under international control and the principle of extraterritoriality accorded to the Western powers, it had lost many of the attributes of a fully sovereign power.

One Far Eastern country and one alone had refused to fall into the almost universal and apathetically fatalistic obsession of the white man's innate superiority over the coloured races. This was Japan.

Like their fellow Asiatics, the Japanese had been threatened with Western domination; but, far from being intimidated and cowed into submission, Japan had saved herself by adopting the tactics of her native *jujutsu*, using her opponents' strength to encompass their eventual overthrow. To avoid being broken, she allowed herself temporarily to bend before the storm; and she set herself to study and master the secrets of the white man's success. So apt a pupil did she prove that, within half a century of being forced by the West out of her 230 years of self-imposed seclusion, she was able to expose the myth of Western invincibility by defeating Russia, the great colossus of the West, after a preliminary and highly successful trial of strength against her gigantic Chinese neighbour.

Japan's victory over Russia in 1905 gave an impetus to two movements which, though still in embryo at the time, were to prove of far-reaching consequence in the years that lay ahead. Asiatic nations, hitherto hypnotized into apathetic fatalism, began to dream dreams which, within a few years, were to materialize into active nationalism and demands for freedom and independence. In Russia, as a consequence of the war with Japan and whilst it was still in progress, revolutionary outbreaks were precipitated, precursors of the Bolshevik Revolution twelve years later and of the Communist International which, from 1919 onwards, set itself assiduously to the task of exploiting for its own ends the nationalist movements in Eastern countries.

Communism and nationalism in South and East Asia have, since 1919, been so closely interwoven at times as to be almost indistinguishable one from the other; it was not, in fact, until after the British withdrawal from India, Ceylon and Burma in 1947 and 1948 that the true line of cleavage between these two great dynamic forces began to emerge with any clarity, a cleavage which had been foreseen by Stalin many years before. The great national leaders of those countries, hitherto hailed by Moscow and by Communists and fellow-travellers throughout the world as models of virtue, were, within a few months, being held up to execration as 'running dogs' of imperialism and 'lackeys' of the capitalist powers. Sukarno and Hatta in Indonesia were, before long, to experience the same changes in Moscow's eyes as Nehru and Thakin Nu. With them, they were to be set alongside Quirino of the Philippines, Chiang Kai-Shek in China, Syngman Rhee in South Korea and Bao Dai in Indo-China as objects of Communist vituperation.

While it was Japan's victory over Russia in 1905 which gave the first real impetus to Asiatic nationalism with its demands for freedom and independence, and while the proclamation in January 1918 of President Wilson's 'Fourteen Points', centring around the principle of self-determination, may be said to have brought matters to a head, nationalist movements in Asia and elsewhere aiming at national independence had been developing for a number of years, and the right of self-determination had been a recognized plank in the programme of international socialism since 1896.

As far back as 1848, the Communist Manifesto had declared: •

'Just as it (the bourgeoisie) has made the country dependent on the

towns, so it has made barbarian and semi-barbarian countries dependent on the civilized ones, nations of peasants on nations of bourgeois, the East on the West.'

By 1864, resentment against this dependence on the West had begun to manifest itself mildly in Java, where sentiments inspiring nationalism began to make their appearance in vernacular journals. Eight years later, in 1872, the Philippines experienced an abortive revolt for independence by 200 soldiers [1]. Then came the founding of the Indian National Congress in 1885 by Allan Hume, an event which was to have far-reaching consequences in the years that lay ahead. Founded with the declared object of producing 'a better understanding between natives and whites' [2], and of finding 'an overt and constitutional channel for the discharge of the increasing ferment which had resulted from Western ideas and education' [3], it was destined to develop into a vast and powerful political machine. As such, it not only led the way in the struggle for Indian independence; it served also as a model and inspiration for Indonesian and other nationalists.

Dissatisfied with the slow progress made by the Congress in securing a greater share in the government and administration of the country despite its annually recurring resolutions demanding fuller participation, many Indians began to favour the adoption of measures aimed at procuring more rapid results. Accordingly, in 1895, B. G. Tilak, a Brahmin of Poona, laid the foundations of a physical force party by inaugurating an annual celebration in memory of Sivaji, the hero of Maratha history, who had led his people with success in a rising against their Moslem rulers. By describing their British overlords as even more aggressive than the Moslem had been, Tilak and his friends set to work to urge the people to rise against their present rulers [4]. The stage was thus set for the terrorist campaign which was to plague India for the last half-century of the British Raj; the first 'political murders' were witnessed in 1897 [5].

In the meantime, the minute spark which had flared up momentarily in the Philippines in 1872, had continued to smoulder, and the last decade of the nineteenth century saw a rapid growth of nationalism in those islands. Hostilities broke out in August 1896; but • although Spanish reinforcements were sent there and defeated some of the insurgents, the insurrection spread throughout Luzon. Aguinaldo, the rebel leader, was finally bought off by the Spaniards, by

means of a pact, and he and the other insurgent leaders left for temporary exile. Revolution, however, was in the air, and the extension of the Spanish-American War to the Philippines shortly after its outbreak in 1898 led the Americans to arrange for the return of Aguinaldo and his fellow-revolutionaries in exile to the Philippines in the role of allies against the common enemy. Filipino dreams of independence, however, proved short-lived; for, on the collapse of Spain, the United States took over, and before long the insurrectionists were engaged in bitter struggle with the new rulers of their country [6].

This was the first serious armed struggle for independence to take place in South-East Asia; and it is noteworthy that the situation immediately following the defeat of the Spanish was not unlike that in Indonesia and Indo-China on the collapse of Japan in 1945. The Americans held Manila, while the supporters of the independence movement held the remainder of the archipelago and set up a constitutional republic at Malolos, some forty miles north of Manila, with Aguinaldo as president. As, however, there was little or no international interest in the fate of such movements in those days, the United States, as one commentator observed many years later, were unhampered in dealing with the rebellion, which was suppressed after a brief period of open warfare and some years of guerrilla activity [7].

As an indication that Japan was already being regarded by fellow-Asiatics as a model to be emulated, it is of interest to recall that Aguinaldo, in proclaiming his short-lived Philippine Republic on 24th May 1898, expressed the desire of his country to become a modern civilized nation like 'our neighbour Japan, which in the short space of twenty years has reached a point where she has no reason to envy anyone, her strength and ascendancy being shown in the late war with China' [8]. In that same year, 1898, Sun Yat-Sen, who was destined to play so outstanding a part in China and the Far East in the years ahead, declared:

'In Asia one has first of all to destroy the Anglo-Saxon positions and to restore to India her independence. As long as this is not done, Asia's soil will continue to tremble. It is therefore necessary to strengthen Japan so that she can oppose the Anglo-Saxons. I hope Japan will grow so powerful that she can break the chains of the Anglo-Saxons and bring about the liberation of Asia. The peoples of Asia must form an alliance in order to achieve the aim of a Greater Asia and to create a new and common Eastern Asiatic culture.' [9]

Nearly forty years later, another prominent Asiatic nationalist, the Indonesian Sutan Sjahrir, was to write in his diary on 16th November 1936: 'Although most do not dare to say so openly, Japan has the sympathy of our people and the Japanese are the most popular foreigners in our country; our people have until now learned to know them from their best behaviour' [10]. Rather less than nine years after this was written, Japan was to leave a political time-bomb for her late enemies by 'granting' independence to the Indonesians, who, in the meantime, had experienced another side of the Japanese, when they were not on their best behaviour. In between these two dates, 1936 and 1945, Sjahrir had made the revealing admission that sympathy for Japan had its roots in the Asiatic feeling of inferiority, which sought compensation in glorification of the Japanese.

This tendency to idealize Japan and look to her as a model played no small part in the Pan-Asiatic movement which, after a rather poor start in the 1920's, made considerable headway under Japan's leadership after she had come to loggerheads with the League of Nations over the question of Manchuria. It also accounted for the fact that many Asiatic nationalists, after falling foul of the authorities in their own countries, sought refuge in Japan, where they were promptly taken under the wing of the ultra-reactionary Black Dragon Society and its curiously enigmatic chief, Toyama Mitsuru.¹ Prominent among these political refugees and malcontents was Sun Yat-Sen, who had turned to Japanese friends for help and advice when planning the Chinese Revolution of 1911 and who sought safety in Japan in 1913 and again in 1915 after he and the left-wing faction of his party had gone into opposition against Yuan Shih-Kai. He was joined there the following year by Rash Bihari Bose, a Bengali terrorist fleeing from justice,² who was to remain in Japan till his death in 1944 and was to play an active and thoroughly insidious part in stirring up anti-British sentiment in that country. Other Asiatic malcontents who sought refuge in Japan at one time or another included a party of Indo-Chinese agitators, who fled there in 1908; Mahendra Pratap, who had been a member of the 'Provisional Indian Government' set up in Kabul with German assistance during the 1914-18 war; Tan Malaka, the Indonesian firebrand who figured

• ¹ Throughout these pages the Japanese practice of giving the surname first will be followed in the rendering of Japanese names.

² His terrorist activities in India are described in some detail by Sir Michael O'Dwyer in *India As I Knew It*. See also pp. 36-38.

prominently in Communist, nationalist, and Pan-Asiatic activities; and Aung San, who was to emerge as the outstanding leader in Burma at the close of the war with Japan and was to retain that position until his assassination with six other members of the Burmese cabinet in July 1947.

Before dealing with the developments in Asiatic nationalism which were to follow, a final point may be noted with regard to the closing years of the last century. In these years were born many of those who, in the years ahead, were to become the outstanding leaders in the Communist and nationalist movements in South and East Asia. The year 1890 was marked by the birth of M. N. Roy, who figured so prominently as an Indian Communist and Comintern agent in the 1920's and subsequently revolted against Moscow. The future Vietnamese Communist leader Ho Chi-Minh was also born about this time.¹ Two years later, in 1892, was born Nozaka Sanzo who, after many years of exile in Moscow and at the Chinese Communist headquarters in Yen-an under the pseudonym of Okano Susumu, was to return to Japan at the end of 1945 to lead and build up the newly revived Japanese Communist Party. April 20th 1893 was memorable not only for the birth of Hitler, but also for the birth of the future leader of Communist China, Mao Tse-Tung. Another outstanding Chinese Communist, Li Li-San, was born in 1896 and yet another, Chou En-Lai, in 1898, in which year also was born the future Indonesian Communist leader, Tan Malaka. Finally, with the turn of the century came the birth of Semaun, Liu Shao-Chi, and P. C. Joshi, future Indonesian, Chinese and Indian Communist leaders respectively, and of Sukarno who, after many years as a leading figure in the Indonesian nationalist struggle for independence, was to become the first president of the Indonesian Republic. If it be true that coming events cast their shadows before, the final decade of the nineteenth century, which saw the birth of these and others who were to figure so prominently in the struggle against Western domination, may well be said to have had its full share of shadows. Only one gifted with second-sight could, however, have foreseen what they portended.

Although Asiatic nationalism had already begun to make its appearance by the turn of the century, there was as yet little or no

¹ Officially Ho Chi-Minh's sixtieth birthday was celebrated on 19th May 1950; but oriental methods of reckoning age differ from those employed in the West, and in actual fact he appears to have been born in either 1891 or 1892.

sign of those socialist trends which were later to take on an increasingly leftist complexion and finally blossom out into full-blooded Communism, bent on exploiting bourgeois nationalism and the struggle for independence to the full. Had there been anyone sufficiently discerning, however, he might have detected the cloud, no greater than a man's hand, in the penetration of socialist ideas into Japan in the closing years of the century and in the activities of Katayama Sen, who in 1896 set Japanese socialists the task of working for social revolution in Japan.¹ Eight years later Katayama, who was to become one of the first Communists in his own country and was eventually to die as an exile in Moscow, created something of a sensation when, as Japanese representative at the Sixth Congress of the Second International held in Amsterdam in 1904 shortly after the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War, he publicly shook hands with the Russian delegate Plekhanov in order to demonstrate the international unity of workers. At this congress he was elected vice-president of the Second International.

In the year following this there occurred in St Petersburg a tragic event, which not only precipitated the abortive revolution in Russia but was to be repeated in essence and similarly exploited by the Communists in China twenty years later. This was the incident of 9th January 1905, when police fired on a procession of workers headed by the priest Gapon on their way to the Winter Palace to submit a petition to the Czar. Stalin, with uncanny foresight, had prophesied in 1902 that some such incident might be expected in 'no more than two or three years' [11]. In order to profit by it, he therefore laid down the principle that street demonstrations should be staged in order to provoke the police into using force so that public sympathy might be aroused for the 'martyrs'. This has remained one of the guiding principles in the tactics employed by Communist agitators ever since and was to be put into effect with far-reaching results on 30th May 1925 in Shanghai and, a month later, in the case of the 'Shameen Incident' in Canton.

It was in India that the nationalist movement was most in evidence in the opening years of the new century, the cry of 'Swaraj' or Home Rule, which was to 'influence young men with patriotic enthusiasm

¹ Sir George Sansom in his *Western World and Japan* (p. 460) gives 1870 as the year in which modern socialism and Communism appear to have been mentioned in Japanese literature for the first time. This, however, was only a passing reference for explanatory purposes. Some ten or twelve more years were to go by before even an embryo socialist movement came into being in Japan.

and conjure up a vision which was their inspiration' [12], having been first raised by Tilak about 1900. Japan's victory over Russia five years later gave a great impetus to the nationalist movement in Bengal, where serious discontent and resentment had been caused by the partition of that province that same year. The defeat of Russia was represented as 'the turning of the tide of conquest in favour of Asia against Europe' [13], while the prevailing tension between the educated classes and the administration served to stimulate the Indian left wing.

That same year, 1905, saw the creation of a conspiracy centre in London against the government of India and the publication of a highly seditious newspaper called the *Indian Sociologist* [14], while in India itself fervent appeals to patriotism, self-respect and self-sacrifice were made to mobilize the students and the younger generation of the politically-minded classes. As a result, an unbalanced and explosive element was introduced into the Indian national movement, an element which was to bedevil the situation from then onwards and to be exploited by the Communists even after the withdrawal of the British from India.

The adoption of the policy of assassination by means of bombs followed a year later, the revolutionary party in Bengal sending one of their number to Paris to learn the art of making effective bombs and explosives. America, too, was brought into the picture, for it was in the United States that the forcible expulsion of Indian workers, mainly Sikhs, from some mills in 1906 paved the way to the creation in 1911 of the *Ghadr* party. The activities of that body in calling upon the martial races of India, and particularly to the Sikhs in the Indian Army, to rise against the alleged oppression and tyranny of the British, were to cause much trouble during the 1914-18 war and later [15]. Rash Bihari Bose, whose flight to Japan in 1916 has already been mentioned, played a prominent part in these activities in India itself [16], and the Communists, when seeking to secure control in China in the 1920's, directed special attention to the Sikhs, who were employed there in considerable numbers as police and watchmen.

With bomb outrages beginning in earnest and sedition spreading rapidly in Bengal and the Punjab, there occurred in 1908 the first political general strike of Bombay workers. The outbreak of this strike attracted the attention of Lenin, then living in exile. Referring to it in an article entitled 'Inflammable Material in World Politics',

he noted with glee that 'in India, too, the proletariat has already matured sufficiently to wage a class-conscious and political mass struggle' [17]. This appears to have been one of his earliest references to India; but, following the Bolshevik seizure of power in Russia in 1917, India and China were to become the prime targets of Communist propaganda and agitation in Asia, as they were regarded not unnaturally as of particular importance in the anti-imperialist campaign. If they could be brought into the Communist fold, it was argued, they, together with Russia, would form a solid bloc of more than half the total population of the world on the side of World Revolution.

At the time when Lenin wrote his article in 1908, however, Communism in India was still a thing of the future and the bomb outrages and sedition then taking place were purely manifestations of extreme nationalism. Similar, though less violent, manifestations of nationalism were likewise occurring in other parts of South and East Asia. The year 1905 had seen the birth of the anti-French Viet Nam Nationalist Party in Indo-China, and two years later nationalists took control of the newly established legislative assembly in the Philippines. With the tantalizing promise of no taxes, less work, and more food and *fiestas*, they appealed to the illiterate masses and agitated for independence [18]. And here it may be interjected that visions of vastly improved economic conditions which would result from independence have been the regular stock-in-trade of nationalist and Communist agitators alike when appealing to the masses for support. These dreams have generally been quickly dissipated, however, and shown to be without any firm foundation when finally the day of 'freedom' has come. A much more honest appreciation of what independence might mean stands to the credit of Manuel Quezon, who declared that he would rather have a government run like hell by the Filipinos than one run like heaven by the Americans.

Had they been gifted with greater perspicacity, the bourgeois nationalists of those early days might have foreseen that, by such methods as the promise of economic Utopias to the masses and the encouragement and condonation of terrorism and similar forms of direct action, they were laying up trouble for the days ahead when they themselves were to be responsible for the government and administration of their own countries—troubles which were to be exploited to the full by Communists and other dissident elements. To preach and extol violence against established authority for a

generation or more, and to imagine that the consequent disrespect for, and revolt against, law and order could be called off the moment circumstances changed, was to show a very poor understanding of human psychology.

While it was in India that sedition and violence were spreading most rapidly, the year 1908, which saw the first political general strike of Bombay workers, was marked also by increasing unrest in Indo-China and in Indonesia. A revolt, which broke out in Hanoi that year, was followed by the flight of a number of Indo-Chinese nationalist agitators to China and Japan¹ and by a number of minor conspiracies during the course of the next six years. Although the French had little difficulty in dealing with these troubles, they were symptomatic of the nationalist ferment which was beginning to work beneath the surface in Indo-China and other parts of South-East Asia.

In the Dutch East Indies this ferment gave rise in May 1908 to the holding of its first Congress by an association of students, the *Budi Utomo* ('Glorious Endeavour'), which gave formal shape to the Indonesian nationalist movement.² Though restricted at first to an educated minority, the evolution of this movement thereafter was greatly influenced by the Congress Party in India, whose organization it adopted. With the founding of *Sarekat Islam* ('Moslem Association') in Sourabaya in January 1911, it began to appeal to a wider audience [19].

Sarekat Islam's proclaimed object at the start was to promote social conditions on Islamic lines; by using religious slogans, it sought to obtain mass support. Before long, however, it had taken on a strongly political complexion directed against the colonial régime and came to exert considerable influence as a people's party. As will be seen later, some of its more extreme elements were to turn to Communism and be expelled from the organization, as the atheistic creed of Moscow is anathema to the true followers of the Prophet.

While Indonesian students in the Dutch East Indies were holding

¹ Stirred by Japan's achievements, Indo-Chinese students in increasing numbers were going to Japan to study and were setting up nationalist organizations there.

² 10th May 1908 has, since 1948, been commemorated as Indonesia's Day of National Awakening. The creation of the *Budi Utomo*—the first nationalist society to be established in what is now known as Indonesia—and the holding of its first Congress, have been characterized by Furnivall in his *Netherlands India* (p. 243) as 'the earliest demonstration of Javanese nationalism as a living creed'.

their Congress and giving formal shape to the nationalist movement, Indonesian students in Holland were taking similar steps. With the aim of strengthening friendship and national consciousness amongst themselves, they founded, in 1908, an Indies Association; and in 1913, when this body had assumed a definitely political shade, its name was changed to *Perhimpunan Indonesia* ('Indonesian Association'). The demand for the complete freedom of Indonesia became one of its principal planks and, for the first time, brought the struggle of the Indonesians for independence to the attention of other countries.

CHAPTER III

The Far East Stirs

IN 1894 Japan had gone to war with China, largely in order to clarify the somewhat ambiguous situation in regard to the suzerainty of Korea. Ten years later, Russia's moves to obtain eventual control of the Korean peninsula played an all-important part in precipitating the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-5. Japan emerged victorious and in 1910 proceeded to annex Korea for herself. Thereby the way was laid for the subsequent emergence of a Korean nationalist movement. This was aimed not at one of the Western imperialist powers, but at obtaining independence from Japan who, instead of taking on the leadership of Asia against Western domination as her fellow-Asiatics had hoped, had decided to assist in the task of taking up the white man's burden.

Japan's entry into the field of territorial expansion had, of course, occurred some years prior to her annexation of Korea. Formosa had already fallen under her sway as a result of her war with China. Her victory over Russia had enabled her to recover the foothold in Manchuria, which she had wrested from China in April 1895 and which she had been tricked by Russia and her Triple Intervention partners into retroceding three months later. Southern Saghalien had also been added to her empire as a result of her defeat of Russia. It was the annexation of Korea, however, that had marked her first definite emergence as an imperialist power, with all that that was to connote in the years ahead when anti-imperialism became a basic plank in the platform of World Revolution.

Coincident with her entry into the imperialist field, Japan had her first experience of radicalism in extreme form. This was the outcome of Anarchist ideas introduced into the country by Kotoku, one of the co-founders of the short-lived Social Democratic Party in 1901, on his return from America in 1904. Four more years were to pass, however, before anarchism was actually brought into the limelight in Japan, the occasion for this being a riot in Tokyo caused by some

of his followers, who suddenly started waving red flags bearing the words 'Anarchist Communism' during a street meeting. Then, in 1910, came the so-called Kotoku Plot, an alleged bomb plot against the Emperor discovered by the police. The details of this affair have never been made public but, as a result of it, eleven men and a woman were executed in January the following year and life sentences were imposed on twelve others [1].

The result of this conspiracy was two-fold. It led the Japanese authorities to regard anything even remotely savouring of socialism as being a danger to the state and therefore a thing to be suppressed with the utmost vigour. It led also to the socialist movement itself being driven underground and thereby made more difficult to detect. Some of the more radical leaders, in order to avoid arrest, fled abroad, amongst these being Katayama,¹ who escaped to America in 1913 after leading a serious strike. Six years later, he was to attend the First World Congress of the Comintern in Moscow, not as a Japanese representative but as a representative of the Communist Party of the United States.

In the meantime, while Japan was suffering the birth throes of social unrest, events of far-reaching consequence for the whole Far East in the years ahead were taking place in the country of her great neighbour, China. There, on 10th October 1911—the 'Double Tenth'—the long-simmering discontent against the effete Manchu Dynasty broke out into open rebellion. Four months later, on 12th February 1912, the Boy Emperor, who was to figure so prominently twenty years later as Henry Pu Yi, was forced to abdicate and China became a Republic. In order to understand what it was that brought about the Revolution of 1911 and, indeed, the eventual establishment of a Communist régime in China thirty-eight years later, a brief survey of the period opening with the so-called Opium War of 1840 is necessary.

As far back as 1793, the British envoy, Lord Macartney, had obtained the right for British merchants to purchase goods from China, but the Chinese authorities had steadfastly refused to consider the sale of foreign goods in their country. As the years went on, this one-way traffic became increasingly unsatisfactory to the British. Lord Napier was accordingly sent to Canton in 1834 with instructions to 'supervise free trade, to open up China, and to assert

¹ See p. 21. Katayama and Kotoku had been leaders of the Social Democratic Party, which was founded in May 1901 and dissolved the same day.

national equality' [2]. The Chinese, however, remained adamant, and Lord Napier himself, in common with Europeans in general, was submitted to gross indignities. The unremitting strain of his attempts to negotiate a peaceful settlement led to his death soon after, but not before he had made it clear to his government that the only alternative to humiliation and exactions was the use of force.

The Duke of Wellington, who was prime minister at the time, refused to countenance such a proposal; but subsequent events were to prove the truth of Napier's forecasts. As these events showed beyond any shadow of doubt that 'war was the only alternative to abandonment of intercourse with China, which could only be carried on in circumstances of insufferable ignominy' [3], resort to forceful measures was finally sanctioned. The 'Opium War' of 1840-42,¹ which followed this decision, led to the Treaty of Nanking. Thereby Hong Kong was ceded to Great Britain, five ports were opened to free trade, extraterritorial rights were granted, and an indemnity was paid by China. It led also to the first signs of open discontent with the ruling dynasty, which was held responsible for the defeat suffered by China and for giving way to British demands.

This was but the first of a long series of what, in later years, were to be denounced so vociferously by Chinese Nationalists and Communists alike as 'unequal treaties' and were to play so important a part in the Chinese Nationalist and Communist movements. While Chinese resentment was understandable, it is well to recall that, as shown in Lord Napier's instructions, it was the foreigner who first had cause to complain of unequal treatment. Had the British and others been freely accorded the 'national equality' which they demanded, China might never have had the hated 'unequal treaties' forced upon her.

Just as the American Commodore Perry's success in 1854 in persuading the Japanese by peaceful means to open up their country to foreign trade and intercourse was followed by similar treaties between Japan and other countries, so, too, Britain's action in obtaining her

¹ Opium was an incident, not the cause. The real cause of the war was, as Morse put it in his *Trade and Administration in the Chinese Empire* (p. 25), that 'the Chinese refused to treat on terms of equality, either diplomatically or commercially, with foreigners, and the latter insisted on the right to be so treated'. As early as 1900, however, Lenin, in an article blaming 'the European capitalists and the European governments who are obedient to the capitalists' for the Boxer rebellion, began to develop the theme that they had plundered and warred against China, 'in order to win the right to trade opium with which to drug the people'.

demands from China by force was the signal for other countries to follow her example. Wars and threats of war led not only to China being forced to extend extraterritorial rights to all countries, to open up the Yangtse to foreign trade, to restrict her customs duty on foreign goods, and to grant concessions and other special rights and privileges to various countries, both individually and collectively; they led also to the gradual carving up of the country amongst the Western powers, a process which was only halted in 1899 when the United States enunciated the principle of the Open Door and Equal Opportunity. While it is true that this policy was not wholly altruistic, it did undoubtedly save China at the time from almost complete dismemberment and for many years was held up as a model of liberality. Half-a-century later, however, it was to be derided by the Communist government in Peking as an act of aggression, the *Peking People's Daily* including it in a 'chronological table of American aggressions against China during the past century'.¹

The galling defeats suffered and the increasing readiness of the ruling dynasty to give way to foreign demands led to growing discontent with the Manchus and to a series of revolts. Of these, the two most important prior to the revolution of 1911 and the most far-reaching in their consequences were the Taiping rebellion of 1851-64 and the Boxer rebellion of 1900. The first of these, though primarily a revolt against the Chinese rulers and against feudal oppression, was finally suppressed by foreign aid, a fact which was to be exploited in the years ahead to arouse anti-imperialist sentiment. The Boxer rebellion, though anti-Manchu in origin, was quickly and cunningly diverted by the central authorities into anti-foreign channels and was largely the outcome of the crushing defeat of China in the war of 1894 with Japan and the land-grabbing by foreign powers which followed. Lenin, in his article on that rebellion [4], was in part correct, therefore, in deducing the idea that the rebels rose because of the 'hatred of the yellow race towards the white race', though he was guilty of twisting the facts to fit his theories.

Analysing these outbreaks and their bearing on subsequent developments, the one-time Indian Communist M. N. Roy observed many years later:

¹ '1899—The United States intensified her aggression against China by enunciating the "open door" policy—a new policy for partitioning China, planned by the then American Secretary of State, John Hay—recognizing the "spheres of influence" of the imperialist powers and opening them to the USA.' (NCNA, 22nd November 1950).

'The Taiping rebellion represented the earlier stages of a bourgeois democratic revolution. The Boxer uprising marked the beginning of the national democratic revolution. The element of nationalism (anti-imperialism) was latent in the former. It became the predominating feature of the latter. The Taiping rebellion, the reform movement, the Boxer uprising, the rise of the nationalist revolutionary party—all those events were connected with each other; they were so many links in the self-same chain of the development of social forces in modern China.' [5]

It may be noted that, although Sun Yat-Sen was to use the phrase when planning the Revolution of 1911, it was the Taiping rebels who first raised the cry 'Down with the Manchus'. It is also of interest that, in an article commemorating the hundredth anniversary of the outbreak of the Taiping rebellion, the Chinese Communist Party organ accused the Manchus of treason in that they had 'secured the help of foreign aggressors (to suppress the revolt) at the cost of signing a humiliating treaty'. It then went on to declare that the rebellion had failed because it was 'a purely peasant revolt without working-class leadership' and because, without such leadership, peasants are 'incapable of drawing up a definite revolutionary programme with which to rally all revolutionary masses', and 'incapable of maintaining revolutionary discipline for a long time or of concentrating their own forces to conquer a powerful enemy'. The lesson drawn from this and other similar examples was that 'History has proved that only the working class, armed with Marxist theory, can bring the revolutionary initiative of the peasant masses into full play' [6].

This is, of course, wholly in line with Communist doctrine, which similarly interprets the failure of the 1911 Chinese revolution to produce a political-social paradise as being due to 'the isolation of the intelligentsia from the peasant masses'. It is also argued that it was not until nearly a quarter-of-a-century of failures had forced him to turn to the masses for support and to establish an alliance with the working class that Sun Yat-Sen was able to set the revolution on the road to success. In this there is, of course, an element of truth, as it was only when Sun came to recognize the potential importance of the Communist Party and brought about its alliance with the KMT¹ in 1924 that the real social revolution, which was to lead twenty-five years later to the Communist control of China, was finally launched.

¹ KMT is the shortened form of *Kuomintang* or nationalist party, and will be used as such henceforth.

From what has been said about the Taiping and Boxer rebellions it will be seen that what started originally as a symptom of anti-dynastic discontent, came gradually to assume an anti-feudal and anti-imperialist complexion, as the rebels resented the aid given by foreign countries to their opponents as much as they resented the special rights and privileges accorded to these foreign intruders. The significance of this changing attitude was not generally appreciated at the time, but was to play a vitally important part from 1919 onwards, when anti-imperialism and anti-feudalism became the slogans of nationalists and Communists alike. This was, of course, after the overthrow of the Manchus; but it became an article of faith with the Communists that, both during the monarchy and during the period of warlordism which followed, the foreign powers, by loans and other means, helped to maintain the decaying power of the feudal ruling class against 'the oppressed masses' in order to retain and strengthen the privileged position accorded them by these rulers. While, however, it was true that the foreign powers gave moral and, sometimes, material support to these feudal elements, the prime reason for this was that the foreigner wanted to ensure stable conditions for trading. Rightly or wrongly it was believed that these could best be attained and maintained by strengthening the position of those in authority against subversive elements.

It was the catastrophic defeat of 1894 in the war with Japan which finally revealed the rottenness of the established order in China; and just as the introduction of Western ideas, political concepts, and learning helped to bring about the rise of nationalism in India, so too they served to spread the spirit of revolt in China.

In 1894, the year which saw the disastrous defeat of China by Japan, the *Shing Chung Hui* ('Chinese Revival Society'), forerunner of the KMT, was founded by Sun Yat-Sen in Honolulu. Recruited solely from overseas Chinese merchants and students, and financed by the former, it set the way for what was to become a marked feature in the years to come. Not only did these overseas Chinese play an outstanding part in supporting and financing the preparations for the revolution of 1911; they did the same for the Nationalist revolution of the 1920's, for the KMT in its heyday and, subsequently, for the Communists. The last-named, when eventually they came to power in 1949, showed their recognition of the actual and potential value of these overseas communities by establishing a Commission of Overseas Chinese Affairs to direct and utilize these

great 'fifth columns' in the neighbouring countries of South-East Asia.

Although the *Shing Chung Hui* was the first of such societies to be formed for the overthrow of the Manchu régime, other similar bodies began to spring into existence. By 1905, Japan had become an operational base for all Chinese revolutionaries, the *Shing Chung Hui* and other such organizations having their headquarters there. Accordingly, in August of that same year, a conference of all these revolutionary groups was held in Tokyo and, as a result, they were all amalgamated to form the *Tung Ming Hui* ('United League of Revolutionaries').

Some of these plotters merely aimed to bring about a constitutional monarchy; but Sun Yat-Sen and most of the others advocated the overthrow of the monarchy, though they had no very clear idea as to what should be set up in its place. Sun's lack of clear thinking in this respect was to prove a source of serious trouble, both to himself and to others, in the years following the revolution of 1911.

Shortly before his assassination in May 1932, Mr Inukai, at that time prime minister of Japan, told the present writer that Sun Yat-Sen had been living with him as a political refugee just prior to the Chinese Revolution of 1911. He, Inukai, had constantly urged him in those days not to overthrow the monarchy but to follow Japan's example in reforming and strengthening the country, as he considered that a monarchical form of government was essential if China was to become strong and united. Sun, however, had flatly refused his advice.

Sun's rejection of this advice, and his failure to think out what exactly was to take the place of the monarchy once it had been overthrown, was to bring him into serious trouble with the new rulers of China on a number of occasions. Although appointed provisional president two months after the outbreak of the revolution in 1911, he held that post less than a month and was then succeeded as president by Yuan Shih-Kai. Eighteen months later, having fallen foul of Yuan, he was back in Japan as a political refugee.

The interval between Dr Sun's supersession as president and his flight to Japan had seen the emergence of a body which was to play a vitally important part in the years ahead. For in August 1912, the revolutionary *Tung Ming Hui*, which had figured so prominently in bringing about the overthrow of the Manchus and the inauguration of a republic, was reorganized and transformed into the *Kuomintang*

or Nationalist Party. Under Sun's leadership, however, it quickly developed a left wing highly critical of Yuan for taking too much power into his hands. By the summer of 1913 it had brought about a second revolution.

The immediate cause of this outbreak was opposition to a Reconstruction Loan, the agreement for which with an international group of bankers had been signed on 25th April 1913 under a hail of protests and threats of repudiation at the earliest opportunity. The revolt was quickly suppressed, Sun and a number of his followers fled to Japan to escape arrest, and in November the KMT was proscribed. Here it may be interpolated that foreign loans in return for concessions, and the ownership of public utilities and nearly all key industries by foreign capitalists, were later to become the targets of vehement denunciation by Nationalists and Communists alike.

With the KMT and its republican adherents out of the way, Yuan Shih-Kai was able to exercise an almost unfettered dictatorship and little was left of the republican ideal which had animated the revolution of 1911. By 1915 he was being urged by his family and his friends to restore the monarchy and ascend the Dragon Throne himself on the grounds that China's only hope of salvation lay in a return to the monarchical system. Though at first averse to this suggestion, his ambition finally got the better of him, and in December that year he agreed that the Monarchy should be proclaimed. Opposition, however, was widespread and one province after another came out in revolt. In March 1916, therefore, the monarchical scheme was abandoned and a month later Yuan agreed to surrender all civil authority and vest it in the cabinet.

Although he had acted unwisely, his real aim had been to create an effective central administration. With his sudden death on 6th June, the last chance of establishing a strong central government went and China entered a prolonged period of war-lordism and civil wars. These ruined and devastated the country and left its governance in the hands of a series of largely incompetent administrators, corrupt, feudal in outlook, and incapable of handling effectively either internal or external affairs.

Meantime the KMT, though officially dissolved in November 1913, continued, under one name or another, to play its part, with Sun Yat-Sen struggling to maintain himself as its head. In 1914 he had reorganized it under the name *Chung Hua Ke Min Tang* ('Chinese Revolutionary Party') with a view to reviving the pre-1911 spirit; but

Japan's presentation of her Twenty-One Demands the following year caused a serious split in this illegally operated body. Some of its members came out in support of Yuan against Japan and were consequently amnestied and allowed to return to China. The remainder, including Sun himself, declined to support Yuan's initial opposition to these demands, as they took the view that China's best hope lay in Pan-Asianism under Japanese leadership. Asiatics, they contended, would thereby be helped to free themselves from Western domination.

Much of Sun's time during the next few years was spent in Canton, alternately establishing provisional governments and fleeing for sanctuary to Hong Kong, Shanghai or elsewhere. In 1919 his Chinese Revolutionary Party underwent its final change of name, when it was reorganized as the new *Kuomintang*, the name it has retained ever since. August 1922 was to prove a turning-point both for it and for China. That month saw Sun Yat-Sen's last defeat in Canton,¹ and on 14th August he arrived in Shanghai, having escaped in a British gunboat. There in Shanghai, in January 1923, he met the Soviet representative, Joffe. The meeting proved epochal. It decided him to throw in his lot with the Communists and to accept Soviet aid. Twelve months later, by which time Sun had been reinstalled in Canton, the KMT held its First National Congress in that southern city and formulated basic principles for its own reorganization on Russian Communist Party lines, transforming itself into a revolutionary mass party in close alliance with the Communists.

¹ Sun had been elected president of the newly-established nationalist government in Canton on 5th May 1921.

CHAPTER IV

The Pan-Asian Setting

By 1915 Sun Yat-Sen had become a firm believer in the liberating mission of Japan and considered it was to Japan's own interest to help the peoples of Asia to free themselves from Western domination. He was to become disillusioned later; but here it may be recalled that it was in this same year 1915 that Lenin defined China as a 'semi-colony' [1] and that he followed this up the next year with his famous thesis on imperialism, which linked up colonies and semi-colonies as objects for 'liberation'.

Sun's belief in Japan's mission as a liberator was not, at that time, shared by the Japanese people themselves as a whole; but Pan-Asianism of a sort, under Japanese leadership, had been envisaged by Yoshida Shoin and his disciples many years previously. Their dreams had been passed on to the reactionary *Genyosha*, which came into existence in the 'eighties of the last century in connection with the agitation for the abolition of the 'unequal treaties', with which Japan, like her Chinese neighbour, had been saddled.

The intense feelings aroused by the question of treaty revision at this period, and by the government's action in agreeing with China to recognize the independence of Korea, had a marked effect on the movement for social reform. Prior to 1879, in which year a Tokyo paper published an account of the theory and purposes of socialism, such topics as the need for social reform, the evils of poverty, and the defects of capitalism had hardly gone beyond the stage of academic discussion. The next few years, however, had seen liberal politicians and others beginning to advocate mild measures of social reform, and embryo socialist movements were launched.

This liberalism in the domestic field was brought to an abrupt end by the national sentiment aroused over the question of treaty revision. Radicals, who had formerly fought for popular rights, turned their attention instead to matters of foreign policy and became the fore-

most upholders of national prestige and advocates of chauvinism.¹ Such were the circumstances in which the *Genyosha* had been brought into being.

From this body sprang the majority of those ultra-nationalistic societies which, in the 1920's and 1930's, were to plague Japan with their reactionary, and often terrorist, activities, carried out with a mistaken idea of what constituted real loyalty and patriotism. Chief amongst these bodies was the Black Dragon Society which was organized in 1901 with the object of opposing Russian imperialism and later espoused the cause of 'Asia for the Asiatics'. It was to Toyama Mitsuru, the enigmatic founder and head of this body, that Sun turned for assistance and protection in 1915, and it was to this same fanatical personality that he introduced Rash Bihari Bose, when that Bengali fugitive from justice arrived in Japan soon afterwards [2].

In view of the important part played by Pan-Asianism in the development of Asiatic nationalism, it is necessary to describe in some detail the background and activities of Bose and other Asiatic refugees in Japan.

A former clerk in the Indian Forestry Department at Dehra Dun, Bose had, for some years past, been engaged in terrorist activities and was one of the ringleaders in the attempt to assassinate Lord Hardinge on the occasion of his ceremonial entry into Delhi in December 1912. Five months later he had played a prominent part in a bombing outrage in Lahore and, following the outbreak of the Great War, he had set to work to engineer the *Ghadr* conspiracy, the main details of which will be familiar to those who have read Sir Michael O'Dwyer's *The India We Knew*. In each instance Bose contrived to elude the police and make good his escape; but India by this time was becoming too 'hot' for him, and there was a heavy price on his head. With the help of friends he was secreted out of the country and made his way to Japan, where he remained for the rest of his life, devoting the greater part of his time and energy to a relentless campaign of invective against the alleged oppression and despotism of British rule in India. Year in and year out, by means of lectures, pamphlets, and articles in the press, he did his utmost to

¹ It is not without significance that a similar trend was witnessed in the 1920's and, more particularly, in the 1930's, when numbers of former left-wingers, including some former Communists, switched over to national socialism and became ardent supporters of aggressive measures.

stir up hatred and contempt for Great Britain and to make his Japanese friends and acquaintances believe that their country had a mission to perform, a mission to assist in driving the British out of India and to help the subject races of Asia in general to free themselves from Western servitude. Thanks to this campaign, the great majority of Japanese became just as convinced of the tyranny and brutality of British rule in India as the British public were of Japanese brutality and ruthlessness in China.

By adopting the role of a high-minded patriot struggling to liberate his country from the British yoke, Bose appealed to two of the emotions to which the Japanese were particularly susceptible. Patriotism was extolled above all other virtues in Japan and xenophobia, in the form of resentment against Western domination of any kind, had been a latent and easily aroused characteristic ever since the enforced reopening of the country to foreign intercourse in the 1850's.

On learning of Bose's arrival in Japan, an attempt was made to have him deported. The full story of how this attempt was foiled will probably never be known, though some light was thrown on it by Bose himself in his *Indo no Kakumei* ('Indian Revolution'), one of a number of propagandist books written and published by him in Japanese. On his arrival in Japan, he said in this book, he fell in with Dr Sun Yat-Sen, a fugitive like himself at the time. In this first president of the Chinese Republic, a fellow-revolutionary, he found a sympathetic friend and helper. Through him he was introduced to Toyama Mitsuru, the veteran leader of the notorious Black Dragon Society, who, on hearing his story, promised to take him under his powerful protection and patronage.

The British government had, by this time, learned of Bose's whereabouts and, at their request, the Japanese government of the day issued orders for his deportation. Toyama and his friends thereupon exerted their best efforts to have the orders cancelled or, alternatively, to have the time-limit extended so that Bose could sail for America rather than Shanghai, where he would certainly have fallen into the hands of the British and suffered the penalty of his crimes. The Japanese government, however, refused to rescind their orders. Toyama therefore engineered a ruse by means of which Bose, disguised as a Japanese, was enabled to escape through the servants' entrance of the house in which he lay hidden and passed unrecognized through the cordon of police surrounding it. After his escape he

remained in hiding for some years until the trouble had blown over and, by marrying the daughter of one of Toyama's followers, who adopted him as his heir, emerged eventually as a Japanese citizen, subject no longer to British control.

While regretting that the Japanese government should ever have issued orders for his deportation, Bose, in his book, remarks that it was really 'a blessing in disguise', as it focused Japanese attention on the question of India and aroused sympathy. Certain it is that, prior to his arrival, the Japanese as a whole showed little interest in India. The attempt to have the deportation order withdrawn and the manner in which it was evaded, however, aroused interest in Bose and his teachings and little by little these teachings took root and spread. Briefly stated his thesis was that it was unjust that huge masses of coloured people should be ruled by a small number of white men; it was, therefore, the urgent duty of those who revered justice and liberty to drive the white man out of Asia. India, he contended, was the very basis of white imperialism and aggression in Asia; consequently if that basis could be destroyed, the white man's influence would be gone. Bose was no Communist, but the similarity between this anti-imperialist creed and Lenin's is clear.

From these teachings sprang the Pan-Asiatic movement which, in its early stages, was of no more than academic interest and was taken seriously by very few Japanese. True, a certain amount of resentment against the West was aroused in some quarters by the rejection of Japan's demands at Versailles in 1919 for racial equality. It had been exacerbated further by the implications of racial inferiority conveyed by the 'White Australia' policy. But Pan-Asianism as a means of escape from Western domination made but little progress until the passage of the American Immigration Law in 1924. The bitter resentment felt at the discriminatory clauses levelled against Japan thereupon led a number of Japanese editors to advocate the establishment of an Asiatic federation, under Japanese direction, as the only means of preserving the peace of the Orient and saving it from Western vassalage. Prior to that, such fleeting references as had appeared in the Japanese press had either ridiculed the movement as chimerical and fantastic or had been definitely hostile to it.

While, therefore, the year 1924 may be said to have witnessed the first marked development of this movement, its influence remained negligible until after the outbreak in Manchuria in 1931. A Pan-Asiatic conference, it is true, was held in Nagasaki in 1926 but, far

from helping to advance the cause of its promoters, it served only to provoke ridicule. Instead of demonstrating the unity of the nations of Asia, it served to emphasize their fundamental differences. The meeting was marked throughout by a heated exchange of invective between the delegates of the countries represented, and numerous obstacles were encountered as a result of the Japanese government's refusal to grant facilities. One delegate was even refused permission to land in Japan. This was Mahendra Pratap, the self-appointed representative of Afghanistan. In view of his subsequent activities, a brief account of this slightly ludicrous figure may not be out of place.

Originally a land-owner in the United Provinces, Pratap became involved in the revolutionary movement in India after meeting with Har Dayal, a well-known extremist, while on a visit to Europe. At the outbreak of the 1914-18 war he was in Germany. There, by representing himself as a distinguished Indian prince, he contrived to obtain an audience with the Kaiser. Later, in German pay, he made his way to Kabul, where he tried ineffectually to turn the Amir Habibullah against the British. Though he failed in this particular task, he joined with other revolutionaries in the Afghan capital in various plots and intrigues against British rule in India and became a member of the farcical provisional government of India established in Kabul. Eventually he made his way to the Far East, sometimes in one role and sometimes in another, but always ensuring the maximum of publicity for himself by his high-sounding claims and melodramatic activities. In the Japanese press he proclaimed himself 'the Servant of Mankind' and he arrogated to himself the same title in a curious little sheet which he published under the name of *World Federation*. This was a strangely incongruous name, as its principal object was to bring about the break-up of the British Empire and to turn the British out of India with the aid of an army drawn from all the races of Asia.

While Pratap helped to disseminate the principles of Pan-Asia in Japan, there was always an element of buffoonery in his actions. He was not, therefore, taken very seriously by many Japanese. Bose, on the other hand, through his close connections with the Black Dragon Society and with its enigmatic leader, Toyama Mitsuru, played an all-important part in preparing the ground for the subsequent spread of these principles. In order to understand why it was that Toyama so readily took this Indian terrorist under his wing and how it was

that the Black Dragon leader came to exercise so potent and malignant an influence in the Pan-Asiatic and other reactionary movements, it is necessary to examine this strange, powerful personality, who built up such an extraordinary reputation for himself that in 1932 *The Japan Times* issued a special supplement devoted entirely to profuse eulogies of him by many of the foremost statesmen and politicians in the country.

A relic of the closing days of Japanese feudalism in which he was born, Toyama continued to live mentally in those times. From his earliest days he had been strongly nationalistic and imperialistic in outlook and in the 'eighties he helped to organize the *Genyosha*, the parent body of all the numerous reactionary and pseudo-patriotic associations which later came to exercise so powerful and retrograde an influence on Japanese politics. Fanatical in his conception of patriotism, Toyama was, in effect, the chief high-priest of the ultra-patriotic cult in Japan. As such, he built up for himself a position of extraordinary power and influence behind the scenes and received the most marked respect from everyone from the highest to the lowest in the land.

It may be wondered why Toyama and his followers, who were such staunch nationalists and advocates of Japanese imperialism, should have been so ready to afford patronage and protection to political refugees from other lands; yet the explanation is simple and serves to throw an interesting light on the genesis of the Pan-Asiatic movement and on the subsequent development of anti-British sentiment in Japan. Toyama had always been a rebel and a revolutionary at heart and from his early days had bitterly resented each and every manifestation of Western superiority. In the 'eighties it was he and his followers in the *Genyosha* who led the agitation for the termination of the 'unequal treaties', under which foreigners were accorded extraterritorial rights and Japan was denied the right of fiscal autonomy. In later years, his fierce and fanatical teachings played an important part in stirring up public opinion in Japan against what he regarded as the humiliation of the naval ratios imposed by the Washington and London naval treaties. In these matters as in others, such as the Triple Intervention of 1895, the rejection of Japan's demands for racial equality at Versailles, and the passing of the American Immigration Law in 1924, Toyama and his disciples saw—or imagined they saw—clear evidence of determination on the part of the Western nations to keep Japan and the Asiatic races in

general in a position of permanent inferiority to themselves. When, therefore, a political refugee from India, Annam, the Dutch East Indies, or any other Asiatic country under Western rule came to him for help and protection, Toyama regarded the fugitive as a fellow-sufferer from Western oppression and readily extended to him his sympathy and support. Little by little, therefore, his fanaticism led him to the view that, not only should Japan free herself from all semblance of foreign domination, but that she should set herself up as the leader and saviour of all Asia and assist her to throw off the yoke of Western 'oppression'.¹ In this, then, is to be seen the germ of the Pan-Asiatic movement which, though largely academic at the outset, came later to exercise so dangerous and inflammatory an influence on the minds and actions of the Japanese.

The country-wide resentment caused by the League of Nations' handling of the Manchurian situation in the early 1930's provided the best possible conditions for the spread and cultivation of this germ. Patriotic organizations innumerable sprang into existence and many of them came to espouse the cause of Pan-Asia. Lest it should have been thought incongruous that the Japanese advocates of this movement were fighting their great Asiatic neighbour, China, the theory was expounded that Chinese opposition to Japan was encouraged by certain Western powers for their own ends. Gradually, therefore, national sentiment was diverted into Pan-Asiatic channels and duly exploited by Bose and his friends, who had little difficulty in persuading Japanese public opinion to regard Britain as the real villain of the piece. That the same tactics were still being employed in the late 1930's is indicated by the following resolution passed at a meeting of the 'Indian Independence League' in Tokyo early in 1938, a meeting which had Bose as its chairman and the veteran Toyama as an 'observer':

'British imperialism is largely responsible for the China affair. . . . Unless it is completely uprooted, it is impossible to expect a radical settlement. . . . British imperialism is using India as its base. We therefore sincerely desire

¹ The idea of Japan setting herself up as the leader and saviour of Asia and bringing self-government and independence to its peoples was expressed as far back as 1884 in a popular novel by Shiba Shiro, writing under the pen-name Tokai Sanshi. (An outline of this book is given in Sir George Sansom's *The Western World and Japan*, pp. 535-9.) This was in effect a development of purely expansionist proposals formulated thirty years earlier by Yoshida Shoin and others. Some details of these can be found in the present author's *The Problem of Japan*, pp. 50-53.

that in order to crush British imperialism, which is the arch-enemy of humanity, and release India from her shackles, the Japanese government will, in collaboration with Germany and Italy—friends of the Far East—give practical assistance to Indian revolutionaries.' [3]

A month or so before this, Bose had been quoted by the Japanese press as declaring that true peace in the Far East would only be brought about when Japan had 'occupied the Singapore naval base, annihilated the British China Squadron, and stationed about three Army divisions in India and the British Pacific possessions' [4].

In normal times such crude forms of propaganda would not have been likely to do much harm; but with Japan infected as she was by then with a virulent type of 'war-time psychology', the effect was serious. Not only did Bose and his friends spread and encourage the belief that Britain was the main obstacle to peace and to the attainment of Japan's aims; they pandered, too, to the crusading spirit of the more fanatical elements, who believed in the divine mission of their country to rescue Asia from Western bondage. More than this, they made it appear as though the whole 460 millions of the Indian sub-continent were looking to Japan to drive the British out of India. That Japan's recent actions in China had aroused serious misgivings and apprehensions even in Indian Congress circles was deliberately glossed over.

Whilst it is true that there was never any great likelihood of Japan going to war with England for the specific purpose of furthering the ideals of Pan-Asianism, the anti-British sentiment, which the Pan-Asian propagandists had done so much to foster, did in fact play an all-important part during the period immediately preceding and following Japan's fatal plunge into war in December 1941. Once having embarked on war, Japan's leaders made full use of the Pan-Asiatic theme by posing as the liberators of the South-East Asian countries from Western domination and promising them freedom and independence. Just as the German attitude towards the Nazi creed gradually changed, so Japanese officialdom first curbed the idea of Pan-Asianism under Japanese leadership, then tolerated it, and finally gave it its head.

There were some who had foreseen the possibility of this development [5]; but most observers had argued, with not a little plausibility, that, much as Asiatic countries like India, Burma, the Dutch East Indies, or Indo-China, might like to free themselves from Western governance, they had no desire to have it replaced by

Japanese domination. Unfortunately, this line of reasoning overlooked the underlying truth of the platitude that nothing succeeds like success. Just as, in the instances of Nazi Germany and post-war Russia, neighbouring states were tricked into becoming satellites; and just as, by the end of 1950, there were signs that a similar development might take place in South-East Asia, where fear of Communist China was tinged with admiration for her achievements; so too, in the case of Japan, in the 1930's, fellow Asiatics were hypnotized by her successes and promises of liberation, and readily offered their collaboration against her enemies. That subsequently most of them became disillusioned should not blind one to the fact that Pan-Asian ideals still operate to some extent in the guise of anti-colonialism and in the attitude of the Asian bloc in the United Nations towards questions of direct concern to all Asia.¹

On the question of colonialism, Pan-Asianism has always had one aim in common with Communism, namely, to put an end to Western domination. Up to the time of Japan's collapse in 1945, both Pan-Asianism and Communism recognized Britain as the principal obstacle in the way of achieving their purpose. In consequence, they were prepared at times to co-operate against her. By subsequently granting independence to India, Pakistan, Ceylon and Burma, however, Britain lost this invidious distinction in so far as Asiatic nationalists were concerned, although Communism continued to hold her up to obloquy and to inveigh against the newly-established Asiatic bourgeois governments on the grounds that they were merely stooges, who had sold themselves to the British imperialists. While, however, the British by their action had gained the confidence of their former Asiatic subjects, bitter memories of colonial domination and economic exploitation had left them and other Asiatic nations in an intensely nationalistic mood and made them suspicious of Western motives and intentions. After the grant of independence to Indonesia in December 1949, Holland, it is true, became less open to hostility in Asiatic eyes; but France, in spite of the considerable degree of independence which she had accorded to Indo-China, continued, until the Geneva Agreement of 1954 and even later, to draw strong criticism for her failure to grant full

• ¹ Pan-Asianism in its post-war form lacks the dynamism and Japanese leadership which marked the Pan-Asiatic movement during the immediate pre-war period. It is perhaps significant, however, that whereas Asian political refugees used to turn to Tokyo for sympathy and protection, they now look to Peking.

independence. It was the United States, however, whose motives and intentions gave rise to the greatest suspicion; and the reason for this is not far to seek. It is that, whereas Asiatic nationalism and the closely allied ideals of Pan-Asianism of earlier years had been concerned primarily with obtaining racial equality and political independence, the main emphasis had now switched over to demands for economic independence. The post-war Asiatic obsession with colonialism was, in fact, closely bound up with the fear of dollar imperialism, a form of subjugation which America was believed to be aiming to impose as a curb to the political freedom which the Asiatic countries had but recently acquired or were on the point of obtaining.

CHAPTER V

The Eve of Revolution in South-East Asia

MENTION has already been made of the founding of the Indies Association by Indonesian students in Holland in 1908, and of its metamorphosis, five years later, into the more definitely political *Perhimpunan Indonesia* (Indonesian Association), a body which was to play an important part in the development of Indonesian nationalism in the years ahead.

December 1912 saw the establishment of yet another nationalist organization in Indonesia itself. This was the Indies Party, which, after a brief existence, was revived later, in 1927, as the Indonesian National Party. Formed for the specific purpose of popularizing East Indian nationalism and awakening and strengthening the national consciousness of the people as a whole, it set forth self-government and complete independence as its goal. As a result, it very soon fell foul of the Dutch authorities. In August 1913 three of its leaders were deported for fanning nationalism and sent into exile, a fate which many others were to suffer.

This same year, 1913, was marked by the arrival of four members of the Dutch Social Democratic Party in Indonesia. Outstanding among these four was Hendricus Sneevliet, who was later to become a prominent Communist and was to figure in China under the name of Mahring. In conjunction with two of the other Dutchmen he set to work to found the Indonesian Social Democratic Union (ISDV), introducing socialist and democratic ideology into the national movement and entering into relations with *Sarekat Islam* and another nationalist body, *Insulinde*, as a medium through which to win the support of the masses.¹ One result of this was soon apparent,

¹ This technique of linking up with a mass-based nationalist organization as a means of contacting the masses was employed also by the Chinese Communist Party, which entered into alliance with the KMT for this purpose. Sneevliet, who was deported from Indonesia in December 1918 and went to China a year or two

for in June 1916, when *Sarekat Islam* held its first National Congress, ideological principles began to be voiced for the first time.

As the months went by, however, internal dissension began to appear in both the ISDV and *Sarekat Islam*. This was brought to a head in 1917 when, stimulated by the outbreak of the Russian Revolution, Sneevliet and other extremists broke away from the moderates of the ISDV and approached the revolutionary elements of *Sarekat Islam*. The moderates thereupon formed a Social Democratic Party. A similar split occurred in *Sarekat Islam* when, at their Second National Congress in October 1917, Semaun, a nineteen-year-old revolutionary who was to play a prominent part in the subsequent Communist movement, led the opposition and created a left wing, based on Marxism and non-co-operation with the Dutch rulers and opposed to the constitutional steps which the majority of his fellow-members supported.¹

Semaun, who had been a railway worker in Java since 1912 and became chairman of the Railway Trade Union in 1918, was at this time one of the three leading figures in that union, the other two being Alimin and Darsono who, like him, were to play outstanding parts in the Communist movement of the 1920's and later years. Becoming increasingly extremist, he was finally expelled in October 1921 from *Sarekat Islam*, whose orthodox Moslem members were revolted by the atheistic creed which he had espoused.²

Although, as mentioned in an earlier chapter, *Sarekat Islam* was founded in 1911 with the declared object of promoting social conditions on Islamic lines, it owed its inception to no small extent to economic grievances arising from Chinese exploitation of the *batik* industry, exploitation which had been proceeding unchecked for many years past. In 1911, therefore, in order to protect themselves against the economic encroachment of the Chinese, Javanese *batik* traders formed a society, with Islam as a symbol of social unity, under a title which was subsequently abbreviated to *Sarekat Islam*.

later, was largely responsible for inducing the Chinese Communists to resort to this technique, which had proved so successful in Indonesia.

¹ It was at this Congress that *Sarekat Islam*, which had previously contented itself with self-government as its goal, called for national independence.

² Although repelled by the atheistic creed of Moscow, the anti-capitalist aspect of Marxism was in accord with Moslem principles and therefore made a strong appeal. *Sarekat Islam* was prepared, however, to tolerate native capitalism while denouncing the foreign brand.

The promotion of economic welfare and the advancement of the interests of Islam were the two main objects.

Resentment against the Chinese increased to such an extent that it led, in the following year, to anti-Chinese riots. As a result, the government suspended the society for a time. The ban, however, was soon removed and the movement, passing under the control of the educated classes, spread rapidly [1]. Thus a movement, which was shortly to become political and was to work for independence from the Dutch, made its first appearance in militant form as a consequence of economic grievances against the Chinese. Nearly twenty years later, Burmese nationalism was to make its début in somewhat similar circumstances, its first open manifestation in militant form being in 1930—not against the British rulers but against the Indian community—when anti-Indian riots were staged. These were partly as a result of Burmese grievances against the way in which Indian moneylenders were undermining the economic stability of Burma, though more directly against Indian coolie labour in Rangoon.¹ Communal strife has, in fact, played a definite part in the rise of the nationalist movements not only in Burma and Indonesia, but in other countries of South and East Asia as well, notably in India between Hindus and Moslems and to a lesser extent in Korea against the Chinese, in Manchuria against the Koreans, and elsewhere against other minority communities. These disturbances, however, were due more to economic or religious differences than to the political motives which have been behind the main developments in the nationalist movements.

The year 1908, which saw the formation of the first nationalist society, also saw the organization of the first trade union in the NEI. This was the railway and tramway trade union (VSTP), of which the fiery Semaun was to become chairman ten years later. By 1914 it had come under the influence of Sneevliet and other advanced Socialists, and from then on its activities, like those of most of the other trade unions formed in the meantime, became increasingly political.

Following certain demands for social reforms made at the Third National Congress of *Sarekat Islam* in 1918, about twenty of these

¹ Hall, p. 158. There were also anti-Chinese riots in 1931, although, as noted by Purcell (*The Chinese in South-East Asia*, p. 92), the Burmese generally had a friendly feeling for the Chinese living amongst them, and called them *pauk paw* or 'next of kin'.

unions formed themselves into a Trade Union Alliance claiming some 77,000 members in all; but whereas the leaders were attracted by the organizing powers and political tactics of their counterparts in Europe, the large majority of the actual workers were too poor and ignorant to take any great interest in socialism. For a time, therefore, it looked as though the leaders were about to drift away from the rank and file; but towards the close of 1919, the Trade Union Alliance was transformed into the Trade Union Central under *Sarekat Islam* auspices. Its first Congress, held in August 1920, was, however, marked by a violent struggle between the socialists and the Communists for control of the trade union movement. As a result, fourteen of the twenty-two unions comprising the new organization seceded and set up a 'Revolutionary Trade Union Central' of their own.

At the same time, the nationalist movement was experiencing similar teething troubles. The Indies Party, formed by Dekker in 1912, having proclaimed self-government and complete independence as its goal, had soon found itself in trouble with the Dutch. *Sarekat Islam*, on the other hand, had realized the need for more caution. On the advice of its leader, Tjokro, it passed a resolution in 1913 favouring national advancement by constitutional means, an evolutionary development of self-government within the Dutch Empire; and at its first National Congress, held in 1916, it repeated this cautionary attitude, declaring its aim to be 'to raise native society to a nation' under the Dutch flag by legal means [2]. When the second National Congress was held a year later, however, a change both in aim and in method became evident. Influenced by developments in Russia and, to some extent, by the Indian National Congress in which the left-wing had recently become predominant, a resolution was passed demanding self-government, proclaiming opposition to capitalism, and showing clearly the growing revolutionary tendencies of the struggle for independence. While the cautious Tjokro made a point of stressing that this anti-capitalism implied opposition only to foreign capitalists and that revolutionary methods would be employed only if constitutional methods failed, it was at this congress that Semaun led the opposition to constitutionalism and created his leftist bloc. The demand for self-government was refused, but the iron had entered into the soul of the movement and it became increasingly political in character [3].

The year 1918 saw the opening of the *Volksraad*, the central

representative assembly, instituted by a law passed two years earlier. Although its powers remained purely advisory until 1927, its establishment reflected the policy of 'association' between the East Indies and the Netherlands along lines advocated many years before by an outstanding Indonesian woman, Raden Adjeng Kartini,¹ and preached more recently by Dutch liberals. These, bearing in mind the Moslem religious intolerance which had accompanied the dawn of nationalism in Turkey and Egypt at the close of the nineteenth century, regarded such association as the best safeguard against similar intolerance in the East Indies. The electorate for the *Volksraad*, however, was largely official and *Sarekat Islam* failed to obtain a seat. In order to soften the blow, the Governor-General, on his own initiative, thereupon nominated Tjokro as the *Sarekat* representative and, at its second session late that same year, a radical bloc, which included both *Sarekat Islam* and *Budi Utomo*, was organized. The session passed off without incident; but a day or two after it had ended, news came of a revolutionary outbreak in Holland and a revolutionary speech was made by an Indonesian member. Fearing trouble, the Governor-General therefore suggested a number of far-reaching reforms.

With revolution in the air, *Sarekat Islam* reacted by turning first to the Dutch radicals who offered much, then to the socialists who offered more, and finally to the Communists who offered most [4]. Even Tjokro, who had acted with such circumspection hitherto, was affected by the socialist and Communist catchwords which were being bandied around and by the increasing resentment aroused by the suppression of strikes. This was clearly shown at the third National Congress held in 1918, when he came out with demands for a long list of social reforms and declared that *Sarekat Islam* would set up an administration of its own to supersede that of the government unless his demands were granted. Extremists, however, were still in a minority, and at its fourth National Congress held in 1919, *Sarekat Islam* firmly refused to adopt the measures advocated by the revolutionary elements. Although they remained in the

¹ While it is true that sentiments which inspired the Indonesian nationalist movement may be traced in some of the earliest Javanese periodicals as far back as 1864, the actual dawn of Indonesian nationalism is generally dated from the emergence of Raden Adjeng Kartini, who received part of her education in a European family and was a keen advocate of Dutch education as a means of national advancement. She died in childbirth in 1904 when only twenty-five years old.

organization for the time being, it was at this point that their leader, Semaun, set about reorganizing the ISDV under the name of PKI (Communist Party of Indonesia), which came into being on 23rd May 1920. The final break came in the autumn of 1921 when, after Tjokro had contrived to hold the two wings together at the fifth National Congress earlier in the year by somehow reconciling Socialist doctrines with the principles of Islam, the revolutionary section broke away at the sixth Congress in October.

Of the developments between May 1920, when the PKI came into existence, and October 1921, when the revolutionary section under Semaun was expelled from *Sarekat Islam* because of Moslem antipathy to the atheistic complexion of the Communist creed, more will be said later. Here it is only necessary to add that the wide divergence between prices and wages during the years 1919–21 and the general economic confusion thereafter, presented opportunities which the Communists were quick to exploit [5].

While Indonesia was experiencing the birth-throes of nationalism and developing a revolutionary movement, similar happenings were being witnessed in other parts of South and East Asia. In Indo-China a revolt had broken out in Hanoi in 1908 and had been followed by a number of minor conspiracies during the next six years. Amongst those taking part in these risings, which aimed to free Annam from France and to place Prince Cuong De—at that time a refugee in Japan—on the throne, was the whole family of a young Annamite named Nguyen Tat Thanh who, under the name of Ho Chi-Minh, was to play an outstanding part in years ahead.¹ Under the pseudonym of Nguyen Ai Quoc, meaning Nguyen the Patriot, he signed on as a ship's steward in 1911 in order to evade imprisonment when his father was arrested. In due course, after visits to England and America, he settled down in France to study. To keep himself in funds he took up work as a photographer's assistant in Paris, where, in 1919, he became interested in Marxism and attracted attention by a fiery speech he made on the question of Indo-China at a socialist meeting. It was in that same year, too, that he drew attention to himself by presenting to the four powers assembled at the Versailles Peace Conference a memorandum demanding the application of

¹ Purcell (*The Chinese in South-East Asia*, p. 256) gives 1933 as the year in which he finally changed his name to Ho Chi-Minh, but this would seem to be a mistake for 1943 when, according to the generally accepted version, he was arrested by the Chinese Nationalists and adopted the Chinese name of Ho Chi-Minh in order to hide his identity.

President Wilson's Fourteen Points to Indo-China. The following year saw him at the Congress of Tours, where the extreme left wing of the Socialist Party broke away from the Second International, and he joined the French Communist Party on its formation that same year.

Although many more years were to pass before he was able to return to his own country, his activities in Moscow, Canton and later Hong Kong, Singapore and Siam, played an all-important part in helping on the nationalist and Communist movements in Indo-China. The early phases of Indo-Chinese nationalism, however, were hampered by the lack of social solidarity and by the apathy of the poverty-stricken peasants; the movement was therefore confined to a small number of educated young men, whose ill-co-ordinated efforts were easily suppressed by an efficient police.

This state of things might have lasted indefinitely had it not been for the 1914-18 war and the new conditions created by it. Just as Japan's defeat of Russia in 1905 had served to stir up latent nationalist sentiment in Indo-China and other Asiatic countries, so too did the First World War provide a new impetus to the desire for independence from foreign control. One hundred thousand Indo-Chinese had been sent to France, some as soldiers, some as labour force. There they had been brought into touch with new ideas, and many of them returned to their own country at the conclusion of hostilities imbued with revolutionary thoughts and principles. Failure of the authorities to implement promises made during the hour of peril gave rise to feelings of resentment and disillusionment, while economic developments resulting from the war had created a disgruntled and insecure body of workers peculiarly receptive to nationalist and revolutionary propaganda. Unlike Indonesian nationalism, however, the nationalist movement in Indo-China had still to wait some years before the dynamism and discipline essential for success in challenging foreign domination were forthcoming; and although the Association of Annamite Revolutionary Youth founded by Ho Chi-Minh in Canton in 1925 was largely Communist in character, it operated mainly outside the country and it was January 1930 before a full-fledged Communist Party was born.

As in Indo-China, so in Burma was nationalism given an impetus by the 1914-18 war and by President Wilson's 'Fourteen Points' centring around the principle of self-determination. And as in Indonesia, so in Burma was nationalism strongly influenced by the

Indian National Congress and by religious considerations, though in Burma these latter were Buddhist, not Moslem, and took the form of opposition to Western cultural influences in general. It was a Buddhist body which, in 1919, put forward the first demand for Home Rule; but although nationalist sentiment became increasingly prominent in the years that followed, especially among students, there was no open rebellion until 1930 and no fully-constituted Burmese Communist Party until 1939.

In the Philippines a Legislative Assembly had been established in 1907 and the nationalists, with demands for immediate and complete independence and promises impossible to implement, had taken control. These nationalists, organized as a single party, have monopolized political power practically ever since and began, like the *Kuomintang* in China, with a purely nationalist programme; but they have never represented the social interests of the community. Their demands for independence, however, met with readier and more sympathetic response from the Americans than the similar demands put forward by the Indonesians and Indo-Chinese met from the Dutch or the French. This was not due to unalloyed American altruism, but rather to a form of enlightened self-interest. As shown clearly by Clinard in his interesting study of Japan's influence on American naval power [6], the bill of August 1916 promising independence to the Philippines 'as soon as a stable government can be established therein' aimed, somewhat naïvely, at removing any excuse for Japan to seize the islands in the event of a conflict which at that time seemed imminent. So long as the islands remained under American control, it was argued, the United States would have felt in honour bound to retake them if Japan seized them. In order, therefore, to divest themselves of the onerous responsibility of having to defend the Philippines and, if they fell, of having to recapture them, the Americans decided that the best course was to grant independence to the Philippines as soon as possible. As President Wilson observed in his annual message to Congress in December 1915:

'We must be free from every unnecessary burden or embarrassment; and there is no better way to be clear of embarrassment than to fulfil our promises and promote the interests of those dependent on us to the utmost.'

The crisis passed; but the grant of a new Constitution and the

promise of eventual independence still held good and served to satisfy the majority of the nationalists for the time being. Demands for setting an actual date for the transfer of authority, however, were put forward from time to time and, although the Communist Party of the Philippines was not formally inaugurated until November 1930,¹ individual Communists and other revolutionary elements were agitating for immediate independence from the early 1920's onwards.

Like most Eastern countries, the population of the Philippines consisted largely of peasantry; but although the poverty-stricken peasants of these islands had long revolutionary traditions, they had little or no class-consciousness. The 1920's saw the formation of a number of peasant organizations and there were armed risings, but these were economic or racial in origin rather than due to class strife. In part they reflected a desire for independence, but more particularly they were aimed at dispossessing the feudal land-owners and the Church of their lands and distributing these lands amongst themselves, the Catholic Church being the largest single landlord in the islands. It was not until after the Communist Party had come into being in 1930 and had started exploiting peasant grievances for their own ends that class-consciousness began to make any headway among the peasantry.

It was, as in other countries, amongst urban labour that class-consciousness first made its appearance, although there was no revolutionary working-class party in the Philippines until the Communist Party was formed in 1930. While, therefore, labour organizations had been in existence since about 1920, the early peasant and workers' movements were, for lack of any labour party to guide and lead them, unco-ordinated and they were in no sense a political force. It was not, in fact, until the economic crisis of 1921, which followed the termination of the First World War and brought high prices, unemployment, and growing discontent, that a militant revolutionary trend began to develop.

¹ The formal inauguration of the Party took place in Manila on 7th November 1930, following the return of four Filipino Communists from Moscow, whither they had gone for training in 1928.

CHAPTER VI

Ferment in India and Malaya

ALTHOUGH the policy of assassination had been adopted by the revolutionary party in Bengal, and although sedition was spreading rapidly in Bengal and the Punjab, and the first political general strike had taken place in Bombay, those in favour of violence were still few in numbers. Extremists in the National Congress, however, made a serious effort between 1905 and 1907 to gain control and to change it from a constitutional into a revolutionary organization. In this they failed, thanks largely to the outstanding character and ability of Gokhale, the leader of the moderates. Under his guidance the Congress, when adopting a new constitution in 1908, reaffirmed its decision to use 'constitutional means by bringing about a steady reform of the existing system of administration'. The split in the Congress, however, was real and, after Gokhale's death in 1915, the more extreme elements became encouraged by the removal of this moderating influence and by the weakening of the moderates' position when, at about the same time, it became clear that the Morley-Minto reforms of 1909, which had been intended to rally the moderates, were merely leading India into a political cul-de-sac [1].

In the meantime, the well-known theosophist, Mrs Annie Besant, who had joined the Congress in 1914, had quickly discerned the possibility of uniting the centre and leftist elements under the banner of Home Rule for India and exploiting the gratitude aroused in England by India's loyalty during the war in order to assist the cause of constitutional advance. Her plan had been rejected in 1915 by the centre bloc; but at the Congress meeting in Lucknow in 1916, the left wing, which had supported her project with enthusiasm from the outset, was predominant and her suggestion was accepted. Further support, moreover, came from an unexpected quarter, for the Moslem League, which had been formed in 1906 and in 1913 had adopted the ideal of self-government within the Empire, was becoming uneasy about the religious implications of the war with Turkey. It decided

at this point, therefore, to make a pact with the Hindus and join the Congress in supporting the Home Rule campaign.

Excitement rose to such a pitch that the authorities, foreseeing danger, arrested Mrs Besant in the summer of 1917 and interned her. This, however, only served to increase the growing influence of the left wing; and although the promise of parliamentary government, with Dominion status to follow, made by the Secretary of State for India in August that year¹ was welcomed by the moderates, the left wing considered it did not go far enough and demanded immediate Home Rule. The cleavage between the two became complete when the Montague-Chelmsford Report was published in 1918 and the Centre Party proceeded to set up Liberal Leagues in opposition to the Congress organization, which then came under the undisputed control of the left wing.

Before going on to the tragic events of 1919, a word should be said here on the matter of Hindu-Moslem relations, as the communal question played an all-important part in the struggle for independence and in the eventual splitting up of the Indian sub-continent into two separate states, India and Pakistan.

It has sometimes been contended that antagonism between Hindus and Moslems was a product of the later stages of British rule. In point of fact, however, religious and cultural feuds between these two great communities can be traced as far back as the early years of the eleventh century [2]. What is true is that, whereas communal disturbances were, until the close of the nineteenth century, essentially due to religious differences, political factors then began to reinforce the religious basis of communal dissension.

Because Moslems had at first stood aside from English learning and English ideas while the higher caste Hindus had taken quickly to them, the great majority of responsible government posts in Indian hands were, by the 1870's, held by Hindus. During this decade, moreover, a Hindu religious revival had taken place, aiming at the expulsion of alien influence and at bringing about the political

¹ This announcement, which was incorporated into the Montague-Chelmsford reforms of 1919, laid down the policy of 'the gradual development of self-governing institutions with a view to the progressive realization of responsible government in India as an integral part of the British Empire'. The reforms introduced the system known as dyarchy, i.e. parliamentary government with partial responsibility in the provinces of India, a system which continued until 1936, when a federal scheme of government based on self-governing provinces and princely states was brought into operation by the Government of India Act of 1935.

and spiritual restoration of Hinduism. In the 1880's, when political agitation began to centre in the recently established National Congress, the Moslems, on the advice of their leaders, had deliberately held aloof; and this dissociation in itself had served to no small extent to estrange the two communities.

In the meantime, becoming apprehensive of the political lead being taken by the Hindus and of the growing enmity shown towards the Moslem community, the Moslems had begun to take steps to remedy matters and to protect themselves and their interests, at first by the establishment of a Moslem university (Aligarh) in 1877 and, eleven years later, by the creation of a Moslem Patriotic Association. It was too late, however, to regain the ground already lost and the Hindus continued to retain their supremacy in the political field. Friction between the two communities increased and serious communal riots in Bombay in 1893 were followed by Tilak's organization of anti-British and anti-Moslem propaganda designed to stimulate the militant spirit of Hinduism and to establish its political domination. Then came the partition of Bengal in 1905, an action which brought on a storm of bitter resentment and a virulent anti-partition campaign under Hindu inspiration. The Moslems, on the other hand, welcomed the creation of the predominantly Moslem new province of Eastern Bengal and in 1906, in order to protect their own interests, the Moslem League was formed.

Pleased as they were with the results of partition and strongly resenting the tactics and violent agitation of the Hindus against it, the Moslems throughout India were bitterly disappointed by the subsequent reversal of the partition in 1911 which brought about a change in their attitude towards the British. Moslem reaction to Turkey's misfortunes in Tripoli that same year and to Turkey's entry into the 1914-18 war on the side of Germany served further to affect the attitude of the Moslems towards the government. It played, too, a definite part in the decision of the Moslem League in 1916 to join the Congress in supporting the campaign for Home Rule. This rapprochement, however, did not last long, as serious communal disturbances in 1917 and 1918, following smaller-scale riots during the two previous years, aroused such intense indignation among Moslems in northern India that friendly co-operation, even in a common cause, became impossible for the time being. And so we come to the disastrous year of 1919.

The months immediately following the close of the 1914-18 war

witnessed a situation in India highly charged with revolutionary sentiment and favourable to its spread. A feeling of political frustration was finding increased expression in acts of terrorism. Fears were rife lest the promised constitutional reforms should be delayed or curtailed, and economic distress was spreading. Anxiety over the Turkish peace terms was reflected in a spirit of unrest among the Moslem community. Among the Indian troops who had served on the Western Front were some who had been influenced by half-baked ideas of freedom and democracy or whose respect for the white man and Western civilization had been undermined by what they had seen or heard while in Europe. Furthermore, the Comintern had just been formed and, at its First World Congress in March 1919, had announced its support of national revolutions in the East and of the liberation of Asiatic countries from Western imperialist domination. It required little to touch off this highly-charged situation. The fatal spark was provided in 1919 by the introduction of the Rowlatt Bills, empowering the government to deal firmly with the growing wave of terrorism and other crimes of violence.

If law and order were to be maintained, some such provisions as those laid down in these two bills were clearly essential, but the reaction to their introduction was immediate and explosive. Even the so-called moderates joined in the general outcry, while the vituperation of the extremists knew no bounds. To make matters worse, the enigmatic Gandhi, who, up to this time, was little known to the world at large, came into prominence with the announcement of his intention to launch a campaign of passive resistance and civil disobedience. Though warned of the mob lawlessness which his action would unleash, he declined to heed the warning, which proved all too well justified. The mob's idea of passive resistance was to resort to widespread riot, arson and murder, and soon the Punjab was in an uproar. Serious riots occurred in Lahore, Amritsar and other places, the situation in Amritsar becoming so bad that the civil authorities handed over to General Dyer, whose subsequent action served to quell the rising there and throughout the Punjab, but created feelings of bitterness which lasted for many years after.¹

It was Mrs Besant who had warned Gandhi what the results of his action would be and it was Mrs Besant who, after order had eventually been restored by resort to martial law, pleaded with the

¹ For a fully-documented account of this controversial incident, the reader may be referred to *The Life of General Dyer* by Ian Colvin (Blackwood, 1929).

moderate leaders to appreciate the need for the action taken by the government, to refrain from criticizing it, and to stand firmly against revolution. Her advice, however, went unheeded and the moderates merely vied with the extremists in condemning the steps taken by the government to suppress the disorders.

Simultaneously with the outburst of mob violence, the newly-established Afghan government, taking advantage of reports that the Punjab was in open rebellion, launched an attack on the North-West Frontier of India. Thanks in no small part, however, to General Dyer's action, the rising in the Punjab had been quickly checked and this in turn enabled the Indian government forces to effect speedily and completely the defeat of the Afghans, whose unprovoked attack had been in part instigated and supported by Russian influence and arms [3].

In the meantime, after helping to allay the storm he had raised, Gandhi had set about trying to unite the Hindus and Moslems. In the hope of achieving his purpose, he joined the Khilafat movement, a Moslem movement deriving its name from the fact that, in the eyes of most Indian Mussulmen, the Sultan of Turkey, as Khalif of Islam, was the head of their religion.

During the war the Germans had played on the dislike of Indian Moslems for fighting the Turks, whose country they regarded as the bulwark of their faith, and had won a number of more extreme Indian Moslems to their cause. The movement thus launched for creating disaffection among Moslems in India was known as the Khilafat movement. Gandhi's idea was that, by supporting it, he would appeal to the Moslems and by demanding the punishment of those concerned in suppressing the Punjab disturbances he would appeal to the Hindus.

Tilak's death in August 1920 had left him as virtual leader of the Hindus. In this capacity, he set to work with the Ali brothers, the two most prominent Indian Moslem leaders of the Khilafat movement, to preach the need of Hindu-Moslem unity. It was as a direct and unintended result of this agitation that the Moplahs, a backward, fanatical Moslem community in the Madras Presidency, broke out in rebellion. The Moplahs, however, far from uniting with the Hindus, turned on them and slaughtered large numbers, while many more Hindus were forcibly converted to the Moslem faith. Other acts of violence also resulted from Gandhi's campaign on behalf of the Khilafat movement, and both Gandhi and the Ali brothers were

arrested and imprisoned for sedition before the agitation was finally brought to an end. This was in 1922, when the Turks themselves deposed the Sultan, abolished the Sultanate and nominated a nephew of the Sultan as Khalif only. The Khalifate itself was abolished two years later.

In the meantime, and partly in consequence of the excitement of the Khilafat agitation, the left wing of the National Congress had pledged itself in September 1920 to Gandhi's scheme for non-co-operation. By the close of that year it had completed its capture of the Congress. The hitherto declared adherence to the British connection and to constitutional methods was thereupon reversed and the history of the Congress as 'a native parliament' was brought to an end. From then on it became a party machine of the left wing. By this time too, it may be noted, the independence movement, which had still been confined to the intelligentsia at the outbreak of the war in 1914, had become a mass movement.

With revolutionary activity so much in the ascendant, it was hardly surprising that Soviet Russia and her Communist allies should have set about exploiting the situation, for here in India were all the concomitants of 'a revolutionary situation' such as Communism always seeks to create and exploit for its own ends. In an article written in October 1915, Lenin had forecast that a proletarian victory in Russia would create very favourable conditions for the development of revolution in Asia [4]; here in India were the conditions he had envisaged.

In one of its earliest pronouncements,¹ the newly-established Soviet government had advocated 'a complete break with the barbarous policies of bourgeois civilization, which builds the welfare of the exploiters and a few select chosen nations upon the enslavement of hundreds of millions of toilers in Asia'; a little more than a year later had come the Comintern declaration that nationalist movements in the East would receive its support, 'as they tend to upset the existing authority while not opposing revolutionary aspirations'.² Both the Comintern and the Russian Communist Party announced their decision to take steps to spread revolution in the East and, with this end in view, the Comintern set about establishing sections in Oriental countries. Other statements, in which India received specific mention, followed and Lenin, Zinoviev and other

¹ On 16th January 1918, quoted by Dallin in *The Rise of Russia in Asia*, p. 180.

² At First World Congress of Comintern, March 1919.

Soviet leaders made it clear that the aim was 'to break Britain's back in the East', as Britain was the principal obstacle to the success of their movement and should therefore be attacked in India. Thus, at the Baku Congress in September 1920, about which more will be said later, Zinoviev called for 'a holy war against British imperialism' and went on to say: 'We will throw a firebrand against its rulers; we will make life miserable for those brazen-faced British officers lording it over Turkey, Persia and India' [5].

It was not only to Indians as a whole that the Soviet posed as disinterested friends and deliverers. Like the Germans and Turks, they had quickly appreciated the possibilities of exploiting Indian Moslem sentiment on the Khilafat question and, at the same time, exploiting the Pan-Islamic movement.

Within a few weeks after its formation, the Soviet Government, on 17th December 1917, issued a manifesto 'To all toiling Moslems of Russia and the East', expressing its opposition to the seizure of foreign lands and to the partition of Turkey and declaring that 'Constantinople must remain in the possession of the Moslems' [6]. A year later, following the defeat of Germany and Turkey, Moscow stepped into the breach by taking the whole Pan-Islam movement under her wing, paying special attention to the Moslems of Turkestan and Afghanistan on the borders of India and establishing propaganda schools at Tashkent, an ancient seat of Moslem learning and culture and capital of Russian Central Asia [7].

It was at this point that developments in Afghanistan played into Soviet hands. In January 1919 came the murder of the Afghan ruler, Habibullah, who had always been friendly disposed towards the British, and his succession soon after by his third son, Amanullah, who usurped the throne after seizing and imprisoning his two elder brothers. This done he promptly entered into relations with Moscow. Kabul thereupon became a centre of intrigue between Soviet Russians and renegade Moslems from India. Moreover Amanullah himself, arrogant and ambitious, 'dreamed of assuming the Khalifate and posing as Head of the Islamic faith' and turned his attention to the Pan-Islamic movement, which Moscow was trying to exploit [8]. Of his unprovoked attack on the North-West Frontier of India, mention has already been made.¹

¹ For first-hand accounts of Soviet activities in these regions at this time the reader may be referred to Etherton's *In the Heart of Asia* and Bailey's *Mission to Tashkent*. Agabekov's *OGPU* throws some light on these activities at a slightly later period.

In the meantime, in India itself the promise of Soviet aid in the form of propaganda and organization was being welcomed by the extremists. They saw in this a golden opportunity to weaken the power of the government by strikes and mass disturbances, though the majority of them had no desire to be dominated by the masses. Some there were, however, who were prepared not to look a gift horse in the mouth and there were others even ready to embrace the Communist creed. Amongst these was a delegation which arrived in Moscow in December 1918 to seek aid against the British, and in July the following year Mahendra Pratap, who had been a member of the 'Provisional Indian Government' set up in Kabul with German assistance during the war, also arrived in the Soviet capital.

It was shortly after this that the Bengali agitator, M. N. Roy, who had fled to America in 1915 and had been indicted in the San Francisco conspiracy case in connection with his attempt to exploit the *Ghadr* Party on behalf of the Germans, arrived in Moscow on Lenin's invitation. He had come from Mexico, whither he had escaped after his indictment and where he had founded the first Communist Party outside Russia. On Moscow's instructions he took charge of a propaganda school in Tashkent, where he trained other Indian terrorists as agents and made attempts to contact India through the medium of Khilafat emigrants across the Afghan border. Later, having been appointed Head of the Eastern Department of the Comintern and of the Moscow Oriental University, he set about guiding the leftist movements in Asia in general. In this task he concentrated particularly on India and China, and in 1921 and 1922 he sent manifestoes to the Indian Congress, formulating leftist principles. In the latter years, however, he moved to Berlin as Comintern representative and, as such, maintained communication with five groups of Communists, which had been organized in Bombay, Lahore, Cawnpore, Calcutta and Madras [9]. Roy will figure again in these pages, but here we must leave him for the time being.

Amongst the five groups of Communists mentioned were some of the agents trained by Roy in Tashkent and infiltrated into India in 1921. Others trained by him continued to arrive in ones and twos, and in May 1923 two delegates of the *Ghadr* Party, who had attended the Fourth World Congress of the Comintern in Moscow the previous November, also returned to India to carry out schemes formulated in Kabul. Communism was therefore well launched on its task of exploiting the mass revolutionary movement into which

Gandhi, more successful in this respect than Tilak, had in effect transformed the middle-class nationalist agitation. Gandhi's theory and practice, however, were as different as could be from Marx's, and he was no lover of Communism. Time and again he was denounced by Moscow, his movement being branded, for example, at the Sixth World Congress of the Comintern in July 1928 as 'treason to the real cause of the working class in India', while he himself has been quoted by Roy as declaring: 'The doctrine of force can never be brought into harmony with our own outlook. The faith of Bolshevism is ruthless self-indulgence, whereas *Satyagraha* means self-restraint.' It was Gandhi's misfortune, and India's too, that his actions frequently served to create the 'revolutionary situation' which it is always the aim of Communism to bring about and exploit.

And here we must leave India for the time being, with its Communist-inspired industrial strikes of 1921, its Communist-inspired attempts to organize agrarian strikes, food riots, plunder of grain stores, assaults on large estates, and its renewal of terrorism in 1923. The formation of the All-Indian Trade Union Congress in 1920, with its strongly left-wing complexion, played its part in all this; and in February 1924, following a minor conspiracy in Peshawar the previous year, the first serious Communist conspiracy case occurred in Cawnpore. The conviction of four Indian Communists for sedition in connection with this case gave the movement in India a temporary setback but, even before the trial was ended, the Comintern had decided that a fully-fledged Indian Communist Party should be created, and by December 1925 the newly-formed Party was sufficiently developed to hold its first conference. In the meantime, Moscow had begun to divert its main attention in the East from India to China. Chicherin's statement in February 1924 that 'Future India must stand at the head of free Eastern republics', and similar statements by other Soviet leaders, showed clearly, however, that the Bolshevization of India continued to be regarded as one of the outstanding objectives of the directors of World Communism.

The year 1920 witnessed the first struggles of the working class in Ceylon. These took the form of strikes in Colombo, a leading part being played by some of those who, twenty-three years later, were to establish the Communist Party of Ceylon. In the years between these two events, Ceylon, like other Asiatic countries, was to have its share of social unrest, notably in the early 1930's. It was not, how-

ever, until 1932 that a secret revolutionary society first came into being, formed by a small body of intellectuals, most of whom had been educated in England.

Apart from India, Indonesia and Indo-China, the only country in South-East Asia to be affected to any great extent by Communist activities in the 1920's was Malaya. Even there the trouble was confined at that period almost wholly to Singapore and to a small section of Chinese in that city. The Malays themselves and a great majority of the Chinese and Indians in Malaya were affected hardly at all, as Communism made little or no appeal to them. The reason for this was correctly diagnosed by the well-known Javanese revolutionary, Tan Malaka, when he ruefully observed that the Malays appeared to be too 'lazy and contented' to be influenced by such a doctrine. The demand for national independence, which was being raised at this time in other colonial countries, was non-existent in Malaya and there was no indigenous grievance on the part of the peasantry or of urban labour for the Communists to exploit.

It was through the organized left wing of the Chinese KMT, under direction of the Comintern's Far Eastern Bureau in Shanghai, that Communism was introduced into Malaya, its introduction being a direct outcome of the rise of nationalism which made rapid progress in China after 1919. Just as the revolutionaries, who overthrew the Manchus and changed China into a republic, had received the whole-hearted support of Chinese in Malaya and other overseas territories, so too the KMT, in their bid for power as the spearhead of the Chinese Nationalist movement in the 1920's, had the full backing of these overseas Chinese communities. With the simultaneous rise of Communist and other radical sentiment in China, however, the KMT quickly developed a left-wing faction and it was under the aegis of its left-wing supporters in Malaya that Communism first made its appearance in the peninsula.

These left-wing elements in Malaya consisted at the start almost entirely of Hailam Chinese, natives of Hainan, who held a virtual monopoly in such occupations as domestic servants, restaurant and lodging-house keepers, food purveyors, and rubber estate coolies [10]. These Hailams had their own clubs and similar organizations, which soon became Communist-dominated; and in 1924, acting apparently at the instigation of the Canton Overseas Bureau of the KMT, which aimed at forming 'Red' trade unions and recruiting Communist youth by means of the Hailams, these clubs amalgamated to form the

Nanyang (South Seas) General Labour Union in Singapore. In this way, Communism began to take root in Malaya, although, for reasons already noted, it made slow progress. Until the 1930's it was, in fact, a negligible factor, and it was not until 1945 that it emerged as a real force.

It was as a centre for directing Communist activities in the neighbouring countries rather than as a centre for spreading Communism in Malaya itself that Singapore was used by the agents of Moscow in the 1920's, the Nanyang General Labour Union maintaining close touch with similar organizations in Indonesia and elsewhere. With this same object in view, a South Seas Provisional Committee, which soon after, in 1926, developed into the South Seas Communist Group¹ with a central office in Singapore, was established in that city in 1925 by the Chinese Communist Party. This committee was formed for the dual purpose of co-ordinating Communist activities in Malaya and South-East Asia in general and of providing a base from which Indonesian Communists could direct operations in the Netherlands East Indies. From then on until 1931, when a reorganization was carried out and the arrest of a Comintern agent led to widespread repercussions, Singapore was the centre of Communist intrigue for South-East Asia. Tan Malaka and Alimin from Indonesia, Ho Chi-Minh from Indo-China, M. N. Roy from India, and other leading Communists from elsewhere in South and East Asia, made full use of Singapore in pursuing their activities.

In the meantime, as a result of a conference of the South Seas Communist Group, which was held in Singapore in 1926 and was attended by delegates sent from Canton to lead and instruct this new organization, Hailam Chinese were busying themselves in organizing a Communist Youth Party and other left-wing bodies with a view to spreading Communism among Malayan Chinese. These left-wing bodies included night schools for adults, which were set up for the purpose of studying the works of Marx and Lenin and became hotbeds of subversive activity.

The first open manifestation of all this ferment was a fracas, which broke out in March 1927 on the occasion of the anniversary of the death of Sun Yat-Sen. This was followed by a boycott against the public transport system in Singapore, accompanied by rioting and violence and by the intimidation of individual Chinese workers who declined to take part. The same year also saw student demonstrations

¹ Sometimes referred to as the South Seas Communist Party.

and a further conference of the South Seas Communist Group, this meeting being the precursor of a spate of propaganda and of further attempts to create disorder and to whip up hatred of the police by means of mobs demanding the release of arrested comrades. Serious trouble, which developed in Singapore towards the close of the year, was finally suppressed by drastic action.

By this time, in addition to the purely Communist bodies, there was a strong, well-organized branch of the KMT in Malaya, drawing its membership mainly from the younger Chinese, who gave both moral and financial support to the national revolution in China. The split between the Chinese Communist Party and the KMT in the summer of 1927, however, had inevitable reactions in the Malayan branch of the KMT.¹ A similar split occurred in its ranks and in 1928 the radical elements were expelled. These thereupon came out in their true colours and organized themselves into a Malayan Communist Party, which was brought into being in embryo form that same year through the instigation and help of the Pan-Pacific Trade Union—a Comintern 'front' organization—and of the Malayan Revolutionary Committee of the KMT. The formal inauguration of the MCP as a fully-fledged party, however, did not take place till July 1931, and it remained illegal until the outbreak of the Pacific War in December 1941. Even to this day it is composed almost wholly of Chinese, as Communism has never had any great appeal for Malays who, both by nature and by virtue of their Moslem faith, are opposed to the Moscow creed.

Thanks to the fact that she served as a buffer state between the British and French spheres of interest in this area during the critical years of the nineteenth century when empire-building was still in full swing, Siam, unlike her neighbours, had been able to retain her independence. Siam has therefore never had a nationalist movement for the Communists to exploit. Moreover, Communism makes little appeal to the easy-going, pleasure-loving Siamese who, by and large, are contented with their lot. As in the case of Malaya, it was through the medium of the Chinese community that Communism was introduced into Siam; but this was not until the early 1930's.

¹ According to Purcell (*The Chinese in South-East Asia*, p. 359), the KMT in Malaya was suppressed in 1925 as being subversive. He also states, however (p. 362), that Sir Cecil Clementi, shortly after becoming Governor in 1929, ordered its dissolution on account of its anti-British activities.

CHAPTER VII

Communism Comes to China [1]

NATIONALISM of a sort had played its part in bringing about the overthrow of the Manchu dynasty in China and in the developments immediately following China's transformation into a republic in 1911. It was not, however, until 1919 that real nationalist fervour manifested itself for the first time.

The immediate cause of this outburst was the action of the powers at Versailles in agreeing to Japan's retention of the former German rights in Shantung. National sentiment was deeply stirred when this became known. Student demonstrations in Peking against this decision were followed by anti-Japanese boycotts in all the principal trading cities; three Ministers notoriously subservient to Japan had their houses burnt down and narrowly escaped with their lives; and the Peking government, scared by this manifestation of public opinion, instructed its delegation at Versailles to withhold its signature of the Peace Treaty so long as it contained the offending clause.¹ That government policy should be dictated in this way by public opinion was something hitherto unknown in modern Chinese history.

It was on 4th May 1919 that the student body in Peking gave the lead to this outburst of outraged national sentiment by demonstrating against 'this humiliating clause' in the Versailles Treaty. This

¹ Although the opening of the revolution that followed took the form of an anti-Japanese outburst, and although Sun Yat-Sen has been lauded by Nationalists and Communists alike as 'the father of the Revolution', it is perhaps pertinent to note that this 'curious, contradictory, domineering, inexplicable character'—to use the description of Dr Sun so aptly given by O. M. Green in *The Story of the Chinese Revolution* (p. 50)—still clung to the idea of close co-operation with Japan in the cause of Pan-Asianism to the end of his days. Speaking in Osaka in February 1951, Chiang Kai-Shek's chief representative in Japan recalled that Sun had declared in a speech in that same city on 18th November 1924, less than four months before his death, that 'the alliance of China and Japan was a spring-board for the ultimate union of the Asian nations for achieving political independence and economic prosperity' (see Central News dispatch dated Tokyo 21.2.51). Other striking statements made by Sun on this same occasion in 1924 are given by Dallin on pp. 207-9 of *The Rise of Russia in Asia*.

date has accordingly been regarded ever since as marking the day on which the Chinese National Revolution was launched, a revolution which was to be exploited to the full by the Communists in the years that lay ahead and was to bring them into power with almost nationwide support thirty years later.¹

With the possible exception of Indo-China, in no country has the successful exploitation of nationalism by Communism been more marked than in China which, along with Turkey and Persia, was classified by Lenin as a 'semi-colony' in an article written by him in August 1915. Of Russia's part in exploiting Chinese nationalist sentiment more will be said later; but here it should be noted that Moscow was quick to recognize the potentialities of the situation brought about by the outburst of resentment against the Shantung clause in the Versailles Treaty. Little more than two months after the student demonstrations in Peking, the Soviet government came out with its historic statement of 25th July 1919, offering 'to give back to the Chinese people all the power and authority which were obtained by the government of the Czar by entering into understandings with Japan and the Allies'. Although making no specific reference to Shantung, the announcement went on to say: 'The Soviet government has renounced all the conquests made by the Czarist government, which took away Manchuria and other territories from China'. By thus expressing its readiness to renounce all Russian rights in China, Moscow sought to appeal to Chinese national aspirations and, at the same time, to underline the difference between the new Soviet régime and the other powers in the matter of imperialism.

That the Chinese government, to which this proposal was addressed, did not at once accede to it was due to a variety of reasons which will be mentioned later; but when finally, five years later, China entered into formal diplomatic relations with Soviet Russia, Moscow's original offer had been modified to a considerable extent and the renunciation of Russian rights in China was only partial. The fact, nevertheless, that Russia alone of all the great powers had made the gesture of proposing complete renunciation was to pay big dividends in the years ahead.

¹ Mao Tse-Tung in his *On New Democracy* underlined the significance of these student demonstrations by declaring that 'The outstanding historical meaning of the May 4th Movement lies in its having a complexion still lacking in the revolution of 1911, in its being completely and uncompromisingly against imperialism and completely and uncompromisingly against feudalism'.

Greatly as this gesture was to influence the subsequent development of the Chinese National Revolution, it is important to note that this revolution was not at the outset, as in Russia, a revolt against social conditions. As emphasized by Borkenau [2], it was nationalism that inspired the revolution in China. There is much truth also in the observation, made by a Chinese commentator many years later, that 'Chinese Communism is a child of Chinese nationalism, which means mainly a determination to shake off foreign domination' [3]. That the Chinese Revolution which started in 1919 was always, both in its strictly nationalist phase and in its later Communist guise, fundamentally anti-imperialist is a fact that cannot be stressed too strongly if a proper understanding of its development is to be obtained.

It was not wholly fortuitous that students should have taken the lead in bringing nationalism to the fore in China. Since the turn of the century, increasing interest had been shown by the Chinese in educational reform. Not only in China itself, but amongst the Chinese communities in the neighbouring countries of South-East Asia as well, the Peking government had begun to interest itself in the matter of education. In so far as the overseas Chinese were concerned, this paternal interest in their education and general welfare was to have particularly important results in the years to come. This was because the consequent development of racial consciousness into ardent nationalism was to lead later to the doctrine that all Chinese living abroad were Chinese citizens, even though they were second or third generation Chinese, who had never been in China and had been brought up as citizens of Burma, Malaya, Indonesia or other land of birth.

In China itself, students reared under the education reform movement played an all-important part in awakening national consciousness and in spreading the ideals for which they stood; and from 1919 onwards the rise of the student body as a social and political force in China was to become one of the outstanding features of the Chinese National Revolution. This, however, was in reality merely an old phenomenon in a new form, for the success or failure of every new dynasty in Chinese history—and the nationalist régime which came into power as a result of this revolution was, in effect, a new dynasty—has always depended on the support of the *literati*. In this instance the students claimed the mantle of leadership traditionally worn by the *literati*. Thirty years later, the process was to be repeated when

the Communists came into power, for they too had the support of the student body. *Plus ça change, plus c'est la même chose.*

Two years prior to the student demonstrations of May 1919, an article by the scholarly Dr Hu Shih had led to the launching of the Literary Renaissance. The obscurantist literary style, which was unintelligible to the masses, was abandoned in favour of an idiom closer to the spoken language, and a great volume of thought and learning, never before available to them, was opened up to Chinese students. A further impetus was also given to the awakening of national consciousness and pride of country in contrast to the narrow local patriotism hitherto existing. As in the case of Japan fifty years earlier, when the restoration of the Emperor to full power had served to replace loyalty to individual feudal lords by loyalty to throne and country, so too in China did Hu Shih's Literary Renaissance help to make the educated classes regard themselves as sons and daughters of China rather than of the localized areas in which they and their forebears had been born and bred.

The Literary Renaissance, however, was not only to help the cause of nationalism; it was also to lead to the introduction of Communism in China. The editor of the magazine in which Hu Shih's article was published in January 1917 was Chen Tu-Hsiu, himself a scholar and member of a mandarin family. Accepting Hu's ideas with enthusiasm, he set to work to spread them far and wide by means of the new simplified written language and began posing the tasks of revolt more boldly and more clearly than anyone had done before. In particular he appealed to the youth of the country to break with the past, and before long he was introducing Marxism and setting up study groups, which were soon expanded into socialist societies. From these it was but a step to Communism, and in May 1920 a Communist group of seven was organized in Shanghai under the guidance of Mahring and Voitinsky, whom the Comintern had sent to China for the purpose. Mahring, be it noted, was none other than Hendricus Sneevliet, who had played so important a part in introducing Communism into Indonesia a year or so earlier. Other Communist groups were formed about the same time by Chinese students in France, Germany, Russia and Japan. Those in France included Chou En-Lai and Li Li-San, who were destined to figure so prominently in the years to come, while those in Germany included Chu Teh, who later was to be commander-in-chief of the 'People's Liberation Armies' which finally swept the Communists into power. Of those in Moscow the most

prominent was Chu Chiu-Pai, who was to succeed Chen Tu-Hsiu as secretary-general of the CCP in 1927.

Mao Tse-Tung, who was to become an even greater world figure, might well have been in one of these groups in Europe; but in 1917 when, as a student, he had the chance to be sent abroad for study, he deliberately refused the opportunity. Not until the close of 1949, when he went to Moscow to negotiate the thirty-year Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Aid with Russia, signed in February the following year, did he ever leave China. In that, he resembles Stalin who, unlike the makers of the Russian Revolution, Lenin and Trotsky, and unlike Mao's own principal lieutenants, spent his formative years in his own country. The parts played by Mao and Stalin in the Chinese and Russian revolutions respectively were undoubtedly influenced to an incalculable extent by the fact that, apart from two or three brief visits abroad by Stalin to attend meetings, neither of them left their own countries until after they had achieved power.

The seven Communists who came together in Shanghai in May 1920 were grouped around Chen Tu-Hsiu and all of them had played leading parts in the demonstrations of 4th May the previous year. Starting a proletarian paper, they quickly set to work to form trade unions. These soon came under Soviet influence through the activities of Voitinsky who, incidentally, had provided funds for the Communist publication and urged the formation of a Chinese Communist Party.

Following the organization of the Communist group in Shanghai, similar bodies appeared later in the year in Peking, Hankow and other Chinese cities; and on 1st July 1921 these various bodies joined together to form the Chinese Communist Party, the first National Congress of the Party being held at the same time in Shanghai. A number of Nationalists, some of whom denounced Communism soon after, attended this Congress. At it the leaders of the Party were chosen, including Chen Tu-Hsiu who was appointed secretary-general, and the upper level organization was determined. It was decided also to seek affiliation with the Comintern.

Small in numbers and working underground at the start, it was not until its alliance with the KMT in 1924 that the newly-formed Party made any great headway, and it was to suffer many ups and downs before finally gaining power in 1949.

When Moscow, in its attempt to obtain Chinese recognition of the

newly-established Soviet régime, made its offer in July 1919 to renounce all Russian rights and interests in China, it was to the Northern government in Peking rather than to Sun Yat-Sen's government in Canton that the proposal was mainly directed. There was, however, no official response from either. In part this was due to China's well-founded belief that this seemingly generous offer covered an ulterior design—a case of *Timeo Danaos et dona ferentes*. In part, also, it was due to pressure exerted on China by Japan and the Western powers, who were engaged in military operations against the Soviet at the time and were opposed to any recognition of this revolutionary régime in Russia. In September 1920, however, China withdrew its recognition of Czarist Russia and on the 17th of that month Moscow repeated its proposals of the previous year in more detail.

The Chinese war-lord Wu Pei-Fu had just taken over power in Peking when these proposals were put forward for the second time and it was with him that the Soviet tried at first to treat, as they were not at all impressed with Dr Sun and the KMT in Canton. The subsequent change in attitude was due to Mahring, who arrived in China in the spring of 1920¹ and quickly came to the conclusion that Moscow's best hope lay in an approach to the KMT. His conviction was strengthened when, on visiting Canton in January 1922 at the time of the Hong Kong seamen's strike, he discovered that the KMT had already established contact with the labour movement. He therefore proposed to the Chinese Communists that they should join the Nationalists.

On meeting Sun Yat-Sen in Shanghai in August that same year, he found him already beginning to change his views regarding the advisability of seeking the support of the masses. Previously he had been opposed not only to the idea of a class struggle but also to the participation of the masses in political life and to the use of a mass movement as a political weapon. In the meantime, however, he had been driven out of Canton by a revolt led by Chen Chiung-Ming and, although he owed his escape to safety to the British, who took him to Shanghai in a British warship, he felt himself aggrieved at the rebuffs and indifference which he considered he had suffered from the West.

¹ Some accounts give the time of Mahring's arrival as Spring 1920 and others as Spring 1921. As, however, he appears to have assisted Voitinsky in the organization and guidance of the Communist group formed in Shanghai in May 1920, it would seem that Spring 1920 is the more credible date.

The prospects of aid from Soviet Russia, therefore, began to attract him and he listened to Mahring's advice about the value of mass propaganda with greater interest than hitherto. As the Western powers had sought to isolate and destroy the Soviet régime and had therefore blocked Moscow's efforts to negotiate a treaty with China, he felt that, with the help of Soviet Russia, who by now had put an end to Western intervention and was master in its own house, it might be possible to extract concessions from the Western powers and Japan in China.

Mahring made note of all this and, on his return to Moscow in September 1922, reported his findings to the Comintern. As a result it was agreed to reverse the original idea of treating with Peking and, instead, to turn attention to Dr Sun and the KMT. Adolphe Joffe was accordingly sent to China to establish formal relations with him. A meeting took place in Shanghai and on 26th January 1923 a joint statement of far-reaching importance was issued. While it was mutually agreed that Communism and the Soviet system would be unworkable in China as conditions were unsuitable,¹ Joffe, on his part, considered that national unification and full independence were the paramount need for China. He promised Russian sympathy and support accordingly. The statement also stipulated that Russia would give up all former Czarist claims in Manchuria and declared that Russia had no desire to separate Outer Mongolia from China.²

With this promise of Russian support, the way was now clear for a rapprochement between the Communists, who looked to Moscow for guidance, and the KMT, who looked to the same source for help. Russia, however, was anxious to emphasize that the assistance came from herself and not from the Comintern. When, therefore, Michael Borodin arrived in Canton with his mission as adviser to the KMT in October that year, he came as the representative of the RCP(B)³ Politburo, not of the Comintern. The Communists, on the other hand, took their orders from the Comintern and it was on the in-

¹ Although the manifesto rejected 'Communism or even the Soviet system' as unsuitable for China, Sun subsequently agreed, after negotiations in the summer of that year between Joffe and Liao Chung-Kai, to adopt the Soviet system of party government and army organization—see Brandt (p. 66).

² How little reliance could be placed on Soviet promises was shown twenty-two years later when at Yalta she re-established her claims in Manchuria and made the separation of Outer Mongolia inevitable.

³ Russian Communist Party (Bolshevik), the name by which the present CPSU (Communist Party of the Soviet Union) was known from March 1918 until December 1925.

structions of that body that an agreement was reached whereby, while retaining nominal independence, the CCP would recognize 'the leading position' of the KMT.

In doing this they were acting contrary to the proviso made at the Second Comintern Congress in July 1920 by Lenin who, in showing how liberation movements in colonial and semi-colonial countries could be led to merge with international proletarian revolutionary movements, had emphasized that Communist co-operation with nationalist movements was only desirable provided that the Communists retained their full independence.¹ It was Stalin's readiness to agree to the CCP forgoing this important proviso that brought about his final split with Trotsky who, from the outset, had been strongly opposed to the subordination of the CCP to the KMT. It was the stand taken by Stalin on this vital principle, moreover, that proved nearly fatal to the CCP itself a few years later, although the blame for the débâcle of 1927 in China was to be laid on others by all good Stalinists. In the case of the CCP itself it was Chen Tu-Hsiu (who had done so much to bring that party into being and, in 1926, had tried in vain to urge the Comintern to permit the withdrawal of the CCP from its *entente* with the KMT), who was made the principal scapegoat. This, however, is looking ahead.

It was at their third Congress, held in Canton in June 1923, that the CCP, with a view to using the prospective alliance for propaganda purposes and for contact with the masses, decided to seek co-operation with the KMT in a national united front. This was in accordance with Comintern instructions, as Stalin and Bukharin, seeking to offset the loss of Russian prestige suffered by the Communist defeat in Germany, thought to retrieve matters by a Communist success in the East [4]. They had accordingly conceived the idea of creating in China a united front of national bourgeoisie, 'victims of foreign imperialist oppression', with peasants and workers. It only remained, therefore, for the KMT to give their approval of the proposed alliance; and this they did at their First National Congress, held in Canton in January 1924, when it was agreed that the Communists could join the Nationalist Party as individuals while the CCP itself should maintain its own independent

¹ 'The Communist International must join in a temporary alliance with the bourgeois democrats of the colonies and backward countries, but not merge with them, and must unconditionally preserve the independence of the proletarian movement even if it is in a quite incipient form.' Lenin, July 1920.

organization and be free to propagate its own views. The CCP, on its part, declared its determination to co-operate in the common fight against foreign imperialism and native reaction.

In the meantime Borodin, who had been busying himself in studying the situation ever since his arrival in Canton three months earlier, had realized and stressed the need of organization and reorganization. The basic principles for the reorganization of the KMT on Russian Communist Party lines were therefore formulated and approved at the January Congress, the necessary documents being drafted with the aid of Borodin and other members of his mission. It was agreed at the same time to organize a military cadet college at Whampoa, as Borodin rightly perceived that an army, properly trained and imbued with revolutionary fervour, was necessary for the Nationalist conquest of China. Five months later this college, which was to play an all-important part in the years ahead by training military leaders both of the Nationalist and Communist armies, was founded, with Galen (famous later as Marshal Blucher) and a number of other Russians as instructors and with Chiang Kai-Shek, who had been sent to Russia in August 1923 to study Russian organization, as commandant.¹

For the purpose of imbuing this Chinese Nationalist Army with revolutionary fervour, political commissars and Communist propaganda played as important a part in the training programme as did the purely military instructors. The parallel drawn between the value placed on revolutionary fervour by Communists and the value placed on religious fervour by Cromwell's Ironsides and by the Scottish Covenanters, or on 'seishin kyōiku' ('training in morale' or 'spiritual training') by the Japanese armed forces in more recent times, is obvious. In each instance it was, in effect, a recognition of Napoleon's famous dictum that 'the moral is to the physical as three to one'. It serves, moreover, to underline the fact that Communism derives much of its strength from the almost fanatical devotion of its adherents to its ideals. In this respect, therefore, one sees the curious anomaly that this essentially materialistic creed must be regarded as a spiritual force akin to a religion. Call it a pseudo-religion if you will,

¹ Louis Fischer, in the preface to the 2nd edition (1951) of *The Soviets in World Affairs* 1917-29, revealed for the first time that when Chiang was sent to Moscow in 1923, he carried a 'rigidly confidential' letter from Sun Yat-Sen to Lenin, Trotsky and Chicherin, asking for arms for the Chinese Nationalists. He also revealed that the Whampoa Military Academy was subsidized by the Soviet Government.

but an equal fervour must be invoked by any real religion that seeks to grapple with it and destroy it.

The emphasis placed by Borodin on the need of an army 'properly trained and imbued with revolutionary fervour' was not lost on Mao Tse-Tung, whose subsequent rise to power was due largely to his recognition of the fact that neither armed force by itself nor revolutionary zeal by itself could ever hope to achieve success for the Communist cause in China. The two must be combined. In addition, the army thus brought into being must, together with the Party, be identified with the masses, whose active co-operation was necessary for providing the Army with recruits, with essential supplies and information, and for other purposes. The doctrine of 'armed struggle' which he enunciated on this basis—a doctrine not unlike that applied by Lawrence of Arabia—and the methods which he evolved for its practical application will be described later in more detail. In spite of being criticized at one time by many Communists as unorthodox, this doctrine and its methods of application were, by the close of 1949, to receive the formal approval of Moscow as the model to be followed, wherever and whenever possible, by all Communist parties of South and East Asia. The dogmatists, who had been dubious of entrusting the future of the revolution to the population of backward rural areas, were shown to be wrong while Mao, with his recognition of the special importance of revolutionary bases and guerrilla warfare, was proved right. The outstanding feature of the Chinese Communist revolution—the feature which led to its ultimate success—was, in fact, that it was carried out for the most part by means of a prolonged struggle based on rural strongholds, not by uprisings in major cities or by operations like those by which Chiang Kai-Shek, through his northern expedition launched in July 1926, brought the Nationalist régime into being.

When Borodin, in 1924, put forward his proposal for the founding of the Whampoa Military College, Mao was still an unknown figure to the world at large. Even among his own fellow Chinese Communists he was looked on askance, for he had already begun to show signs of apparent deviation from strictly orthodox Marxist principles. Instead of concentrating on the urban proletariat as the natural field for Communist endeavour, he was beginning to interest himself in the peasant movement, which had been cradled in Haifeng, in the East River district of Kwangtung, by Peng Pai, a school teacher and son of a wealthy landlord. By the middle of 1923, a provincial peasant

association had been established in Kwangtung and by 1924, when the KMT was reorganized, the peasant movement, which was to play so important a part in the future rise of the Communists to power, had been duly launched [5].

Although Mao had been one of the eleven delegates who had sat down to draw up a platform for the new party at the time of its inauguration in the French Concession of Shanghai in July 1921, he was already preoccupied with peasant organization in his native province of Hunan and was, accordingly, considered 'a trifle peculiar, since the Comintern itself had declared that the base of the Chinese revolution would be the industrial proletariat of the cities' [6]. Two years later he broke sharply with Chen Tu-Hsiu, the secretary-general of the Party, on this peasant issue, as Chen held firmly to the orthodox view that the peasants were too diffused to provide a satisfactory foundation for a Communist revolution.

Following the rebuke levelled at him by Chen for his deviation on the peasant question, Mao mended his ways for a while. His belief in the value of the peasant movement, however, remained undiminished and reasserted itself when, in the summer of 1926, he was allowed to return to his native Hunan to head the Party's Peasant Bureau. There he proceeded to rouse the peasants to revolt against the landlords, and in support of this action submitted a report, *On the Peasant Movement in Hunan*, in April 1927 to the Fifth Congress of the CCP, which promptly rejected it. In this report he wrote with prophetic foresight:

•

'The present upsurge of the peasant movement constitutes an extremely important problem, since in the near future it must bring about a movement among several hundred million peasants throughout the rest of China. . . . The peasants will break down all that stands in their way and will hasten along the road to emancipation. All revolutionary parties and all revolutionaries will be put to the test by these masses.'

Today this report is regarded as one of the inspired writings of Chinese Communist literature and Chinese Communists go out of their way to aver that the peasant basis of the CCP is strictly and orthodoxly proletarian;¹ but at the time it was written, it was an

¹ That the facts are by no means palatable to orthodox Marxists, however, is indicated by the way in which the 1952 edition of Mao's *Collected Works* omits the passage in his 1927 report on the peasant movement in Hunan in which he said that the peasants did 70 per cent of the work in the revolution, i.e. that the 'revolutionary vanguard' was not the urban proletariat but the poor peasantry.

offence to orthodox Communist susceptibilities and was considered as clear evidence that Mao had returned to the error of his old ways. As a result he was removed from his post on Borodin's advice and was, in effect, banished by being ordered to Szechuan. He contrived, however, to evade the order and, after organizing an unsuccessful peasant rising in Hunan against the landlords in the autumn of 1927,¹ took to the hills of his native province and remained, both physically and politically, 'in the wilderness' until 1931, by which time—such is the way of Communist orthodoxy—most of those who had denounced him for deviationism had themselves come under the stigma of deviation or had been killed or imprisoned by the Nationalists. By January 1935 he had been formally elected head of the Party, a position he has held ever since, and five years later, in enunciating the fundamental principles of 'China's New Democracy', he was able to declare that 'China's revolution is a revolution of the peasantry; . . . the politics of New Democracy is in essence the politics of the transfer of power to the peasantry.'

¹ Known as the Autumn Harvest Rising or Insurrection.

CHAPTER VIII

From Socialism to Communism in Japan

IN contrast to China, where nationalism and Communism were closely allied in their opening stages and where, even now, Communism is strongly tinged with nationalist sentiment, the Japanese brand of nationalism has always, by virtue of its intense devotion to the throne and its inherent dislike and distrust of Russia, been bitterly antipathetic to Communism. Even socialism has been regarded with deep distrust by the great majority of Japanese until relatively recently, and when the first Socialist Party was established in 1901 it was promptly suppressed.¹ On the other hand, the labour movement, which came into being towards the close of the last century, met with little interference until the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War in 1904 and it was not until the discovery of the Kotoku bomb plot in 1910 [1] that everything even remotely savouring of socialism became regarded as a danger to the state and therefore a thing to be crushed with the greatest vigour. As a result, the socialist movement was driven underground and for the next few years little was heard of it. Beneath the surface, however, considerable activity was taking place and a class of malcontents, with a grudge against the existing order of society, was coming into being.

The atmosphere of comparative quiet was, in fact, deceptive and indications of the growing spirit of unrest among the working classes were to be seen in the outbreak of industrial strikes and peasant disputes. Some of these, though not all, were clearly the outcome of

¹ Even as far back as 1882 a Japanese journal had warned its readers of such subversive doctrines as nihilism and socialism and had asked why ideas of this kind were springing up in Japanese minds. That same year had seen the formation and prompt suppression of a so-called Far East Socialist Party at Shimabara in Kyushu, the southern island of Japan. Other small-scale socialist movements were started by workers in 1883 and 1884. They too were suppressed. (See Sir George Sansom's *The Western World and Japan*, pp. 460-1).

socialist influence, and some idea of the extent to which the spirit of unrest had developed was revealed in 1918 when rice riots broke out on a large scale. In no less than forty-two provinces the houses of large landlords were attacked and burned down by infuriated peasants, who inflicted 192 casualties on the police, soldiers and firemen brought in to deal with the situation. In addition, large numbers of civilians were injured, these civilian casualties being put officially at ninety-two, although this was regarded at the time as a very definite under-estimate.

These riots, it is true, were largely spontaneous. For the most part they reflected the feelings of the masses, who had been severely hit by the high cost of living, towards one particular section of the community. This was the *narikin* or war profiteers, who had sprung into such prominence since 1914. An indication that certain militant elements and agitators were at work was seen, nonetheless, in the fact that printed appeals for action had appeared in a number of places [2].

The spirit of social unrest which manifested itself in the riots of 1918, however, was not due solely to resentment against the war profiteers or to its exploitation by a radical minority. Its roots went deeper, to the rapid industrialization of the country, which had been proceeding at an ever-increasing pace since the turn of the century. As in the industrial revolution in England, so in Japan did the change from agriculture to commerce and industry, with the consequent drift from country to town, bring discontent and unrest in its train. The peasant, hitherto the mainstay of the country, felt disgruntled at the way in which everything was being done for the encouragement of industry and little or nothing for the rural areas, while he himself had to bear an increasingly heavy burden in taxes and rents. The student, whose family had sacrificed everything to enable him to receive a university education with a view to his qualifying for a post in the government service or in one of the great industrial or commercial undertakings which were rapidly springing up, felt equally resentful on discovering, all too often, that the supply of educated youngsters was far in excess of the number who could be absorbed into 'white collar' jobs. The creation of this growing army of 'unemployed intellectuals', with a grievance against society for failing to provide employment commensurate with their educational attainments, was, by the early 1920's, a serious problem. Industrialization, moreover, brought with it a rapid increase in population, with its

attendant evils of unemployment and overcrowding. It brought about also the gradual break-up of the long-established family system, which had always in the past been such a stabilizing factor in Japan. Instead of enjoying somewhat feudal relations between master and man, in which the exercise of a paternal despotism by the employer was largely mitigated by his personal interest in the welfare of his employee, the newly-created industrial worker had to slave and toil for the enrichment of an impersonal capitalist.

The undercurrent of dissatisfaction and unrest resulting from Japan's industrial revolution and from the high cost of living was increased still further by the political awakening induced by the war, by the Russian Revolution, and by the growing talk of the people's rights and of the blessings of democracy. While, however, economic causes and the introduction of a flood of cheap Russian and socialist literature served to foment the growing spirit of unrest, discontent was directed primarily against the bureaucracy, the war profiteers, and the governing classes. Except in the case of a handful of radicals, it was in no way anti-dynastic. When, therefore, Communism began to appear, it met with little support; and during the 1920's Communist Party membership never rose above 1000. It was not until after Japan's defeat in 1945 that Party membership made any spectacular advance. Even then, the growth in membership was greatly handicapped by the fact that the anti-Emperor slogans of the Party were abhorrent to large numbers of Japanese who, in other respects, were sympathetic towards Communist aims.

In the years immediately following the conclusion of the First World War, it was among the students and intellectuals, rather than among labour elements, that advanced social theories took the greatest hold. The Bolshevik Revolution in Russia, the rice riots of 1918, and a succession of serious industrial strikes which followed, attracted their attention to the study of social science. In universities and high schools social study groups were formed and the works of Karl Marx, which had hitherto been banned from publication in Japan but were now allowed to appear on sale for the first time, became 'best sellers'.¹ The labour movement which, under liberal leadership, had always tended towards moderation, could not hope to escape the infection. It, too, became affected for a time and, under

¹ In 1919 Takabatake's translation of Kautsky's exposition of Marx's *Das Kapital* into Japanese was published for the first time and quickly became a popular favourite.

the instigation of these groups of 'parlour Bolsheviks' and re-emerged Socialists, turned increasingly radical. Syndicalism was introduced in 1919 as the guiding principle of Japanese labour¹ and three years later was supplanted by Communism. Fortunately this phase was short-lived; and the formation of a labour government in England in 1924, followed a year later by the introduction of universal manhood suffrage in Japan, served to turn the thoughts of Japanese labour leaders from achieving their aims by revolution to obtaining them by evolution and constitutional means.

It was towards the end of 1918 that Moscow took its first definite step towards introducing Communism into Japan. This was in November of that year, when the First Congress of Communist Organizations of the East, which had been convened in the Soviet capital and concerned itself mainly with Central Asia, decided to establish a Japanese Division in its Department of Propaganda. Supplementing this decision, *Pravda* announced two months later that the Japanese Socialist groups had been officially invited to attend the First World Congress of the Comintern, scheduled for March 1919. Those attending this gathering included the veteran Japanese Socialist, Katayama Sen. More than three years were to pass, however, before the Japanese Communist Party was formally inaugurated. An attempt to prepare the way for the formation of such a party was seen, nevertheless, in the autumn of 1920, when one of the outstanding Japanese extremist leaders, Osugi Sakae (whose death at the hands of a Japanese gendarme officer during the confusion following the disastrous earthquake of 1923 was to cause something of a sensation), was invited to a secret conference in Shanghai. There he received Comintern funds with which to launch activities in Japan, mainly by starting the publication of a left-wing paper.

One of the editors of this new venture was Kondo Eizo who, with Osugi, had translated the Communist Manifesto into Japanese. This had been published in November 1904 in the *Heimin Shimbun*, which had promptly been suppressed in consequence. In 1922 he was to figure as one of the founders of the Japanese Communist Party and later he became a member of the Comintern Secretariat in Moscow; but, like Takabatake, the translator of Kautsky's exposition of

¹ As against those who looked to political and trade union action for a solution of labour's problems, the Syndicalists rejected political action in favour of strikes and the seizure of power by trade unions.

Marx's *Das Kapital*, and like many of the radicals of the 1880's, Kondo subsequently executed a *volte face* and became an extreme Nationalist.

The tendency to go from one extreme to another has, in fact, always been a notable feature among Japanese radicals. Thus, in the 1920's, Akao Toshi and other former anarchists forsook their old creed and established the ultra-nationalist *Kenkokukai* (National Foundation Society), which proclaimed as its object 'the creation of a genuine people's state based on unanimity between the people and the Emperor', paid tribute to state socialism and espoused the cause of Pan-Asia with Japan 'at the head of the coloured peoples' [3]. In like manner the 1930's were to see the defection of such outstanding Communist leaders as Sano Gaku and Nabeyama Sadachika, who gave, as the reason for their recantation, their gradual realization that the Comintern was no more than an organ of the Kremlin and their disgust with the Party's 'abject submission to the Soviet Union'.

Over 500 of the Communist Party's rank and file are said to have followed their example for the same reason. And so it came about that in the 1920's and 1930's, as in the 1880's, national sentiment proved stronger than left-wing ideology when put to the test. Any forecasts for the future of Communism in Japan should surely take this characteristic into account.

Plans were drawn up in May 1920 by a group of twenty-nine Marxists, anarchists, Socialists and syndicalists to create a Socialist League, but the attempt to inaugurate it in December was promptly suppressed by the Japanese authorities, who dealt similarly with a second attempt made in May the following year.

The year 1920 was also marked by the sudden spread of anarchist doctrine in Japan. Anarchism, it will be recalled, had been brought into prominence by the Kotoku Plot in 1910; but although certain intellectuals had interested themselves subsequently in Kropotkin's social and political conceptions, it was not until early 1920 that the doctrine had begun to be widely known and understood in Japan. In January that year, however, a professor at the Tokyo Imperial University published a scholarly article on the subject, and both he and his publisher were promptly dismissed, indicted and in due course imprisoned. It was the publicity given to this affair that aroused interest throughout the country in anarchist ideas.

The years 1920-22 also saw further developments in the efforts to

launch a Communist movement in Japan. The Baku Congress of Nations of the Orient was held in September 1920 and was attended by a Japanese delegate, Yoshihara Taro, and in the spring of 1921 Kondo Eizo, who was later to figure as one of the bitterest opponents of Communism, visited Shanghai to seek further Comintern support. On his return to Japan he set to work to organize a Communist body, which was to be the forerunner of the eventual Communist Party; but as he failed to secure the anticipated support of the left-wing leaders, the Comintern sent a secret Chinese emissary to Japan with more funds and instructions.

This agent also had the task of selecting promising young Japanese representatives for the First Congress of the Toilers of the East, which was opened in Moscow in January 1922 for the declared purpose of considering how to strengthen the Communist movement in Asia as a whole. The important part allotted to Japan by the Comintern leaders in the scheme to achieve this aim was soon made clear at this meeting; for not only was the Japanese delegation given the signal distinction of being received by Stalin in person, but Zinoviev made an impassioned appeal to them. Declaring that the Japanese proletariat held in its hands 'the key to the solution of the Far Eastern question' and that 'the defeat of the Japanese bourgeois and the final victory of the revolution in Japan' was essential for this solution, he stressed that it was up to the young Japanese proletariat to bring this about.¹

The Japanese delegation attending this Congress included two young Japanese who were to spring into international prominence twenty odd years later. One of these was Nozaka Sanzo, who, after nine years of exile in Moscow and five in the Chinese Communist war-time capital of Yenan, returned to Japan at the end of 1945 to head the newly-revived Japanese Communist Party. The other was Tokuda Kyuichi who, after seventeen and a half years in a Japanese prison, was released by the Allies after the collapse of Japan and became the fiery secretary-general of the Party on its resuscitation. Although both of them had attended the Far Eastern Conference at Irkutsk in 1921, they were still unknown to the world at large at the time of the Congress in Moscow in January 1922.

Before leaving this Congress they received the draft of a party

¹ Six months earlier, at the Third World Congress of the Comintern, Zinoviev had laid similar stress on the importance of Japan to the world revolutionary movement.

platform, party regulations, and funds from the Comintern; and on their return to Tokyo they held a secret meeting with left-wing leaders to discuss the implementation of Moscow's instructions and set to work to prepare the formal inauguration of the Japanese Communist Party. This took place on 15th July that year, and thenceforward, to quote an illuminating passage in an article by the authoritative American research workers, Paul Langer and Rodger Swearingen, appearing in the December 1950 issue of *Pacific Affairs*:

'Russian control, exerted through the Comintern and at times through official diplomatic agencies, constituted the most important single influence on the course followed by the Japanese Communist Party. Throughout the history of the Party, none of its basic policies has originated in Japan. Both of the fundamental documents which guided Party strategy until the spring of 1950 were conceived and written in Moscow. The circumstances attending the formulation of these documents, known as the "1927 Bukharin Thesis" and the "1932 Thesis", illustrate the Party's absolute subordination to foreign control.'

The history of the Japanese Communist Party since its formal inauguration in July 1922¹ has been a stormy one. Eleven months after its formation its dissolution was ordered by the Government and most of its leaders, including Tokuda and Nozaka, were arrested. These arrests were disastrous for the Party organization, and thereafter those who escaped met in Shanghai, where the Comintern had established its Far Eastern Bureau, or in Moscow, to plan reorganization. Tokuda, who was released from prison in December 1923 owing to ill-health and resumed activities by organizing unions and editing a Party paper, made his way to Moscow in December 1925 and, on his return to Japan, proceeded to call strikes to test the power of the Communists. Nozaka also obtained his release after a time and in May 1925, after breaking away from the Japanese Federation of Labour, which had become too moderate for his liking, formed a new and more radical labour body, the Trade Union Council. Osugi, who apparently had evaded arrest in the general round-up of Communist leaders in June 1923, was less fortunate. In the general confusion following the disastrous earthquake of 1st September that year, he and a large number of left wingers were arrested. With his wife and young nephew he was

¹ The Japanese Communist Party was formally accorded recognition as a branch of the Comintern at the Fourth World Congress of that body in Moscow in November 1922.

murdered in prison on 16th September by a gendarme officer, Captain Amakasu, who considered he was doing a patriotic act by ridding his country of such subversive elements.¹

As the year 1923 was drawing to a close, there occurred an incident which confirmed the authorities in their determination to root out all radical thought. On 17th December, while the Prince Regent was on his way to address the Diet, a young man named Namba Daisuke, imbued with the idea that regicide was a short cut to reform, fired at him. By good fortune the aim was poor and the Prince escaped unscathed. Many months were spent in trying to extract from the would-be assassin the names of confederates or associates, but Namba resolutely refused to implicate anyone and was eventually sentenced to death and hanged on 15th November 1924. The incident, however, brought anarchism to an end. It led also to further severity and repression, and in April the following year the government enacted a Peace Preservation Law. Under this law it was forbidden to organize, join, or induce others to join any society which aimed at altering the national constitution or repudiating the system of private property.² The maximum penalty for violation of this law was imprisonment for ten years. Three years later, in 1928, it was revised and the crime in question was made punishable by death.

Despite the increasing severity of the measures taken against them, the Communists continued to plan the revival of their Party and, under Comintern instructions, reorganized it once more in February 1924, only to have it dissolved again the following month. It was in order to seek the Comintern's views on this dissolution that Tokuda went to Moscow towards the end of 1925.

In the meantime the grant of Manhood Suffrage in March that year, following as it did the formation of a labour government in England, had, as already noted, given an impetus to constitutional methods in the Japanese labour movement. The immediately succeeding years, therefore, saw the establishment of a succession of parties claiming to represent urban and rural labour; but owing

¹ For a full account of this gruesome affair and of the fate of other left wingers arrested at this time, see Morgan Young's *Japan Under Taisho Tenno*, pp. 299-301.

² It is of interest to compare this law, aimed at Communism, with the famous Edict issued by Iyeyasu some 300 years earlier, in 1614, against the spread of Christianity in Japan. Like Communism three centuries later, the Christian religion was denounced on the grounds that it sought to 'change the government of the country' and imperilled 'the safety of the state'.

to their penetration by Communists, who used them as 'fronts' through which to work for their own purpose, most of these parties were dissolved or split almost as soon as they were formed.

One feature peculiar to Japan calls for special note: the difference between the emergence and growth of the Communist movement in Japan and its origins and development in other countries of South and East Asia. With the exception of Siam, which has always prided itself on being an independent state, all those other countries were, at the time that Communism was first introduced into them, wholly or partly under foreign domination. China, like Egypt and Persia, was, in Soviet terminology, a 'semi-colony'; all the others were 'colonies'. In each one of these countries a nationalist movement was already in being, striving to attain eventual political independence. It was Moscow's aim to incite these nationalist movements into revolutionary action in the cause of national liberation and, by playing on the anti-imperialist theme, to provide nationalism and Communism with a common slogan and common enemy. To a greater or less extent, therefore, Communism in each instance developed out of these nationalist movements, of which it was, in effect, the left wing. Not only, in fact, did it become an offshoot of nationalism but, in the earlier stages, it operated as a natural ally of nationalism and was often almost indistinguishable from it.

In Japan the circumstances were entirely different. After being forced out of their 230-year-old policy of self-imposed seclusion in the 1850's, the Japanese, it is true, had to undergo the humiliation of having certain of their sovereign rights restricted for a period of some forty years. In the Communist jargon of later years she was, in fact, reduced to semi-colonial status during the greater part of the second half of the nineteenth century. Extraterritoriality was imposed by the Treaty of 1858, foreign troops were garrisoned in Japan until 1871, and it was not until 1899 when, after several years of agitation, the treaties were revised and judicial and tariff autonomy were attained, that full national independence was restored once more.

It was as a result of the feelings aroused in the 1880's by the question of treaty revision that the early radicals and advocates of popular rights had turned to ultra-nationalism. It was from the goadings of the leaders of the super-patriotic cult, which these advocates of social reform initiated, that Japan later turned her attention to territorial aggrandisement and imperialism. It was under the impact of these same goadings that finally she tried to set herself up,

with such disastrous results, as leader of the Pan-Asian movement against Western domination. It might almost be said, therefore, that in Japan it was socialism that gave birth to extreme nationalism and not, as in other countries of South and East Asia, socialism and Communism that developed from left-wing nationalism.

By the way in which, unlike so many other Asiatic nations, she had avoided falling wholly under foreign domination and by the way in which, unlike China, she secured the restoration of full independence in so short a space of time, Japan showed great skill and perspicacity. She had quickly perceived that the secret of the white man's success was military strength and that this was largely derived from industrialism and its application to modern weapons and methods of warfare. She had accordingly set herself to master both the technique and the political ideas of the West. As a result, she was able to reorganize her social structure in such a way as to facilitate co-operation with the West on equal terms. A nationalist movement of the kind common to most of the countries of South and East Asia in the 1920's was, therefore, non-existent in Japan. Moreover, as she had abolished feudalism in 1871, achieved the restoration of full independence twenty-six years later, and become an imperialist power before the close of the century, the slogans of anti-feudalism and anti-imperialism, which served to link Communism and nationalism among her fellow-Asiatics after the close of the First World War, made no appeal to the Japanese at large.¹

The fact is, of course, that nationalism provides a tool both for Communism and for reaction. Japan's brand of nationalism lent itself to the latter; and so the ultra-nationalist bodies, which later were to exploit national sentiment against the West with such disastrous results, devoted most of the 1920's to attacking Communism and anything even remotely savouring of left wing principles. This included liberalism in all its forms.

¹ It is significant, however, that since 1948 the Japanese Communist Party has attempted to steal the nationalist thunder by means of the slogan 'racial independence'. This was made all the easier for them at the start, because all the ultra-nationalist bodies had been suppressed in October 1945 at the outset of the Allied occupation of Japan. With the signing of the peace treaty in September 1951, however, the ultra-nationalists began coming out into the open once more, and by 1953 were making common cause with the Communists in anti-American tirades and protestation, not only against the retention of American troops and bases in Japan, but also against the special privileges accorded to them and against what they called the 'Finance Occupation' which had succeeded the 'Army Occupation'.

It was in their censure of their country's foreign policy that these self-styled patriots were later to exert so reprehensible an influence on Japanese national sentiment. Accusations of 'weak-kneed policy' were increasingly bandied around and successive governments were taken to task for alleged subservience to the Western powers and for weakness towards China. In this attitude towards the West and in this alone they showed something in common with the Communists, for it was based largely on the colour question which they, like the Communists, exploited to the full. Politically, Japan was on equal terms with the West; but, following their defeat of the Russians in 1905, the Japanese, rightly proud of the position they had achieved in the comity of nations by their own efforts, became increasingly sensitive on the score of colour prejudice and colour discrimination and resented the air of superiority adopted by so many white men towards the coloured races. Such measures as the White Australian policy and the American Immigration Law of 1924 in which, by implication, the Japanese on account of the pigmentation of their skins were made to appear as 'lesser breeds without the Law', were like wormwood and gall to Japan's *amour propre*. From this feeling of resentment arose the Pan-Asiatic movement, the development of which, with Japan as its leader against the haughty West, has been described in an earlier chapter.

No study of the development and growth of nationalism and Communism in South and East Asia would be complete if it failed to note the part played by Japanese ultra-nationalism and the colour question. From these two sources grew the Pan-Asiatic movement, which exerted so much influence on Asiatic nationalism; and it was by exploiting this Asiatic nationalism that Communism was able to obtain its first foothold in Asia. Paradoxically, therefore, colour-conscious Japanese ultra-nationalists, the most bitter opponents of Communism in their own country, created an ideal climate for Communist success.

One other country calls for attention—Korea, which was annexed by Japan in 1910 and was therefore under foreign, though not under Western, domination like the other Asiatic colonies and semi-colonies.

The Koreans had never taken kindly to their Japanese masters. Large numbers had therefore crossed the border into Manchuria or Eastern Siberia or emigrated elsewhere rather than live under

Japanese rule. It was not, however, until the close of the First World War that, under the stimulus of President Wilson's enunciation of the principle of self-determination and the ferment caused by the Bolshevik Revolution, a full-scale independence movement developed. It was launched on 1st March 1919 and the accompanying anti-Japanese demonstrations continued until mid-April, when drastic action by the Japanese authorities brought them to a halt for the time being. Sporadic outbursts occurred thereafter in various localities, but the severe measures adopted against them by the Japanese from then on put a stop to further open manifestations of discontent on a large scale. The nationalist movement, directed mainly by Korean refugees in the French Concession in Shanghai, was driven underground.

Like the nationalist movements in other Asiatic countries, the Korean movement was, at the outset, essentially bourgeois, but the Communists were not slow to exploit it. Korean exiles in Eastern Siberia had, in fact, started a Communist movement of their own early in 1918, a year before the independence movement was launched in Korea itself. Under the leadership of one Li, they formed a Communist group known as the Irkutsk Party and thereby claimed to have created the first national Communist movement in any country outside the USSR. War with Japan and co-operation with Russia were the two main planks of their party platform [4]. It was not, however, until 1925 that a Korean Communist Party was formed in Korea.

In the meantime, while these and other Communist developments were in progress, an independent Korean provisional government had been organized by the 3,000 or so Korean exiles in Shanghai. Syngman Rhee, who was to figure so prominently as head of the South Korean government which came into being after the collapse of Japan twenty-five years later, was elected president. This provisional government, established in 1920, was split into two groups, one of which looked to the United States and the West for support, while the other looked to Russia and to their fellow-exiles in Siberia and Manchuria. The embryo of the situation which came into being after the Second World War was already starting to develop.

By 1924 the Irkutsk Party, which reflected the outlook of this second group, had extended its activities to Korea and Manchuria, where Communist influence came to play a growing part. Koreans, both those in their own country and those in exile, however, were

influenced in the years that followed not only by Marxist ideology but also by the nationalist movement in China, and many of those in exile joined the KMT forces and training centres. In Manchuria, where the bulk of these exiles had gone to live, two revolutionary groups existed until suppressed by the Japanese after the Japanese incursion into Manchuria in September 1931. Many of their members thereupon joined the Chinese guerrillas in their fight against Japan.

In the meanwhile the Far Eastern Bureau of the Comintern in Shanghai had established a special Korean section, and it was under the aegis of this body that the Korean Communist Party was formally established in Seoul on 17th April 1925. During a brief three years of existence as an organized body, it was composed mainly of petty bourgeois intelligentsia. With national independence as the ultimate goal, this preponderant bourgeois element made it its principal aim to offer organized resistance to the Japanese. This was in marked contrast to the sporadic, unco-ordinated and purely local outbursts, which were all that the Korean nationalists had been able to produce hitherto. Concentration on the task of resisting the Japanese rather than on pursuing the ideals of Communism, however, was not Moscow's idea of the function of a Communist Party. The disbandment of the Korean Communist Party was accordingly ordered in June 1928; but even without such orders, the combination of Japanese repressive measures and the inherent instability of the petty bourgeois intelligentsia constituting its core had served by this time to bring the Party virtually to an end as an organized body. Seventeen years were to pass before it was re-established on a firm basis.

controlling the disturbances, which were largely the work of excitable youths and criminal elements who had armed themselves with weapons and equipment taken from the Japanese.

This, however, was but a passing phase. Of far more lasting consequence was the way in which the political organization of the future Republic of Indonesia was being built up. The last two months of 1945, in fact, saw the birth or rebirth of all the main political parties which contend for power in Indonesia today—the *Masjumi* with its essentially Islamic basis; the PNI (Nationalist Party) with its secular and nationalist basis and leftist leanings; the Socialist Party, whose offspring, the Indonesian Socialist Party, like its Indian counterpart, was to attract some of the best brains in the country but was to prove sadly sterile by virtue of having too little following among the masses; and last, but by no means least, the PKI, the Indonesian Communist Party. Each of these parties reflected one or more of the outstanding and often conflicting features of Indonesian life and thought—the teachings of Islam and Marx and the exuberance of nationalism. Until the long-postponed elections in September 1955, the *Masjumi* was always thought to be the largest of these parties. It remained for the 1955 elections, the first ever held in Indonesia, to show that the PNI commanded a larger following, although this was due mainly to a split which had occurred in the *Masjumi* in April 1953, when the more right wing Moslem elements had broken away to form a separate party of their own, the *Nahdatul Ulama*.

These early months also saw the birth of a number of those organizations which, with their portmanteau names, present such a bewildering array of seemingly incomprehensible initials to the uninitiated. Most of them had fissiparous tendencies and were constantly splitting up and forming new bodies; but some of them, like the PESINDO and the BKPRI and, later, the SOBSI and SARBUPRI, were destined to play an all-important part in the trade union, youth and Communist movements.¹ The PESINDO (Indonesian Socialist Youth), which was founded at a congress held in November 1945 and was reorganized as the *Pemuda Rakjat* (People's Youth) five years later, was headed by a Communist, and

¹ The name SOBSI is derived from the initial letters of the Indonesian rendering of this body, *Sentral Organisasi Buruh Seluru Indonesia*. BKPRI is likewise composed of initial letters. PESINDO, on the other hand, is a shortened form of *Pemuda Socialis Indonesia*, and SARBUPRI is a similar portmanteau word.

at the outset was composed largely of graduates of the war-time Japanese-sponsored youth schools. The BKPRI (All-Indonesian Republic Youth Congress), which came into existence about the same time, was later to become the Indonesian affiliate of the WFDY, the World Communist Front youth organization. SOBSI (Central Organization of All-Indonesian Labour), though not formally inaugurated until November 1946, was to outrank all other organizations in strength and importance and, coming increasingly under Communist control, has been affiliated to the WFTU since May 1947. By that time it claimed a membership of 1,200,000, and it was later to attain more than double that strength. The SARBUPRI (Estate Workers' Union) came into being shortly after SOBSI and, like it, soon came under strong Communist influence.

One other body which was established about the same time calls for mention because of its link with the World Communist Front organizations. This was the National Union of Indonesian Students. Created as the result of a resolution passed at a students' congress in Malang in March 1947, it became an affiliate of the IUS shortly after its formation. By the time, therefore, that the Cominform was created in October that year, three of the four principal World Communist Front organizations, which that mouthpiece of Moscow was to use as 'transmission belts', already had their branches in Indonesia. The fourth, the WIDF (Women's International Democratic Federation), was to have its Indonesian affiliate later.¹

Whilst nationalist exuberance was reflected in the creation of all these political parties and organizations the Communists were taking full advantage of the situation brought about by the collapse of Japan, the declaration of independence, and the general aftermath of close on four years of war. Opinion among them, it is true, was divided, the more orthodox being opposed, at that stage, to the use of violence to achieve their aims. War-time concentration on anti-Fascism to the virtual exclusion of anti-capitalism still lay heavy upon them and, lacking a direct lead from Moscow, they were slow to readjust themselves to the changing situation. The fact that Sukarno and Hatta, who now headed the new Republic, had collaborated with the Japanese 'Fascists' during the war made most Communists hesitant to support them fully in their struggle against the Dutch. Amongst the less orthodox Communists, however, there

¹ The WPC (World Peace Council), which today may be said to rank above all four of these in importance, is not included here, as it was not formed until later.

was no such hesitation. On the contrary, they wanted the Republican leaders to oppose the Netherlanders more vigorously.

Most active of these unorthodox elements at the start was the former Communist leader Tan Malaka who, though looked on askance by his orthodox comrades on account of his break with Moscow, had lost none of his enthusiasm for proletarian revolution or for getting rid of the Dutch. To assist his purpose he attempted to persuade Sukarno and Hatta, who had been selected as president and vice-president respectively, to nominate him as sole political heir in the event of their being either killed or imprisoned. On their refusal to do so, he proceeded to forge their signatures to a document which he himself drew up, transferring all power to him alone in such an eventuality [1]. Armed with this spurious authority, he spread reports that both Sukarno and Hatta had been arrested by the British and sought to persuade those with influence that it was his duty, therefore, to assume the presidential powers.

In view of the way in which Communists in Eastern Europe paved their way to power by obtaining key posts in coalition governments, it was not without significance that Tan Malaka, after informing the Socialist leader, Sjahrir, of his alleged nomination as political heir, outlined a plan under which Sjahrir was to be president while he himself would head the government and hold the key ministries of the Interior and Labour. Tan Malaka's radical proposals for securing mass support for the revolutionary struggle by such methods as seizing all foreign properties without compensation, were flatly rejected by Sjahrir, who saw that the only result would be to alienate Britain and America and rally them to the support of the Dutch in crushing the Republic.

Foiled though he had been in his attempts to achieve power, Tan Malaka's ardour for revolutionary activities remained unabated. In addition to organizing a 'People's Front' which, by using nationalism as a bait for Communist aims, was intended to embrace all revolutionary and republican groups, he had earlier put forward an ambitious plan for a proletarian republic of Indonesia, Malaya, Burma, Siam, the Philippines and Northern Australia, a kind of enlarged proletarian version of the Greater Indonesia which was being advocated by a section of nationalists in both Indonesia and Malaya. While, however, he failed in this as he had failed in his attempt to achieve power by forgery and intrigue, he continued to plot and to plan and had the support of the PKI, which had been

nominally re-established by Mohamed Jusuf, a former member of a Japanese-sponsored political organization. But again success eluded him. By March 1946 his intrigues for the overthrow of the Republican leaders and his increasingly aggressive demands had made the Nationalist Government so thoroughly apprehensive that they had him arrested and jailed, together with a number of his principal supporters. In prison he remained, except for a brief interval, until released nearly two years later.

Jusuf, whose followers had been indulging in anti-government terrorist activities, was arrested at the same time and the party he had set up under the name of the PKI had its claim to be the legal successor of the pre-war Communist Party repudiated by the more orthodox Communists, who disapproved its terrorist methods. Jusuf had, in fact, never been a member of the pre-war PKI, nor had he taken part in the anti-Japanese underground movement of the war-time Party. It was only the absence of the real Communist leaders abroad that had enabled him to assume the Communist leadership and to claim the title of PKI for the party he had created. It was not, therefore, until about May 1946, when the old pre-war leaders began to return from exile, that what may be called the true PKI was re-established. Sardjono, who, after being imprisoned since 1926 for his part in the Communist rebellion of that year, had spent the war years in Australia, was amongst those who returned to Indonesia in the spring of 1946 and it was he who replaced the discredited Jusuf as chairman and set the party on a more orthodox course. Under his guidance it increased both in numbers and prestige. This was more particularly noticeable after he had been joined by the veteran Communist, Alimin, who returned in August 1946 after twenty years in exile abroad, mostly in Moscow, but more recently in Yenan.

By no means all of the many Indonesian Communists who returned from abroad during these early days of the post-war period entered the PKI. Some had served in the 'underground' in the Netherlands during the war and on their return home decided for one reason or another to join a non-Communist Marxist body instead. Some, such as Abdul Madjid and Tan Ling Djie, joined Sjahrir's Socialist Party; Setiadjit joined the Labour Party; others sought to hide their Communist affiliations by joining the PESINDO. It was not until 1948 that they, like Amir Sjarifuddin who had spent the war years in Indonesia itself, reappeared as openly-declared

Communists. By that time the Cominform had been brought into existence and the word had gone forth that the days when Communists were free to collaborate with bourgeois nationalist governments in the cause of independence and unity were ended. Up to the time when this new phase was introduced, however, the PKI, while building up its strength and organizational apparatus, had adhered to the Marxist programme it had adopted under Sardjono's guidance. This looked to the maintenance and consolidation of the Republic as the first step towards the Communists' own eventual assumption of power. The second step would be to obtain key posts in a coalition government.

Apart, therefore, from the opening phase under Jusuf, when it was indulging in terrorist and other anti-government activities, the PKI subordinated its ultimate aims during this period to the task of supporting the Republican government in its struggle to maintain and consolidate the independence it had proclaimed. In this struggle the Republic had, from the autumn of 1945 onwards, the full backing of Soviet Russia, which was quick to appreciate the opportunity for mischief-making offered by the situation in Indonesia. First came the Moscow newspaper denunciations of Britain for helping to restore Dutch rule. Then, in January 1946, followed the demands of the Soviet delegate in UNO for the withdrawal of the British forces and the recognition of Indonesian independence. A month later came the proposal of the Ukrainian delegate at the Security Council meeting for the dispatch of a commission of investigation.

By the time of the first Dutch 'police action' in July 1947, which followed the breakdown of the Linggadjati Agreement¹ of March, the Russians were hitting out right and left in righteous indignation. Both the Renville Agreement, which ended the resultant dispute in the Security Council, and the Committee of Good Offices, which helped to bring about the signing of that agreement in January 1948, came under their scathing denunciation. The agreement was stigmatized by Gromyko in the Security Council as a Dutch victory and attributed by him to the fellow-feeling of the Western 'imperialists', while his Ukrainian colleague bitingly referred to the Committee of Good Offices as the 'Committee of Good Offices for the Netherlands Usurpers'. By that time, however, the Cominform had been formed; and while Moscow continued to make the maximum trouble

¹ Under this agreement the Dutch had accorded *de facto* recognition to the Indonesians.

for the Western powers by playing to the Asian gallery in its role as the champion of Asian freedom in general and of Indonesian independence in particular, the Communist line in Indonesia as elsewhere in South-East Asia was, under Cominform direction, on the point of changing from the policy of united front to that of revolutionary tactics.

Russia's championship of Indonesian independence during the discussions in the Security Council following the Dutch 'police' action of July 1947 were not without effect on the more politically immature and left wing elements in Indonesia. Sukarno, Hatta, Sjahrir and others of their calibre may not have been deluded, but to many others it seemed that Russia was actuated solely by altruism and had shown herself to be the one true friend. Pro-Soviet sentiment began to spread in consequence and there was a corresponding growth of anti-Americanism.

For this latter phenomenon, which was to play an important part in the years ahead, there was a two-fold reason. Not only had the United States, hitherto regarded as the great proponent of self-determination and critic of colonial rule, caused disappointment and disillusionment by seeming to show more regard for the Dutch than for the Indonesians in their struggle for independence; there was also the further consideration that the two 'camps' into which the world was by then divided were, in Indonesian eyes, an anti-imperialist camp led by Russia and an imperialist camp led by the United States. From this it was but a short step to the somewhat naïve conclusion that, if Russia was Indonesia's friend, America must be her enemy.

Amongst those who, in the latter part of 1947, were inclining increasingly towards this view, was Sjarifuddin who, together with Sjahrir, led the Socialist Party, which was linked with the PKI (Communist Party), Labour Party, and PESINDO in a left wing coalition known as the *Sajap Kiri*. His increasing alignment with Russian policy, however, antagonized Sjahrir, who had no illusions about the Soviet Union and took the view that Indonesia's interests could best be served by standing clear of both camps and adopting an attitude of strict neutrality. This conflict of views reached its climax in February 1948, when Sjahrir decided to break away from the Socialist Party and form a new party of his own under the name of Indonesian Socialist Party. A fortnight later the *Sajap Kiri*, with the rump of the original Socialist Party under Sjarifuddin as a com-

ponent part, carried out a reorganization and re-emerged as the FDR (*Front Democratic Rakjat* or People's Democratic Front), with the Army and labour as its main bases of strength.

In the meanwhile, the signing of the Renville Agreement in January had led to a cabinet crisis and Sjarifuddin, under whose premiership the agreement had been signed, had resigned after the PNI (Nationalist Party) and the *Masjumi*, which had opposed the agreement, had withdrawn their representatives from the government. In order to meet the situation, Hatta, the vice-president, was appointed to form a presidential cabinet. His attempt to make it a 'national government' with all the main parties represented in it, however, was frustrated by the impossibility of reconciling the conflicting demands of the *Masjumi* and the PNI as against those of the *Sajap Kiri*. The groups from the *Sajap Kiri* had therefore to be left out and were soon thrown into increasing opposition by Hatta's introduction of a rationalization programme, which aimed at greater economy of man-power and greater efficiency in its use, both in the armed forces and in the field of labour. As this involved the demobilization of large numbers of soldiers and militiamen and the transfer of labour to where it was most needed, considerable discontent and unrest was caused among the demobilized soldiery and the displaced workers, who thereupon turned to the newly-formed FDR and its trade union ally, SOBSI, for support. This support was given all the more readily because Sjarifuddin, during his tenure of office as prime minister and minister of defence, had taken the opportunity to build up a strong personal following in military circles. Many of the officers specially appointed by him at that time were among those now affected by the rationalization programme.

In conjunction with its growing hostility to the Hatta government came a reversal of the FDR's attitude towards the Renville Agreement. Sjarifuddin, it will be recalled, had been prime minister when it was signed, and the various components of the *Sajap Kiri* from which the FDR had been formed had supported the agreement at the time of its signature. By March 1948, however, they had decided to reverse their former stand and proceeded to demand the repudiation of the agreement and the cessation of all negotiations with the Dutch pending their withdrawal from Indonesia. At the same time they called for the nationalization of all foreign properties without compensation and, in general, adopted an increasingly leftist attitude.

In all this, it would seem, they were influenced by the Communists, who not only held a commanding position in the FDR but were, by then, beginning to fall in line with Cominform policy as expounded to the Indonesian delegates at the South-East Asia Youth Conference in February. Zhdanov, it is true, had enunciated the new policy of world Communism at the inaugural meeting of the Cominform in the previous October; but it was not until the return of the youth delegates from Calcutta some four or five months later that its effect upon the PKI became at all marked. The reversal of the attitude towards the Renville Agreement by the FDR, of which the PKI was the senior partner, was but one reflection of it. It is not without significance that by August the various component parts of the FDR, together with the closely allied SOBSI, were indulging in the characteristic Communist practice of beating their breasts in self-criticism of their former errors, especially for their part in supporting the Linggadjati and Renville agreements [2].

The fact was that, although the Renville Agreement of January 1948 had brought about the cessation of hostilities for which the Security Council had called, its signature had been obtained largely at the expense of the Indonesians. The situation therefore remained precarious. The resultant resentment and unrest were not unnatural, but unfortunately they provided conditions which seemed highly favourable to the new Moscow line laid down at the South-East Asia Youth Conference in February. The Soviet leaders decided to act accordingly. Taking advantage, therefore, of the recall of an Indonesian envoy with whom the Soviet consul in Prague had signed an agreement, they arranged that this envoy, a young man named Suripno, should take with him the veteran Communist exile, Muso, disguised as his secretary. In this guise, armed with an assumed name and a false passport, Muso returned to Indonesia after prolonged residence abroad, mostly in Moscow. Apart from a secret visit paid in 1935, it was his first time on Indonesian soil for twenty-two years.

Bad though conditions were, they were not, however, as ripe for Communist revolution as they had appeared to be; and although Muso, after revealing his true identity, did his best to whip up revolutionary ardour and was joined by Sjarifuddin and others who had hitherto hidden their Communist affiliations, the leaders of the young Indonesian Republic proved more than a match for them. Neither Muso nor Suripno, who was among those who revealed

themselves as Communists for the first time, was in favour of open rebellion at that precise moment. They realized all too well that more time was required for agitation and other necessary preparations before sufficient popular support could be assured. Muso's plans, in fact, were similar to those of the FDR—to acquire power without resort to force if possible, as Gottwald had recently done in Czechoslovakia, but to fall back on open insurrection if necessary.

Some of their more excitable followers, however, began to cause disturbances and the government took prompt steps to suppress them. Thrown into consternation by the speed and determination with which the government acted, and fearing the complete disruption of their plans, the Communists summoned an emergency meeting at Madiun, the trade union centre on which the loyalist forces were moving. As a result, it was decided to resort to open rebellion without delay and on 18th September a call to arms was issued by Muso. It was a fatal decision, as it meant that the Communist plan for revolt was put into action long before the ground had been properly prepared. In this, the Indonesians were merely repeating the mistake which had cost them so dear twenty-two years earlier. For that revolt, too, had gone off at half-cock, with serious results for the Communist cause.

The Dutch offered to assist the Republican government in suppressing the rebellion, but the offer was declined, and by 25th October Sukarno was able to declare, in an Order of the Day, that the insurrection had been quelled. Skirmishing, however, continued for some time after and it was in one of these affrays that Muso himself was killed. Other outstanding Communists who lost their lives in the fighting included Sjarifuddin and the veteran trouble-maker Tan Malaka, who, however, after being released from his two years in prison at the outset of the rebellion, had fought on the side of the government forces against his old enemy Muso. And here it should be mentioned that, on his release from prison, Tan Malaka had formed a new party, the *Partai Murba* or Proletarian Party. This was in effect a nationalist Communist party and differed from the orthodox PKI in placing what it considered to be Indonesia's interests before those of Moscow. Many of its members ranged themselves alongside Tan Malaka and the government against the rebels. It only remains to add, therefore, that an attempt to cover Muso's and Moscow's responsibility for the uprising and for its failure was made in November that year by the Dutch Communist leader de

Groot, who claimed that it had been deliberately provoked by the United States [3]; but this was as devoid of fact as was the contention put forward in the Cominform journal three months later, that the Communists were waging a 'national liberation struggle' [4].

In the meanwhile, negotiations had been proceeding between the Dutch and the Indonesian Republic with a view to bringing about the settlement of a number of outstanding issues. Far-reaching concessions were made by the Indonesians, but they failed to satisfy the Dutch. The negotiations finally broke down on 12th December and a week later the Dutch launched their second 'police' action. But the blow, which was intended to bring the Republic to heel once and for all, failed. A conference of Asian nations held in Delhi in January 1949 passed a resolution putting forward demands for a just settlement of the dispute and these were echoed in a Security Council resolution a few days later. At the same time, steps were taken to ensure that the resolution was implemented.

As a result of a Round Table Conference at The Hague in August 1949 the Indonesians were granted their independence. On 27th December sovereignty was transferred by the Netherlands, and Indonesia became an independent state. While, however, the long struggle for independence was over, the young Republic found itself faced from the outset with opposition, not only from the Communists and their allies but also from extremist religious and separatist groups within the state. Moreover, although political independence had been achieved, Dutch interests had been left in virtual control of a large part of the national economy, in particular the plantations, communications, oil and mining.

Although seriously incapacitated and disorganized for a time by the severe handling received at Madiun, the Communists were showing renewed activity by 1950 when they set to work together with other extreme left wing bodies to organize social and industrial unrest, thereby impeding the task of national consolidation and economic development. January 1951 witnessed widespread strikes in foreign enterprises, largely political in aim, and the interest taken in them by the directors of world Communism was reflected in an article in the Cominform journal [5]. Declaring that Indonesia could never become a 'slave state', it went on to say that Indonesia's 'democratic organizations' were reorganizing themselves to prepare a final blow against the imperialists and against their economic grip on the country.

Following the outbreak of serious riots in Jakarta in August that year, about fifty suspected Communists were arrested and a week later there was a round-up of subversive elements in Medan. Further Communist round-ups followed and on 29th October, after referring to the arrest of about 15,000 persons, Sukiman, who had succeeded to the premiership in March, announced that a 'foreign supported underground movement' had planned to kill the president, the vice-president and various government officials and to overthrow the Republic and proclaim a new state. By that time, however, the Communist leaders had retired for a while underground.

In February 1952 a fresh outburst of anti-American sentiment was caused by Sukiman's action in accepting United States' aid under the Mutual Security Act without the prior knowledge of the cabinet. In protest against this action, all his colleagues in the government resigned and it was not until May that a new government was formed under Wilopo to take its place. Its formation ushered in a new phase. By its emphasis on neutrality it encouraged the Communist leaders to re-emerge into the open and to offer their support for so long as its programme was based on 'democracy and world peace'. By July that year Aidit, the Communist secretary-general, was advocating a national front and reflecting Chinese Communist influence by declaring that his party was prepared to co-operate with the 'national industrialists'.

It was three months after this that there occurred the so-called 'October 17th Affair', a somewhat muddled and, at the time, enigmatic episode. It was marked by an abortive demonstration in Jakarta demanding the dissolution of the non-representative parliament and its replacement by an elected one. Certain Army elements had a hand in this and linked with it was a dispute revolving around the defence minister and the Dutch military mission, whose retention he favoured for the purpose of building up a smaller but well-disciplined Western-trained army. On the one hand there were those who wished to get rid of the Dutch altogether, even a friendly mission such as this one. On the other hand, Sukarno himself, the Indonesian president, was opposed to the idea of a small professional army and wanted instead a 'People's Army' of ex-guerrilla fighters. It is now an open secret that the mutinies which followed a few days later, when three divisional second-in-commands deposed their chiefs and affirmed their loyalty to the president, were instigated by Sukarno himself. The outcome of the dispute was that both the defence minister, the

Sultan of Djocjakarta, and the able chief of staff, Colonel Nasution⁹ resigned, while the officers and officials most closely connected with them were removed from positions of influence.

To all this there was, as usual, a Communist background. Not only were the Communists behind the agitation for the withdrawal of the Dutch mission, but also they supported the president's stand in the matter of a People's Army. Communist influence, they knew, would be far greater in an armed force of that type, composed in part of Communist ex-guerrillas, than in a well-disciplined professional army. It was not without significance, therefore, that the new defence minister appointed to succeed the Sultan was Iwa Kasuma Sumantri, who was strongly suspected of having Communist affiliations. In the circumstances it was not surprising that a year later, in December 1953, discontent in the regular army was brought to a head by Iwa's appointment of three of his own nominees to important military posts. The discontent was reflected in the action of Colonel Bambang Sugeng, the acting chief of staff, who tendered his resignation in protest against Iwa's failure to consult him concerning these appointments.

Even Sukarno himself was by then becoming alarmed by the growing signs that, under Iwa's administration, the armed forces were coming more and more under Communist control. At the same time, Indonesian moderates, especially Moslems, were becoming seriously disturbed by the government's left wing and anti-Moslem policies. These left wing tendencies had, in fact, become increasingly pronounced since the resignation of the Wilopo cabinet, which had been brought about in June by dissensions between its PNI (Nationalist Party) and *Masjumi* members, and its replacement by a government under the premiership of Sastroamidjojo. The main reason for this was that, as both the *Masjumi* and Sjahrir's PSI (Indonesian Socialist Party) were excluded from the new government, the PNI felt the need for a powerful ally. They accordingly turned to the Communists for the necessary support. This was readily promised and in October the PNI chairman had reciprocated by instructing all branches of his party to co-operate with the Communists to the full against the Socialists and the *Masjumi*.

By the opening months of 1955, however, there were signs that the PNI had become aware of the Communist danger and that the period of collaboration was nearing its end. In return for their support in parliament, the Nationalists had given the Communists a free hand

to woo the masses, but the Communists had been so successful in their wooing that the Nationalists were becoming seriously worried. With the long-postponed general elections in sight, however, the Communists decided in June to tone down the slogan, 'Establish a People's Dictatorship', which had been proposed at the PKI Fifth Congress in March the previous year, as they feared it might injure their electoral chances. Instead, they adopted the battle-cry of 'A National Coalition Government with a progressive programme under the Premiership of a non-Communist'. The idea was, by this means, to pave the way for a People's Democratic Government later, as they realized that stronger mass support would be needed for anything more ambitious at the moment.

It was, however, the Communist-tainted Iwa's action in once more flouting Army opinion that finally brought about the downfall of the Sastro government in July that year. This episode revealed the Army as a new latent factor in Indonesian politics. Undeterred by the outcry he had caused in December 1953, he nominated one of his own adherents as the new chief of staff; but this time the Army, which had meanwhile decided to bury its own past differences, acted with resolution and refused to accept his choice. The government fell, and on 13th August Burhanudin Harahap of the *Masjumi* formed its successor with the support of the Indonesian Socialist Party and other elements, but without the Communists and the PNI.

The annoyance felt by the Communists at this blow to their plans was reflected in a news item in the Cominform journal, showing that the SOBSI had denounced the establishment of the Harahap government as being contrary to the wishes of the worker and peasant masses [6]. A week later this was followed by an article in the same Moscow mouthpiece, in which Aidit, the Communist secretary-general, declared that the downfall of the Sastro government, which he claimed had been 'supported by the people', was due to political manoeuvres directed from abroad in order to wreck the forthcoming general elections [7]. Whereas, however, Moscow, Peking and Hanoi radio had, in the meantime, been violently attacking the *Masjumi* and the PSI for their part in the new government, Aidit in his article drew a distinction between these two parties and their leaders, and suggested that the PKI should offer to co-operate with both parties while seeking to isolate their leaders.

Communist annoyance was understandable, for Harahap was determined to reverse the pro-Communist policy of his predecessor.

Unless, however, one equated the masses with the Communists, the Cominform journal's contention that the establishment of the new government was contrary to the wishes of the masses was hardly borne out by the results of the long-postponed elections. These were finally held on 29th October. The Communist Party, it is true, obtained approximately one-fifth of the thirty million votes cast and the PNI, whom the Communists had supported during the Sastro régime, headed the polls with over eight million votes; but the moderate and 'modernist' Moslem *Masjumi* was but a short way behind the PNI in the number of votes obtained, while the *Nahdatul Ulama*, the right wing Moslem group which had broken away from the *Masjumi* in April 1952, also secured more than the Communists. Both of these Moslem parties, like the PSI and most of the smaller parties which accounted for the balance of the total thirty million votes, were supporters of the Harahap government.

Like the Socialists in the Indian elections, the PSI, it may be noted, fared badly. The reason for this was clear. It was due to what Sjahrir, its leader, once described as its main handicap, its failure to recognize the danger of the intelligentsia becoming alienated from the common people. This was unfortunate, as the party included some of the best and soundest elements in the country and was potentially fitted for the role of a constructive Opposition and ultimately for providing a responsible government.

The temporary eclipse suffered by the Communist Party as a result of the abortive rebellion of 1948 had by now become a thing of the past. Not only had the Party itself been rehabilitated, but the typical series of Communist Front bodies, affiliated with their international counterparts, had also been built up. Chief of these was the Communist-led trade union organization SOBSI which, by the time of its Second Congress held in January 1955, claimed a membership of over 2,600,000, while GERWIS, the women's organization which had become the Indonesian affiliate of the Women's International Democratic Federation, was sufficiently established by March 1954 to attract the attendance of a number of foreign delegates to its Second Congress, at which it changed its name to GERWANI. Those attending this meeting included the British Communist, Monica Felton, and three Russians.

GERWIS was not the only Indonesian Communist Front organization to be honoured in this way. WFDY and IUS delegates had attended a conference of the IPPI (Students' Youth League) in Solo,

in Java, in September 1951 and a students' congress in Jakarta in November the following year. This last-named meeting had been attended also by delegates from China, Vietnam, India and North Korea. Two months previously a SOBSI conference had been attended by WFTU and other foreign delegates, while in April 1954 the WFDY sent delegations of American, Indian, Chinese, West European, and Central Asian youth representatives to visit the principal towns and cities of Indonesia. Nor was it by any means a one-way traffic. Delegations from the various Indonesian Communist Front organizations were constantly being sent abroad to take part in congresses, conferences and junketings of all sorts arranged by the international bodies to which they were affiliated. The opportunities afforded by these contacts and meetings for learning and transmitting the Moscow line at any one time need no emphasis. It was all part of the 'transmission belt' system to which international Communism attaches so much importance.

In addition to the normal Communist Front organizations, a Communist-controlled body of ex-guerrillas, the PERBEPSI, had also been coming into prominence since early 1953 and it was widely predicted that, if the Communists decided at some future date to resort once more to armed force, this body would be found figuring as their military arm under the guise of a People's Liberation Army in accordance with the Chinese model. There were, in fact, increasing signs that the Indonesian Communists, like the Communists in other South-East Asian countries, were modelling their plans and policies on those which had proved so successful in bringing the Chinese Communists into power. Since the summer of 1953 this has been particularly revealed in the strenuous efforts made to win the support of the peasantry, who had previously been largely ignored. Following their exploitation of the campaign for squatters' rights in Sumatra,¹ which helped to bring about the fall of the Wilopo cabinet in June 1953, the Communists played the leading part in arranging the fusion of the two principal peasant organizations in September, and by March 1954, when the Party held its Fifth National Congress, the encouragement of peasant support had become a major factor in Communist calculations. As clearly stated by Aidit, the Party's secretary-general, some months later, the Congress defined its 'basic and most immediate tasks' as being 'to mobilize the peasants and

¹ In this they used the technique of deliberate provocation in order to force the police to fire and thereby create 'martyrs'.

draw them into the struggle to eliminate the remnants of feudalism and to develop the anti-feudal agrarian revolution' [8]. To this he added the words: 'Apart from concentrating the main attack on work among the peasants, apart from giving priority to the work of building the alliance of peasants and workers, the Communist Party of Indonesia must also develop the united national front' with the 'intelligentsia, urban petty bourgeoisie, and national bourgeoisie'. Not only therefore did the Indonesian Communists follow the Chinese line in regard to the peasantry but also in the matter of the 'national bourgeoisie'. In a subsequent article in the Cominform journal, Aidit held out the usual Communist bait when, after stressing that 'agrarian revolution is the very essence of the people's democratic revolution of Indonesia', he went on to assert that the land taken from the landlords would go to the peasants instead of becoming state property [9].

It was in this article that Aidit claimed a total of 49,042 members and 116,164 candidate members in the Party at the time of the Fifth Congress in March; but by November that year Moscow was quoting him as saying that the figures had risen to 500,000 in all by the end of October. If these figures were to be taken at their face value, they would seem to have indicated a temporary relaxing of the normal Communist principle of quality rather than quantity.

That the attempt to attract the peasantry to their support was not proving as successful as the Communists had hoped was indicated in two further articles by Aidit in the latter part of 1955. Writing in the Cominform journal in September he stressed that better work among the peasants was required in order to win them over [10], and two months later he was expressing perturbation at the relative weakness of Communist agitation among the peasants [11]. In the first of these two articles he had taken occasion to refute such 'slanders' as that the Communists were opposed to religion and that the Party itself was not a national party but was directed from Peking and Moscow. The poor results may therefore have been attributable in part to these 'slandrous' contentions. It is possible, too, that the peasants had been dubious of the land-to-the-tiller bait dangled before their eyes, as Aidit had found it necessary to repeat this promise in February. In doing so, he had even had the temerity to make invidious comparisons with the Soviet Union. The PKI, he was quoted as saying, 'seeks to make the peasants have their own land, whereas in Russia the land is nationalized. We do not agree

with the Soviet system, because the peasants' sense of land property is great in Indonesia' [12].

Of other outstanding Indonesian developments in the past few years it must suffice to note the relegation of the veteran Communist leader Alimin to a position of obscurity 'for health reasons' as the result of decisions taken by the Party's Central Committee in October 1953; the expulsion of another leading Communist, Tang Ling-Djie, at the same time, on the grounds of 'subjectivism' and 'favouring parliamentary means for achieving aims'; the establishment of a Soviet Embassy in Jakarta in September 1954, the third Soviet diplomatic mission to be opened in South-East Asia; and the conclusion of a treaty with China in April 1955 to settle the vexed question of dual nationality for the two million Chinese in Indonesia. Each of these developments has had, or is likely to have, its repercussions; but the last of the four seems likely to produce the most beneficial effect, not only on Sino-Indonesian relations but, if followed by similar treaties with other South-East Asian countries, throughout the whole area of South and East Asia.

Communist China had indeed established an Embassy in Jakarta some time before the Russians opened theirs, and close contact appears to have been maintained from the start between the Chinese Embassy and the Indonesian Communists, who have also been in close touch with the large Chinese communities controlled and organized by that Embassy. It is an open secret, too, that after the fall of the Sastro government in July 1955, the PKI consulted Zhukov, the Soviet ambassador, as to the attitude they should adopt. It was said to be on his ruling that they decided to follow a moderate line, as both the internal and the international situation prevailing at the time made this advisable. This is but one more example of the way in which the PKI, like all orthodox Communist parties other than the Russian and perhaps the Chinese, work under foreign direction, Aidit's show of righteous indignation notwithstanding.

Of the developments in the other two island nations in this area, both now independent, only the briefest outline need be given.

In the Philippines, where the semi-feudal system of land tenure gave so much cause for peasant grievance, the Hukbalahaps who, together with the PKM (National Peasants Union), had been declared illegal two years previously, were named the People's Liberation Army in March 1950 and have, since then, been firmly

under Communist direction. Adopting the policy of armed struggle, they proceeded to carry out raids on small local centres and to engage in terrorism of all sorts until early 1953 when, increasingly weakened by the resolute action taken against them by Ramon Magsaysay,¹ they sought a truce in order to consider the government's surrender terms. Their request, however, was rejected on the grounds that it was merely an attempt to obtain a 'breather'. Minor raids were resumed; but the surrender of their leader, Luis Taruc, in May 1954 and the death in action of the Communist secretary-general, Mariano Balgoss, six months later, had a demoralizing effect. The rebellion has not yet been wholly suppressed and the possibility of its revival cannot be ignored, but for the time being it has ceased to offer a serious threat to the government.

In Ceylon, the other island country in question, the existence of three separate Communist parties has helped to keep the Communists from offering a unified front against the government. The Fourth Congress of the orthodox Communist Party, which was held in August 1950, agreed to form a 'People's United Front against the Imperialists', but the attempt to do so does not appear to have been very successful. In March 1952 Keuneman, the joint assistant secretary-general of the Party, described the revised aims of the Party as being the formation of a coalition of all parties opposed to the government, with the defeat of imperialism as the immediate task.

The only serious Communist disturbance since Ceylon achieved independence within the Commonwealth in February 1948 was in August 1953, when a one-day strike inspired by the Communists led to acts of terrorism, violence and arson and compelled the government to declare a state of emergency and to impose a curfew. The Communist-dominated Colombo Municipal Council, which supported the strike, was dissolved by the government, over 200 casualties, including twenty-one killed, were reported, and a month passed before the state of emergency was finally ended.

¹ At that time secretary of defence. Elected president in November 1953.

CHAPTER XXXVIII

The Indian Sub-Continent

THE year preceding the transfer of power to the newly-created independent states of India and Pakistan in August 1947 had been marked by serious communal riots, particularly in Bengal [1]; but the tragic communal disorders which followed hard on the partition of this great sub-continent exceeded, both in violence and in scope, anything of the kind that had happened before. It might have been expected that the Communists would have exploited the resultant situation to their own advantage; but they did not. On the contrary, their immediate reaction was to denounce these outbursts of violence and bloodshed and to offer their support to the Nehru government in bringing the situation under control. But their support of the government was fated to be of short duration. By the close of the year the government was being accused by them of 'pandering to Anglo-American imperialism'. A complete reversal of policy was indicated and the repercussions of the recent formation of the Cominform soon became clear.

The first rumblings of the coming storm were heard soon after the return of Dange, one of the leading Indian Communists, from a long spell abroad in the USSR and other parts of Europe. From November onwards, articles and news items in *People's Age*, the Communist Party organ,¹ showed ever more clearly that a drastic change in policy was imminent and, after a ten-day session of the Party's Central Committee in Bombay in December, it was announced that the policy of support for the government was to end. This was in accord with a paper, 'On the Present Policy and Tasks of the Communist Party of India', which had been adopted by the Central Committee at its meeting earlier in the month. In it the Party's

¹ This paper was replaced in July 1949 by the *Indo-Soviet Journal*, which only lasted till April 1950, when it was succeeded by *Cross-Roads* as the Party organ. After a run of three-and-a-half years, *Cross-Roads* was renamed *New Age* in October 1953.

former 'opportunistic illusions' had come under strong criticism and the need for a 'New Democratic Front' had been stressed. It only remained for the necessary preparations to be made to ensure that the policy would be endorsed at the Party's Second Congress, which was to open two months later in Calcutta.

The Congress was to prove a momentous one, as it was immediately preceded by the notorious South-East Asia Youth Conference in the same city and was attended by a number of outstanding foreign Communists, who had come to India professedly to take part in the ostensibly innocuous youth conference. Amongst those who addressed it were Sharkey and Than Tun, secretary-generals of the Australian and Burmese Communist parties respectively. The new policy of opposition to the Nehru government was approved by the Congress; the policy of moderation followed by the Party since 1942 was vehemently criticized; and Joshi, the secretary-general, after vainly attempting to justify his former tactics, was replaced by Ranadive, whose policy of violence, which he had advocated ever since 1946, was now to be implemented. The political thesis put forward re-echoed the Zhdanov interpretation of the international situation and, while condemning the Indian socialists and all other 'reformist' elements, called for the establishment of a Democratic Front, the hard core of which was to be 'the Communist Party together with the mass organizations led by the Party, the trade unions, the Kisan Sabhas, and students and youth organizations' [2]. It was at this Congress, too, that the decision to organize a separate Communist Party of Pakistan was taken and to transfer the Indian Party's headquarters from Bombay to Calcutta.

The new policy of violence was quickly brought into action. In the Telengana area of Hyderabad, where the Communists had entrenched themselves for some time past and had already resorted to murder and intimidation on a large scale, the campaign was heightened in intensity. In other parts of India, notably in Western Bengal, Madras, Manipur, Travancore-Cochin and parts of the Punjab, the United Provinces and Bombay, Communist terrorism spread rapidly. For the next eighteen months it was to be of almost daily occurrence in many districts. That the Communists were aiming to paralyse the government and bring about an armed rising with a view to seizing power was abundantly clear.

Counter-action by the provincial governments concerned was not long in coming. By the first week in April the Party had been out-

lawed in Western Bengal and seven leading Communists had been arrested in Bombay, among them Dange, president of the All-India Trade Union Congress and vice-president of the WFTU. Similar action was taken later in other provinces, although too late in some instances to prevent the more important leaders from evading arrest by going underground. It was only by firm measures and elaborate precautions that the government was able to prevent a country-wide railway strike in March 1949, by which the Communists had hoped to create chaos and bring about a mass uprising by paralysing the railway system.

The campaign of violence called forth a strong denunciation of Communist policy from Nehru, who characterized it as one of hostility to the government 'bordering on revolt'. From that time onwards, while tending to differentiate between the native brand of Communism and the exponents of world Communism, he denounced the former so frequently and with so much vigour that Ajoy Ghosh, the CPI (Communist Party of India) secretary-general, was led, only as recently as January 1956, to remark ruefully that 'he seldom speaks without attacking us' [3].

It was his foreign policy, based on his determination to keep India neutral in the Cold War, that made him draw this distinction between the Communists in his own country and the leaders of world Communism in Moscow and Peking. It was in the realization that this ardent desire for neutrality might be turned to their own advantage, however, that the Russians and their camp followers, who had hitherto attacked Nehru and his government almost as virulently as they had denounced Britain and the United States, began about the end of 1949 to soften their criticism of the Indian prime minister. While, therefore, the Indian Communists continued to hurl abuse at him for another six years, Moscow's policy from 1950 onwards was, quietly and gradually, to lure India and other non-committed Asian countries away from the Anglo-American bloc and bring them eventually, if possible, into the Russian orbit.

By the time that this policy had been initiated, the Indian Communists had begun to realize that their own policy of violence was not only failing to produce the results they had anticipated but, on the contrary, was harming their cause. Crude terrorism and the constant call for strikes was merely alienating the workers and forcing the government to adopt repressive measures. The membership of the Party itself had, in consequence, dropped from 90,000 in 1948

to 20,000 two years later; that of the All-India TUC, which it controlled, had been reduced from 700,000 to 100,000 during the same period. Clearly a change was called for and, like that in 1948, it was marked by a further change of secretary-general.

The main significance of the change, however, was its connection with the rise of Communist China to the position of the model prescribed for the Communist parties of all South and East Asian countries. In June 1949 Ranadive had published an anonymous article strongly critical of Mao Tse-Tung's unorthodox methods [4]. Six months later an editorial in the Cominform journal directed that Mao's 'path' was to be followed by all these Communist parties, the Indian party being specifically mentioned by name [5]. It was as an outcome of this rejoinder that in July 1950 Ranadive was replaced as secretary-general by Rajeshwar Rao, whose interests were, as Mao's had been, in the countryside rather than in the towns and urban districts where Ranadive's lay. Abject apologies were made by all concerned, including the whole editorial board of the magazine which had published the offending article, and a change of policy was announced. Like the Japanese Communist Party, whose leaders had been reprimanded by the Cominform journal three weeks before, the CPI was also torn by internal dissension. Rao himself was to be replaced as secretary-general a year or so later by Ajoy Ghosh when a further change of policy took place.

When Joshi had been replaced in 1948, the charge brought against him had been that he was guilty of 'right reformism'. This was because he had failed to oppose the Nehru government, which was accused of co-operating with capitalists and imperialists. Ranadive, on the other hand, was now charged with 'left deviationism', which was defined in this instance as pushing the policy of violence too far, before strengthening the Party adequately by broadening its base to include the 'middle bourgeoisie' and those rich peasants who did not indulge in feudal exploitation. The Central Committee of the Party, having recognized the 'left adventurist mistakes' of which it had been guilty under Ranadive's leadership, accordingly published a communiqué on the revision of its policy on 21st July [6]. At the same time, it set to work to follow the Chinese path 'wherever and whenever possible' as directed in the Cominform journal editorial six months earlier. Amongst other things, this enjoined resort to armed struggle on the Chinese pattern; but as this would have entailed new suicidal adventures at a time when the Party organization was weak

and disrupted, it was intimated to the Party leaders through the medium of the British Communist Party that the instructions regarding the Chinese 'path' should not be taken too literally [7]. Eventually, after a period of recuperation and reconstruction of the Party, resort to armed struggle would be necessary, it was stressed, if the revolution in India were to succeed; but the time for that had not yet come.

Despite the intimation of Palme Dutt of the British Communist Party, that the directive in the Cominform journal concerning armed struggle need not be taken too seriously, Dange, Ghosh and Rao returned from a visit to Moscow early in 1951, bringing with them a document described as the 'Tactical Line' [8]. The two opening paragraphs of this document, under the unambiguous heading, 'Not Peaceful But Revolutionary Path', went straight to the point by declaring that the Party's objectives 'cannot be realized by a peaceful, parliamentary way. These objectives can be realized only through a revolution, through the overthrow of the present Indian state, and its replacement by a People's Democratic state'. Armed revolution, it went on to say, would be a combination of partisan war in the rural areas and armed workers' risings in the cities. The way in which the ultimate goal was to be achieved was laid down. Subsequently the new draft programme of the Party was published on 11th May in the Cominform journal, which also, in its issue of 15th June, carried a lengthy policy statement issued by the Politburo showing that the immediate aim was to build up a People's Democratic Front as a preliminary to eventual armed struggle on the Chinese pattern. Based, as it was, on the Tactical Line, this statement only thinly veiled the more explosive sections, which were kept secret for the time being.

Although the Party was in no fit state at the time to implement these policies, the government's hand had, in the meanwhile, been weakened by a ruling given in the Calcutta High Court necessitating the release of Communists placed under detention in various parts of India since 1948. The ban imposed on the Communist Party and allied organizations by the Madras government had therefore to be lifted in November 1950, the Communist *détenus* in Western Bengal were released in January 1951, and other provincial governments were compelled to adopt similar measures. Not only was the work of the police in rounding up Communist leaders undone; it also meant that these leaders re-emerged with heightened prestige, for in

India a politician's standing, like that of a political terrorist, is always enhanced by political imprisonment.

It was shortly before the issue of the policy statement in June 1951 that the Politburo had been reconstituted so as to function as a secretariat of the Central Committee, with Ajoy Ghosh as secretary. In line with this it was announced on 4th June that the secretary-general, Rajeshwar Rao, had resigned. Although, temporarily, no successor was appointed, it was not long before Ghosh himself succeeded to this all-important post. By then, preparations for the coming general elections were in train and on 31st August the Cominform indicated its approval by publishing in its journal the full text of the Party's election manifesto. In view, however, of Moscow's plans for wooing Nehru, it is deserving of note that his 'so-called independent policy of neutrality' was subjected to stinging criticism. Three-and-a-half years later, during the Andhra election campaign early in 1955, this criticism was to be repeated with dire results for the Party, as *Pravda* came out at the height of the campaign with a fulsome eulogy of the Indian prime minister to the great embarrassment of the Indian Communists.

It was in order to improve their own chances in the coming general elections that, at a six-day All-India Party Conference held in Calcutta in October 1951, it was decided to call off the guerrilla warfare which, although already abandoned elsewhere, was still being waged in the Telengana area of Hyderabad in accordance with Rao's belief in agrarian upheavals. The wisdom of this decision was seen when the final results of the elections were published early in March 1952. These showed that the main successes of the Party were achieved in Hyderabad, Tripura and Manipur, where the terrorist campaigns had recently been abandoned.

It was at this All-India conference that the draft programme and statement of policy, published in May and June respectively, were adopted with but minor amendments. They were finally endorsed in December 1953 by the Party's Third Congress. Amongst other assertions, this programme laid down that India was not yet ready for 'a socialist transformation' but was sufficiently mature for 'a new government of People's Democracy'. The statement of policy, for its part, like the election manifesto of August, paid tribute to China as a model; but it also stressed the considerable difference existing between conditions in India and those in China prior to the Communist seizure of power in that country. Of these, the main differences

listed were that the Chinese Communists already had an army before they 'began to lead the peasantry in the liberation struggle'; that China lacked good communications, 'which prevented the enemy from carrying out concentrations and swift attacks on the liberation forces'; and that the Chinese Communist Army had the inestimable advantage of a secure territorial base, with the Soviet Union in its rear, while preparing for its final offensive. These were all great assets for the Chinese Communists in their armed struggle; the Indian Communists had no such factors in their favour.

Meanwhile, the election campaign went forward and, thanks to having called off the use of violence and adopted a relatively moderate line in their election manifesto with a view to attracting support for a United Front policy against the government, the Communists, who had never before figured as a parliamentary party, emerged from the general elections as the second largest single party. The advantage gained, however, was soon diminished by their crude and obstructive tactics in the central parliament, which brought them into disrepute and disclosed the real significance of their aims. Moreover, the openly expressed contempt of some of their leaders for parliamentary practice showed that no confidence could be placed in their adherence to constitutional methods.

The harm they did to their own cause in this respect, however, was counterbalanced to a large extent by the skilful use they made of their parliamentary membership for agitation and propaganda. This aimed not only at bringing about the downfall of the government. It sought, too, to win support from the intelligentsia for the Soviet Union and Communist China, for the spurious peace campaign, and for much else besides in accordance with the Moscow line. The peace campaign in particular was intensified and was very effective, as Indians, both in their general disposition and by virtue of their adherence to neutralism, were peculiarly receptive to the peace appeal. That this appeal had been pressed forward in 1950 and 1951 at the height of the terrorist campaign in Telengana, Andhra, Tripura and Manipur did not appear to matter, since Communists everywhere draw a subtle distinction between civil wars and war for 'liberation' on the one hand and 'imperialist warmongering' on the other.

As stated with brutal frankness in the tactical line document brought from Moscow by Ghosh and his friends early in 1951, 'The Peace Movement is not a pacific movement, not a movement mainly for recording abstract support for peace. It is a fighting move-

ment for concrete action in defence of peace and against the imperialistic warmongers, including those waging colonial wars.' From the time of its inception, therefore, the All-India Peace Council, the Indian affiliate of the World Peace Council, had waged an active campaign for peace as defined in this curiously qualified definition. Conferences, congresses, and peace festivals had been held under their auspices, celebrations with such resounding titles as 'Hands Off Kashmir Day', 'Asia Week' and 'Defence of Korea Day' had been organized, and everything possible had been done to stir up hatred against the United States and other 'imperialist' countries by meetings of protest against the alleged resort to germ warfare by the American forces in Korea, the atom bomb, colonialism and the like. As in other sectors of the Communist world, the trade union, youth, students', women's and other such Communist Front organizations were all brought in to play their part and to subordinate their own particular functions to the demands of the peace campaign. In view of the success achieved, it was perhaps not surprising that both Dr Kitchlew, president of the All-India Peace Council, and Major-General Sokhey, his active second-in-command, were later awarded the Stalin Peace Prize.

One further outcome of the general elections which calls for mention was that the Party's headquarters, which had meantime been transferred from Calcutta to Bombay, were moved once more, this time to Madras. This was because the election results had appeared to indicate that the centre of gravity was shifting from Bombay where, as in other industrial areas, the Communists had failed in the elections, to the South, where the prospects of setting up a territorial base on the Chinese Yenan pattern seemed increasingly favourable. A few months later, however, in September 1952, the headquarters were shifted once more, this time to Delhi. This, it would seem, was due to the realization that guidance from the Soviet Embassy, from the *Tass* Agency, and from their own leaders in parliament would be easier to obtain in the Indian capital than in far-away Madras. It offered better opportunities, moreover, for directing activities in the northern areas and border districts, where a territorial base, if established, would have the advantage, lacking in the south, of a safe rear.

Before the year had ended, two more articles from the pen of Ajoy Ghosh, indicative of the secretary-general's line of thought, had appeared in the Cominform journal [9]. In the first of these two, in addition to playing on the theme, 'The Party grows by raising the

ideological political level of its cadres', he defined the peasants as 'the granite foundation of the proletariat'. In the second, he set out to analyse Stalin's contribution to the recent Nineteenth Congress of the CPSU in Moscow and, in accordance with the Soviet leader's pronouncement, played up the peace campaign by hammering out the line that war was avertible and at least postponable.

The increasing emphasis laid on the importance of the peasantry—especially on the agricultural workers and poor peasants—and the attempts made to woo them, were probably in part due to the need to counter the movement for the voluntary distribution of land initiated by Vinobha Bhave, that Gandhian figure of the contemporary Indian scene. This movement was showing far better results from the peasants' point of view than were the Communists' forceful methods. It had the advantage, moreover, of achieving these results by friendly persuasion instead of by violence and bloodshed. To the Communists this was as deplorable and reactionary as Gandhi's methods had been. It had to be denounced with vehemence and countered. In the years that have passed since then, the Communists have pressed on with their attempts to win the support of the peasantry. In May 1954, for example, this policy was reflected in a further article by Ghosh in the *Cominform* journal urging the rallying of the agricultural workers to the Communist cause and the establishment of a separate organization for them [10]; and in January 1956, while advocating 'Land to the Tiller', he declared that, although collectivization would come eventually, it would come 'much later and voluntarily' [11]. It was the old, old cry, and probably no more likely to prove valid in a Communist India than it has in China, North Korea or North Vietnam.

It was not only to peasants and urban workers, to youths, women, and the intelligentsia that the Communists were directing their attention. The bourgeoisie engaged in commerce and industry also became the target of Communist propaganda. This sought to gain their support by dangling before their eyes the advantages that would accrue to them if British and American economic and financial competition were eliminated or at least severely curtailed. As had happened in China, so in India the virtues and advantages of economic nationalism and national capitalism were preached. To help on the good work, Indian industrialists and businessmen were invited to take part in the World Economic Conference held in Moscow in August 1952. The real object of this meeting was to set up an inter-

national trading agency, through which it was hoped to break down the Western embargo on strategic and war materials for the Soviet bloc and Communist China, and to create trouble and friction in the international business world. It also aimed at playing up 'national capitalism' against Anglo-American 'economic colonialism'.

This policy was to be strongly reflected in one of the decisions taken at a meeting of the Party's Central Committee held in Calcutta during the first ten days of January 1953. 'National industry,' it declared, 'must be protected against the competition of foreign goods' and foreign concerns. Other points of interest in this meeting included the stress laid on the importance of 'working relentlessly' for the formation of a united front with all democratic parties, organizations, groups and individuals; a discussion on the significance of the CPSU Nineteenth Congress held three months previously; the lauding of Stalin's 'Economic Problems of Socialism in the Soviet Union', which had been published on the eve of that congress and had promptly been given the status of holy writ by Communists throughout the world;¹ and decisions to popularize the resolutions passed at the Vienna Peace Congress a few days previously² and to work for Indo-Pakistan friendship.

The Third Party Congress, which the Central Committee had resolved to convene, opened in Madura in the last days of December³ and proved to be a stormy one. Ajoy Ghosh, who had returned from Moscow earlier in the month after one of his prolonged 'medical' visits there, presided. The meeting was conspicuous, not only for the bitter internal dissensions which it brought to light, but also for the severe scolding given to the assembled delegates by the British Communist Party secretary-general, Harry Pollitt, who attended it as Moscow's representative. After endorsing the programme adopted at the Party Conference in October 1951, rejecting terrorist methods and advocating a broad-based united front for the purpose of establishing a 'government of democratic unity', the Congress went on to

¹ Since this chapter was drafted, this thesis, together with Stalin's *History of the CPSU(B)* which also had been treated hitherto as 'holy writ', has been attacked by Mikoyan at the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU held in February 1956.

² In particular, a call had been made for a 'People's Congress for Peace', and great efforts had been exerted to conceal the fact that the gathering was Communist-controlled. As had happened at the Wrocław Congress of Intellectuals in August 1948, resort was had to trickery in 'electing' the Praesidium. When, moreover, the report of the Congress was published later, it was found that all criticisms by non-Communist delegates had been omitted.

³ The Party Congress lasted from 27th December 1953 to 3rd January 1954.

emphasize the need 'to further strengthen the bonds of friendship and brotherhood between the peoples of India and the Soviet Union'. (The Party was clearly looking to Moscow rather than to Peking as the focus of control and support. Mao and his party were largely ignored in the discussions.) Then followed a resolution to 'judge specific issues on their merits' and to support the Nehru government in its attitude towards world peace, Korea, atomic weapons, the recognition of Communist China and, to a limited extent, in its economic policy as well. This was certainly a change from the Party's previous stand and reflected Moscow's approval of the Government's foreign policy and the Kremlin's aim to draw Nehru further towards the Soviet camp. The hand of Moscow was also seen in a resolution denouncing the military pact alleged, quite incorrectly, to have been concluded between the United States and Pakistan, which was claimed to have 'brought the war danger to the very threshold of India'.

The storm which shook the Congress almost throughout its deliberations arose over the so-called Andhra Thesis, whose proponents contended that the main enemy was 'British imperialism and its stooges' as represented by the Nehru government, and not American imperialism. Pollitt, on behalf of Moscow, argued strongly against this thesis and sought to persuade the Congress to accept an anti-American and relatively pro-British line in accord with the foreign policy being pursued by the Soviet Union at that time. In this he finally had his way, but his attempt to heal the serious breach in the Party revealed by this and other points of dispute failed and he berated all present in no uncertain terms.

Although the Congress had endorsed the rejection of terrorist methods, this did not exclude the exploitation of grievances for the purpose of stirring up riots and bloodshed. Barely a month after the meeting had closed, Communist-instigated riots broke out in Calcutta and the police were compelled to open fire. More recently, in November 1955, Bombay was the scene of similar rioting and bloodshed encouraged by the Communists, and two months later that same city was subjected to a week of rioting which, though not initiated by the Communists, was soon being led by them and resulted in a death-roll variously estimated at between two hundred and fifty and four hundred.¹

¹ The local Mahrattas had been demanding Bombay City as part of a Mahratta State. The riots arose from the indignation caused by the announcement that

In its constitutional capacity the Communist Party has met with varying degrees of success since the close of its Third Congress in January 1954. Although only moderately successful in the Pepsu elections two months later, it had, in conjunction with the Communist-controlled United Front of Leftists and other allied groups, defeated the Congress Party in the Travancore-Cochin elections and secured the largest number of seats in the local legislative assembly. The formation of a Communist-dominated government in that state was only prevented by the action of the Praja Socialist Party which, though it had fought the Congress Party in the elections in alliance with the Communists, took over the reins of government after being assured of Congress Party support if they did so. One year later, in March 1955, came the Andhra elections in which, though they polled nearly 2,700,000 votes or 30 per cent of the total number cast, the Communists had their hopes of victory shattered when, in contradistinction to their own campaign of deriding Nehru, *Pravda* came out at a critical stage with an article in his praise. The article, which was published for reasons of Soviet foreign policy, was a striking example of the way in which the Kremlin leaders are prepared to subordinate local Communist policy to Soviet interests. A contributory cause of their failure to win was, admittedly, their own pre-election promise to expropriate the lands of the large landowners without compensation. This had served to frighten the smaller landowners as well. But it was the embarrassment caused by the *Pravda* article which lost them the most votes. At this point, therefore, it seems apposite to consider the developments which had been taking place during the past few years in India's external relations in general and her relations with the countries of the Soviet bloc in particular.

Although electing to remain within the British Commonwealth of Nations after achieving her independence in August 1947, India made it clear from the outset that she had no intention of basing her foreign policy on that of Great Britain. Within a month of becoming independent she had entered into diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union and, before the year had closed, a Soviet Embassy, the first Soviet diplomatic mission ever to have been established in the Indian sub-continent, had been opened in Delhi. Two years later, at the end of December 1949, this was followed by India's recognition

Nehru had decided to place it under central government administration. The Bombay government has since denied the accuracy of the estimated deathroll and has given the number of deaths as seventy-six.

of the newly-established régime in Peking. The Chinese Communists, for their part, responded readily to these friendly overtures and, apart from a temporary rift caused by the Chinese advance into Tibet in October 1950, Sino-Indian relations have been marked by increasing friendship almost ever since. In January 1951, it will be recalled, it was the Indian representative who sought to dissuade the United Nations from condemning China; and although the Chinese foreign minister, Chou En-Lai, supported the rebuff administered to India by Vishinsky on the question of mediation in Korea in November the following year, this placed no great or lasting strain on Sino-Indian relations.

While freely condemning Communist activities in his own country, Nehru has sought to maintain the most friendly relations with Communist governments compatible with the maintenance of Indian neutrality. In particular he has shown sympathy towards the Communist régimes in China and North Vietnam, not because they are Communist, but because he views them from a nationalist angle as fellow-Asian countries which have struggled for freedom from Western domination.

By April 1954 the last bit of ill-feeling engendered by Chinese actions in Tibet had been seemingly removed by the signature of a Sino-Indian Agreement on that formerly hermit country, and two months later relations between Delhi and Peking were further cemented by the talks between Nehru and Chou En-Lai in the Indian capital. These ended with a joint statement suggesting that the five principles¹ laid down in the recent agreement on Tibet as a guide to Sino-Indian relations, should be applied to relations with other Asian countries as well as to international relations in general. Nehru's personal visit to Peking in October that year and his talks with Ho Chi-Minh in Hanoi on his way to China served to emphasize the friendly relations he had established with both régimes.

While the initiative for improving relations with China had come largely from India, the cementing of friendly relations with the Soviet Union, which had been taking place simultaneously, had been largely due to Moscow. The attempt to draw India towards the Soviet orbit had started as far back as the close of 1949; but it was not until the arrival of Menshikov in Delhi as the new Soviet ambassador

¹ Mutual respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty; non-aggression; non-interference in each other's internal affairs; equality and mutual benefit; and peaceful co-existence.

in October 1953 that the wooing of India appears to have begun in earnest. A reflection of this policy was to be seen in the qualified support of Nehru's foreign policy given at the Third Congress of the CPI some three months later. It remained for the *Pravda* bombshell, which so disconcerted the Communists at the time of the Andhra elections early in 1955, to bring this wooing into the full light of day.

During the Pepsu and Travancore-Cochin elections a year before, Nehru himself had criticized Moscow by implication in a slashing attack on the Indian Communists, whom he accused of being mere 'stooges' of Soviet Russia; and in October 1954 he had shown irritation with the Kremlin on account of derogatory remarks on Gandhi appearing in the latest edition of the Soviet Encyclopaedia. The *Pravda* article may therefore have been intended to mollify him and when, a few months later, in June 1955, he arrived in Moscow on a visit, he was given an ovation such as no non-Communist visitor had ever before been accorded. Eulogies and flattery were poured out upon him and nothing was left undone to emphasize the warmth of the welcome and of Russia's friendly feelings towards India and its great leader. The climax came with Nehru and Bulganin appearing together on the television, when each was shown agreeing with the other, although Nehru took advantage of the occasion to put in a few tactfully-worded remarks about non-interference in the internal affairs of foreign countries.

Influenced by this friendly welcome in the Soviet capital and by the embarrassment inflicted on themselves by the *Pravda* article earlier in the year, the Indian Communists' Central Committee adopted an interim resolution, for confirmation by the Fourth Party Congress in March 1956, approving the Nehru government's foreign policy; and on 6th November the Party organ, *New Age*, published an article by Ghosh supporting the government in everything which could 'weaken the position of the main enemies of the Indian people at this stage—imperialism and feudalism'. The principal task, he went on to say, was to oust British capital from the Indian economy and to eradicate feudalism. It was on these two foes that the main attack would have to be concentrated 'in accordance with the Leninist strategy of isolating the chief enemy by forging the broadest united front against it'. His emphasis on the 'broadest united front' was clearly a reflection of a rebuke received from Moscow a month earlier for the Party's deviation from a 'Popular Front' policy.

That the factionalism within the Party, which had been so ruthlessly exposed at its Third Congress in January 1954, was as strong as ever was shown at the 'All-Party discussions' held in January 1956, when the question of supporting Nehru's foreign policy was put to the meeting. Opinions were violently divided, the official leaders being strongly in favour of it, while the opposing faction denounced it with vehemence. By the time these pages are published, the Fourth Congress will have been held and will no doubt have brought the bitter feud among the Party leaders into the open once more.

Ghosh's demands for the ousting of British capital, like his advocacy of support for Nehru's foreign policy, were seen to be fully in line with Moscow's aims when the two Soviet leaders, Bulganin and Khrushchev, arrived in India two weeks after the publication of his article. Although it was their graceless propagandist speeches and pronouncements which attracted the greatest attention and served to evaporate any diluted fumes of the Geneva spirit which might still have lingered after Molotov's exhibition of intransigence at the Foreign Ministers' Conference a few days previously, it seems probable that their most substantial and lasting achievement was seen in the trade agreement announced on the last day of their visit. In effect, this was the culmination of the politico-economic offensive waged by Moscow since September 1953 to counter American aid to under-developed countries and encourage the neutralization of the non-committed Asian powers. While, in fact, the world's attention was being distracted by the fulminations of the two Soviet leaders against the West and against Pakistan, Russian economic experts attached to their mission¹ had been quietly and unobtrusively carrying out discussions in the background and drawing up the necessary plans for the conclusion of this trade pact. Under this agreement the Russians, who, earlier in the year, had granted a long-term credit to India estimated at between one hundred and one hundred and fifty million dollars for the erection of a steel plant, undertook to supply a million tons of steel within the next three years. Oil, mining and other equipment required by India for her second Five-Year Plan, on which she placed such store, were also to be provided in return for raw materials and manufactured goods.

¹ Bulganin and Khrushchev had brought with them an entourage numbering about one hundred persons in all. These included the Chief of the Soviet Security Service, General Serov, and thirty security men. Somewhat incomprehensibly, three 'ladies' maids' also accompanied the party.

This is not meant to imply that the anti-Western diatribes with their gross distortion of historical facts, or the constant harping on Russia's alleged efforts in the cause of world peace and on the baulking of those efforts by the West, were not an important part of Soviet policy. They certainly were; and to no small extent they were successful, although close observers of the scene were divided in opinion as to the lasting effects of this propaganda. By posing as the champions of India and of Asia as a whole on such matters as colonialism, the H-bomb, disarmament, world peace, and colour discrimination; by the flattery paid to Indian achievements and the appeal to her prejudices; and by skilful, albeit unscrupulous, resort to half-truths and distortion of facts, they did their best to achieve their aim of arousing Indian suspicions of the West and Western suspicions of Indian neutrality, of increasing Indo-Pakistan¹ tension, of weakening the Baghdad Pact and, in general, of making everyone thoroughly suspicious and resentful of everybody else.

As shown by the joint communiqué issued at the close of the visit, calling for the relaxation of international tension by disarmament, the banning of nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons, the admission of Communist China to a seat in the United Nations, and opposition to military alliances and blocs, much of this propaganda had been in line with India's own way of thinking and was in agreement with almost everything on which Nehru differed from the West; but at one stage of the visit there had been indications that the Soviet leaders had gone too far in their abuse of Indian hospitality and that the Indian leaders were becoming annoyed by their blatant propaganda. The announcement of the executions in Georgia and the report of further purges among Malenkov's leading supporters, moreover, seemed hardly consonant with Khrushchev's lyrical description of the Bolshevik Revolution as 'the most bloodless' of its size in history and with his assertion that it had resulted in 'real freedom' and the welding of the Soviet Union into 'one happy family'. The announcement of the hydrogen bomb explosion in Siberia during the visit and the gleeful boastings of its immense size served likewise to raise doubts in Indian minds as to the sincerity of the Soviet leaders' professed love of peace. Further doubts were aroused by the leakage of reports that Shepilov, the editor of *Pravda*, had passed on secret instructions to the CPI Central Committee to support Nehru 'for the time being' on the grounds that economic circumstances were forcing him in his development plans

to adopt methods similar to those of the Communists and that his foreign policy was helpful to world Communism [12].

For these and other reasons it seemed for a time that the Soviet leaders were outstaying their welcome. It was unfortunate, therefore, that, just at that stage, Mr Dulles issued his joint statement with the Portuguese ambassador criticizing the Indian stand on the question of Goa. The reaction was immediate. The flagging enthusiasm for the Russian visit was given a tremendous fillip by the consequent upsurge of national sentiment and by the visitors' prompt espousal of India's cause in the dispute.

Although it is all but inconceivable that Nehru will ever let India join the Soviet bloc, everything points to his becoming increasingly suspicious of Western motives. Furthermore, the fact has to be faced that, unless some other equally firm and magnetic leader emerges in the meanwhile, the national unity, which he has done so much to bring about and maintain, may well be shattered when death removes him. No potential successor has come to the fore since Patel died in December 1950. Should Nehru die and India tire of Congress Party rule, the danger of the Communists proving to be the only party with sufficient coherence and organization to profit from the resultant situation cannot, therefore, be ignored. Even as it is, the two Soviet leaders showed that they bore in mind Lenin's axiom that if India and China could be brought into the Communist fold, they, together with Russia, would form a solid bloc of more than half the total population of the world on the side of World Revolution. Khrushchev might, for the moment, have been thinking only of bringing India into the Soviet orbit rather than into the Communist fold; but it is significant that, on his return to Moscow on 21st December, he recalled this saying and declared that India was 'a great and good friend of our country . . . and India, China and the Soviet Union, as Lenin taught, constitute an invincible force'. That he hoped to line up India, Burma and Afghanistan in support of Russian policy was clear from his subsequent reference to them as 'our allies in the struggle for peace' and explained that his purpose in visiting them was 'simple and clear', namely, to 'strengthen friendship and co-operation with them'.

One way in which he and Bulganin sought to achieve this was by openly inciting Indian intransigence over Kashmir. By declaring that the whole of Kashmir was an integral part of India, the two Soviet leaders not only helped to win Indian goodwill for themselves and

their country; they also undermined the prospects of a peaceful settlement of the Kashmir question and inflamed national sentiment in Pakistan. In taking sides in this way, however, they were thinking primarily in terms of the war of nerves which they had launched against Pakistan in retaliation for its adherence to the Western camp and, more particularly, for its recent entry into the Baghdad Pact.

Pakistan had elected to remain within the British Commonwealth on becoming independent; she had shown her fidelity to the United Nations by sending troops to Korea in 1950; she had accepted American aid for rearmament in February 1954;¹ and she had joined the Baghdad Pact in September 1955. All these actions were abhorrent to Moscow; and ever since the alleged talks, late in 1953, for a military alliance with the United States and the establishment of American air bases in Pakistan, the Russians and their Communist allies throughout the world have denounced the Pakistan government and professed inability to believe the stout denial that any such negotiations had ever taken place. But it was the Baghdad Pact that caused the greatest offence, and it was during their visit to Kashmir in December 1955, when the two Soviet leaders went out of their way to support the Indian claim to that territory, that Khrushchev delivered his greatest broadside against Pakistan, berating that country for denying India's ownership of Kashmir, for joining the Baghdad Pact and, quite untruly, for allowing the United States to establish bases on its territory. For good measure he accused Britain of having created Pakistan in order to split the peoples of the Indian sub-continent in accordance with her policy of 'divide and rule'. When, a few days later, the two Soviet leaders went on to visit Afghanistan, they bestirred themselves to cause further trouble for Pakistan by expressing sympathy with the Afghan attitude towards the question of Pushtunistan and by declaring that the Pushtuns were entitled to the right of self-determination and that Pakistan had no right to claim them for herself. This open encouragement of Afghanistan in its claims against Pakistan, like the incitement of Indian intransigence over Kashmir, was all part and parcel of the war of nerves, aimed at stirring up trouble for Pakistan and con-

¹ President Eisenhower, in a personal letter, had sought to reassure Nehru regarding this aid and had, at the same time, offered similar military assistance to India if she cared to have it. Nehru, however, had expressed doubts concerning American assurances and declined the proffered aid.

sequently weakening her effectiveness as a member of the Baghdad Pact. With this support of Afghanistan in her dispute with Pakistan, it should be added, went a long-term loan of one hundred million dollars on easy terms in order further to predispose its rulers towards the Soviet Union.

Support for India and Afghanistan on the Kashmir and Pushtunistan questions respectively was stressed still further by Bulganin and Khrushchev when addressing the Supreme Soviet after their return to Moscow; but on that occasion they combined blandishments with threats. If Pakistan should decide to pursue an 'independent policy' and revise its attitude to the Baghdad Pact, they said, it would be assured of Soviet friendship. Whether, in this event, the Soviet Union would, in turn, revise its attitude towards the questions of Kashmir and Pushtunistan was not stated.

With the rights and wrongs of the Indo-Pakistan dispute over Kashmir we need not concern ourselves here. What is important to bear in mind is the serious effect it has had on the peace and stability of the Indian sub-continent in general. Ever since the Kashmir question was brought into prominence by the invasion of that territory in October 1947 and the developments that followed, relations between India and Pakistan have been sadly bedevilled. The unhappy state of those relations has served to distract the attention of the leaders of both countries from other urgent matters and to prevent a unified front by the two great neighbours against the common menace from without and within. Nehru's intransigent speech in March 1951, in which he claimed Kashmir as an integral part of India, merely increased the difficulties of finding a solution. The mischievous speeches of the two Soviet leaders in December 1955 added fresh fuel to the fire.

In the circumstances it was perhaps inevitable that the Communists should have exploited the situation to the full and, while penetrating even the highest administrative organs in Kashmir and giving limited support to the ruling party in the state, had sought to build up 'a united front from below' against the Kashmir leadership [13]. Kashmir they regarded as a potential Indian Yenana which, unlike their base in South India, would have the great advantage of facilitating contact with Soviet Russia and Communist China. It was, in fact, by concentrating their forces in the Punjab¹ and Pepsu in the

¹ In the Punjab they had been strengthened in 1952 by the accession of the Lal (Red) Communist Party, a relic of the Ghadr Party whose activities during and

North-West, in Manipur, Tripura and Assam in the North-East, and in Kashmir in the far north that they saw the greatest possibilities for a successful rising in the years ahead. The arrest, in August 1953, of the Kashmir prime minister, Sheikh Abdullah, who had originally been regarded as India's protégé, must therefore be seen within this context. It was generally interpreted at the time as due to Nehru's annoyance at his action of a few weeks earlier in declaring opposition to a merger with India. This may have been the immediate cause; but Sheikh Abdullah had for long shown leanings towards the Communists and the main reason for his arrest would seem to have been the increasing concern of the Indian government at the progress of Communist penetration and infiltration in Kashmir.

Apart from the serious handicap imposed by its strained relations with India over the question of Kashmir and other matters, Pakistan, for its part, has had to face a series of internal troubles and losses from the start. The death of Jinnah, its architect and creator, in September 1948 was a serious blow at a critical juncture, and three years later came the assassination of the able Liaquat Ali Khan. The revelation of the Rawal Pindi conspiracy case in March 1951, with its Communist bearing, was an indication of the fires smouldering beneath the surface. Since April 1953 a succession of troubles in the internal administration of the country, necessitating government action, has added further to its problems. The Communist Party of Pakistan, which was called into existence at the time of the Indian Communists' Second Party Congress in February 1948, has exploited the situation in the way common to Communist parties in all non-Communist countries and, since July 1954, has been outlawed in both East and West Pakistan. Compared with its Indian counterpart it is weak and seemingly lacking in organization, but it has the advantage of operating in a country calling for land reform and still, in large sectors, in the grip of feudal abuses. Recognizing the opportunities that this state of affairs offers for Communist exploitation of grievances, the government has drawn up plans for the necessary reforms but, in doing so, has aroused the ire of powerful and reactionary landed interests. An instance of this was seen in March 1955, when six members of the Sind Assembly were arrested and eight others, including some former ministers, were sought for their part in an alleged assassination plot by big landlords and estate

immediately prior to the First World War have been recorded earlier in these pages.

holders to thwart recent land reforms and prevent their implementation.

It was not only in the matter of land that the Communists were provided with grievances to exploit. In April 1953 speculation, nepotism and provincialism, in conjunction with economic difficulties, scarcity of food and lax control of public order, were spreading with such alarming rapidity that the governor-general of Pakistan was compelled to order the prime minister and cabinet to relinquish office. This drastic action was necessary in order to end a situation which was playing into the hands of the Communists. A year later, following anti-government riots in which nearly a thousand persons lost their lives, the chief minister of East Pakistan was replaced in order to 'forestall a threat to the security of the state'. Six Communist leaders were arrested in connection with these riots and, in Karachi, fifteen alleged Communists were arrested and given a year's detention for activities 'likely to disturb public peace and tranquillity'.

From all this it will be seen that the rulers of Pakistan were, and still are, faced with the dual internal problem of having to carry out reforms to remove grievances which lay themselves open to Communist exploitation and, at the same time, to deal sternly with their own reactionary elements, who are determined to oppose the enforcement of such reforms. The Communists, on their part, show their usual readiness to follow the Moscow line and to build up the customary Communist Front organizations geared to the corresponding international bodies in Europe. The ready acceptance by the Pakistani Communists of the directive to 'follow the Chinese path', given to Asian Communists in general in the Cominform journal of 27th January 1950, and their denunciation of Pakistan's alleged military pact with the United States in December 1953, are but two examples of ready obedience to the Moscow line.

No account of Communist developments on the Indian sub-continent since the war would be complete, however, without at least a passing reference to the emergence of one other new Communist Party. In the autumn of 1950 the Nepali National Congress Party, which had been in exile, forced its way back into Nepal from India. Thereby they set on foot the developments which have since destroyed the old stability of what had hitherto been almost a hermit kingdom. Taking advantage of the disorders that followed, a Communist Party of Nepal was formed a year later. Although out-

lawed in January 1952, it has continued its activities ever since and has increased considerably in strength and influence, especially among the student class. It appears to be well organized, with fully-fledged Communist Front organizations in support. The Katmandu Municipality and civic administration are already dominated by the Communists, who have close contacts with the CPI and with Tibet.

It was to Tibet that Dr K. I. Singh, in company with thirty leading Nepali Communists, fled in January 1952 after the armed intervention of India had caused the failure of a revolt he had launched against the royal government. From Tibet he made his way to Peking, where his presence was revealed in July 1954 together with that of Pridi, the former Siamese prime minister. Another year passed and then, in July 1955, the Peking government suddenly announced its intention of handing him back to the Nepalis. Two months later, after being promised an amnesty by the young King,¹ he returned by the way he had gone, accompanied from Tibet by twenty-seven followers, and soon after formed a political party of his own.

Dr Singh, who is a Nepali of Indian origin, has always denied being a Communist. Perhaps he is not; but his flight to Communist territory in the company of leading Nepali Communists and his subsequent sojourn of three and a half years in Tibet and Peking, where he was received as an honoured guest, would seem to indicate at least a friendly attitude towards the Communist world. According to his own account, the Chinese Communists had offered to reinstall him in Nepal by force, but he had declined. This, too, may be true; but what seems more likely is that his return at that particular juncture, just two months before the visit of Bulganin and Khrushchev to India, was a calculated move in Moscow's game to woo India, who had been greatly concerned about Nepal ever since the upset caused by the return of the Nepali National Congress Party in the autumn of 1950. This interpretation finds support in the fact that, after his return to Nepal, Dr Singh went out of his way to commend India for her friendly, generous and 'selfless' assistance to Nepal. Previously, while in Peking, he had made numerous broadcasts urging the people of Nepal 'to win democratic rule and throw off India's overlordship', a slogan entirely in line with Nepali Communist policy at that time.

¹ King Tribhuvana, who had died in March, had been succeeded by his son, Mahendra.

If India had felt concern regarding developments in Nepal since the autumn of 1950, she had shown even greater perturbation about Tibet ever since September the previous year when it was reported that the Chinese People's Liberation Army intended to 'liberate' that country [14]. In view of its strategic position and the potentiality it possessed for infiltrating Communist agents and others into India, this was hardly surprising. The developments of the next twelve months fully confirmed the report and increased India's apprehensions. Finally, late in October 1950, came the announcement that Chinese troops had been ordered to advance into Tibet 'to free the three million Tibetans from imperialist aggression'. Delhi showed its alarm by dispatching a Note to Peking expressing 'surprise and regret'. There followed a Tibetan request for India's support against the threatened invasion and an exchange of acerbities between Delhi and Peking; but by May 1951 Peking had announced the signing of an agreement for the 'peaceful liberation of Tibet'. India being in no position to oppose it by force, the 'liberation' was duly carried out and it was not until April 1954 that an agreement was signed restoring India's trading rights in Tibet and allowing China to have certain trading and other facilities in India in exchange. This was followed four months later by Chou En-Lai's visit to Delhi. The outcome of his meeting there with Nehru was the issue of a joint statement enunciating the five principles centring around non-aggression and non-interference, which have since been accepted as a guide to their relations with China by a number of other countries as well.

Finally it must be noted that in both India and Pakistan there is a Soviet embassy; in India since December 1947; in Pakistan since March 1950. No such diplomatic listening posts had ever before been available to the Russians in this vital area. To what extent they have concerned themselves with matters outside their legitimate duties is largely a matter of surmise. What seems clear beyond doubt is that the embassy in Delhi has maintained contact with Indian Communists and has flooded India with propagandist literature at a price within reach of the most slender purse. Whether the large sums of money available to the Indian Communists on such occasions as the general elections of 1952 came from the embassy or through other channels is open to question. Certain it is that such lavish expenditure would not have been possible if the Communists had had to depend solely on their own very slender resources.

CHAPTER XXXIX

Conclusion

THE main evolutionary and revolutionary developments in South and East Asia during the past hundred years or so have now been outlined. To indicate how and why they have occurred, and to set them within the framework of world events in general and of Moscow's plans for world revolution in particular, has been one of the primary objects of this book. Apart from throwing out occasional suggestions as to possible future trends, the role of prophet has been deliberately eschewed. In these closing pages it remains to record certain final observations and conclusions of a general nature.

Compared with the years immediately following the Bolshevik Revolution and the creation of the Comintern, the situation throughout these Eastern regions has undergone a fundamental change. Gone are the days when the whole vast area, with the exception of Japan and Siam, was wholly or partly under Western or Japanese domination. Instead, out of the twelve hundred and fifty millions now living within its compass, only the relative handful dwelling in Malaya, Singapore, Hong Kong, Macao and Goa remain under foreign control; and before 1957 has ended Malaya, too, will have become independent. Asian nationalism, with its strident demands for political independence, can no longer be exploited, therefore, by the Communists on the same lines as before and, as shown at the Bandung Conference in April 1955 and on other occasions, Soviet imperialism is now, at least in principle, just as suspect and abhorrent to large sections of Asia as Western or any other imperialism ever was. Sir John Kotelawala, who, as prime minister of Ceylon, led the attack on Soviet imperialism at Bandung, expressed himself succinctly on this matter in a book of reminiscences published early in 1956. 'The colonialism from which we have progressively escaped,' he wrote, 'was in no sense worse than the new colonialism which has emerged in the form of aggressive and subversive Communist expansion. The old colonialism had at least the redeeming virtue of a

democratic basis. The new colonialism is nakedly totalitarian in intention and effect' [1].

Moscow, however, is never long at a loss for fresh lines of attack and has adapted itself to the changing circumstances by stirring up and exploiting new nationalist grievances and aspirations aiming at economic as well as purely political independence. The old battle-cry of anti-imperialism continues to be raised, but it is coupled with the slogan of anti-colonialism and is directed primarily at weakening Western influence by the encouragement of economic nationalism. The Russians are then, in effect, adapting rather than adopting the Marxist precept that political freedom is meaningless so long as the worker is exploited and suffers from economic insecurity. Marx was thinking in terms of socialism and the proletariat. Moscow is applying his precept in a nationalist context, substituting 'nation' for 'worker' and inciting the Asian nations formerly under foreign domination to feel that the political freedom they have achieved is only half the battle. Until they have obtained economic independence as well, they will be subject to economic exploitation by the West and their national economy will remain insecure. So runs the Soviet theme.

The attainment of political independence by all these countries of South and East Asia and the consequent change in Moscow's line of attack, however, are by no means the only transformations that have taken place in the Asian scene since the upsurge of Asian nationalism and Communism caused by President Wilson's advocacy of self-determination and by the Bolshevik Revolution. They are new and vitally important factors in the present situation, but no more so than the spectacular rise of India and China, the removal of Japan from the leadership of South and East Asia, or the diminution of Western prestige and influence.

As far back as 1805, Napoleon forecast that the destinies of Europe would one day be decided in Asia and he likened China to a sleeping giant, which would change the course of history if ever aroused from its slumbers. The sleeping giant has now awakened and, together with India, is exerting an incalculable influence on world affairs. If India, like her neighbour Pakistan, had elected to side with the Western camp, the contest between her and China for the leadership of Asia left vacant by Japan's defeat would have been largely in the nature of a projection of the world-wide struggle between the two ideological camps of Western democracy and

Communist autocracy. But India did no such thing. Instead, she has sought to remain neutral and, when circumstances presented themselves, to adopt the role of mediator. In regard to Korea, in regard to Indo-China, and in regard to Formosa, she has, at one time or another, attempted to mediate; and although it concerned other countries besides those of Asia, it was seemingly on India's initiative that the Soviet Union reversed its veto on the 'package deal' for the admission of new members to the United Nations in December 1955.¹

In addition to setting herself up as the main exponent of neutralism and as a mediator between the two world camps, India has, since 1947 when she acted as host to the conference for Asian unity held in Delhi, shown her ambition to assume the leadership of Asian nationalism. Two years later, in January 1949, it was India who took the initiative in rallying Asian opposition to Dutch military action in Indonesia by inviting thirteen other Asian nations to Delhi to consider ways and means of supporting the Indonesians in their struggle for independence. On numerous occasions since then, she has taken the lead in denouncing Western colonialism in both Asia and Africa and, though activated by the highest principles, has inevitably played into Communist hands at times by doing so.

If India's emergence as an independent nation in August 1947 may be said to have marked the advent of a new era in Asia, it is equally true that the birth of the Cominform two months later—with its emphasis on Asian revolution—and the establishment of the Chinese People's Republic in October 1949, served to mould the shape and affect the course of the new era to an incalculable extent. While India has sought by democratic means to assume the leadership of Asian nationalism, China, with Soviet acquiescence and in full support of the Soviet camp, has set herself up as the model and leader for Asian Communism. Between these two great giants, both of whom are seeking to solve the same basic problems of poverty

¹ Although the veto was reversed for all the other countries sponsored by the West, the Soviet Union maintained its veto on Japan, ostensibly as a counter-weight to Outer Mongolia, whose admission had been vetoed by Nationalist China. This action would seem to have been a calculated move to turn Japan's resentment against her Western friends for acquiescing in this deliberate snub. There was irony in the fact that it was Nationalist China who, by vetoing Outer Mongolia, brought this about and that its ability to do so was due to her being still accorded that status of one of the 'Big Five', who alone have the right of veto. Barely a week later, India recognized Outer Mongolia, the first non-Communist country to do so.

and backwardness in their own respective ways, lie the countries of South-East Asia. Future trends in that area seem bound, therefore, to depend to no small extent on which of the two systems shows the quicker and more effective results, as the peoples of those countries are more interested in results than in ideologies, and democratic tradition is still relatively weak.

Poverty, disease and ignorance, like landlordism which is gradually being overcome in many areas by land reform, are features common to all Asian countries in varying degrees. Until these have been eliminated or at least eased very considerably, they will always provide fertile soil for the spread of Communism. If India is able to overcome these conditions by democratic methods, the moral effect on the countries of South-East Asia should be wholly beneficial. Compared, however, with the relatively slow-moving methods of democracy, the regimentation and compulsion employed by Communist régimes for the attainment of economic aims are apt to produce results far more rapidly and spectacularly. Therein lies the danger, for these are the means employed by the Chinese rulers. But here it may be interpolated that, while hostile to Communist activities within its own borders, India has undoubtedly been impressed by what the Communists have already done for China. The irony of this is that, apart from the great impression made on Nehru during his visit to China in October 1954 by the discipline, industriousness and achievements of the Chinese, Indian admiration has been aroused to no small extent by the way in which Communist China has won the respect, though hardly the liking, of the West; yet this respect has been won largely in the same way as it was won by Japan half a century ago, by strength resting on armed force.

Nothing succeeds like success. The South-East Asian countries may have no more love for Communism than they had for Pan-Asianism under Japanese leadership; but if China, in addition to winning the respect of the West by its strength, is able to produce more rapid and seemingly more spectacular results by the forceful means of Communism than India is able to show by the more plodding, albeit less painful, ways of democracy, the example may prove catching. The possibility, moreover, that China, like Soviet Russia, may also employ territorial expansion as an instrument for the spreading of social revolution cannot be ignored. While, therefore, many of the Asian countries look askance at the South-East Asia Treaty Organization because of its implications and imperfections,

some sort of guarantee of immediate and effective action by the leading democratic countries of the world—Asian as well as Western—would seem to be required in order to ensure that fear of further Chinese aggression and consequent readiness to come to terms with the Communists does not become a more compelling force than dislike of Communism.

In so far as active opposition to those countries already under Communist domination is concerned, it is one of the tragedies of the contemporary scene in the Far East and South-East Asia that the only apparent alternatives to the Communist régimes in China, North Korea and Northern Vietnam would have to be supplied by the discredited Chinese Nationalists, by the intemperate Syngman Rhee, and by the disunited elements in Southern Vietnam respectively. The Communists may be tyrannical, but they are reasonably efficient and are led by men of ability. The Chinese Nationalists and the South Koreans, on the other hand, are tyrannical and corrupt without the redeeming virtue of competence. The Southern Vietnamese, though seemingly more democratic, are lacking in unity and ability. It is hardly surprising, therefore, that the idea of liberation from Communist domination fails to arouse much enthusiasm among the peoples of these territories when they realize what this would imply.

This is perhaps the greatest weakness of the anti-Communist camp in the Far East and South-East Asia, but it is by no means the only one. There are, too, the running sore of Kashmir, which keeps India and Pakistan at loggerheads instead of co-operating for the common good; the hostility between Karens and Burmans, which helps to increase the unrest in Burma; the anti-Japanese sentiment of so many Indonesians and the economic instability which exists in the former Netherlands East Indies; the constant friction between Japan and Southern Korea; the problems raised by Japan's increasing pressure of population;¹ religious, racial and other communal tensions which disturb the tranquillity of so many countries in the whole area. These and other factors wholly independent of Communism, some of them of more direct concern to the non-committed nations than to the anti-Communist countries,

¹ Pressure of population is not, of course, confined to Japan and there are close observers, like Guy Wint, who regard the tremendous yearly increase of population in China (12,000,000), India (5,000,000) and Japan (1,500,000) as 'the supreme and most sinister force likely to be at work in Asia in the next half-century' [2].

nevertheless help to produce the conditions on which Communism thrives.

To speculate on China's future intentions would be out of place in these pages; yet China and India between them, for good or for ill, would seem to hold the key to the future of these regions. A forecast made by Manjilsky thirty years ago has already proved well-founded. 'Revolutionary China,' he declared in 1926, 'can become, in alliance with the USSR, the greatest world factor in the Far East.' What was no more than a speculative piece of rhetoric at the time it was uttered is now an established fact. As such it is the outcome of 'the victory of the Chinese people's revolution', which Khrushchev in September 1954 described as being 'next to the great October Revolution . . . the most outstanding event in world history' [3].

When, as a result of the Bolshevik October Revolution in 1917, the application of Lenin's thesis on imperialism became a practical proposition, Asia emerged as a major factor in the struggle for World Revolution. Now, as a result of 'the victory of the Chinese people's revolution' and the alliance of Communist China with Soviet Russia, China has become the outstanding factor in the Far East and South East Asia. As for potential points of future friction between Moscow and Peking, these have been noted elsewhere; but as yet no signs of serious strain are apparent. It was perhaps significant, nonetheless, that Bulganin and Khrushchev made little reference to China during their tour of India and Burma and appeared to be making a definite bid to extend Russian influence in an area which China had hitherto regarded as coming within, or at least bordering on, its own preserves. Even, however, if the alliance should break down eventually, China seems likely to remain the dominant factor in that vast sector of Asia for a long time to come.

While India and China are attempting by different methods to solve the same basic problems of poverty and backwardness, they are at one in their hostility towards colonialism. And here we come to one of the curious paradoxes of the present time. The Americans, with their traditional dislike of colonialism, are now the main target of Communist attack on the grounds of alleged imperialism. They have, too, incurred the outspoken criticism and suspicions of the former colonies and dependencies to which they have extended so much moral, economic, and technical aid. There is irony, moreover,

in the fact that if the United States, as represented at the time by Roosevelt, had had their own way, Hong Kong would now almost certainly be under Communist administration. While Churchill's firm stand prevented the restoration of that strategically placed colony to China, it is nevertheless hardly too much to say that anti-colonial sentiment in anti-Communist America, by undermining French authority in Indo-China and Western influence in other Eastern territories as well at a crucial period, contributed unwittingly to the Communist cause. A strong Britain, a strong France and a strong Holland are wanted by the United States, yet this largely irrational hatred of colonialism could end only in depriving them of some of their sources of strength. The pre-war paradox of anti-Western Japanese nationalists, the most bitter opponents of Communism, assisting the Communist cause by encouraging Asiatic nationalism on which Communism battened in those days, is therefore paralleled to some extent by the unintentional support given to Communist machinations by the American exponents of anti-colonialism.

It is, however, the anti-colonialism of India and the other non-committed countries of South and East Asia that provides Moscow with such an invaluable target for exploitation. To these peoples the suspicion that the Western powers are seeking to reimpose their grip on them in a new form is far more real and frightening than are the dangers of Communist subversion or the expansionist ambitions of China and Soviet Russia. Washington in particular is more suspect than either Moscow or Peking. Yet paradoxically, as Mr Macmillan, at that time British foreign secretary, pointed out in a broadcast in December 1955, the Russians, 'by their conquests and annexations' are 'one of the greatest colonial powers, not in the good sense either' [4]. In view of the way in which Bulganin and Khrushchev, during their visit to India and Burma, made concerted attacks on British colonialism which, they declared, 'formerly doomed India to existence without rights' and 'robbed and plundered the Burmese', he might have added, as an illustration, that Russians and Ukrainians now account for about a quarter of the total population of the Central Asian Republics. Had the British 'imperialists' colonized India and increased the number of their officials to the same extent, India would have had to make room for about one hundred million British within its confines.¹

¹ Even as far back as 1904, there were less than 6,500 British employed in the

Despite these demonstrable facts, anti-colonialism, directed primarily against the West, remains a powerful force among the peoples of South and East Asia and, through the medium of the IUS (International Union of Students) and the World Federation of Democratic Youth in particular, is exploited to the full by the forces of world Communism. The non-committed countries in that area are, however, mainly concerned with seeking to remain neutral and have no wish to align themselves openly with either camp. Yet it is in this very desire to remain neutral that they have unwittingly played into Moscow's hands. Should a shooting war replace the present cold war, their strategic position would almost inevitably result in their becoming involved in it, willy-nilly, on one side or the other. Their anxiety to remain neutral has therefore led them to adopt a stand entirely in accord with the policy pursued by Moscow for very different reasons. The Communist peace campaign, with its demands for disarmament and the banning of nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons, makes 'a natural appeal to them as seeming to offer the best means to reduce the prospects of a shooting war in which they could not hope to maintain their neutrality. Like the implications of the Russians' idea of disarmament, the Western contention that the hydrogen bomb provides the best deterrent against aggression leaves them unmoved. Similarly, they are alarmed by and distrustful of such developments as SEATO and the Baghdad Pact which, in their eyes, tend to increase the risk of large-scale war in South and East Asia by provoking Moscow and Peking. Russia and Communist China, for their part, are equally opposed to these essentially defensive measures, because they act as a curb to their own plans and actions. And so it comes about that countries like India and Burma, with a genuine desire to remain neutral and undisturbed, are brought into line with the Communist bloc on some of the outstanding questions of the day, although Moscow's primary aim in advocating these seemingly peace-loving objectives is to deprive the Western powers of their only means of holding the Russians and their Communist allies at bay.

By playing on these sentiments of the uncommitted Asian coun-

•

administration of India [5]. Thirty years later this figure had been reduced to under 3,000. By 1947, on the eve of Indian independence, the progress of Indianizing the Services had resulted in the number of British officials being reduced to approximately 1,600, including 350 in the Indian Police. The total number of European British subjects in India at that time was given as 'about 100,000'.

tries and, since September 1953, carrying out its political economic offensive, Moscow has, as we have seen, sought to draw them into the Soviet political and economic orbit. That they have met with no small success in their attempt to divide the East from the West and to eliminate, or at least weaken, Western influence in South and East Asia by stirring up ill-feeling for, and suspicion of, the West and its motives is all too apparent. The exploitation of colonialism past and present, together with the peace campaign and the political economic offensive, must therefore now be regarded as the principal weapons in the Kremlin's armoury, aided by its machinery for conducting propaganda and subversion. That there is no question of seeking to solve problems is equally clear. To do so would be to act against long-established Communist principles, which regard compromise and 'reformism' as deadly sins. On the contrary, as seen by its open support of Indian intransigence in the disputes over Kashmir and Goa and of Afghanistan in the matter of Pushtunistan, Moscow has sought to make these problems still more insoluble.

In so far as the Soviet political economic offensive is concerned, her economic system enables Soviet Russia to offer more favourable terms than the West and her own economic achievements provide a most telling argument for inducing the under-developed countries of South and East Asia to imagine that Soviet methods of industrialization may provide the solution to their own problems. It is significant, therefore, that Japan, though far more advanced industrially than any other country in Asia, has recently expressed views common to those held in other Asian countries, contrasting American aid unfavourably with Soviet aid. A Japanese government pamphlet, issued at the end of January 1956, contended that, although American aid was on a greater scale than that given by Russia, it was of such a nature that it might, in the end, cause more resentment than gratitude amongst its recipients. This, according to the pamphlet, was because the form in which this assistance was given was dependent on the stocks that were surplus to the requirements of the United States rather than on the needs of the recipients. Russian aid, on the other hand, was given in forms best suited to the requirements of the countries receiving it. As an example it quoted the recently concluded agreement in Rangoon, under which the Russians undertook to purchase surplus Burmese rice in exchange for Soviet heavy machinery and construction materials. In contrast to Russian credit, which could be repaid in raw materials, the loans proposed by the

Western powers 'would have to be repaid in cash at a much higher rate of interest' [6].

Although this criticism was couched in moderate terms, it was indicative of an underlying resentment. Coming, as it did, from Japan, it called to mind that one of the principal aims laid down at the CPSU Nineteenth Congress in October 1952 was to provoke and exploit dissensions among the countries of the 'imperialist' camp, setting Britain against Japan, France against Germany, and all four against the United States. Dissensions, or 'divisions' as the Communists prefer to call them, in the 'imperialist' camp there are bound to be, for honest differences of opinion are the strength as well as the weakness of the free world as against the monolithic unity imposed by the totalitarian system of the Communist world. In view, therefore, of the categorical statement of aims made at the CPSU Nineteenth Congress, the importance of ensuring that their differences with one another are not aggravated in such a way as to serve Moscow's avowed purpose should be clear to all the countries concerned.

This final chapter is being written on the eve of the CPSU Twentieth Congress, which is to be followed by the Eighth Congress of the Chinese Communist Party, the Fourth Congress of the Communist Party of India and the North Korean Workers' (Communist) Party Congress. These are important milestones in the progress of world Communism and will lay down the policy and tactics to be followed, especially in South and East Asia, during the immediate years ahead. Without indulging in any crystal gazing, it is safe to say that the pace and direction for the last three parties will be set by the decisions taken and the resolutions passed at the Moscow gathering. It is probably safe to say, too, that the peace campaign, with its stress on the alleged efforts for peace made by the Soviet bloc and nullified by the West, will continue to feature as one of the main weapons in the Communist armoury. It seems appropriate to note, therefore, that, by aiming to spread discontentment with Western defence measures and their economic consequences, and to divide and weaken the free world, this campaign is subserving the purpose of the Cominform.¹ Apart from guiding and enforcing Communist orthodoxy among Communists throughout the world, that body seeks to

¹ Since this was written, the Cominform has been dissolved, but the WFTU and other international Communist front organisations remain and provide the necessary 'ties and contacts' for the guidance and co-ordination of Communist activities throughout the world.

co-ordinate Communist strategy directed against European recovery by the disruption of Western economy. World Revolution and the downfall of Western democracy and capitalism therefore remains the ultimate objective, and the strategy of the indirect approach through what Stalin used to call 'the far imperialist rear' continues to be employed. Even if the former 'colonies and semi-colonies' of South and East Asia cannot be brought into the Communist fold, their use as basic markets and sources of raw material for the Western world can be so greatly curtailed that Western economy will be seriously affected if the now independent states can be wooed away sufficiently from the Western camp. It is by means of its political economic offensive in conjunction with the peace campaign that the Soviet hopes to bring this about. These Asian territories are, in fact, regarded by Moscow and the Communist world at large in much the same way as Churchill, in his plans for the downfall of Nazi Germany, regarded what he called 'the soft under-belly of Europe'.

While Soviet wooing has been mainly directed at India and Burma, it should not escape notice that in Indonesia President Sukarno has of late been showing increasing distrust of the West and admiration for the achievements of Communist China. His was the master-mind, according to the Indonesian press, in the attacks made on the pro-West Harahap government which, in January 1956, lost the support of some of its adherents in consequence. It was significant that, only a few days previously, he had addressed an anti-colonial rally in Jakarta and had recommended Communist participation in a new Indonesian government. It should be clear, however, to all these non-committed countries that the present Soviet policy of wooing their non-Communist leaders is but a passing phase in the traditional Communist policy of temporary alliances. The Communists in their more expansive moments make it clear that such policies as the current 'peaceful co-existence', which the writer of an article in a Soviet publication in October 1954 stressed was not intended to last 'for ever' but merely 'for a prolonged period' [7], are no more than temporary expedients in accordance with the 'zigzag course' advocated by Lenin. This was described by him as meaning 'sometimes retracing our steps, sometimes giving up the course once selected and trying various others', a policy which Stalin said involved 'manœuvring the reserves with a view to effecting a proper retreat when the enemy is strong'. It is a policy followed by international Communism from the outset, a policy which leaves the

final strategic objective, World Revolution, untouched, but provides wide scope for the shifts and changes in tactics required to suit the changing conditions and circumstances of national and international developments.

It was in line with this resort to temporary expedience that Shepilov,¹ as noted in the previous chapter, instructed the CPI to support Nehru 'for the time being'. The constant reiteration of the promise, 'Land for the Tiller', and the subsequent gradual trend towards collectivization in Communist China, North Korea and Northern Vietnam are but different aspects of this same Communist practice of temporary expedients. Temporary friendship and moderation are but a passing phase in the zigzag course leading to eventual Communist control; and here it may be recalled that on 4th November 1955 *Pravda* proudly announced 'the completion of the building up of socialism and of the gradual transfer from socialism to Communism' in the Soviet Union. Recent pronouncements by Mao Tse-Tung would seem to indicate that China hopes to reach that same stage before long. 'Communism', however, is different from Communist control and is, of course, only made possible after Communist control has been established.

An attempt has been made to show how Moscow, through its followers in the various countries of South and East Asia, has sought to impose Communist control in those widespread, densely-populated territories. Many of those who figured in the early days of the Communist movement, when the upsurge of Asian nationalism at the close of the 1914-18 war seemed to offer such promising material, are now dead, either through natural causes or through violence. Others have become disillusioned and quit the Communist cause; but some there are who remain alive and active in the cause of World Revolution. It may be not without interest, therefore, to consider the fate of some of those who have figured most prominently in these pages.

Of non-Asians who played all-important parts in striving to set Asia ablaze, Lenin, Trotsky and Stalin, all now dead, have left indelible marks. Leaving aside the unconfirmed reports and suspicions that Lenin's and Stalin's deaths may not have been wholly due to natural causes, it is certainly true that Trotsky died the victim of Moscow-inspired assassination. Zinoviev, Bukharin, Radek, and Karakhan, who likewise played important roles in stirring up revolu-

¹ Since this was written, Shepilov succeeded Molotov as foreign minister.

tion in Asia, met their deaths at the hands of Soviet executioners, and Joffe committed suicide. Borodin, Marshal Blucher, *alias* Galen, and Heinz Neumann, who all figured prominently in the early stages of the Chinese revolution, are also dead, Borodin dying in a Siberian prison camp, Blucher falling foul of the Kremlin and 'disappearing', and Neumann shot in prison by his former Moscow masters. Sneevliet, *alias* Mahring, who played so active a role in the early days of the Communist movement in both Indonesia and China, appears to have died in exile. Such is the price paid by so many of those non-Asians who sought to carry out the dictates of Moscow in setting the Asian world ablaze. One of the few who remains alive today, though long since bereft of all illusions about the virtues of Communism, is Philip Spratt, who served as a Comintern agent in India in the 1920's and as recently as 1955 published a book describing his activities in those days [8].

Of Asians who strove to stir up Communist revolution in their own and other Asian countries, M. N. Roy, the 'father of Indian Communism' and the Comintern agent who caused the final drastic split in the CCP-KMT alliance in the 1920's by revealing to Wang Ching-Wei the instructions sent by Moscow to the Chinese Communists, died peacefully in January 1954 long after becoming disillusioned and breaking away from his former Soviet masters. Tan Malaka, another Comintern agent in the 1920's and 'father of Indonesian Communism', is believed to have met his death in action in 1949;¹ but although still a fiery revolutionary at the time, he too had fallen into Moscow's bad graces many years previously. His former rival, Muso, also fell in battle during the Madiun rebellion, but was still fighting for the orthodox Communist cause. Of other Indonesians prominent in the early days of the Indonesian Communist movement, Alimin, Darsono and Semaun are still alive, but Alimin has been removed from the Party 'for health reasons', Darsono has become disillusioned, and Semaun continues his long exile in Moscow. Of formerly prominent Japanese Communists, Tokuda is dead, although his death in Peking in 1953 was only announced two years after it occurred, and Sano Gaku has defected long since; but Nozaka and Shiga now lead the Party. It is, in fact, only in Japan,

¹ Although there have been reports from time to time since then that he is still alive, it seems reasonably certain that he was, in fact, killed. Having become an almost legendary figure, his former followers are probably responsible for the recurring legend that he escaped death.

China and Indo-China that members of the Old Guard continue to guide the movements in which they have been conspicuous from the outset—Nozaka and Shiga in Japan, Mao Tse-Tung, Chou En-Lai and Chu Teh in China, and the veteran Ho Chi-Minh in Indo-China. In Burma, it is true, Than Tun and Thakin Soe can make a similar claim; but the BCP only dates back to 1938 and Thakin Soe, though still an ardent Communist, is in opposition to the orthodox Party.

And so we come to the outstanding leaders of that Asian nationalism which the Communists sought to exploit for their own purposes in the days following the nationalist upsurge at the close of the First World War. Gandhi, Jinnah and Patel are no more, but Nehru remains as the outstanding figure in India and indeed, in Asia with the possible exception of Mao Tse-Tung. Sun Yat-Sen is long dead, but his widow now plays an active part in Communist China, though not herself a member of the Communist Party. Her brother-in-law, Chiang Kai-Shek, too, continues to figure prominently, but as a rather pathetic shadow of his former self. In Indonesia Sukarno, Hatta and Sjahrir occupy leading positions in the country which they led to independence, with Sukarno, in the capacity of president, showing increasing anti-Western and leftist leanings. In South Korea the fiery intransigent octogenarian Syngman Rhee plays the leading role. In Burma, U Nu occupies a similar outstanding position; but Aung San is dead, the victim of assassination, and U Saw, who planned his murder, has paid the price of his crime. In Siam, where nationalism was never such a dynamic force as in other parts of South-East Asia, Pibul remains supreme while Pridi, with whom he played Box and Cox for so many years, stays biding his time in exile abroad. And Japan, where nationalism among its more extreme exponents took the form of distorted patriotism and espoused the cause of Pan-Asianism under Japanese leadership? The enigmatic Toyama Mitsuru, the great high priest of the ultra-patriotic cult, is no more. He died during the war, as also did the former Indian terrorist, Rash Behari Bose who, under the protection of Toyama and his Black Dragon Society, played so baleful a part in stirring up anti-Western, and more particularly anti-British, sentiment in Japan. The old dynamic leaders are gone; but the cult, though lessened in influence, is by no means dead and some who played direct parts in the political assassination plots of the 1930's are still alive and active. But here we must end this review of what has happened to those who figured so prominently in the Asian nationalist and Communist

movements in the years immediately following the Bolshevik Revolution and turn to other features of the situation as it is to-day.

Of how Moscow, by injecting the idea of 'new colonialism' has sought to arouse suspicions of Western policies towards the now independent countries of Asia, enough has already been said; but the new technique employed for this purpose merits emphasis. Not only have Soviet diplomatic missions been set up in India, Pakistan, Burma, Siam and Indonesia, in which none existed before, as well as in the Communist states of China, North Korea and North Vietnam; there has also been a constant exchange of 'cultural' and other missions with these countries, culminating in the personal visits of the two Soviet leaders to India and Burma in the closing weeks of 1955. Never, in Stalin's days, had such methods been used. Comintern agents, in the years between the two world wars, had been sent to incite and direct Communist activities and, with the coming of the Cominform in 1947, Communist Front organizations and 'fraternal delegates' started to play their part in subversive agitation and propaganda. But these have all been part of the traditional Communist practice of working for the downfall of existing social, political and economic systems. It required Stalin's death and the consequent replacement of individual dictatorship by the principle of collective leadership to enable the two topmost figures in the Soviet hierarchy to introduce the new technique. This entails the making of personal visits as honoured guests in order to woo the heads of governments by flattery and promises of aid instead of sending covert agents to work for their downfall by subversion. Subversion continues, but for the time being it is relegated to a subsidiary role.

Since the Russians finally completed their control of the Comintern apparatus in 1927, however, subversion has always been subordinate to the requirements of Soviet foreign policy. The new technique is merely another means of serving those requirements. Tactics change, conditioned as they are by the current needs of Soviet foreign policy, but the ultimate strategic aim of World Revolution remains unaltered. The zigzag course laid down by Lenin, with its temporary alliances and its use of 'transmission belts' for ensuring that the ever-changing Moscow line is communicated to the masses in palatable form, continues. It is still directed, moreover, by a small group of highly-trained, efficiently organized and strictly disciplined men dedicated to the revolutionary theories of Marx, Lenin and Stalin. Africa and the Middle East are now added to South and East

Asia as the target of Communist anti-colonial propaganda and are being subjected to similar techniques, although the tactics employed vary according as to whether the countries are subject to the old forms of colonialism, as in the case of much of Africa, or to 'new colonialism' as in the Middle East. It is a chastening thought in regard to all these countries, but more particularly in regard to those of Asia, that much of the recruiting and training for the respective Communist parties is started in England, where the British Communist Party has always made a point of befriending and indoctrinating coloured students and others. There is no colour bar in the United Kingdom and no curbing of the normal freedoms; but the majority of Asian or African visitors or temporary residents find few English homes open to them and many of them are refused quarters by British landladies. Feeling humiliated and homesick, they present an easy target for Communist propaganda with its denunciation of colour discrimination, colonialism and the like.

The ability and the readiness of the Communists to exploit the colour question cannot be too strongly emphasized. Its bearing on the whole question of colonialism must be clear to all; but what is apt to be overlooked even now is the increasing necessity on the part of the Western camp to heed the voice of Asia. This need has been brought more and more into evidence since the outbreak of the Korean war, but more particularly since April 1954 when, coincident with the Five-Power meeting in Geneva to discuss the questions of Korea and Indo-China, the prime ministers of India, Pakistan, Ceylon, Burma and Indonesia met together in Colombo to decide how best the moral weight of united Asian opinion could be used to tip the scales in favour of peace as between the two great power-blocs struggling for supremacy. As shown by Sir John Kotelawala, on whose initiative the Colombo Conference was called, the deliberations of these Asian statesmen and the conclusions set forth in the communiqué issued at the close of their meeting had a 'very salutary effect on the negotiations at Geneva' and 'tipped the balance in bringing about the settlement in Indo-China' [9]. From their subsequent meeting at Bogor in Indonesia in December that year there emerged the decision to convene the far wider-embracing Afro-Asian Conference at Bandung in April 1955, a meeting which was to bring about a definite change in the world balance of power.

The Asian countries still have their differences with one another, but the voice of Asia is now backed by a unity unknown before.

As such it can no longer be disregarded with impunity. Moreover, by their show of sympathy for Asians and Asian aspirations and by their professed love of peace, the Communists are able to curry favour among the Asian peoples in contrast to the Western powers who, even in their most generous offers of aid, appear in Asian eyes to be actuated more by anti-Communist motives than by pro-Asian sentiment and to think and speak in terms of war rather than strive for the cause of peace.

It was noticeable that, following the Afro-Asian Conference in Bandung in April 1955, both the Soviet Union and Communist China took up the anti-colonial theme with increasing vigour, and Chou En-Lai, underlining the 'common experience' of the Asian and African countries, declared that it could serve as a basis for mutual 'sympathy and support'. The relative moderation shown by Chou at that conference, however, when taken in conjunction with the enunciation of his 'five principles' and with the signing of the agreement with Indonesia for abolishing dual nationality, gave rise to hopes that the Peking leaders were beginning to appreciate the need for a more flexible foreign policy than was possible under a rigidly dogmatic, doctrinaire Communist approach.

Pertinent to this possibility was a study of Chinese Communist behaviour and its causes which had recently been published by Michael Lindsay, who had had close war-time associations with many of the present Chinese leaders [10]. The conclusion he reached was that its undoubted deterioration since about the summer of 1946 had been due to Communist irrationality rather than to bad faith. This may not have afforded much satisfaction for those who had suffered from it, but first-hand acquaintance with these leaders led the author of this study to assert that the Chinese Communist Party was rather more rational than most Communist bodies. From this he deduced the belief that China's present rulers might, in certain specified circumstances, prove more amenable to reason and less doctrinaire than most Communists, at least in so far as their relations with foreign countries were concerned. Claiming equality with the Soviet Union as China does, and being less subject to Moscow than are the satellite countries, it might therefore be that the interests of the state would be given precedence over those of the Party.

If these deductions should prove justified, there seems room for hope that increasing contact between such outstanding Chinese

leaders as Chou En-Lai and the statesmen of the democratic countries of Asia and the West may help to remove some of the delusions and misunderstandings responsible for Chinese Communist behaviour since 1946 and lead to a more rational outlook. It seems possible, moreover, that the Bulganin-Khrushchev visit to India and Burma, with its accompaniment of lavish promises of material aid to those two countries and to Afghanistan, has aroused some misgivings and even resentment in Chinese minds. If this is so—and Chou En-Lai's recent warning that China must not rely on Soviet experts indefinitely may be a pointer [11]—it might conceivably dispose China to show greater readiness to seek a better understanding with the Western powers, especially if a favourable response was forthcoming. This may seem verging on wishful thinking, for, even if the Chinese should feel so disposed, the Russians are in a position to hold them in check by threatening to curtail, or even withhold, the material aid which they will require for many years to come; but it is a possibility to be borne in mind.

Could Chinese delusions and misunderstandings be removed, the effect on the existing situation would be wholly beneficial; but there would clearly have to be a reasonable amount of give and take on both sides and a readiness on the part of the Western powers to remedy China's more legitimate grievances, on such matters as Peking's admission to the United Nations and the question of Formosa, if a real and lasting improvement is to be obtained. Failing this, the outlook for the future must remain gloomy indeed, with both China and the Soviet Union continuing their attempts to confirm the truth of Zinoviev's aphorism of 1925, that the road to World Revolution lies through the East.

Bibliography and Note on Sources

ONLY those books and other material used in the preparation of this volume have been included in the bibliography.

Without going into the varying degrees of reliability and merit of each of the publications mentioned, they may be divided into five main groups:

1. *Documentary Material*

Most important are: Stalin's *Problems of Leninism*, *Marxism and the National and Colonial Question*, and *History of the CPSU(B)*, Lenin's *Selected Works*, Mao Tse-Tung's *Selected Works* and other writings, Liu Shao-Chi's *On The Party and Internationalism and Nationalism*, Dona Torr's *Marx On China*, the Cominform journal (officially entitled *For a Lasting Peace, For a People's Democracy*), *Imprecor*, NCNA (New China News Agency) despatches, Jane Degras' *Soviet Documents on Foreign Policy*, and Brandt's *Documentary History of Chinese Communism*.

In Communist eyes most of these have the authority of Holy Writ. Being primary sources, they are essential material for the study of Communist thought and practice. In so far as they relate to historical events, however, the bias and distortion of facts in which their authors indulge have to be borne in mind. The struggle for power among the Communist leaders themselves, especially in Russia, has led to some strange re-writing of history in order to show that the victors of these struggles were always right while the vanquished were unprincipled blackguards and traitors.

2. *First-hand Works by former Communists*

Under this heading come the writings of Agabekov, Borkenau, Margarete Buber, Deutscher, Louis Fischer, Ruth Fischer, Douglas Hyde, Harold Isaacs, M. N. Roy, Trotsky, and Jan Valtin.

All these are invaluable sources, as the authors are writing from first-hand knowledge and experience. Allowance must, however, be made for the varying degrees of bias and prejudice which tend to colour their writing, from the strongly prejudiced outpourings of Trotsky at one end of the scale to the commendable objectivity of Deutscher and Douglas Hyde at the other.

3. *First-hand Works by Others*

These include the works of Sir Winston Churchill, Deane, Etherton, Hilton, Thakin Nu, Onraet, Snow, Spencer Chapman, Stettinius, and Stilwell. Although varying in merit, they all provide valuable material and useful background.

4. *Scholarly Studies*

Chief amongst those listed are the works of Sir Olaf Caroe, Edward Carr, Dallin, Deutscher, Fitzgerald, Carew Hunt, Jones, Kahin, Mitrany, North, Purcell, Sir George Sansom, Schwartz, and Swearingen and Langer. All of these call for high commendation.

5. *Miscellaneous*

There are also many other books and publications that cannot be placed under any of the four previous heads. Most of them are of real value for the study of Communism and Nationalism in South and East Asia, but among those calling for special mention are the works by the anonymous 'American Sociologist', Leonard Barnes, Beloff, Blumberger, Owen Chapman, Christian, Colbert, Sir John Cumming, Elegant, Elsbree, Furnivall, O. M. Green, Hall, Hanrahan, Michael Lindsay, Masani, Millar, Mills, Van Mook, Payne, Philips, Sokolsky, Tanin and Yohan, Virginia Thompson, Willoughby, and Guy Wint.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

1. *Periodicals*

Akahata, *Asian Horizon*, *British Survey*, Chatham House periodicals (Fortnightly *Chronology of International Events*, *International Affairs*, and *The World Today*), *China Year Book*, *Cominform Journal*, *Cross-Roads*, *Daily Worker*, *Eastern World*, *Economist*, *Foreign Affairs*, *Imprecor*, *Japan Advertiser*, *Japan Chronicle*, *Japan Year Book*, *Keesing's Contemporary Archives*, *Manchester Guardian*, NCNA (New China News Agency) *Nhandan*, *Observer*, *Pacific Affairs*, *People's China*, *Pravda*, *The Times*, and *Times Literary Supplement*.

2. *Books and Pamphlets*

Agabekov, *OGPU* (Brentano, 1931)
 American Sociologist, *The Socialist and Labour Movement in Japan* (Japan Chronicle Press, 1921)
 Bailey, Colonel, *Mission to Tashkent* (Jonathan Cape, 1946)
 Ball, W. Macmahon, *Nationalism and Communism in East Asia* (Melbourne University Press, 1952)
 Barnes, Leonard, *Soviet Light on the Colonies* (Penguin, 1944)
 Beloff, Max, *Soviet Policy in the Far East 1944-51* (Oxford University Press, 1953)
 Bessedovsky, G. Z., *Revelations of a Soviet Diplomat* (Williams & Norgate, 1932)
 Blumberger, J. T., *Le Communisme aux Indes Neerlandaises* (1929)
 Borkenau, Franz, *The Communist International* (Faber & Faber, 1938)
 Brandt, Schwartz & Fairbank, *A Documentary History of Chinese Communism* (George Allen & Unwin, 1952)
 Bruce-Lockhart, Sir Robert, *Memories of a British Agent* (Putnam, 1932)
 Buber, Margarete, *Under Two Dictators* (Gollancz, 1949)

- Butow, Robert, *Japan's Decision to Surrender* (Oxford University Press, for Stanford, 1955)
- Byas, Hugh, *Government by Assassination* (Allen & Unwin, 1943)
- Calthrop, Captain, *The Book of War* (John Murray, 1908)
- Carew Hunt, R., *The Theory and Practice of Communism* (Geoffrey Bles, 1950)
- Caroe, Sir Olaf, *Soviet Empire* (Macmillan, 1953)
- Carr, E. H., *The Bolshevik Revolution 1917-23* (Macmillan, 1952)
- Chapman, H. Owen, *The Chinese Revolution 1926-27* (Constable, 1928)
- Chatham House Study Group, *Defence in the Cold War* (1950)
- Christian, John Le Roy, *Burma and the Japanese Invader* (Thacker, Bombay, 1945)
- Churchill, Sir Winston, *The Second World War* (Cassell, 1948-54)
- Clinard, Outlen Jones, *Japan's Influence on American Naval Policy* (University of California Press, 1947)
- Colban, Alfred, *National Self-Determination* (Oxford University Press, 1944)
- Colbert, Evelyn, *The Left Wing in Japanese Politics* (IPR, 1952)
- Colvin, Ian, *The Life of General Dyer* (Blackwood & Sons, 1929)
- Crankshaw, Edward, *Russia by Daylight* (Michael Joseph, 1951)
- Crossman, R. H. S. et al., *The God That Failed* (Hamish Hamilton, 1950)
- Cumming, Sir John, *Political India 1832-1932* (Oxford University Press, 1932)
- Cumming, Sir John, *Modern India* (Oxford University Press, 1932)
- Dallin, David, *Soviet Russia and the Far East* (Yale University Press, 1948)
- Dallin, David, *The Rise of Russia in Asia* (Hollis & Carter, 1950)
- Davies, Joseph, *Mission to Moscow* (Victor Gollancz, 1942)
- Deane, Major-General John, *The Strange Alliance* (Viking Press, 1947)
- Dedijer, Vladimir, *Tito Speaks* (Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1953)
- de Francis, John, *Nationalism and Language Reform in China* (Princeton University Press, 1950)
- DeGras, Jane, *Soviet Documents on Foreign Policy* (Oxford University Press, 1951-3)
- Deutscher, Isaac, *Stalin* (Oxford University Press, 1949)
- Deutscher, Isaac, *The Prophet Armed* (Oxford University Press, 1954)
- Elegant, Robert, *China's Red Masters* (Twayne Publishers, 1951)
- Elsbree, Willard, *Japan's Role in South-East Asian Nationalist Movements* (Harvard University Press, 1953)
- Etherton, Colonel, *In the Heart of Asia* (Constable, 1925)
- Fall, Bernard, *The Viet Minh Régime* (Cornell University and IPR, 1954)
- Fischer, Louis, *The Soviets in World Affairs 1917-29* (Jonathan Cape, 1930)
- Fischer, Ruth, *Stalin and German Communism* (Harvard University Press, 1948) •
- Fitzgerald, C. P., *Revolution in China* (Cresset Press, 1952)
- Forman, Harrison, *Report From Red China* (Holt, 1945)
- Furnivall, J. S., *Netherlands India* (Cambridge University Press, 1944)
- Gelder, Stuart, *The Chinese Communists* (Gollancz, 1946)
- Green, O. M., *The Story of China's Revolution* (Hutchinson, 1945)

- Hall, D. G. E., *Burma* (Hutchinson's University Library, 1950)
- Hanranhan, Gene, *The Communist Struggle in Malaya* (IPR, 1954)
- Harvey, G. E., *British Rule in Burma* (Faber & Faber, 1946)
- Hashimoto, M., *Sunk* (Cassell, 1954)
- Hill, Christopher, *Lenin and the Russian Revolution* (Hodder & Stoughton, 1947)
- Hilton, Richard, *Military Attaché in Moscow* (Hollis & Carter, 1949)
- Hladun, John, *They Taught Me Treason* (Maclean's Magazine, 1st October to 1st November, 1947)
- Hu Chiao-Mu, *Thirty Years of the Communist Party of China* (Lawrence & Wishart, 1951)
- Hyde, Douglas, *I Believed* (Heinemann, 1950)
- Isaacs, Harold, *The Tragedy of the Chinese Revolution* (Secker & Warburg, 1938)
- Johnston, Sir Reginald, *Twilight in the Forbidden City* (Victor Gollancz, 1934)
- Jones, F. C., *Japan's New Order in East Asia 1937-45* (Oxford University Press, 1954)
- Jones, Borton and Pearn, *The Far East 1942-46* (Oxford University Press, 1955)
- Kahin, George, *Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia* (Cornell University Press, 1952)
- Karaka, D. F., *Betrayal in India* (Gollancz, 1950)
- Kato, Masuo, *The Lost War* (Alfred Knopf, 1946)
- Kennedy, M. D., *The Changing Fabric of Japan* (Constable, 1930)
- Kennedy, M. D., *The Problem of Japan* (Nisbet, 1935)
- Kent, P. H. B., *The Twentieth Century in the Far East* (Arnold, 1937)
- King-Hall, Stephen, *The Communist Conspiracy* (Constable, 1953)
- Kotelawala, Sir John, *An Asian Prime Minister's Story* (Harrap, 1956)
- Laski, Harold, *The Communist Manifesto: Socialist Landmark* (Allen & Unwin, 1948)
- Lenin, *Collected Works* (Lawrence & Wishart, 1938)
- Lenin, *Selected Works* (Martin Lawrence, 1936-9)
- Lindsay, Michael, *China and the Cold War* (Melbourne University Press, 1955)
- Liu Shao-Chi, *On The Party* (Foreign Languages Press, Peking, 1950)
- Liu Shao-Chi, *Internationalism and Nationalism* (Foreign Languages Press, Peking, 1951)
- Lyons, Eugene, *Assignment in Utopia* (Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1937)
- Lyons, Captain Gervais, *Afghanistan, the Buffer State* (Higginbotham, Madras, 1910)
- Mao Tse-Tung, *The Turning Point in China* (New Century Publishers, New York, 1948)
- Mao Tse-Tung, *People's Democratic Dictatorship* (Lawrence & Wishart, 1950)
- Mao Tse-Tung, *Selected Works*, Vols. I to IV (Lawrence & Wishart, 1954 and 1956)
- Masani, M. R., *The Communist Party of India* (Verschoyle, 1954)

- Mendelssohn, Peter, *Japan's Political Warfare* (Allen & Unwin, 1944)
- Millar, Harry, *Menace in Malaya* (Harrap, 1954)
- Mills and Associates, *The New World of South-East Asia* (Minnesota Press, 1949)
- Mitrany, D., *Marx Against The Peasants* (Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1951)
- Mook, Van, *The Stakes of Democracy in South-East Asia* (Allen & Unwin, 1950)
- Napier, J. P., *Survey of the Japanese Communist Party* (Nippon Times Ltd, 1952)
- Nicolson, Harold, *The Congress of Vienna* (Constable, 1946)
- North, Robert, *Moscow and the Chinese Communists* (Stanford University Press, 1953)
- Nu, Thakin, *Burma Under The Japanese* (Macmillan, 1954)
- O'Dwyer, Sir Michael, *India As I Knew It* (Constable, 1925)
- Oliver, Robert, *Syngman Rhee* (Robert Hale, 1955)
- Onraet, René, *Singapore: A Police Background* (Dorothy Crisp & Co., 1947)
- Orwell, George, *Animal Farm* (Secker & Warburg, 1949)
- Panikkar, K. M., *Asia and Western Domination* (Allen & Unwin, 1953)
- Panikkar, K. M., *In Two Chinas* (Allen & Unwin, 1956)
- Pares, Sir Bernard, *History of Russia* (Jonathan Cape, 1926)
- Payne, Robert, *The Revolt in Asia* (Gollancz, 1948)
- Payne, Robert, *Mao Tse-Tung* (Secker & Warburg, 1951)
- Philips, C. H., *India* (Hutchinson's University Library, 1948)
- Purcell, Victor, *The Chinese in South-East Asia* (Oxford University Press, 1951)
- Purcell, Victor, *Malaya: Communist or Free?* (Gollancz, 1954)
- Roth, Andrew, *Dilemma in Japan* (Gollancz, 1946)
- Roy, M. N., *Revolution and Counter-Revolution in China* (Renaissance Publishers, Calcutta, 1946)
- Sansom, Sir George, *The Western World and Japan* (Cresset Press, 1950)
- Schwartz, Benjamin, *Chinese Communism and the Rise of Mao* (Harvard University Press, 1951)
- Schwarzschild, Leopold, *The Red Prussian* (Hamish Hamilton, 1948)
- Sharpley, Cecil, *The Great Delusion* (Heinemann, 1952)
- Snow, Edgar, *Red Star Over China* (Gollancz, 1946)
- Sokolsky, George E., *The Tinder Box of Asia* (Allen & Unwin, 1932)
- Spencer Chapman, F., *The Jungle Is Neutral* (Chatto & Windus, 1949)
- Spratt, Philip, *Blowing Up India* (Sita Ram Goel, Calcutta, 1955)
- Stalin, *History of the CPSU(B)* (Foreign Languages Publishing House, Moscow, 1943)
- Stalin, *Problems of Leninism* (Foreign Languages Publishing House, Moscow, 1947)
- Stalin, *Marxism and the National and Colonial Question* (Lawrence & Wishart, 1947)
- Stein, Gunther, *The Challenge of Red China* (New York, 1945)
- Stettinius, Edward, *Roosevelt and The Russians* (Jonathan Cape, 1950)
- Stilwell, General, *The Stilwell Papers* (Macdonald, 1949)

- Swearingen & Langer, *Red Flag In Japan* (Harvard University Press, 1952)
- Tanin & Yohan, *Militarism and Fascism in Japan* (Martin Lawrence, 1934)
- Temperley, Major-General, *The Whispering Gallery of Europe* (Collins, 1938)
- Thein Pe, *What Happened in Burma* (Published 1943 in Allahabad)
- Thompson, J. M., *Robespierre and the French Revolution* (English Universities Press, 1952)
- Thompson, Virginia, *The Left Wing In South-East Asia* (William Sloane, New York, 1950)
- Thomson, Gladys Scott, *Catherine the Great and the Expansion of Russia* (English Universities Press Ltd., 1947)
- Torr, Dona, *Marx On China 1853-60* (Lawrence & Wishart, 1951)
- Trotsky, *Stalin* (Hollis & Carter, 1947)
- Tuker, Lt.-Gen. Sir Francis, *While Memory Serves* (Cassell, 1950)
- Vambery, Arminius, *The Coming Struggle For India* (Cassell, 1885)
- William, Maurice, *Sun Yat-Sen Versus Communism* (Williams & Wilkins Co., Baltimore, 1932)
- Willoughby, Major-General, *Sorge: Soviet Master Spy* (William Kimber, 1952)
- Wilson, Edmund, *To The Finland Station* (Secker & Warburg, 1941)
- Wint, Guy, *The British In Asia* (Faber & Faber, 1947)
- Wint, Guy, *Spotlight on Asia* (Penguin Special, 1955)
- Woodhead, H. G. W., *Adventures in Far Eastern Journalism* (Hokuseido Press, Tokyo, 1935)
- Woodman, Dorothy, *The Republic of Indonesia* (Cresset Press, 1955)
- Valtin, Jan, *Out Of The Night* (Heinemann, 1941)
- Yim, Louise, *My Forty-Year Fight For Korea* (Gollancz, 1952)
- Young, Morgan, *Japan Under Taisho Tenno* (Allen & Unwin, 1928)
- Zacharias, Captain Ellis, *Secret Missions* (Putnam, 1946)
- Zacharias, Captain Ellis, *Behind Closed Doors* (Putnam, 1950)

REFERENCES AND NOTES

Except where more than one work by the same author has been shown in the Bibliography, only the author's name is given in these References. 'Deutscher', however, refers to that writer's *Stalin* unless otherwise noted.

In order to avoid unnecessary repetition, Stalin's name as author has been omitted from the frequent references to his *Problems of Leninism*, *History of the CPSU(B)*, and *Marxism and the National and Colonial Question*. For the same reason, the last of these three works has been shortened to *Marxism and the Colonial Question*.

CHAPTER I

- (1) Carew Hunt, p. 161. See also Lenin's *Selected Works*, Vol. V, p. 112
- (2) Lenin's *Collected Works*, Vol. IV, p. 160. The original article appeared under the title *The China War* in the first issue of *Iskra* on 24th December 1900.

- (3) Christopher Hill, p. 139
- (4) *Marxism and the Colonial Question*, p. 18
- (5) *A Few Theses*, published in *Sotsial Demokrat* of 24th October 1915, see Lenin's *Selected Works*, Vol. V, p. 156
- (6) Lenin's *Selected Works*, Vol. V, p. 316
- (7) *Problems of Leninism*, p. 98
- (8) *Marxism and the Colonial Question*, p. 186
- (9) Schwarzschild, p. 136
- (10) *Ibid*, p. 162
- (11) *Ibid*, p. 93
- (12) *Problems of Leninism*, p. 97
- (13) Carew Hunt, p. 132
- (14) *Problems of Leninism*, p. 191
- (15) *History of the CPSU(B)*, pp. 233-4
- (16) NCNA Peking, 12th May 1950
- (17) Cominform journal editorial, 27th January 1950
- (18) Lenin's *What Is To Be Done?*
- (19) Deutscher, p. 70
- (20) *Ibid*, pp. 51-3 and *History of the CPSU(B)*, p. 39
- (21) Deutscher, pp. 58-9
- (22) Liu Shao-Chi's *On The Party*

CHAPTER II

- (1) Mills, p. 25
- (2) Karaka, p. 36
- (3) Philips, p. 100
- (4) Cumming's *Political India*, p. 227
- (5) *Ibid*, p. 49
- (6) Mills, p. 26
- (7) Article in *The World Today*, November 1948
- (8) Van Mook, p. 95
- (9) Quoted by Kimaze Seizo in *Mitsuru Toyama Fights for Greater Asia*
- (10) Mills, p. 109
- (11) Deutscher, p. 44
- (12) Karaka, p. 37
- (13) Cumming's *Political India*, p. 228
- (14) *Ibid*, p. 231
- (15) *Ibid*, p. 232
- (16) Sir Michael O'Dwyer, pp. 169, 185, 197 and 201-3
- (17) Lenin's *Collected Works*, Vol. XII, p. 306
- (18) Mills, p. 32
- (19) Van Mook, pp. 113-14

CHAPTER III

- (1) *American Sociologist*, pp. 8-9 and 11
- (2) Roy, p. 113
- (3) Kent, p. 174

- (4) *See* p. 4
- (5) Roy, p. 215
- (6) NCNA 11th January 1951

CHAPTER IV

- (1) Lenin's *Selected Works*, Vol. 5, p. 139. In article published 23rd August 1915
- (2) *See* p. 19
- (3) *Japan Chronicle*, 27th January 1938
- (4) *Ibid*, 18th November 1937
- (5) *See*, for example, Kennedy's *The Problem of Japan*, pp. 212-13 and 275

CHAPTER V

- (1) Furnivall, pp. 243-4
- (2) *Ibid*, p. 249
- (3) Payne's *The Revolt of Asia*, p. 35
- (4) Furnivall, p. 250
- (5) Van Mook, p. 114
- (6) Clinard, pp. 155-7

CHAPTER VI

- (1) Philips, pp. 105 and 112
- (2) *Indian Statutory Commission* (HMSO), Vol. IV, Part I, pp. 96-7
- (3) Etherton, pp. 162-3 and 233
- (4) Lenin's *Selected Works*, Vol. V, p. 156
- (5) Ruth Fischer, p. 275
- (6) Dallin's *The Rise of Russia in Asia*, p. 154
- (7) Etherton, p. 225
- (8) *Ibid*, p. 163
- (9) Cumming's *Political India*, p. 242
- (10) Onraet, p. 111

CHAPTER VII

- (1) In compiling this chapter, I have relied mainly on the following works: Borkenau's *Communist International*, Brandt's *Documentary History of Chinese Communism*, Elegant's *China's Red Masters*, Louis Fischer's *The Soviets in World Affairs*, Green's *Story of China's Revolution*, Isaacs's *Tragedy of the Chinese Revolution*, Roy's *Revolution and Counter-Revolution in China*, Schwartz's *Chinese Communism and the Rise of Mao*, and Sokolsky's *Tinder Box of Asia*.
- (2) Borkenau, pp. 300-2
- (3) *Communism and Nationalism in China* by C. M. Chang in *Foreign Affairs*, July 1950
- (4) Ruth Fischer, p. 575
- (5) Isaacs, pp. 72-3
- (6) Elegant, p. 45

CHAPTER VIII

- (1) *See* p. 27
- (2) *See* 'American Sociologist'
- (3) For fuller details see Tanin and Yohan
- (4) *The World Today*, 1st April 1946

CHAPTER IX

- (1) J. M. Thompson, p. 59
- (2) *See* p. 21
- (3) *See* his *Left Wing Communism*
- (4) Degras, Vol. I

CHAPTER X

- (1) *See* p. 21
- (2) *See*, for example, Harold Nicolson's *Congress of Vienna*, p. 119
- (3) Borkenau, p. 419
- (4) Deutscher, p. 529
- (5) Ruth Fischer, p. 637
- (6) Chatham House Study Group's *Defence in the Cold War*, p. 13
- (7) Article by V. Wolpert in *Eastern World*, February 1948
- (8) George Orwell's *Animal Farm*
- (9) *History of the CPSU(B)*, p. 214
- (10) Ruth Fischer, p. 309

CHAPTER XI

- (1) Manuilsky
- (2) Dona Torr, pp. 48 and 51
- (3) *Ibid*, pp. xvi and xvii of Introduction
- (4) *The World Today*, May 1952
- (5) *See* p. 4
- (6) *See* p. 21
- (7) *See* p. 105
- (8) *See* p. 23
- (9) Vol. V, p. 112
- (10) NCNA report of 13th November 1952 quoting speech by Yefimov in Peking on 7th November on the history of the development of Sino-Soviet friendship
- (11) Lenin's *Selected Works*, Vol. IV, pp. 305-11
- (12) *Ibid*, pp. 312-13
- (13) Article in *New York Daily Tribune*, 12th December 1859, *see* Dona Torr, p. 88
- (14) *Marxism and the Colonial Question*, p. 18
- (15) Article on Rosa Luxemburg in *Times Literary Supplement*, 9th November 1951
- (16) Lenin's *Selected Works*, Vol. V, p. 130
- (17) *Ibid*, p. 275

- (18) *Ibid*, p. 156
- (19) *Problems of Leninism*, p. 160
- (20) *Marxism and the Colonial Question*, p. 74
- (21) For the full text see Degras Vol. I, p. 15
- (22) Quoted in Dallin's *The Rise of Russia in Asia*, p. 180
- (23) Degras, Vol. I, p. 92
- (24) *Marxism and the Colonial Question*, p. 76
- (25) Swearingen, p. 8
- (26) *Ibid*, p. 7
- (27) Virginia Thompson, p. 221
- (28) Etherton, pp. 158-9
- (29) Brandt, p. 67. *See also Marxism and the Colonial Question*, p. 234, where Stalin quotes Lenin's proviso
- (30) Colban, p. 107
- (31) *Marxism and the Colonial Question*, p. 79
- (32) Leonard Barnes, p. 242
- (33) *Ibid*, p. 244. Other details are given on pp. 243-6
- (34) *Marxism and the Colonial Question*, p. 206
- (35) For details of the former, see Ruth Fischer pp. 218 and 574; for details of the latter, see John Hladun
- (36) *Marxism and the Colonial Question*, p. 115. Italics are mine
- (37) *Ibid*, p. 117
- (38) Swearingen, p. 11
- (39) Virginia Thompson, p. 222
- (40) *Problems of Leninism*, pp. 137-8
- (41) Crossman, p. 82
- (42) Deane, p. 207
- (43) Carew Hunt, p. 161
- (44) Schwarzschild, p. 177
- (45) Swearingen, pp. 12-13
- (46) Virginia Thompson, p. 223
- (47) *See* p. 125

CHAPTER XII

- (1) *Marxism and the Colonial Question*, p. 156
- (2) *Ibid*, p. 168
- (3) *Ibid*, p. 148
- (4) *Manchester Guardian*, 10th November 1952
- (5) *Marxism and the Colonial Question*, pp. 194-5
- (6) Virginia Thompson, pp. 170 and 223
- (7) *Problems of Leninism*, p. 16
- (8) *Marxism and the Colonial Question*, p. 192
- (9) Agabekov, pp. 16-27
- (10) Etherton, p. 237
- (11) Dallin's *The Rise of Russia in Asia*, p. 164
- (12) *Bolshevik*, 2nd October 1952
- (13) Dallin's *The Rise of Russia in Asia*, p. 166
- (14) *Ibid*, p. 167

- (15) Quoted in a review of Gallacher's *The Rolling Thunder* in *The Times Literary Supplement*, 6th May 1949
- (16) Ruth Fischer, p. 480
- (17) *Marxism and the Colonial Question*, p. 223
- (18) Crossman, pp. 251-2

CHAPTER XIII

- (1) The main sources used in compiling this and the next two chapters have been Borkenau's *Communist International*, Brandt's *Documentary History of Chinese Communism*, Owen Chapman's *The Chinese Revolution 1926-7*, Hu Chiao-Mu's *Thirty Years of the Communist Party of China*, Dallin's *Soviet Russia and the Far East* and *The Rise of Russia in Asia*, Elegant's *China's Red Masters*, Isaacs's *Tragedy of the Chinese Revolution*, North's *Moscow and the Chinese Communists*, Payne's *Mao Tse-Tung*, Roy's *Revolution and Counter-Revolution in China*, Schwartz's *Chinese Communism and the Rise of Mao*, Edgar Snow's *Red Star Over China*, and Sokolsky's *Tinder Box of Asia*.
- (2) Owen Chapman, p. 107
- (3) Schwartz, p. 100
- (4) Chatham House *Chronology of Events in China 1911-27*

CHAPTER XIV

- (1) Brandt, p. 131
- (2) NCNA 7th February 1951

CHAPTER XV

- (1) *Marxism and the Colonial Question*, p. 237

CHAPTER XVI

- (1) The main sources used in compiling this chapter have been *The Socialist and Labour Movement in Japan* by an anonymous American Sociologist, Evelyn Colbert's *The Left Wing in Japanese Politics*, Kennedy's *The Changing Fabric of Japan*, Napier's *Survey of the Japanese Communist Party*, and Swearingen and Langer's *Red Flag in Japan*.

CHAPTER XVII

- (1) Apart from the specific references given below, the main sources used in compiling this chapter have been Hugh Byas's *Government by Assassination*, Kennedy's *The Problem of Japan*, and Tanin and Yohan's *Militarism and Fascism in Japan*. Much of it, however, was written before any of these three works were available and appeared originally in the form of an article I wrote for the March 1933 issue of *Contemporary Japan*, the publishers of which kindly gave me permission to reproduce it in whole or in part.
- (2) Article by Aono Suyekichi in *Chuo Koron* of April 1932

- (3) Kennedy's *Changing Fabric of Japan*
- (4) *Ibid*, p. 122
- (5) See his *Nihon Ayaushi (Japan in Danger)*
- (6) *Japan Advertiser*, 17 December 1927, article by Dr. Washio.
- (7) Kennedy's *Changing Fabric of Japan*
- (8) *Ibid*, p. 94

CHAPTER XVIII

- (1) The main sources used in compiling this chapter have been Dallin's two works, Mills's *The New World of South-East Asia*, Van Mook's *The Stakes of Democracy in South-East Asia*, Payne's *Revolt in Asia*, Purcell's *The Chinese in South-East Asia*, and Virginia Thompson's *The Left Wing in South-East Asia*. For the section on Indonesia, I have relied largely on Blumberger's *Le Communisme aux Indes Neerlandaises*, Furnivall's *Netherlands India*, and Kahin's *Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia*.
- (2) Article in *The World Today*, 1st April 1946
- (3) Dallin's *Soviet Russia and the Far East*, p. 52
- (4) *Imprecor*, 12th March 1931

CHAPTER XIX

- (1) The main sources used in the three principal sections of this chapter are:
 Malaya: Onraet, Millar, Purcell, and Spencer Chapman
 Burma: Christian, Hall, Harvey, Mills, Thakin Nu, and Virginia Thompson
 India: Cumming, Masani, and Philips
- (2) Onraet, p. 113
- (3) Thein Pe's *What Happened in Burma*

CHAPTER XX

- (1) Stettinius, p. 28
- (2) Dedijer, p. 331
- (3) Edgar Snow, p. 223
- (4) *Ibid*, p. 23
- (5) *Ibid*, p. 417
- (6) *Ibid*, p. 446
- (7) *Pravda*, 18th December 1950
- (8) Cominform journal, 5th January 1951
- (9) *Ibid*, 27th January 1950
- (10) NCNA 27th March 1950
- (11) Deutscher's *The Prophet Armed*, p. 155
- (12) Jones, p. 160

CHAPTER XXI

- (1) Brandt, p. 37
- (2) Stilwell, p. 296

CHAPTER XXII

- (1) Degras, Vol. II, p. 289
- (2) *Ibid*, p. 26
- (3) *Ibid*, p. 57
- (4) *Ibid*, p. 65
- (5) *Ibid*, pp. 322-3
- (6) North, p. 124⁹
- (7) For the text of the decree, *see* Degras, Vol. II, p. 391
- (8) *See* p. 72
- (9) Degras, Vol. III, pp. 168-70
- (10) *Ibid*, pp. 187-8
- (11) Snow, p. 102
- (12) Brandt, p. 64
- (13) Degras, Vol. III, p. 487
- (14) Jones, p. 175
- (15) Degras, Vol. III, p. 109
- (16) Jones, p. 175
- (17) Dallin's *Soviet Russia and the Far East*, p. 362

CHAPTER XXIII

- (1) Kennedy's *The Problem of Japan*, p. 76
- (2) *Ibid*, pp. 77-9 and 110
- (3) Degras, Vol. II, p. 516
- (4) *Ibid*, p. 514
- (5) *Ibid*, pp. 519-21
- (6) *Ibid*, p. 529
- (7) *Ibid*, p. 532
- (8) *Ibid*, p. 552
- (9) Degras, Vol. III, pp. 2-4
- (10) *Ibid*, pp. 17 and 122
- (11) *Ibid*, pp. 441-7. *See also* Mao Tse-Tung's *Selected Works*, Vol. I, p. 120
- (12) *Ibid*, p. 45
- (13) *Ibid*, p. 89 and Temperley, p. 76
- (14) *Ibid*, p. 100
- (15) Joseph Davies's *Mission to Moscow*
- (16) Deutscher, p. 419
- (17) Crankshaw, p. 26
- (18) Degras, Vol. III, p. 139
- (19) *Ibid*, p. 165. Interview with Roy Howard, 5th March 1936
- (20) Jones, p. 177-8
- (21) Degras, Vol. III, p. 321
- (22) Jones, p. 180⁹
- (23) *Ibid*, p. 184
- (24) Degras, Vol. III, p. 399
- (25) *Ibid*, p. 373-4
- (26) *Ibid*, p. 399
- (27) *Ibid*, pp. 486-7

- (28) Churchill, Vol. I, pp. 286-7
- (29) Jones, p. 128
- (30) Degras, Vol. III, pp. 363-71
- (31) *Ibid*, p. 390

CHAPTER XXIV

- (1) *History of the CPSU(B)*, p. 288 and Deutscher, p. 311
- (2) Deutscher, p. 316
- (3) *Ibid*, p. 321
- (4) *Ibid*, p. 317 and King-Hall, p. 513
- (5) E. Lyons, p. 279
- (6) Deutscher, p. 321
- (7) Directive issued by Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party on 23rd April 1953, as reported by the NCNA
- (8) Deutscher, p. 328 and Cranshaw, p. 106
- (9) Deutscher, pp. 338-9
- (10) *History of the CPSU(B)*, p. 321
- (11) *Problems of Leninism*, p. 369
- (12) Deutscher, p. 358
- (13) *Ibid*, p. 357
- (14) *Ibid*, p. 379
- (15) Churchill, Vol. I, p. 225
- (16) Trotsky, p. 418
- (17) *Ibid*, p. 416
- (18) Deutscher, p. 471
- (19) NCNA 2nd October 1952
- (20) Masani, p. 33
- (21) Willoughby, p. 251
- (22) Reuter despatch of 30th October 1954, from New Delhi
- (23) Cominform journal, 29th November 1949, and King-Hall, pp. 122-3
- (24) *British Survey*, 15th July 1941, p. 15
- (25) Article on the Comintern in *The Times* of 3rd May 1938
- (26) *Observer*, 7th November 1954

CHAPTER XXV

- (1) Elsbree, p. 3
- (2) Kennedy's *Problem of Japan*, p. 1
- (3) Hashimoto, p. 46
- (4) Jones, p. 409
- (5) *Ibid*, p. 411
- (6) Beloff, p. 20 and Deane, p. 226
- (7) Churchill, Vol. VI, pp. 206-7 and Deane, pp. 146-7
- (8) *Ibid*, p. 340
- (9) Zacharias's *Behind Closed Doors*, p. 63
- (10) Zacharias's *Secret Missions*, p. 364

- (11) Jones, p. 429
- (12) Churchill, Vol. VI, p. 555
- (13) Zacharias's *Secret Missions*, p. 387
- (14) Kato, *The Lost War*, p. 240

CHAPTER XXVI

- (1) Philips, p. 139
- (2) Payne's *Revolt in Asia*, pp. 115-16
- (3) Masani, p. 80
- (4) Thakin Nu, p. 106
- (5) Purcell's *Malaya: Communist or Free?* p. 45
- (6) Millar, pp. 39 and 69
- (7) *Ibid*, pp. 66-71
- (8) *Ibid*, p. 46
- (9) *Ibid*, p. 44
- (10) Spencer Chapman, pp. 168-75

CHAPTER XXVII

- (1) Kahin, p. 104
- (2) Payne's *Revolt in Asia*, p. 254
- (3) Vietnam News Service, 22nd December 1950

CHAPTER XXVIII

- (1) NCNA 19th December 1949. Text issued
- (2) North, p. 198
- (3) For text of this statement see Stuart Gelder, pp. 169-73
- (4) Stilwell, p. 296
- (5) *Ibid*, pp. 292-3
- (6) Elegant, p. 220
- (7) Payne's *Mao Tse-Tung*, p. 262
- (8) Full text given in Gelder, pp. 1-60
- (9) Stettinius, p. 28
- (10) For more detailed accounts, see Swearingen and Langer, Chapter IX, and Colbert, pp. 58-70
- (11) *Pravda*, 18th January 1950
- (12) Hugh Deane in *The China Weekly Review* of 26th July 1947

CHAPTER XXIX

- (1) See Vyshinsky in *Questions of Philosophy*, No. 2 of 1948, quoted by King-Hall, p. 59
- (2) Stettinius, pp. 22-23
- (3) Deane, p. 207

CHAPTER XXX

- (1) Deane, pp. 278 and 281

- (2) *The World Today*, August 1953 and *Pacific Affairs*, March 1947 and December 1950
- (3) Oliver, p. 204
- (4) *Ibid*, p. 214
- (5) *Ibid*, pp. 194 and 210
- (6) Masani, pp. 87-88
- (7) Tucker, p. 86

CHAPTER XXXI

- (1) Cominform journal, 10th November 1947
- (2) Dedijer, p. 367
- (3) Cominform journal, 29th November 1949
- (4) Published in Peking *People's Daily*, 19th December 1954
- (5) NCNA 16th November 1949

CHAPTER XXXII

- (1) *The Present Situation and Our Tasks*, published in pamphlet form under the title, *Turning Point in China*
- (2) Full text given in pamphlet under that title published in 1950 by Lawrence & Wishart
- (3) For full text see Stuart Gelder, pp. 1-60
- (4) NCNA 24th March 1949
- (5) *Ibid*, 6th May 1949
- (6) *Ibid*, 23rd June 1953
- (7) Mao Tse-Ting's *People's Democratic Dictatorship*
- (8) *Ibid*
- (9) NCNA 13th March 1949
- (10) *Ibid*, 29th December 1951
- (11) Cominform journal, 25th July 1952
- (12) NCNA 27th September 1949
- (13) See, for example, the despatch from New Delhi in *The Times* of 31st December 1954

CHAPTER XXXIII

- (1) Leonard Constantine in *Manchester Guardian* of 17th November 1950
- (2) Mao Tse-Tung's *The Turning Point in China*
- (3) Liu Shao-Chi's *Internationalism and Nationalism*
- (4) Liu Shao-Chi, 16th November 1949
- (5) Malenkov's message to Mao, reproduced in Cominform journal of 2nd October 1953
- (6) *Pravda*, 26th August 1952
- (7) Tass despatch of 19th October 1953
- (8) NCNA 5th November 1952
- (9) *Ibid*, 7th February 1953
- (10) Liu Shao-Chi, 13th February 1953
- (11) Cominform journal, February 1953
- (12) *Ibid*, 19th February 1954

- (13) NCNA 30th September 1954
- (14) *Ibid*, 23rd July 1950
- (15) Cominform journal, 26th September 1952
- (16) NCNA 10th February 1954
- (17) Full text in Cominform journal of 24th September 1954
- (18) NCNA 23rd September 1954
- (19) *Ibid*, 4th February 1953
- (20) *Ibid*, 10th May 1953
- (21) Lai Jo-Yu, 10th May 1953
- (22) NCNA 15th September 1953
- (23) *Ibid*, 27th March 1953
- (24) *Ibid*, 5th March 1954
- (25) Cominform journal, 10th September 1954
- (26) NCNA 2nd February and 27th March 1953
- (27) Peking *People's Daily*, 15th November 1953
- (28) *Ibid*, 10th October 1955
- (29) *Ibid*, 12th January 1956

CHAPTER XXXIV

- (1) Cominform journal, 6th January 1950
- (2) See Foreword to T.U.C. pamphlet, *Free Trade Unions Leave the W.F.T.U.*, issued March 1949
- (3) Jones, Borton & Pearn, p. 318
- (4) Peking *People's Daily*, 18th December 1950
- (5) Text given in NCNA of 10th January 1952
- (6) See, for example, Cominform journal of 14th April and 29th September 1950, and 10th August 1951
- (7) Cominform journal, 7th October 1955
- (8) *Akahata* of 30th July 1955
- (9) *Ibid*, 23rd August 1955
- (10) Cominform journal, 19th August 1955

CHAPTER XXXV

- (1) Bernard Fall, p. 13
- (2) Vietnam News Agency, 9th January 1954, quoting *Nhan Dan* editorial of 6th January 1954
- (3) Cominform journal, 23rd May 1952
- (4) *L'Humanité*, 14th April 1953
- (5) NCNA 23rd April 1955
- (6) *Life*, 12th January 1956
- (7) See *The Manifesto and Platform of the Vietnam Lao Dong Party*, published as a supplement to *People's China*, 1st May 1951
- (8) Cominform journal, 19th December 1952
- (9) *Ibid*, 21st August 1953
- (10) NCNA 25th February 1953, and Cominform journal, 3rd April 1953
- (11) Cominform journal, 3rd September 1954
- (12) *Nhan Dan*, 6th June 1955

- (13) NCNA 18th January 1954
- (14) Ho Chi-Minh in a speech on foreign aid delivered on 20th September 1955
- (15) NCNA 19th January 1953
- (16) NCNA 24th April 1953
- (17) Cominform journal, 1st December 1950
- (18) *Ibid*, 27th June 1952

CHAPTER XXXVI

- (1) *Manchester Guardian*, 10th November 1955
- (2) Cominform journal, 3rd August 1951
- (3) Notably in the Cominform journal of 27th January and 1st September 1950, 3rd August 1951, and 29th February 1952
- (4) *The Times*, 23rd June 1952
- (5) *Observer*, 22nd March 1953 and *The Times*, 23rd March 1953
- (6) *The Times*, 1st December 1952

CHAPTER XXXVII

- (1) Kahin, p. 150
- (2) *Ibid*, pp. 277-80
- (3) *Daily Worker*, 5th November 1948
- (4) Cominform journal, 15th February 1949
- (5) *Ibid*, 5th January 1951
- (6) *Ibid*, 2nd September 1955
- (7) *Ibid*, 9th September 1955
- (8) *Ibid*, 27th August 1954
- (9) *Ibid*, 15th October 1954
- (10) *Ibid*, 9th September 1955
- (11) *Ibid*, 4th November 1955
- (12) Interview in *Pedoman*, 17th February 1955

CHAPTER XXXVIII

- (1) A fully documented and detailed account of these is given by Lieut.-General Sir Francis Tuker, who was C-in-C Eastern Command India at the time, in his *While Memory Serves*
- (2) Masani, p. 283
- (3) *Observer*, 15th January 1956
- (4) June/July 1949 issue of CPI magazine, *Communist*
- (5) Cominform journal, 27th January 1950
- (6) Published in *Crossroads*, 21st July 1950
- (7) Masani, pp. 108-9
- (8) Reproduced in full by Masani, pp. 252-63
- (9) Cominform journal, 7th November and 12th December 1952
- (10) Cominform journal, 21st May 1954
- (11) Delhi despatch from Philip Deane in *The Observer*, 15th January 1956
- (12) *The Observer*, 27th November 1955
- (13) Masani, pp. 200-202

(14) NCNA 4th September 1949

CHAPTER XXXIX

- (1) Kotelawala, p. 8
- (2) Guy Wint's *Spotlight on Asia*, p. 215
- (3) Khrushchev in speech in Peking, 30th September 1954
- (4) Broadcast, 17th December 1955
- (5) Cumming's *Modern India*, p. 88
- (6) *Manchester Guardian*, 1st February 1956
- (7) Article by Leontyev in *Kommunist*, quoted in 19th October 1954 issue of *The Times*
- (8) Philip Spratt's *Blowing Up India*
- (9) Kotelawala, p. 122
- (10) Michael Lindsay's *China and the Cold War*
- (11) Chou En-Lai's report to a meeting of the Central Executive Committee: see *The Observer*, 12th February 1956

Indexes

General Index

- AEBUS, 216
- Afghan War (1919), 58, 120
- Afghanistan, 39, 60, 102-3, 491-3, 506, 515
- Afro-Asian Conference, *see* Bandung Conference
- Aigun Treaty, 101
- Akahata*, 402, 407
- Aligarh University, 56
- All-Burma Peasant Union, 222, 307
- Youth League, 218
- All-China Federation of Labour, 163, 373-4, 388
- Federation of Trade Unions, 163, 365, 388-9
- Soviet Congress, 160-1
- All-India Federation of Labour, 229
- Peace Council, 482
- Trade Union Congress, 62, 226, 229, 478
- All-Japan Proletarian Youth League, 176
- Alma Ata, 260, 270
- American economic aid, 446, 467, 492, 506
- Immigration Law, 38, 40, 88, 184
- Security Pact with Japan, 400, 403, 406
- Security Pact with S. Korea, 417
- White Paper on China, 322
- Amritsar, 57, 120
- Amur, 101
- Anarchists, 26-7, 82-3, 85, 92, 181
- Andaman Islands, 296
- Andhra Elections, 480, 486, 488
- Thesis, 485
- Anglo-Japanese Alliance, 104, 184
- Annam, 50, 295, 317, 419-20, 422, 423
- Annamite Revolutionary Youth League, 51, 196-7
- Anti-Americanism, 29, 44, 368, 388, 392, 401-6, 410, 414-15, 437-8, 462, 467, 482
- Anti-Chinese Riots, 47
- Anti-Colonialism, 43, 404, 414, 446, 498-500, 503-6, 508, 513
- Anti-Comintern Pact, 266
- Anti-Fascist People's Freedom League (AFPFL), 305-6, 355, 440, 442, 444
- Anti-Feudalism, 8, 31, 66-7, 87, 163, 324, 342, 472
- Anti-Imperialism, 8, 26, 29-31, 38, 53, 67-8, 87, 93, 105, 116, 163, 290, 335, 342, 499
- Anti-Indian Riots, 47
- Anti-War Campaign, 96, 178-9
- Congress, 278
- League, 326-8
- Anti-Western propaganda, 292, 314, 343, 511
- Arcos Raid, 251
- Armed Struggle, 75, 77, 138-9, 147, 227-8, 366, 370, 405, 474, 478-9
- Aryan Army, 295
- Asian and Pacific Regions Peace Conference, 278, 365-6, 429
- Trade Union Conference, 143, 365-6, 373, 382
- Asian apprehensions and suspicions, 391, 414, 490, 504, 506
- bloc, 413
- Nations Conference (January 1949), 466, 500
- neutralism, 440, 446-7, 462, 477, 480-1, 487, 489-90, 500, 505
- Relations Conference (March 1947), 446, 500
- Socialist Conference, 447

- Atlantic Pact, 375
 Atom Bomb (*see also* Nuclear), 299-300, 342, 363
 Attlee-Aung San Agreement, 440, 442
 Australian Communist Party, 204, 312, 450, 476
 Autumn Harvest Insurrection, 77, 156, 167
 Awakening League, 326
 Azerbaijan, 122

 Baghdad Pact, 490, 492-3, 505
 Baku Congress, 60, 83, 120-4, 130, 135
 Bandung Conference, 381, 430, 437, 447, 498, 513-14
 Basle Congress, 96
 Bastille, Capture of, 93
 Bengal Partition, 22, 56
Binh Xuyen, 433
 BKPRI, 457-8
 Black Dragon Society, 19, 36-7, 39, 187, 193, 511
 Bokhara, 102, 107, 135-6
Bolshevik, 237, 359
 Bolshevik Revolution, 16, 89, 95, 98, 106, 236, 336, 490, 498-9, 503, 512
 Bolshevik Sama Samaj Party, 304
 Bolsheviks, 14, 94, 113, 115, 118, 135, 137, 240
 Boxer Rebellion, 4, 28-31, 104, 113
 Brain-Washing, 416-17
 Brest-Litovsk Treaty, 98, 136, 330
 Britain as Communist Target, 43, 60-1, 122, 130, 148-9, 215-16, 451-2
 British Communist Party, 204, 303, 479, 513
 British Empire Communist Conference, 355, 450
 Buddhism, 52, 355
Budi Utomo, 24, 49
 Bukharin Thesis, 84, 174, 177
 Burma (*see also* All-Burma), 43, 51-2, 216-23, 291, 304-7, 355-6, 440-50, 491, 502-3, 505, 508, 511-12, 515
 Burma, Communism in, 218, 220, 355, 359
 — Communist Party, 52, 221-3, 304-7, 355, 440-4, 476, 511
 — Defence Army, 296, 305
 — Independence, 355-6, 358, 440-1
 — Independence Army, 305, 442
 — Insurrection, 441-2, 445
 — Japanese Invasion of, 220, 304-5
 — National Proletarian League, 305
 — National Revolutionary Party, 219, 221, 306-7
 — Nationalism, 47, 51, 217-23, 305-6, 355
 — Resistance Movement, 305-6
 — Socialist Party, 306-7, 442-4
 — Trade Union organizations, 443-445
 — Workers and Peasants' Party, 224, 445

 Cairo Conference, 292-4, 300
 Cambodia, 195, 201, 295, 317, 353, 423-30
 Canadian Spy Case, 345
 Canton Commune, 156-7, 164, 169, 208
Cao Dai, 433
 Cawnpore Conspiracy Case, 62
 Central Asia, 60, 81, 101-3, 107, 135
 Central Asian Republics, 107, 130
 Ceylon, 43, 62, 229-30, 358, 445, 474
 — Communist Party, 62, 229-30, 304, 474
 Changkufang, 266-7
Cheka, 110, 139
 China (*see also* All-China), 15, 23, 27-34, 86, 97, 107, 112-15, 119, 292, 320-6, 350-2, 368-92, 500-5, 508-10, 512
 — as Model and Guide, 380-92, 365, 382-4, 434-6, 442-3, 451, 453, 467, 471-2, 478-9, 480, 495, 500, 514-15
 Chinese Communism (*see also* Chinese Communist Party), 28-9, 33, 68-70, 380

- Chinese Communist Army, 75, 155, 160, 236, 244-7, 293-4, 309-10, 321, 323, 368-88, 481
- — Common Programme, 70, 376-8, 387
- — Constitution, 14, 159, 325, 376-9, 387
- — Party, 64, 70, 75-6, 129, 131-133, 147-57, 158-64, 196, 213, 216, 231-43, 247-9, 254, 320-326, 350-2, 368-79, 389-90, 514-15
- — Party Congresses: 1st—70; 2nd—129, 257; 3rd—73, 131-132; 5th—76, 153; 6th—158-9, 280; 7th—323, 325; 8th—390, 507
- — Régime, 376-9, 380, 385-92, 446
- — Relations with KMT, 30, 33-34, 46, 65, 71-4, 121, 129, 132, 147-57, 165-9, 235, 243, 249, 251, 270, 322-4, 368, 373, 510
- Chinese disliked, 308
- Democratic League, 370-1
- Eastern Railway, 253-5, 261, 263-4, 385
- Eighth Route Army, 155, 245, 310, 321, 326
- Five-Year Plan, 387
- Imperialism, 107, 379
- Labour Organization Secretariat, 162-3, 166
- National Labour Congress, 154, 161-4, 373
- National People's Congress, 381
- National Revolution, 31, 67-9, 120, 165, 381
- Nationalism, 28-9, 33, 63, 66-70, 253, 380
- Nationalist Government, 245, 257, 294, 300, 368-9, 445-6
- Overseas, 31-2, 63, 68, 381-2
- People's Political Consultative Conference, 371
- People's Republic, 152, 238, 369, 375, 382, 417, 500
- Revolution (1911), 19, 27-30, 32-3, 67, 106, 114, 381
- Chinese Soviet Government, 156, 160-1, 231, 233, 235, 244, 248, 369
- Choren*, 410
- Cochin-China, 419-20, 422-3
- Collective Leadership, 408, 512
- Collectivization, 10, 239-40, 271-2, 390, 435, 483, 509
- Colombo Conference, 513
- Plan, 446-7
- Colonial Revolutions, 118, 366
- Colonialism, 362-3, 438, 490, 498-499, 503-4, 513
- Colonies, 15, 35, 116-17, 119, 121-122, 124-5, 132, 134, 279-80, 284
- Colour Question, 38, 88, 109-10, 342, 490, 513
- Cominform, 12, 108, 140, 282, 328, 358, 360-4, 375, 383, 397, 402, 405, 440, 464, 475, 500, 507, 512
- Cominform journal, 9, 108, 237-9, 360, 363-4, 370, 372, 376, 378, 389-90, 399-400, 405-7, 417, 428, 434, 438, 466, 470, 472, 478-80, 482, 495
- Comintern, 53, 59, 65, 70-3, 76, 93, 97-8, 108, 116, 120, 140, 142, 153, 158-9, 167, 170, 172-3, 176-178, 180, 208, 214, 265, 321, 325, 332, 358, 361, 498, 512
- World Congresses: 1st—27, 57, 59, 81, 120, 130; 2nd—73, 121-122, 130, 139, 333; 3rd—83, 125, 130, 138, 205; 4th—61, 84, 129-30, 205; 5th—129, 133, 203; 6th—11, 62, 108, 158, 203-4, 206, 279-84, 331; 7th—139, 178, 180, 198, 211, 233, 249, 265, 268, 279-80, 282-3, 321
- agents, 64, 69, 149, 157, 168-9, 172, 174, 200-1, 205, 213, 215, 224, 510, 512
- dissolution, 331-3, 358, 361
- funds, 81, 83-4, 171, 180, 192, 206, 224
- interference, 160, 165-70, 177-8, 180
- Commission of Overseas Chinese Affairs, 31, 381

- Communalism, 47-8, 55-6, 225, 227-8, 356, 475
- Communist Front Organizations, 118, 126-8, 130, 277, 334, 355, 361-7, 374, 415, 421, 424, 429, 439, 444, 457-8, 470, 482, 495, 507, 512
- Communist League, 91
- Communist Manifesto, 16, 81, 91, 112, 117, 128
- Communist University of Toilers of the East, *see* KUTV
- Contradictions, 137, 262-3
- Coral Sea, Battle of, 291
- Counter-revolutionary elements, 372, 385
- CPI, 62, 134, 221-4, 226-7, 278, 280-1, 303-4, 357, 359, 476-97, 509
- Congresses: 2nd—441, 476, 494; 3rd—480, 484-6, 488-9; 4th—488-9, 507
- CPSU, 5, 72, 237
- Congresses: 14th—142, 251; 15th—251, 270-1; 16th—272; 17th—274; 18th—266; 19th—137-8, 142, 237, 359, 392, 404, 483-4, 507; 20th—273, 484, 507
- Crimean War, 102
- Cross-Roads*, 475
- Czechoslovakia, 465
- Das Kapital*, 3, 80, 82, 92
- Dawes Plan, 140, 263
- Dien Bien Phu, 423, 432
- Disarmament Conference, 126, 252-3, 264
- Dobama*, *see* Thakins' Party
- Dogmatism, 236, 323
- Dominion Status, 55, 222, 225, 228-9, 302
- DRV, 344, 419-20, 435
- Dual Nationality, 381, 473
- Durand Agreement, 102
- Dutch East Indies, *see* Indonesia
- Dyarchy, 55, 218
- ECAFE Conference (February 1953), 447
- Economic Aid, 382-3, 417, 436, 446-9, 489, 514-15
- Economic Nationalism, 483
- Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR*, 404-5, 484
- Extraterritoriality, 292
- Factionalism, 171, 180, 489
- Far Eastern Bureau, 63, 84, 90, 134, 176, 196, 198, 204-5, 213-15
- Far Eastern Conference (Irkutsk), 83, 128
- Far Eastern Labour Conference, 121
- Far Eastern Socialist Party, 78
- Farmers' Death Band, 189
- Fascism, 190-1, 233, 281, 283-4, 332
- Fatherland Front, 435
- FDR, 463-5
- Feudalism, 87, 324
- Finland, Soviet invasion of, 268
- 'Five-Antis Campaign', 386
- Five Principles, 487, 514
- Formosa, 26, 293, 371, 387, 392, 412, 500, 515
- Free Cambodia Movement, 424-5, 427
- Free India Movement, 296
- Free Laos Movement, 424-8
- Free Thai Movement, 200, 316
- French Communist Party, 51, 283
- French Revolution, 91, 93, 386
- Friendship Associations, 279
- Fukumoto-ism, 174
- Fulton Speech, Churchill's, 346
- GPU, 110, 139
- General Council of Buddhist Associations, 216, 219
- Geneva Conferences: (June 1954)—317, 416-17, 423, 429, 432-3, 513; (July 1955)—399; (October 1955)—489
- Genyosha*, 35-6, 40, 183-4
- Gerindo*, 211
- Germ Warfare Allegations, 363, 414-15, 482

- German Communist Party, 96, 98, 157
 Germany, 137, 140
 GERWANI, 470
 GERWIS, 470
 Gestapo, 111, 157
 Ghadr Conspiracy, 36
 — Party, 22, 61, 223, 493
 Goa, 491, 498, 506
 Government of Burma Act (1921), 217
 Government of India Act (1919), 217, 219
 Government of India Act (1935), 55, 219, 226
 Great Han Nationalism, 274
 Greater East Asia, 290–2, 295
 Guerrilla Warfare, 13, 75, 237, 245–246
 .
 Hailams, 63–4
 Hankow, 148, 150–1
 Hindu-Moslem Relations (*see also* Communalism), 47, 55–8, 356
History of the CPSU(B), 10, 272–3, 392, 484
 Hitlerism, 186–7, 191
 Hoa Hao Sect, 433
 Hokkaido, 294, 347, 394
 Hong Kong, 498, 504
 —Strike, 71, 148–9
 Hukbalahaps, 202, 318–19, 352, 473–4
 Hydrogen Bomb (*see also* Nuclear), 490, 505
Hyogikai, 181
 IKKI, 123, 133, 139, 165–6, 168–9, 174, 204–5, 208–9, 226, 249, 283
 ISDV, 45–6, 50
 ISH, 142, 279
 IUS, *see* International Union of Students
 Imperialism, 3, 9^g, 113–14, 116–17, 124–5, 132, 134
 India, 17, 22–4, 38, 41, 43, 54–62, 113, 123, 223–9, 301–4, 356–7, 413, 445, 475–97, 499–505, 508, 512, 515
 Indian Communist Party, *see* CPI
 — Communism, 59, 61–2, 223–7, 280–1, 301, 357
 — Congress Party, 24, 210, 219, 223–6, 229, 302, 356, 486, 491
 — Elections, 480–2, 486, 488
 — Five-Year Plan, 489
 — Independence, 356, 358
 — Independence League, 41, 295–6
 — Mutiny, 113
 — National Army, 295–6, 303
 — National Congress, 17, 42, 48, 52, 54–7, 59, 61, 227, 281
 — Nationalism, 17, 52, 59, 61
 — Naval Mutiny, 357, 404
 — Socialist Party, 486
 Indies Association, 25, 45
 — Party, 45, 48
 Indo-China (*see also* Vietnam), 43, 50–1, 195–9, 317, 343–5, 419–22, 424–37, 500, 504, 513
 — Communism, 51
 — Communist Party (*see also* Lao Dong), 51, 195–9, 344, 420–1, 428
 — Independence, 317
 — Nationalism, 23–4, 51, 195–6
 — Religious Sects, 433
 Indonesia, 43, 45–50, 52, 202–12, 291, 295, 311–15, 343–5, 419, 456–73, 500, 511–12, 514
 — Army, 463, 467–9
 — Communism, 46–9, 64, 311–12, 314–15, 359, 457
 — Communist Party, *see* PKI
 — General Elections, 470
 — Independence, 43, 314, 461–2, 456, 466
 — Japanese Invasion, 210–12, 311–312
 — Labour Party, 460, 462
 — National Party (*see also* PNI), 45, 457
 — Nationalism, 17, 24, 45, 313–14
 — Social-Democratic Party, 45
 — Socialist Party, 456–7, 460, 462–463, 468–70
Indo-Soviet Journal, 475
 Indo-Soviet Relations, 475

- Industrialization, 132-3, 262, 271-273, 373, 379, 386, 388-9, 391-2, 448
- Inner Mongolia, *see* Mongolia
- Insulinde*, 45
- International, First, 91-2, 112
- Second, 21, 93, 97-8, 112-13, 116
- Third (*see also* Comintern), 16, 93, 98, 108, 116
- Fourth, 229, 304
- International Association of Dockers and Seamen, 142, 279
- International Commission of Scientists, 415
- International Congress of Writers, 143
- International Juridical Association, 279
- International Lawyers' Commission, 415
- International Union of Students (IUS), 126, 334, 361-2, 364, 374, 404, 439, 458, 470, 505
- International Union of Revolutionary Writers, 142-3
- IPPI, 470
- Irkutsk Party, 89
- Japan, 15, 26-7, 78-88, 126, 138, 346-7, 393-411, 498-500, 502, 506-7, 510-11
- and Greater East Asia, 289-297
- compared with Russia, 290
- Communism, 21, 80-6, 171-81, 346-7, 393-411
- Communist Party, 81-5, 87, 129, 131, 193, 326-9, 359, 383, 394, 400
- General Elections, 399-400, 409
- Labour-Farmer Party, 175
- Labour Union Council, 172, 175
- National Socialism, 182, 192-3
- Peace Treaty, 400, 403, 406
- Security Pact, 400, 403, 406
- Social-Democratic Party, 394-6, 398, 409
- State Socialist Party, 192-3
- Japan, Trade Union Movement, 346-7, 394-5, 408
- Ultra-Nationalism, 36, 40, 82, 86-8, 179, 190, 346, 400-1, 416, 511
- Japanese Army, 188-91, 401
- Constitution, 399
- National Defence Force, 401
- Peasants and Workers' School, 327
- People's Emancipation League, 326, 328, 348
- Population Question, 293, 300, 502
- Prisoners-of-War, 326-7
- Rearmament, 401, 403, 409
- Relations with Communist China, 405, 409-10
- Relations with National China, 410
- Rice Riots, 79-80
- Soviet Relations, 258, 267-8, 292, 295, 297-300, 405, 409-10
- JFLU, 395-6, 408
- Juichin, 160-1, 232, 369
- Kabul, 19, 39, 61
- Kamchatka, 138
- Karen Revolt, 441-3
- Kashmir Dispute, 482, 491-4, 502, 506
- Kazakhstan, 102, 107
- Kellogg Pact, 252-4
- Kenkokukai*, 82
- Khmer Issarak, 425, 427-9
- Khilafat Movement, 58-60
- Khiva, 102, 107, 135
- Kirghizia, 107
- Kirti Kisan*, 223
- Kisan Sabha*, 228, 476
- KMT, 30-4, 45, 52, 63, 70-4, 76, 149, 370-1
- National Congresses: 1st-34, 73, 147; 2nd-149
- Revolutionary Committee, 370-371
- Kokand, 102
- Kokuhonsha*, 187
- Kommunist*, 237, 359

- Korea, 26, 35, 47, 88-90, 194-5, 293, 300, 337, 347-50, 383, 388, 392, 410-18, 500, 502, 512
 Korean Armistice, 415-16
 — Army, 411-12
 — Communist Party (*see also* Korean Workers' Party), 89-90, 134, 194, 347-50
 — Independence Movement, 89, 120
 — Labour Union, 418
 — Nationalism, 26, 89
 — Peasant League, 418
 — Riots, 410, 414
 — War, 402, 410, 412-17, 430, 444
 — Workers' Party, 348-50, 417-18, 507
 Kotoku Plot, 27, 78, 82
 Krestintern, 142-3
 Kuomintang, *see* KMT
 Kuriles, 100, 105, 294, 298, 403
 Kutien Military Conference, 160, 244
 KUTV, 118, 124-5, 130, 172
Kyodo, 401

 Land Reform, 412
Lanka Sama Samaj, 229, 304
 Lao Dong Party, 344, 424-5, 428, 434, 436
Lao Issarak, 425-6
 Laos, 195, 201, 295, 317, 353, 423-430
 Lausanne Treaty, 137, 253
 League Against Imperialism, 128, 203, 208, 277-9
 League of Nations, 252-3, 262; Germany and, 250, 264; Japan and, 41, 191, 264; Soviet Union and, 110, 126, 252, 264, 266, 268
 Lenin University, 125, 204-5
 Liberation Movements, 3-4, 8, 12, 35, 53, 57, 72-3, 93, 116, 121-2, 124, 129-30, 134, 211, 358-9, 382
 Lien Viet, 421, 428, 434
 Lien Viet Front, 424, 428, 434-6
 Linggadhati Agreement, 461, 464
 Locarno Pact, 140, 250, 252
 London Naval Conference, 184
 London Naval Treaty, 40, 189
 Long March, The, 161, 233, 241, 244, 249, 369
 Lytton Commission, 262

 Macao, 498
 Madiun Rebellion, 206-7, 359, 465-466, 510
 Mahachon, 438
Mahasabha, 225
 Malaya, 63-5, 213-16, 266, 307-10, 353-5, 450-5, 498
 — Communism, 63-5, 353-5, 359
 — Communist Party, 65, 200, 213-216, 236, 307-10, 353-5, 438, 443, 450-5
 — Communist Youth Corps, 64, 214-15
 — Nationalist Party, 354
 — People's Anti-Japanese Army, 310, 353
 — Races' Liberation Army, 451
 — Soviet Republic, 443, 451
 — Trade Unions, 214, 451
 Manchu Dynasty, 27, 29-32
 Manchukuo, 178, 257-8, 263-4, 267
 Manchuria, 26, 47, 67, 72, 88-90, 103-6, 159, 191, 253-5, 259, 261-263, 293-4, 298, 300, 325, 337, 350-1, 385-6
 Manchurian Incident, 38, 41, 90, 178-9, 182, 185, 192, 195, 248, 253, 261
 Manchurian Operations, 178, 262
 Manchurian Trade Agreement, 375
 Manipur, 296
 Mao's Writings, 236-9, 245-6, 383-384
 Marshall Plan, 140, 346, 358, 360, 364, 444
Masjumi, 457, 463, 468-9, 470
 Meerut Conspiracy, 224, 226-7
 Mensheviks, 14, 94, 113, 115, 141, 240
 Mexico, 61
 Midway, Battle of, 291
Min Yuen, 451
 Minsk Congress, 94
Minsei, 411

- Minsen*, 411
 Mongolia, Inner, 106
 — Outer, 5, 72, 103, 106–7, 111, 255–8, 294, 298, 300, 335–7, 350, 500
 Mongolian People's Republic, 256–258, 266–7, 336–7
 Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party, 256–7
 Montague-Chelmsford Reforms, 55, 217–18, 225
 Moplan Rebellion, 58
 MOPR, 142
 Morley-Minto Reforms, 54
 Moscow Conference, 345, 349, 351
 Moscow Oriental University, 61
 Moslems, 24, 46–7, 50, 55–8, 60, 65, 107
 Moslem League, 54, 56, 225, 228–9, 302, 356
 MPAJA, 310, 451
 Myochit Party, 220, 306
- Nagani Book Club, 219, 221
Nahdatul Ulama, 457, 470
 Nanchang Insurrection, 155–6, 158
 Nanking Outrage, 152–3
 Nanking Treaty, 28
 National Liberation Fronts, 333
 Naval Ratios, 40
 NCIO, 395–6, 408
 NCNA, 29, 162–3
 NEP, 138, 141, 251–2, 271
 Nepal, 595–7
 — Communist Party, 495–6
 Neutralism, *see* Asian Neutralism
 Netherlands Communist Party, 203, 211, 465–6
New Age, 475, 488
 New Democracy, 11, 77, 234, 237–240, 324, 370, 434
 New Democratic Youth League, 374
 Nicobars, 296
 Nine-Power Pact, 184
 NKVD, 110
 Nomanhan Operations, 266–7
 North Atlantic Pact, 140, 375
 North China Incident, 193, 215, 266, 328, 414
 Northern Expedition, 150
 Noulens Defence Committee, 128, 143
 Nu-Attlee Agreement, 440
 Nuclear and Thermo-Nuclear Weapons, 404–5, 448, 485, 490, 505
 Nuremberg Trials, 276
- Ochrana*, 110
 October Revolution, 10, 118–19, 236, 370, 376, 503
 October 17th Affair, 467
 Opium War, 27–8, 112
 OGPU, 110–11
 Outer Mongolia, *see* Mongolia
- Pacific War, 243, 285
 Pakistan, 43, 55, 228, 356, 358, 475, 492–5, 497, 499, 502, 512
 — and United States, 485, 492
 — Communist Party, 476, 494–5
 Pan-Asia, 16, 19–22, 34–44, 66, 82, 87–8, 206, 289, 511
 Pan-Bokhara Congress, 135
 Pan-Islam, 60, 129, 205–6
 Pan-Malayan FTU, 354, 451
 Pan-Pacific Syndicalist Congress, 133
 Pan-Pacific Trade Union Conference, 214
 Pan-Pacific Trade Union Congress, 203
 Pan-Pacific Trade Union Secretariat, 65, 142, 172, 198, 214, 277
 PARI, 206
 Paris Commune, 92
 Paris Congress, 93, 96
 Parliamentaryism, 333
Partai Murba, 465
Partindo, 209–11
 Pathet Lao, 425–6, 429
 Pau Conference, 423
 Peace Campaign (*see also* World Peace Campaign), 264, 283–4
 Peace Preservation Law, 85, 173, 176

- Peaceful Co-existence, 251-2, 284, 487, 508
- Peasant Unions, 127, 150, 163
- Peasantry, 9-12, 29-31, 76-7, 95-6, 126, 133, 143, 147, 149, 156, 161-163, 167, 170, 237-9, 271-2, 324-325, 370, 372-3, 389-91, 434-5, 471-3, 478, 483
- Peking, 368, 382-3, 385
- Pemuda Rakjat*, 457
- People's Age*, 475
- Pepsu Elections, 486, 488
- Perbepsi*, 471
- Perhimpunan Indonesia*, 25, 45, 209, 211
- Persia, 60, 67, 86, 102-3, 119, 123, 136
- PESINDO, 457, 460, 462
- Peta*, 313
- Philippines, 17-18, 52-3, 201-2, 292, 297, 317-19, 352, 473-4
- Communist Party, 52-3, 201-2, 318-19, 352, 359, 473-4
- Independence, 318, 352
- Japanese Invasion, 52, 202, 318
- Nationalism, 23, 52, 317-19
- PKI, 50, 131, 202-3, 205, 207-9, 211, 224, 457-73
- 5th Congress, 469, 471-2
- PLA, 155, 158, 245, 369
- PNJI (*see also* Indonesian National Party), 209-10, 456-7, 460, 463, 468-70
- Poetara*, 312-13
- Police State Methods, 385-6
- Polish-Russian Dispute, 332-3
- Popular Front, 126, 139, 180, 198, 211, 233, 265, 268, 283-4
- Population, 8-9, 293, 371, 380-1, 502
- Port Arthur, 103-5, 385
- Portsmouth Treaty, 105
- Potemkin Mutiny, 95
- Potsdam Conference, 399-300
- Pravda*, 81, 122, 125, 237, 272, 328, 345, 391, 399, 480, 486, 488, 490, 509
- Profintern, 142-3, 277
- Psychological Warfare, 326-7
- PVO, 441-2
- Purges, 141, 153, 264-5, 274-5, 336
- Pushtunistan, 492-3, 506
- Pyeongyang, 348, 383, 402, 417
- Racial Equality, 38, 40-1, 43-4, 184, 342, 377, 380
- Racial Independence, 359, 400
- Radio Free Japan, 404, 407-8
- Renville Agreement, 463-4
- Resistance Movements, 13, 285, 333, 341
- Rights Recovery Movement, 248, 254
- Rowlatt Bills, 57
- RSDLP, 4, 14, 92, 94, 115, 120
- Russian Communist Party (*see also* CPSU), 59, 72, 74, 92, 99, 142, 237
- — — Congresses: 7th—120; 8th—120; 10th—141; 12th—132; 14th—140, 142
- Russian Expansionist Policy, 99-109, 136
- Foreign Policy, 59, 138-42, 486
- Imperialism, 36, 100-9, 122, 255-60, 268, 337, 447, 498-9, 504
- Revolution, 46, 70, 80, 95, 107
- Russo-Japanese War, 16, 21, 26, 31, 51, 78, 88, 96, 103-5, 107, 113-14
- Russo-Turkish War, 102
- Saghalien, 26, 100-1, 105, 298
- Sajap Kiri*, 462-3
- San Francisco Conference, 345, 403
- Sanbetsu*, *see* NCIO
- SARBUPRI, 457-8
- Sarekat Islam*, 24, 45-50, 202-3, 208
- Saya San Rebellion, 217-18
- SCAP, 393-4, 396, 401, 405-8, 411
- Seisanto*, 187, 189, 193
- Self-determination, 4, 16-17, 50-2, 499
- Shakai Minshuto*, 192
- Shameen Affair, 21, 149
- Shan States, 316
- Shanghai Incident, 21, 133-4, 148-149, 166
- Shantung, 66-7, 350

- Shimonoseki Treaty, 104
 Showa Restoration, 188, 191-2
 Siam, 65, 86, 199-201, 206, 315-16, 352-3, 425, 427, 430, 437-9, 452, 498, 512
 — Communism, 65, 199-201, 316, 353, 438
 — Communist Party, 438-9
 — Japanese Invasion, 201, 315
 Sian Incident, 234, 247
 Singapore, 498
 Sinkiang, 103, 106-7, 255, 257-60, 335-6, 350-1, 376, 385
 Sino-Indian Relations, 487, 497
 Sino-Japanese War, 26, 29, 31
 Sino-Soviet Alliance (1950), 70, 385, 410
 Sino-Soviet Relations, 67-8, 70-1, 108, 157, 165-6, 266-7, 373, 376, 384-5, 414, 417, 436, 503
 Sino-Soviet Treaty: (1924)—256-7; (1945)—325, 336-7, 350-1
 SOBSI, 457-8, 463-4, 470-1
 Social Democracy, 265, 281, 283, 376
Sodomei, *see* JFLU
Sohyo, 408
 South-East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), 501, 505
 South-East Asia Youth Conference, 355, 359, 362, 441, 443, 450, 464, 476
 South Seas Communist Group, 64-65, 196, 200, 213, 218, 277
 Soviet (*see also* Russian) Diplomatic Missions, 345, 353, 445, 472, 482, 486, 497, 512
 — Economic Aid, 385, 417, 436, 447-9, 489, 506-7, 515
 — Far Eastern Army, 255, 261, 266
 — Foreign Policy, 362-3, 405, 512
 — German Pact (1939), 198, 216, 268, 284
 — German Treaty (1926), 250
 — Japan Neutrality Pact, 258, 267, 295, 297-8, 331
 — Manchurian Agreement, 257
 — Mongolia Mutual Assistance Pact, 257, 266
 — Monitor, 333
 — Outer Mongolia Treaty, 255-6
 — Plans, 330-7
 — Trade Unions 11th Congress, 366
 Soviet Union, defence of, 109, 179, 266, 281, 283, 331
 Soviets, 95, 156, 159-61, 169
 Spanish-American War, 18
 Spanish Civil War, 266, 283, 414
 Stockholm Peace Appeal, 363
 Students, 66-9, 370, 453, 458
 Stuttgart Congress, 96-7
 'Sugar-coated bullets', 378
 Sun Yat-Sen University, 125
 Syndicalism, 84
 Tadzhikistan, 107
 Taiping Rebellion, 29-31
 Tannu Tuva, 107, 257, 336-7
 Tashkent, 120, 260
 — Propaganda Schools, 60-1, 124
Tass, 418, 421, 482
 Teheran Conference, 297
 Telengana, 476, 480-1
 Terrorism and Violence, 17-18, 22-23, 57, 62, 227-33, 451, 474, 476-477, 481, 484-5
 Thai Autonomous Area, 437
 Thailand, *see* Siam
 Thakins' Party, 218-19, 221
 'Three-Antis Campaign', 386
 Tibet, 5, 103, 257, 369, 382, 487, 496-7
 Toilers-of-the-East Congress, 83, 128, 203
 Toilers-of-the-East University, *see* KUTV
 Tonking, 316-17, 419, 422-3, 426
 Trade Unions, 47, 70-1, 91-2, 133, 137, 161-4, 203, 365-6, 388-9
 'Transmission Belts', 127, 129, 334, 361, 434-5, 374, 388, 421, 426, 428, 458, 471, 512
 Trans-Siberian Railway, 101, 104, 255
 Triple Intervention, 26, 40, 104
 Trojan Horse Tactics, 126, 283
 Truman's Point Four, 444, 446

- Turkestan, Chinese, *see* Sinkiang
 — Russian, 60, 102, 107, 122, 135
 Turkmenistan, 107
 Turkey, 49, 54, 56–60, 67, 114, 119,
 123, 135, 137
 Turk-Sib Railway, 255, 260
 Twenty-One Demands, 34
 •
 UMNO, 354
 Unequal Treaties, 28, 35, 40, 183
 United Front, 139
 United Nations, 323–4, 331, 345,
 353, 411–16, 446–8, 461, 487,
 490, 492, 500, 515
 — — Security Council, 345, 461–2,
 464, 466
 USSR, 110, 142
 — German Invasion of, 269, 276,
 284–5
 Uzbekistan, 107
 •
 Versailles Peace Conference, 50,
 184, 263
 Versailles Treaty, 38, 40, 66–7
 Vienna Peace Congress, 484
 Vietnam (*see also* Indo-China), 317,
 423–4, 426–37, 502, 512
 — Confederation of Workers, 421
 — Nationalist Party, 23
 — News Service, 421
 — People's Army, 317, 424
 — Revolutionary League, 316
 — Women's Union, 421
 — Youth Group, 421
 Viet Minh, 199, 224, 266, 316–17,
 344, 353, 419–32, 437
 Violence, *see* Terrorism
 Vladivostok, 101, 103–4
 VOKS, 142–3, 278
Volksraad, 48–9, 211
 •
 Washington Conference, 138, 184
 Washington Naval Treaty, 40
 West European Bureau, 134, 205
 Whampoa Military College, 74–5,
 149
 Women's International Democratic
 Federation (WIDF), 126, 334,
 363–4, 371, 374, 415, 421, 458
 Women's Movement, 280
 Workers' and Peasants' Party
 (Burma), 223–4; (India), 224, 278
 World Economic Conference, 483
 World Federation of Democratic
 Youth (WFDY), 126, 285, 334,
 361–2, 364, 374, 404, 421, 450,
 458, 470–1, 505
 World Federation of Trade Unions
 (WFTU), 126, 142, 230, 334, 361,
 397–8, 364–7, 373–4, 382, 421,
 431, 439, 444, 458, 471, 477, 507
 World Federation of Trade Unions
 Asian Liaison Bureau, 365–6, 373
 World Peace Campaign, 117, 143,
 176, 282, 327, 362–7, 404, 481–8,
 505, 507–8
 World Peace Congress, 126, 362–3,
 404, 429, 431, 484
 World Peace Council, 176, 282,
 363–4, 371, 415, 439, 444, 458,
 482
 World Peace Council Asian Liaison
 Committee, 365–6
 World Revolution, 4, 8–10, 13, 23,
 26, 91–4, 97, 99, 108–9, 112–14,
 116, 118–19, 121, 123, 125–6,
 129–30, 132, 134, 136, 141, 148,
 158–9, 165, 203, 214, 234, 242,
 251, 265, 268–9, 276, 284–5, 300,
 330–4, 346, 358, 362, 364, 393,
 443, 452, 495, 498, 503, 508–9,
 512, 515
 World War I, 5, 51, 53, 56, 59, 80,
 87, 89, 93, 97, 107, 116, 184, 190,
 195–6
 World War II, 13, 89, 109, 126, 160,
 171, 219, 242, 247, 263
 Wroclaw Conference of Intellec-
 tuals, 143, 362, 484
 Wuhan Government, 150, 153–4,
 168, 243
 •
 Yalta Conference, 72, 100, 105, 107,
 113, 293–4, 298, 300, 325, 337,
 350
 Yen'an, 233, 237, 245, 323, 326–7,
 348, 350, 368, 395
 — Independence League, 348

- | | |
|--|------------------------------------|
| Yenbay Revolt, 197 | <i>Zaibatsu</i> , 399 |
| Young Communist League, 127 | <i>Zaigo Gunjinkai</i> , 189 |
| Young Plan, 263 | <i>Zenkoku Rono Taishuto</i> , 192 |
| Young Turk Movement, 114 | <i>Zenroren</i> , 408 |
| Youth Movement, 280, 285, 355,
361-2, 374 | <i>Zevern Provinciën</i> , 210 |
| | <i>Zigzag Course</i> , 508-9 |

Index of Persons

- Abdul Ghaffar Khan, 227
 Abdullah, Sheikh, 494
 Acheson, Dean, 411
 Agabekov, 60, 135
 Aguinaldo, 17-18, 290-1
 Aidit, 9, 467, 469, 471-3
 Akamatsu, 192-3
 Akao Toshi, 82, 186
 Alexander I, 109 •
 Ali Brothers, 58
 Alimin, 46, 64, 202-7, 209, 326,
 460, 473, 510
 Amakasu, Captain, 85
 Amanullah, King, 60
 An Tzu-Wen, 378
 Arahata Kanson, 171, 173
 Arita Hachiro, 268
 Atcheson, George, 394
 Attlee, Clement, 440, 442
 Aung San, 20, 220-2, 290-1, 296,
 305-6, 355-6, 440, 442-3, 511

 Bā Maw, 219, 221-2, 296, 305
 Ba Sein, 222
 Bahol, Colonel, 201
 Bailey, Colonel, 60
 Bakunin, 92
 Balgoss, Mariano, 474
 Bambang Sugeng, 468
 Bao Dai, 16, 423-4, 432-3, 445
 Bela Kun, 123
 Beloff, Max, 170
 Beneš, 264, 276
 Beria, 406
 Besant, Mrs, 54-8, 57-8
 Bhave, Vinobha, 483
 Blanqui, 10
 Blucher (*see also* Galen), 254, 266-
 267, 510
 Borkenau, 68, 108

 Borodin, 72, 74-5, 77, 133, 147-8
 150, 154-5, 166, 251, 510
 Bose, Rash Behari, 19, 22, 36-9,
 41-2, 290, 295-6, 302, 511
 Bose, Subhas Chandra, 296-7, 303
 Browder, Earl, 204, 214
 Brandt, Conrad, 72
 Buber, Margarete, 111, 157
 Bukharin, 73, 84, 137, 177, 206,
 270-1, 275, 509
 Bulganin, Marshal, 448-50, 488-9,
 491, 493, 496, 503-4, 515
 Buu Loc, Prince, 432

 Calthrop, Colonel, 246
 Carew, Major, 306
 Caroe, Sir Olaf, 135
 Catherine the Great, 102
 Chang Hsueh-Liang (the Young
 Marshal), 234, 254
 Chang Kuo-Tao, 240-2, 249
 Chang Tso-Lin, 123, 152, 166, 251,
 254
 Chapman, Lieut.-Col. Frederick
 Spencer, 216, 307
 Chen Chiung-Ming, 71
 Chen, Eugene, 154
 Chen Ping, 309, 354, 454-5
 Chen Po-Ta, 320, 376
 Chen Tu-Hsiu, 69-70, 73, 76, 129,
 150, 156-7, 167, 241, 254
 Chen Yi, 378
 Chen Yun, 321, 390
 Chiang Kai-Shek, 16, 74-5, 150-4,
 157, 161, 163, 166, 168, 232,
 234-5, 241, 246-7, 249, 251, 266,
 321-2, 351, 368, 370, 392, 414,
 419, 445-6, 511
 Chiang Kai-Shek, Mme, 335
 Chicherin, 62, 74, 119, 250, 252-3

- Chin Peng, *see* Chen Ping
 Chin Shu-Jen, 259
 Chou En-Lai, 20, 69, 151-2, 155, 158, 170, 204, 234-5, 249, 292, 323-5, 327, 381, 385, 387-8, 415, 437, 449, 487, 497, 511, 514-515
 Chu Chiu-Pai, 70, 156, 167
 Chu Teh, 69, 155, 160-1, 233, 376, 388, 511
 Churchill, Sir Winston, 276, 297, 299, 325, 331, 346, 432, 504, 508
 Citrine, Lord, 397
 Clark, General Mark, 414
 Clementi, Sir Cecil, 65
 Clinard, Outten Jones, 52
 Colbert, Evelyn, 174
 Colvin, Ian, 57
 Crankshaw, Ernest, 265
 Cripps, Sir Stafford, 229, 301, 303
 Cromwell, 74
 Cuong De, Prince, 50
 Czar, The, 95-6

 Dallin, David, 59, 66
 Dan, Baron Takuma, 183
 Dang Xuan-Khu, *see* Truong Chinh
 Dange, 475, 477, 479
 Darsono, 46, 203, 205, 207, 510
 Davies, Joseph, 265
 Dawes, General, 140, 263
 de Castries, 432
 de Groot, 465-6
 de Lattre de Tassigny, 424
 Deane, Maj.-Gen. John R., 334
 Dekker, 48
 Deshpande, 226
 Deutscher, Isaac, 3, 98, 109, 141, 265, 271, 275-6
 Diem, Ngo Dinh, 432-3
 di Vittorio, 366
 Dimitrov, 111, 126, 283, 321
 Djocjarkarta, Sultan of, 468
 Ducroux, 198, 214-15
 Dulles, Foster, 403, 430-2, 491
 Duranty, 264
 Dutt, Palme, 479
 Dyer, General, 57-8
 Dzerzhinsky, 110

 Eden, Sir Anthony, 264, 298
 Eisenhower, President, 492
 Emperor (of Japan), 194, 298, 300, 393, 395
 Engels, 9, 112
 Enver Pasha, 135-6
 Etherton, Colonel, 60

 Fall, Bernard, 317, 420
 Federenko, 384
 Fedeyev, Alexander, 375
 Felton, Monica, 470
 Feng Yu-Hsiang, 154, 371
 Fischer, Louis, 74
 Fischer, Ruth, 109, 111
 Frunze, 275, 276
 Fukumoto Kazuo, 171, 174-5, 177
 Furnivall, J. S., 24

 Galen (*see also* Blucher), 74, 154, 510
 Gandhi, 57-9, 62, 113, 221, 225-6, 281, 302, 483, 488, 511
 Gapon, 21
 Ghate, 223-4
 Ghosal, 221, 441, 443
 Ghosh, Ajoy, 477-84, 488-9
 Gide, André, 143
 Gokhale, 54
 Gondo Seikyo, 188
 Gorky, 275
 Gottwald, 465
 Gouzenko, 345
 Gracey, General, 419-20
 Green, O. M., 66
 Gromyko, 265, 403, 461
 Gurney, Sir Henry, 453

 Habibullah, Amir, 39, 60, 120
 Hakamada, 180
 Hall, 47
 Hamaguchi, 182
 Har Dayal, 39
 Harada, Baron, 268
 Harahap, Burhanudin, 469-70, 502
 Hardinge, Lord, 36
 Harriman, Averell, 297-8, 331
 Hatta, 16, 209-10, 312, 314, 458-463, 511

- Hay, John, 29
 Herzen, 9
 Hilferding, 3, 113-14
 Hirayama, Baron, 187
 Hitler, 20, 117, 187, 263, 282, 296,
 303, 307, 374, 415
 Hla Kywe, Thakin, 444
 Ho Chi-Minh, 20, 50-1, 64, 123,
 196-200, 215, 266, 292, 316, 344,
 383, 419, 422-4, 431-3, 435-6,
 445, 449, 487, 511
 Ho Chien, 154
 Ho Lung, 155, 160
 Hobson, 3, 113
 Hodge, General, 347
 Hsiao Keh, 233
 Hsu Shu-Tseng, 106
 Hu Chiao-Mu, 162
 Hu Shih, 69
 Hull, Cordell, 297, 331
 Hume, Allan, 17
 Hunt, Carew, 127
 Hurley, General, 231, 323, 325
 Hyde, Douglas, 333

 Inouye, Junnosuke, 183
 Inukai Tsuyoshi, 32, 183, 188
 Ito Ritsu, 406
 Iwa Kasuma Sumantri, 468-9
 Iyeyasu, 85

 Jao Shu-Shih, 241
 Jebb, Sir Gladwyn, 413
 Jinnah, 228, 494, 511
 Joffe, Adolph, 34, 72, 132-3, 165,
 256, 270, 510
 Johnston, Sir Reginald, 104
 Joshi, P. C., 20, 304, 476, 478
 Jusuf, Mohamed, 460-1

 Kahin, George, 203, 207, 209, 315
 Kaji Wataru, 326
 Kamenev, 275
 Kamiyama Shigeo, 406
 Kao Kang, 241, 375, 386-7
 Karakhan, 165, 275, 509
 Karttunen, Miss Raden Adjeng, 49
 Kasuga Shoichi, 406, 408
 Kasuga Shojiro, 180

 Katayama Sen, 21, 27, 81, 113, 128,
 178, 326
 Katayama Tetsu, 398
 Kautsky, 80-1
 Kazama Jokichi, 177-9
 Kemal, Mustapha, 137
 Keuneman, 304, 474
 Khrushchev, 384, 448-50, 489-93,
 496, 503-4, 515
 Kim Il-Sung, 348, 416-18
 Kim Koo, 349
 Kirov, 264, 274-6
 Kisch, 278
 Kita Ikki, 188
 Kitchlew, Dr, 482
 Koestler, Arthur, 127
 Kondo Eizo, 81-3, 171
 Kotelawala, Sir John, 498, 513
 Kotoku, 26-7
 Kravchenko, 157
 Kropotkin, 82
 Kuo Mo-Jo, 415

 Lai Jo-Yu, 365, 389
 Langer, Paul, 84
 Laval, 264
 Lawrence of Arabia, 75
 Lenin, 3-5, 8-10, 12-14, 22-3, 28,
 29, 35, 38, 59, 61, 67, 70, 73-4,
 93-9, 112-17, 120-1, 123, 128-9,
 135, 137-9, 141-2, 147, 166, 178,
 240, 251, 271, 273-5, 302, 320-1,
 325, 330, 345, 491, 503, 508-9,
 512
 Lefranc, Serge (*see also* Ducroux),
 213-14
 Li Chai-Sum, 153, 164, 370
 Li Chi-Sen, *see* Li Chai-Sum
 Li Li-San, 11, 20, 69, 148, 158-60,
 167, 231, 241, 254, 372
 Li Mi, General, 446
 Li Min-Jen, *see* Li Li-San
 Li Ta-Chao, 123
 Li Teh-Chuan, 154, 371
 Liao Chung-Kai, 72
 Liaquat Ali Khan, 494
 Lindsay, Michael, 514
 Litvinov, 252-3, 262-4, 268
 Liu Ning-Yi, 444

- Liu Shao-Chi, 14, 20, 121, 159, 249,
 321, 366, 373-4, 376, 378-9, 382-
 384, 387, 389, 405
 Liu Ting-Yi, 352
 Loi Tek, 309, 354
 Lominadze, Besso, 168
 Luxemburg, Rosa, 4, 96, 116
 Lwin, Thakin, 444
 Lyuh Woon-Hyung, 349

 Ma Chan-Shan, 262
 Ma Ching-Yin, 259
 MacArthur, General, 294, 298, 347,
 386, 393, 399, 413
 Macartney, Lord, 27
 MacDonald, Malcolm, 443
 Macmillan, Harold, 504
 MacWhinnie, 444
 Madjid, Abdul, 460
 Magsaysay, Ramon, 474
 Mahendra, King, 496
 Mahring (*see also* Sneeveliet), 45, 69,
 71-2, 165-6, 510
 Makino, Count, 182
 Malaka, Tan, 19-20, 63-4, 129,
 200-2, 204-9, 315, 459, 465, 510
 Malenkov, 138, 448, 490
 Mamiya Rinzo, 100
 Manuilsky, 112, 345, 503
 Mao Tse-Tung, 11, 20, 67, 70, 75-7,
 156, 158-60, 162, 167, 170, 231-
 241, 245-6, 249, 257, 274, 320-1,
 323-5, 328, 331-2, 351, 360, 369,
 370-2, 375-6, 378, 381-5, 387-
 392, 434, 436, 443, 445, 449, 478,
 485, 509, 511
 Mao Tun, 384, 431
 Marshall, David, 454-5
 Marshall, General, 323, 346, 351-2
 Martov, 96
 Marx, 3, 5, 8-9, 80, 82, 91-2, 112-
 113, 116-17, 128, 325, 345, 457,
 499, 512
 Mayhew, Christopher, 265
 Menshikov, 487
 Merlin, Governor-General, 196
 Mif, Pavel, 125, 169
 Mikoyan, 273, 484
 Miyamoto Kenji, 407

 Molotov, 178, 231, 252, 260, 262,
 267-9, 298-9, 325, 335, 347, 375,
 405, 489, 509
 Montalembert, 127
 Morse, 28
 Mountbatten, Lord, 306
 Munzenberg, Willi, 127
 Muso, 203-7, 359, 464-5, 510
 Mussolini, 187, 190
 Mya, Thakin, 222

 Nabeyama Sadachika, 82, 180, 398
 Nagata, General, 192
 Nakanishi Ko, 328-9
 Namba Daisuke, 85
 Napier, Lord, 27-8
 Napoleon, 74, 499
 Narayan, Jaya Prakash, 303
 Nasution, Colonel, 468
 Nehru, 16, 221, 225, 277, 292, 356-
 357, 359, 432, 445, 449, 475-8,
 480, 485-94, 501, 509, 511
 Neumann, Heinz, 157, 510
 Nguyen Ai-Quoc, *see* Ho Chi-Minh
 Nguyen Tat Thanh, *see* Ho Chi-
 Minh
 Nomura, Admiral, 195
 Norodom, King, 430
 North, Robert, 128
 Noulens, Hilaire, 128, 143, 198,
 215, 279
 Nozaka Sanzo, 20, 83-4, 128, 172,
 175, 178, 180, 204, 326-8, 348,
 395, 405, 407, 408, 510-11
 Nu, Thakin U, 16, 219, 292, 294,
 306, 313, 440, 443, 448-9, 511

 O'Dwyer, Sir Michael, 19, 36
 Okada, Admiral, 182
 Okano Susuma, *see* Nozaka
 Onraet, René, 214
 Ordzhonikidze, 275
 Orwell, George, 110, 283
 Osugi Sakae, 81, 84, 171
 Oyama Ikuo, 176

 Pak Heung-Yung, 349, 418
 Panchen Lama, 382

- Panikkar, K. M., 413
 Patel, 491, 511
 Pearn, Professor, 420
 Peng Pai, 75
 Perry, Commodore, 28
 Petsarath, Prince, 425-6
 Pham Van Dong, 430
 Pibul, 200-1, 316, 353, 438, 511
 Plekhanov, 9, 21, 92, 94, 113
 Pollitt, Harry, 204, 303, 484-5
 Prasong Vong Vivat, 438
 Pratap, Mahendra, 19, 39, 61, 295
 Pridi Phanomyong, 200-1, 313, 316, 352-3, 383, 436, 496, 511
 Prince Regent (Japanese), 85
 Pu Yi, Henry, 27
 Purcell, Victor, 47, 50, 65
 Putiatin, 100

 Quezon, Manuel, 23, 202
 Quirino, 16

 Radek, 123, 125, 139, 275, 509
 Rahman, Tengku Abdul, 454-5
 Ranadive, 357, 372, 383, 476, 478
 Rao, Rajeshwar, 478-80
 Rhee, Syngman, 16, 89, 348-9, 411, 414-17, 432, 502, 511
 Roosevelt, Franklin D., 297-9, 325, 504
 Roy, M. N., 20, 29, 61-2, 64, 121, 153, 168, 214, 226-7, 510
 Rykov, 270-1, 275

 Saburov, Maxim, 284
 Saionji, Prince, 268
 Saito, Admiral Viscount, 182, 189, 191
 Sakai Toshihiko, 171-2
 Sano Gaku, 82, 171, 173, 176, 180, 398, 510
 Sansom, Sir George, 21, 41, 79
 Sardjono, 460
 Sastroamidjojo, Ali, 468-9, 473
 Sato Naotake, 298-9
 Saya San, 217-18
 Saw, U, 219-20, 222, 306, 356, 511
 Semaun, 20, 46-8, 50, 202-7, 209, 224, 510

 Serov, 489
 Setiadjit, 460
 Sharkey, 204, 450, 476
 Shen Shih-Tsai, 259-60, 335
 Shen Yen-Ping, 384
 Shepilov, 490, 509
 Shiba Shiro, 41
 Shidehara, Baron, 261
 Shiga Yoshio, 175, 346, 407, 510-11
 Shigemitsu Mamoru, 194-5, 295, 298
 Shimonaka, 192-3
 Shirakawa, General, 194
 Shvernik, 366
 Singh, Dr K. I., 383, 496
 Sisavang Vong, King, 426
 Sivaji, 17
 Sjahrir, Sutan, 19, 210, 312, 315, 459-60, 468, 470, 511
 Sjarifuddin, Amir, 311-12, 460, 463-5
 Sneevliet, Hendricus (*see also* Mahring), 45-7, 69, 510
 Snow, Edgar, 234, 248
 Soe, Thakin, 219, 306, 355, 440, 511
 Sokhey, Major-General, 482
 Son Ngoc Minh, 427
 Son Ngoc Thanh, 427, 429
 Soong Ching-Ling, 154, 278, 511
 Sorge, Richard, 181, 328, 406
 Souphavong, Prince, 425-6, 429
 Souvanna Phouma, 426
 Spratt, Philip, 510
 Stalin, 5, 10-14, 16, 21, 70, 73, 83, 92, 94, 108-10, 113, 116-19, 121-2, 124-5, 127, 130, 132-4, 136-7, 140-1, 143, 153, 168-9, 175, 178, 232, 234, 240, 251, 259, 263-6, 270-7, 292, 297-9, 320-1, 325, 330-1, 345, 358, 383, 390-1, 401, 404, 408, 449, 483-4, 508-9, 512
 Stilwell, General, 249, 320, 322-3
 Stolypin, 142
 Sugiyama, General, 295
 Sukarno, 16, 20, 208-10, 312, 314, 458-9, 465, 467-8, 508, 511
 Sukiman, 467
 Sun Tse, 246

- Sun Yat-Sen, 18-19, 30-5, 37, 64,
 66, 70-2, 74, 115, 119, 132-3, 147,
 165-6, 205, 238-40, 243, 256,
 270, 511
 Sun, Mme, *see* Soong Ching-Ling
 Suripno, 464
 Suzuki, Admiral Kantaro, 182
 Suzuki Kyo, 188
 Swearingen, Rodger, 84, 124, 171,
 174

 Tachibana Kosaburo, 188
 Tai Li, 322
 Takabatake, 80-1, 186
 Takahashi, 182
 Tan Malaka, *see* Malaka
 Tanaka Seigen, 176-7
 Tan Ling-Djie, 460, 473
 Taruc, Luis, 318-19, 474
 Teng Tse-Hui, 239, 390
 Than Tun, 219, 222, 305-6, 355,
 440-3, 476, 511
 Thein Pe, 220-1, 304
 Thorez, 204
 Thornton, 366
 Tilak, 17, 22, 56, 58, 62
 Tito, 348, 360, 375
 Tjokro, 48-50
 Tojo, General, 328
 Tokai Sanshi, *see* Shiba Shino
 Tokuda Kyuichi, 83-5, 128, 171,
 173, 175, 346, 400, 402, 404, 406-
 408, 510
 Tomskey, 271-2
 Ton Duc Thang, 436
 Toyama Mitsuru, 19, 36-41, 511
 Tran Van Giau, 198
 Tribhuvana, King, 496
 Trotsky, 9, 14, 70, 74, 98, 136, 141,
 143, 167-8, 175, 229, 240, 251,
 270, 274-6, 304, 372, 444, 509
 Truman, President H. S., 299, 351,
 412
 Truong Chinh, 197
 Tu Yueh-Sen, 152

 Tun Oke, Thakin, 305
 Tukhachevsky, 267, 275-6
 Tydings, Senator, 202

 Ungern-Sternberg, Baron, 106

 Valtin, Jan, 111, 142
 Vasilievsky, 347, 394
 Vishinsky, 487
 Vo Nguyen Giap, 317, 423
 Voitinsky, Gregory, 69-71
 Vong-Vivat, Prasong, 438
 Vorovski, 252

 Wang Ching-Wei, 150, 153, 168,
 243, 247, 292, 510
 Wang Min, 249, 284
 Washio, Dr, 189-90
 Watanabe, General, 182
 Wellington, Duke of, 28
 Willoughby, Major-General, 181
 Wilopo, 467-8, 471
 Wilson, President, 4, 16, 50-1, 89,
 499
 Wint, Guy, 502
 Wu Pei-Fu, 71, 162
 Wu Tse, 246

 Yakub Beg, 258
 Yamakawa Hitoshi, 171-2, 174-5
 Yamamoto Masami, 179
 Yang Tsen-Hsin, General, 258-9
 Yeh Ting, 155, 160, 247
 Yoshida Shigeru, 396
 Yoshida Shoin, 35, 41
 Yoshihara Taro, 83
 Young, Morgan, 85
 Yuan Shih-Kai, 19, 32-4
 Yudin, Pavel, 236, 383

 Zhdanov, 332, 358-60, 362, 464,
 476
 Zhukov, 359, 473
 Zinoviev, 8, 59-60, 83, 122-3, 126,
 128, 134, 270, 274-5, 509, 515

लाल बहादुर शास्त्री राष्ट्रीय प्रशासन अकादमी, पुस्तकालय
Lal Bahadur Shastri National Academy of Administration Library

मुससूरी

MUSSOORIE

यह पुस्तक निम्नांकित तारीख तक वापिस करनी है ।

This book is to be returned on the date last stamped.

दिनांक Date	उधारकर्ता की संख्या Borrower's No.	दिनांक Date	उधारकर्ता की संख्या Borrower,s No.

GL 335.43
KEN



108448
LBSNAA

335.43
Ken

वर्ग संख्या

Class No.

लेखक

Author Kennedy, Malcolm D

शीर्षक

Title A short history of Communism

अवाप्ति संख्या 106448

Acc No. 6472

पुस्तक संख्या

Book No.

335.43

Ken

LIBRARY

LAL BAHADUR SHASTRI

National Academy of Administration

MUSSOORIE

Accession No.

106448

1. Books are issued for 15 days only but may have to be recalled earlier if urgently required.
2. An over-due charge of 25 Paise per day per volume will be charged.
3. Books may be renewed on request, at the discretion of the Librarian.
4. Periodicals, Rare and Reference books may not be issued and may be consulted only in the Library.
5. Books lost, defaced or injured in any way shall have to be replaced or its double price shall be paid by the

CHAPTER IX

Russian Internationalism and Leadership

UNTIL the coming of Communism, revolutionary wars had been primarily national in character. Even the French Revolution itself had been essentially national in content, though it spread its infection across national boundaries and served to introduce and popularize the view of revolution as a 'phenomenon which defied conventional political frontiers'.¹ It was the Communist Manifesto of 1848, with its call to the workers of all countries to unite and its insistence on allegiance to class taking precedence over loyalty to nation, that first introduced the idea of international revolution in the broadest sense. The year of its publication saw a series of revolutions spreading across Europe from country to country like a contagious disease; but there was no centralized body to direct and control these outbreaks. One by one, therefore, they were suppressed and peace and order were restored.

It was in 1864 that an international organization largely revolutionary in character first came into being.² This was the International Federation of Working Men, better known as the First International, which was formed in London after preliminary meetings between British trade unionists and representatives of various European workers and revolutionaries. Marx himself drew up its statutes and, in the inaugural address, incorporated the phrase 'Workers of all Lands, Unite!' from the Communist Manifesto of 1848. The com-

¹ In May 1790, when the French Revolution was still in its early days, the National Assembly had declared that 'the French nation will refuse to undertake any war of conquest'. Two-and-a-half years later, however, the Convention published a decree—in November 1792—promising 'brotherly assistance' to any people wishing to regain its freedom [1].

² This statement should perhaps be modified, as the short-lived Communist League, for whose sake Marx drafted the Communist Manifesto, was international in character.

position of this new body, however, was extremely heterogeneous, ranging from moderate socialists, who aimed merely at ameliorating working conditions throughout the world by strengthening the trade unions and securing reforms, to anarchists and revolutionaries of varying degrees. It was found almost impossible, therefore, to obtain agreement on any positive policy and the successive congresses held produced little more than colourless resolutions on political and economic matters. It struggled on, however, in an ineffectual way for some years; but the Paris Commune of 1871, in which a number of the leaders of the International played a prominent part, dealt it a serious blow, as the more moderate elements were horrified by the excesses perpetrated by the French insurgents and hurriedly withdrew from the International. A second blow was suffered the following year when Marx, in order to prevent the organization falling into the hands of its anarchist elements under Bakunin, had its headquarters transferred to the United States. There, being virtually cut off from the European labour movement, the First International quickly declined and was finally dissolved in 1876.

The year 1872, which saw the transfer of the headquarters of the First International to America, saw also the publication of a Russian translation of Marx's *Das Kapital*. Marx himself may have had an inkling of the dynamic effect that this seemingly innocuous development was to have in the years ahead, as he had always feared and distrusted the Russians. Not even he, however, could have foreseen the violent repercussions that it was to have throughout the world, with Moscow standing forth as the leader of World Revolution and, later under Stalin, confronting the world also with the dangers of renewed Greater Russian chauvinism, dangers against which Marx himself had frequently uttered warnings. Another twenty-six years were to pass, however, before the Russian Social Democratic Labour Party, which later gave birth to the Russian Communist Party, was formed; but by 1883 a group with a Marxist programme had been set up in Russia, and it was under Plekhanov, the leader of this group, that the transition from Narodnyism, which looked to the peasantry as the coming revolutionary force in Russia, to Marxism, with its emphasis on the proletariat as the leader of the eventual revolution, was accomplished.

While Marxism was thus beginning to take root in Russia, the question of reviving the International was being considered by certain socialist elements in Western Europe. Marx himself was opposed to

the idea, but eventually on 14th July 1889, the centenary of the capture of the Bastille, the Second International was brought into being.¹ Although it adopted the basic Marxist principles of class struggle, international unity, proletarian action and the socialization of the means of production, it included non-Marxists as well as Marxists amongst its members and was a far more moderate body than its predecessor had been. Later, as a result of a resolution condemning militarism, which was carried unanimously at its Congress in Paris in 1900, the International took on a pacifist role and socialist members of parliament in all countries were committed to vote against budgets 'for military or naval purposes or for colonial expeditions'. When war came in 1914, however, national loyalties and sentiment proved stronger than international unity for most of its members, and the Second International in consequence suffered a blow from which it never recovered, though it lingered on in an emasculated form until 1923.

By that time, the Third International—better known as the Comintern or Communist International—which had been established in Moscow in March 1919, was already actively engaged in carrying out plans for World Revolution. This was a very different body from its predecessors—a dynamic body based on revolutionary zeal and rigid discipline and sternly opposed to 'reformism'.² Moreover, a key factor in the policy of the new organization was anti-imperialism, with special emphasis on Asia and colonial 'liberation' which, except for the lip service paid to the principle of self-determination, had played little or no part in the two previous Internationals.

It was the lack of a revolutionary spirit, of discipline and of solidarity, and the readiness to compromise and seek reforms by constitutional means which, particularly from the Communist point of view, had made the Second International so ineffectual. The founders of the Comintern had therefore seen to it that none of these weaknesses would be tolerated in the new International.³ As, however, these founders were mainly Russians and as the Comintern

¹ It was at the inaugural meeting of this body that May Day was set aside for annual celebration thereafter to mark the anniversary of the outbreak of the French Revolution.

² A term used contemptuously by Communists to denote readiness to seek and be satisfied with reforms within the framework of the existing social order instead of striving to overturn that order by revolutionary means.

³ The Second International was denounced by Lenin in March 1921 as a 'handmaiden to the bourgeoisie'.

itself became, at an early stage in its existence, the instrument of Soviet Russia, it is necessary at this point to turn back some thirty years in order to outline briefly the developments which, since the closing years of the last century, had brought Russia to a position of leadership in the movement for World Revolution and had split the international labour movement into Marxists and Social Democrats.

The first Russian group with a Marxist programme had been formed in 1883, with Plekhanov as its leader. Several similar groups were established in the years that followed, and in 1895 some of these were amalgamated into a 'League for the Emancipation of the Working Class' by Lenin, who had made his first appearance in the political field two years previously. Lenin himself was arrested soon afterwards and was sent to Siberia, but during his absence other leagues of a like nature were formed and in 1898 representatives of nine of these bodies met at Minsk and issued a manifesto announcing the formation of a Russian Social Democratic Labour Party (RSDLP). The announcement, however, was somewhat misleading, as it was not until 1903, when this new body held its Second Congress, that it emerged as a real party with rules and a programme and a properly constituted Central Committee, the organization having been without such a committee since the publication of the original announcement, when all its members had been promptly arrested.

The intervening period had been marked by bitter controversy among the various groups whose representatives had met at Minsk in 1898, and the Second Congress brought these dissensions to a head. As a result the Party split into Bolsheviks and Mensheviks, the former insisting that membership be restricted to a small *élite* body of trained revolutionaries under strict discipline with a revolutionary theory to guide them, while the latter favoured a far wider membership, which would include sympathizers as well as active revolutionaries. Bolsheviks and Mensheviks, nevertheless, continued to work together in the Party until 1912, when the Mensheviks, whom Plekhanov had joined in 1904, were expelled and the name of the Party was changed to RSDLP(B), the (B) standing for Bolshevik. But before this occurred, developments, which were to have far-reaching effects in the years ahead, had taken place in Russia.

New Year's Day 1905 had been marked by the appearance of an article by Stalin, stressing the importance of organization, discipline and unity in the Party. Eight days later, workers marching through

the streets of St Petersburg with a petition for presentation to the Czar were fired on by the police and revolution was precipitated. The action of the police in firing on unarmed workers marching in peaceful and orderly procession was a piece of rank folly, as it angered the moderates and played into the hands of the extremists. In the years ahead such incidents were to be deliberately provoked by the Communists and exploited for revolutionary purposes [2].

The wave of strikes which followed the massacre of 'Bloody Sunday', as it was called, and the outbreak of a mutiny on board the battleship *Potemkin* in June the same year, led the Russian authorities to realize the need for reforms to stem the rot that was setting in. Various reforms were therefore promised and, as these included the creation of a parliament and the grant of a constitution, the workers set up soviets, i.e. councils, in St Petersburg and Moscow, not with a view to seizing power but in order to prepare for a constituent assembly. Within a few years the term 'Soviet' was to become a household word throughout the world; but in October 1905, when the first Workers' Soviet was formed, there can have been few persons even in Russia who realized the significance with which the term was to become imbued.

The year 1905 closed with a clash between Moscow workers, who had started an armed rising, and a regiment sent from St Petersburg to suppress them after the troops garrisoned in Moscow had shown themselves to be unreliable. The outbreak was quickly crushed and, although large-scale strikes and other manifestations of unrest continued until 1907, reforms which were put into effect served to stave off further serious developments for the time being.

Towards the end of his life, Lenin, who had played a leading part in this abortive revolution and had escaped abroad in December 1907, was to describe the events of 1905 as 'the dress rehearsal' for the victory of the Bolshevik Revolution of October 1917, and to declare that, without it, the victory of 1917 would have been impossible [3]. In this he was undoubtedly correct, as the abortive 1905 revolution paved the way for the Communist success of twelve years later and, in its failure, taught valuable lessons which were taken to heart by the revolutionary leaders. Not only had it shown that a spontaneous rising of the masses without any directives from above was doomed to failure. It had also served to confirm Lenin's assertion that an armed insurrection must be planned and offensive, not spontaneous and defensive; and it had shown, too, that a peasant rising

against the Czar and not merely against the landlords was required in order to ensure real success. The fact that the peasantry, who had joined in the revolution of 1905 for a time, and the liberals, who had sympathized with it, had been mollified by the reforms granted, served to make opposition to 'reformism' a fundamental principle of the Communist doctrine in the years ahead. To end a dispute by accepting conciliation or compromise became one of the seven deadly sins never to be tolerated.

While the revolution of 1905 had been purely national, Lenin and other revolutionaries were quick to see that the lessons derived from its failure could be applied to international revolution as well. It was dissatisfaction with the war with Japan that had created the revolutionary situation of 1905 in Russia. It seemed clear, therefore, that similar revolutionary situations could be created in other countries which might become engaged in war. Should such situations arise, however, it was necessary to prepare beforehand so as to ensure that they were properly planned and exploited to the full. Accordingly, at the Stuttgart Congress of the Second International in 1907 Lenin, backed by Martov and Rosa Luxemburg,¹ persuaded the members of that body to agree to a motion binding them, in the event of war, to utilize the resulting economic and political crisis to hasten the overthrow of the whole capitalist system. Five years later, in 1912, this resolution was endorsed by the Second International at its Congress in Basle.

It was Rosa Luxemburg who had initiated the motion at the Paris Congress in 1900 condemning militarism, as she had foreseen then the likelihood of a European war before many years had passed. Others in the Second International had not been so far-sighted and, while supporting the motion, had apparently not fully realized either its significance or the implication of its commitments. By 1907, however, when the Stuttgart Congress was held, war in Europe had become more than a theoretical possibility and the pledge to vote against war budgets was beginning to cause some embarrassment. The pledge, however, was renewed after some hesitation on the part of the German delegates, and was further reinforced by the Russian delegation's motion mentioned above. Thereby the members of the International bound themselves not only to employ every means at

¹ Although Rosa Luxemburg was born in Poland of Jewish parents and was to be one of the founders of the German Communist Party, she attended this Congress as a member of the Russian delegation.

their disposal to prevent war but, if war came despite their efforts to prevent it, to exploit the situation caused by the war in such a way as to put an end to the capitalist order.

It was a drastic resolution; but it failed in its purpose when, with the outbreak of war in 1914, national sentiment and loyalty to country proved stronger than international class unity for most of those who had endorsed it. Apart from a handful of Germans, who were to lead the revolution which broke out in their own country in the closing days of that war, it was only in backward Russia that the social democratic movement showed itself to be largely impervious to the call of loyalty to a national government. The reason for this is clear. In Russia the workers enjoyed few privileges and had little to hold their allegiance to their own country. In the more advanced countries of Western Europe, on the other hand, they had a relatively high standard of living and a recognized place in the national polity. Loyalty to country, therefore, had a stronger pull than loyalty to class. Thus it came about that in 1917 Lenin was able to use the war as a means to social revolution in Russia in accordance with the resolution passed at Stuttgart ten years previously. Russia thereby became the acknowledged leader of world revolution, with Moscow as the Mecca towards which the eyes of the faithful turned for guidance. Thirty odd years later a somewhat similar phenomenon was to be witnessed in the Far East when China, having been brought under Communist control, became the model and mentor for Communists in all other countries of South and East Asia, with Peking second only to Moscow as the guiding star in the Marxist firmament.

Russia, by her successful revolution, attained the leadership of the movement under the Marxist banner; but how it was that Moscow became the Headquarters of the Comintern on its formation in March 1919 and continued to be so throughout the existence of that body is worth recalling, as it explains much that might otherwise appear unaccountable.

The seed from which this development sprang is to be found in the decision of the German Social Democratic Party on 4th August 1914 to vote for war credits, a decision which struck a staggering blow at the Second International and its basic principle of 'Workers of the World, unite!' To many it seemed to shatter for ever the idea of the solidarity of international socialists; but to the Russian revolutionary leaders it had no such implication. Two months later,

writing entirely independently of one another, Lenin and Trotsky published articles declaring that, as the Second International was dead, it was necessary to create a Third International.¹ From then on until the Bolshevik Revolution three years later, Lenin hammered away at this theme; but with the start of the peace negotiations at Brest Litovsk at the close of 1917, the immediate and overriding need for the new rulers of Russia became peace rather than World Revolution. For a time, therefore, the idea of a Third International faded into the background, where it remained until revived by the collapse of Germany in November 1918 and by the appearance of symptoms indicating that revolution in Central Europe was imminent.

The final impetus to the transformation of this concept into an accomplished fact was given by the announcement of the socialist parties of Western Europe that they proposed to meet in Berne early in 1919 to consider the question of reviving the Second International. Learning of this announcement, Lenin decided to carry out his own project first. Together, therefore, with Trotsky and others, he issued an appeal on 24th January 1919 for the formation of a Communist International aiming at 'the dictatorship of the working class (and in some places also the rural semi-proletariat, i.e. the poor peasants)', with 'mass action by the proletariat right up to open armed conflict with the political power of capital' as the 'basic method of struggle' [4]. Two months later the Comintern was accordingly brought into being.

Although Lenin succeeded thereby in translating his dream into a reality, it was only after overcoming strong opposition from the German Communists that he did so. The German Communist Party, which had been founded on the last day of 1918, realized all too well that the revolution in Germany was still immature and that the Communists in other countries were still too weak. The Germans foresaw, therefore, that as it was only in Russia that success in seizing power by revolution had been achieved, Russian influence and prestige in such an International would be overwhelming. The German delegate to the founding congress held at Moscow in March 1919 argued accordingly that the creation of the proposed new

¹ It was not until nearly a year later that the movement leading to the actual formation of the Third International was properly launched. This was at a meeting held in Zimmerwald on 5th September 1915. See Deutscher's *The Prophet Armed*, p. 225.

International was premature; but his objections were overruled after speeches by other delegates, who enthusiastically depicted Central Europe as seething with revolution and declared that the opportunity for setting up a Communist International to guide, lead and co-ordinate the movement for World Revolution was too good to miss. That revolution was in the air at this time is undeniable, but it was not long before the wave of revolution began to recede. Thus it came about that, as the revolution failed to spread beyond Russia, the Comintern remained a partnership between a single victorious revolutionary party and a number of unsuccessful ones. Inevitably, therefore, the Comintern retained its Headquarters in Moscow, where Russian interests, outlook and resources were predominant and where it came increasingly to depend on Russian leadership, inspiration and methods of organization. From this it was but a short step to its developing into a mere adjunct of the Russian Communist Party and thus of the USSR. The fact, moreover, that the conclusions drawn from Lenin's thesis on imperialism became an all-important part of the programme of world Communism, as represented by the Comintern, served to consolidate Russian leadership still further. While, therefore, Russia nominally held no more than a position of equality with the other members of the Comintern at the start, she very quickly came to assume the actual leadership of that body and before long turned it into the pliant instrument of her own national policy. To appreciate how this came about and, more particularly, how it came to be used for furthering Russian interests in Asia and thereby enabling Soviet Russia to continue the expansionist policy of Czarist Russia, a brief survey of the historical background to Russian expansion in the Orient is necessary.

CHAPTER X

Czarist and Soviet Imperialism in Asia

IT was in the opening years of the nineteenth century that Russia first began to show an interest in the Far East. Taking advantage of a slight relaxation of the seclusion policy to which Japan had been wedded for the previous 160 odd years, she dispatched an embassy in 1804 asking for trade privileges. The Japanese authorities, however, were suspicious of Russia's intentions and refused the request. Four years later, apprehensive of a possible attempt by the Russians to force their way in by aggressive means from the north, the Japanese sent a one-man expedition to Saghalien to find out who lived there and whether or no there was anything to be feared from that quarter. Mamiya Rinzo, the official dispatched on this voyage of discovery, having found that it was an island and not a peninsula jutting out from the neighbouring mainland as previously imagined and that its only inhabitants were a few Ainus, proceeded to claim it as belonging to the group of islands forming Japan. Half a century later, when the Russian envoy Putiatin arrived in Japan to demand a treaty similar to those which Britain and America had just concluded with that country, it was discovered that Saghalien was claimed by both Russia and Japan.

Thus began a dispute which bedevilled Russo-Japanese relations from that time onwards and resulted in the island's becoming something of a shuttlecock between the two disputants, to each of whom it was of strategic importance. Sometimes it was in Japanese hands and sometimes in Russian; sometimes the change in ownership was brought about by negotiation and sometimes by war. It was in 1875, in one of the changes brought about by negotiation, that Japan was induced to accept the Kuriles by way of compensation for allowing Russia to have the whole island, although the Kuriles, too, had been claimed by both. Russia was to obtain them for herself seventy years later as a result of the Yalta Agreement of 1945.

It was shortly after the original dispute over Saghalien in the 1850's that Russia's main expansion eastwards took shape. By the Treaty of Aigun in 1858 she compelled China to cede to her all territory to the left bank of the River Amur, thereby completing her hold on the whole vast territory north of the Amur to the Behring Straits. By the same treaty she also obtained joint control of the Maritime Province of Eastern Siberia, lying to the east of the River Ussuri and stretching down to the Korean border. Two years later, by a mixture of trickery and diplomacy, she secured full possession of this province under the terms of the Peking Treaty of 1860. As a result, she procured an outlet to the sea and was able, a year later, to found the port city of Vladivostok for the accommodation of her Pacific fleet. It was as the logical outcome of the establishment of this new naval base that the idea of linking it by rail with European Russia began to germinate, although a further thirty years were to pass before the construction of the Trans-Siberian Railway was actually started.

In the short space of the three years 1858-61, Russia had not only obtained a vast area of territory giving access to the Pacific and to the countries of the Far East; she had also begun to consolidate her hold on her newly-acquired possessions. Had it not been for Britain's action in protesting and sending a naval squadron to back up the protest by force if necessary, she would have been able to consolidate her position still further, for in 1861, with the ostensible purpose of securing freedom of navigation in the Korean Straits, Russian marines were landed on the small but strategically important island of Tsushima. There is little doubt that Russia's real intention was to annex it, as the Japanese at that time were in no position to prevent her doing so. Britain's clear readiness to eject her by force, however, sufficed to deter her from this further act of aggression.

Simultaneously with her advance eastwards to the Pacific, Russia was expanding her territory in Central Asia. Both drives were in part due to the same cause.

The first half of the nineteenth century had witnessed the early stages of Russia's advance in Asia in three directions—south through the Caucasus, south-east through the Kirghiz steppes and on towards India, and eastward through Siberia to the Pacific Ocean and China. The first of these three thrusts was already well under way when the nineteenth century opened, for Russia had looked to the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles as the means of egress into the Mediterranean

ever since Catherine the Great had secured the north coast of the Black Sea by driving out the Turks. Since 1768 a series of campaigns had been fought against the decadent Ottoman Empire in an attempt to reach the sea, but in 1854 the Russians received a severe check as a result of the Crimean War. They had thereupon turned their attention more seriously to the task of finding an outlet to the sea in the Pacific and to carrying out a more definite policy of expansion in Central Asia. A further impetus was given to this thrust to the east and south-east after British naval policy had, for a second time, deprived her of the fruits of victory following the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-8.

It was in 1804 that Russia had first begun seriously to threaten Persia, and it was the subsequent establishment of Russian rule in the Caucasus that provided her with the base for her advance into Central Asia and on to the borders of India. Her first step in this expansion south-eastwards had been to accept the transfer of the allegiance of Moslem princes from the Mongol to the Russian Empire and to take possession of the steppe lands of the nomads. By the 1860's the whole of what is now Kazakhstan was in Russian hands, together with the Yaxartes valley, Tashkent and Samarkand, former capital of Tamerlane. Thus far her advance into Central Asia had been mainly at the expense of nomads, but at this stage she came up against the Islamic states of Bokhara, Khiva and Kokand. Parts of the two former were annexed soon after, but the main portion of these two Khanates were allowed to retain nominal independence after swearing allegiance to Russia, Khiva's action in this respect being followed by an Anglo-Russian agreement binding Russia to refrain from interfering with the Afghan borders. It remained for Soviet Russia, half a century later, to put an end to the autonomous states of Bokhara and Khiva and absorb them into the USSR. Kokand, however, was incorporated into Russia in 1878 and became the province of Ferghana. Six years later, in 1884, the Turkoman tribes east of the Caspian were subjected to Russian rule and the Merv oasis was annexed; and in 1891 Russia occupied the Pamirs, the Pamir boundary question being finally settled by the Durand Agreement of 1893. By the close of the century, therefore, Western Turkestan, an area of over 400,000 square miles, had been added to the Czarist Empire and became known as Russian Turkestan accordingly.

In the meantime, Russia had been casting covetous eyes at the

neighbouring territory of Chinese Turkestan, which had been a Chinese dependency since the middle of the eighteenth century.¹ In 1871, taking advantage of a revolt by the native population against their Chinese overlords, she therefore occupied Ili and announced that she would remain there until the Chinese were in a position to take over control once more and administer it properly. When, however, the Chinese sought to get the Russians to carry out their promise to withdraw, difficulties were raised by Russia and war between the two countries seemed imminent. It was only after two Chinese missions had been sent to St Petersburg—the first having proved abortive—that a treaty was concluded in February 1881. Under its terms, the greater part of the territory in dispute was restored to China in return for the grant of special trading privileges to Russia, whose aim it was to incorporate Chinese Turkestan into its own sphere of influence. Half-a-century later, 'anti-imperialist' Soviet Russia was to be found using similar imperialist means to extend her influence and control in this same area.

Throughout the nineteenth century, Russian policy was aimed at obtaining ice-free commercial and naval outlets to the open seas. This was the objective of her war with Turkey, the development of Vladivostok and Port Arthur, and her aggressive policy towards Persia and Afghanistan. Her defeat by Japan in 1905, and the subsequent settlement of 1907 regarding spheres of interest in Manchuria, Mongolia and Sinkiang, served to ease the strain for a time in the Far East; and a similar settlement regarding spheres of interest in Persia, Afghanistan and Tibet was reached with Britain in August the same year and brought about a similar easing of the situation in Central Asia. This satisfactory state of affairs continued until the advent of the Soviet régime which, despite its violent tirades against imperialism, was not long in showing that it had inherited the traditional ambitions of its Czarist predecessors. The policy of expansion was resumed, but this time by the more insidious methods of propaganda in backward border countries.

Having now outlined the salient features of the Russian thrusts into Asia, south through the Caucasus and south-east towards India, it remains to consider the later stages of her advance eastward to the Pacific. The 1890's, which saw the greater part of the Pamirs allocated to Russia under treaty with Great Britain, saw also a further and

¹ It was not until 1882 that Chinese Turkestan was formally proclaimed a province of China under the name of Sinkiang, 'the New Dominion'.

CHAPTER X

Czarist and Soviet Imperialism in Asia

IT was in the opening years of the nineteenth century that Russia first began to show an interest in the Far East. Taking advantage of a slight relaxation of the seclusion policy to which Japan had been wedded for the previous 160 odd years, she dispatched an embassy in 1804 asking for trade privileges. The Japanese authorities, however, were suspicious of Russia's intentions and refused the request. Four years later, apprehensive of a possible attempt by the Russians to force their way in by aggressive means from the north, the Japanese sent a one-man expedition to Saghalien to find out who lived there and whether or no there was anything to be feared from that quarter. Mamiya Rinzo, the official dispatched on this voyage of discovery, having found that it was an island and not a peninsula jutting out from the neighbouring mainland as previously imagined and that its only inhabitants were a few Ainus, proceeded to claim it as belonging to the group of islands forming Japan. Half a century later, when the Russian envoy Putiatin arrived in Japan to demand a treaty similar to those which Britain and America had just concluded with that country, it was discovered that Saghalien was claimed by both Russia and Japan.

Thus began a dispute which bedevilled Russo-Japanese relations from that time onwards and resulted in the island's becoming something of a shuttlecock between the two disputants, to each of whom it was of strategic importance. Sometimes it was in Japanese hands and sometimes in Russian; sometimes the change in ownership was brought about by negotiation and sometimes by war. It was in 1875, in one of the changes brought about by negotiation, that Japan was induced to accept the Kuriles by way of compensation for allowing Russia to have the whole island, although the Kuriles, too, had been claimed by both. Russia was to obtain them for herself seventy years later as a result of the Yalta Agreement of 1945.

to any further Russian expansion in that region for the next forty years. The immediate cause of this war of 1904 was the failure of the Japanese attempt to reach an amicable understanding with Russia by peaceful means with a view to checking the rapidly growing menace from Manchuria and the Korean border regions, which were also coming under Russian influence. Under the terms of the Portsmouth Treaty which followed, Japan recovered Port Arthur and the Liaotung Peninsula and took over Russia's railway rights in South Manchuria. The southern half of Saghalien, which Russia had induced her to cede in 1875, was also restored to Japan.

Russia's defeat and the readiness of her government to agree to these peace-terms were in no small part due to the internal stress caused by the revolutionary outbreaks in St Petersburg and elsewhere [1]. The revolutionaries, for their part, had been opposed to the war and showed no regret whatsoever at having helped to bring about the discomfiture of their own country. Loss of territory meant nothing to them and, in fact, one of their first actions on coming into power twelve years later was to offer to return to China all the remaining Russian rights and interests in that country. This magnanimous gesture, it is true, concealed ulterior motives; but ostensibly it indicated that the newly established Soviet régime was prepared to live up to its declared principle of anti-imperialism.

This particular aspect of revolutionary zeal was not to last long, and before many years had passed Soviet Russia had reverted to the traditional expansionist policy of the Czars, spurred on by a similar mystical belief in its own mission. The Soviet stipulation at Yalta in February 1945 that, as the price of her entry into the war against Japan, 'the former rights of Russia violated by the treacherous attack of Japan in 1904 shall be restored', serves as a measure of the change that had taken place in the intervening years. Not content at Yalta with recovering the imperialist rights and interests lost by the Czarist Government as a result of Russia's defeat in 1905, Moscow insisted also that the Kuriles, which had nothing whatsoever to do with that defeat, be handed over to her. That Moscow, the self-proclaimed world leader of anti-imperialism, is now more imperialist than Czarist Russia or any other imperialist country ever was, is generally recognized throughout the free world: but a more glaring proof of this than that provided by her demands at Yalta would be hard to find. It may be noted that both the original offer, in 1917, to

significant stage in the strengthening of her grip on the Far East. The construction of the Trans-Siberian Railway, which was to enable her to open up and develop her recently acquired possessions in the Far East and provide a direct link with her far-distant naval base at Vladivostok, was started in 1891. Four years later, in July 1895, she played the leading part in an action which, soon after, was to secure for her the important strategic base of Port Arthur and the virtual control of Manchuria. This fortress, and the Liaotung Peninsula on which it stood, had been ceded to Japan in April that year, under the terms of the Shimonoseki Treaty, as part of the fruits of her recent victory over China. Russia, however, in conjunction with Germany and France, carried out the Triple Intervention and, on professedly altruistic grounds, forced Japan to restore this territory to the Chinese. The hypocrisy of these three powers, and of Russia in particular, was nevertheless soon made evident, as each of them proceeded to acquire bases for themselves in China three years later, the base acquired by Russia being none other than Port Arthur, which she had induced Japan to retrocede to the Chinese.

This was not the only extension of Russia's grip on the Far East at this time. In 1896 she obtained from China the right to construct and control a railway across North Manchuria, linking with Vladivostok to the east and with the main Trans-Siberian railway to the west and having a branch from Harbin southward to Port Arthur. Having secured and exercised this right, she was enabled to consolidate her position still further when, two years later, she acquired the lease of Port Arthur and the Liaotung Peninsula. But the extension and strengthening of her holdings in the Far East did not end here, for the Boxer rebellion, which broke out in 1900, provided a useful pretext for her to pour troops into Manchuria and to retain them there in breach of agreement. Thus, as the late Sir Reginald Johnston recalled in his *Twilight in the Forbidden City*, British merchants and missionaries living there at the time came to regard Manchuria as 'Russian in all but name'.

The threat to Japan provided by this Russian expansion on the neighbouring mainland of East Asia, and the threat to India by similar encroachments close to her border, led to the conclusion of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance in January 1902. When, two years later, Japan and Russia came to blows, this alliance served to hold the ring. By ensuring that no other country went to Russia's assistance, it enabled Japan to defeat her powerful opponent and to put a stop

to any further Russian expansion in that region for the next forty years. The immediate cause of this war of 1904 was the failure of the Japanese attempt to reach an amicable understanding with Russia by peaceful means with a view to checking the rapidly growing menace from Manchuria and the Korean border regions, which were also coming under Russian influence. Under the terms of the Portsmouth Treaty which followed, Japan recovered Port Arthur and the Liaotung Peninsula and took over Russia's railway rights in South Manchuria. The southern half of Saghalien, which Russia had induced her to cede in 1875, was also restored to Japan.

Russia's defeat and the readiness of her government to agree to these peace-terms were in no small part due to the internal stress caused by the revolutionary outbreaks in St Petersburg and elsewhere [1]. The revolutionaries, for their part, had been opposed to the war and showed no regret whatsoever at having helped to bring about the discomfiture of their own country. Loss of territory meant nothing to them and, in fact, one of their first actions on coming into power twelve years later was to offer to return to China all the remaining Russian rights and interests in that country. This magnanimous gesture, it is true, concealed ulterior motives; but ostensibly it indicated that the newly established Soviet régime was prepared to live up to its declared principle of anti-imperialism.

This particular aspect of revolutionary zeal was not to last long, and before many years had passed Soviet Russia had reverted to the traditional expansionist policy of the Czars, spurred on by a similar mystical belief in its own mission. The Soviet stipulation at Yalta in February 1945 that, as the price of her entry into the war against Japan, 'the former rights of Russia violated by the treacherous attack of Japan in 1904 shall be restored', serves as a measure of the change that had taken place in the intervening years. Not content at Yalta with recovering the imperialist rights and interests lost by the Czarist Government as a result of Russia's defeat in 1905, Moscow insisted also that the Kuriles, which had nothing whatsoever to do with that defeat, be handed over to her. That Moscow, the self-proclaimed world leader of anti-imperialism, is now more imperialist than Czarist Russia or any other imperialist country ever was, is generally recognized throughout the free world: but a more glaring proof of this than that provided by her demands at Yalta would be hard to find. It may be noted that both the original offer, in 1917, to

return to China all the remaining Russian rights and interests in that country and the original proposal, in 1943, to enter the war against Japan on the side of the Allies, were made unconditionally. In both instances, however, Moscow imposed strongly imperialist stipulations when it came to the point of carrying these offers into effect.

Although it was not until 1945 that the rights and privileges in South Manchuria lost by Czarist Russia forty years previously were recovered by Soviet Russia, agreements reached in 1907 had ensured that Japan should recognize North Manchuria, Sinkiang and Outer Mongolia as Russia's sphere of influence in return for Russian recognition of South Manchuria as Japan's sphere. This amicable arrangement continued until the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917. In the meantime, however, developments of close concern to Manchuria had been taking place in Outer Mongolia which, following the Chinese Revolution of 1911, had declared its independence of China and dispatched an expedition to Inner Mongolia with a view to helping on the cause of Mongolian unity and independence. The Chinese were defeated in every encounter; but they managed to prevail upon the Outer Mongolian forces to withdraw, while the Barga Mongols, who dwelt in North-West Manchuria and had likewise taken the opportunity afforded by the Chinese revolution to secede from China, were persuaded by the Russians, for reasons of their own, to return to the Chinese fold on promise of a satisfactory measure of autonomy.

In the years that followed, the local Chinese authorities had to deal with a number of other Mongol risings in Manchuria and in the autumn of 1919, on the pretext of saving the Mongols from the spread of Bolshevik disorders in Siberia, the Chinese general Hsu Shu-Tseng invaded Outer Mongolia. By means of a coup, which he carried out on arrival at Urga, he compelled the Mongols to renounce the autonomous rights which they had won for themselves less than a decade before. Hsu's success, however, proved a pyrrhic victory, for in October 1920 the anti-Bolshevik leader, Baron Ungern-Sternberg, invaded Outer Mongolia with a mixed force of White Russians, Mongols and Tibetans and, having slaughtered most of the local Chinese troops, proceeded to set up a new independent government of Outer Mongolia in February 1921.

This success was even more short-lived, for the brutality of the 'Mad Baron' and his men brought about a revulsion of feeling, which

Soviet Russia quickly turned to her own advantage. With the help of Soviet forces, the newly established government was overthrown and a revolutionary government, supported by Soviet Russia, came into power. How Moscow, through a clause in the Yalta Agreement twenty-five years later, eventually manoeuvred China into according independence to Outer Mongolia, will be shown later. Here it must suffice to note that from July 1921 onwards Outer Mongolia had been a virtual Soviet satellite; that Tannu-Tuva, which broke away from Outer Mongolia in 1922, joined the USSR as an autonomous state in 1944; and that, in the methods used for penetrating Outer Mongolia and the technique applied, the Soviet government initiated its policy of using territorial expansion as an instrument for spreading social revolution.

When the revolution broke out in Russia in 1917, there was no immediate change in Turkestan or in the two vassal states of Khiva and Bokhara. Soviet agents, however, soon began to make their appearance in these two Khanates and in 1920, following the overthrow of their native rulers, they were proclaimed republics. Nominally independent republics they remained until 1925, when they were dissolved and absorbed into the Soviet Union as part of the administrative reorganization involved in the transformation of Russian Turkestan that same year into the five Central Asian republics of Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Tadzhikistan and Kirghizia. Of the way in which these nominally autonomous republics were controlled almost wholly by Russians and of how, in the 1930's, the Soviet government resorted to ruthless persecution of the native Moslem leaders with a view to suppressing local patriotism and to secularizing the five republics by suppressing the Moslem faith, no more need be said here. The incorporation of Khiva and Bokhara into the USSR and the forcible breaking of all links between the five republics and the free world, however, provide yet another example of Soviet technique and of Soviet Russian imperialism.

With regard to Sinkiang, Czarist Russia's ambitions towards this Chinese territory, which had received a check by the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-5 and a further setback by the outbreak of the 1914-18 world war, were revived by Soviet Russia after her recognition by China in 1924. With the reopening of Russian consulates in Sinkiang, which followed this action, the economic domination of that territory by Russia made rapid progress. By the 1930's civil and military key posts were in the hands of Soviet advisers, Soviet schools and

committees were established, and the province had become largely sovietized.

What emerges clearly from this brief excursion into Russian history is that, fundamentally, Russian characteristics and policy remain unchanged. Soviet aims and ambitions are virtually identical with those of the Czarists. The one significant difference is that those who now seek to fulfil Russia's imperial destiny are more ruthless and more powerful than their predecessors and have harnessed the dynamic forces of World Revolution to the chariot of Russian expansionism. The mystical belief in Russia's mission remains as firm as ever and the self-assertiveness, arrogance and intrigue, which characterized Czarist actions after the Napoleonic Wars [2], are equally conspicuous features of the Soviet régime. While Moscow affects an internationalist pose, her internationalism is merely Russian nationalism in a new guise and means nothing more nor less than whatever contributes to Soviet national interests.

In his work on the Third International Borkenau asserts that the Russian leaders of the Comintern showed that they were Russian nationalists who regarded other Communist parties as auxiliaries to their cause [3]. This is undoubtedly true and was well exemplified, for example, at the Sixth Congress of the Comintern in 1928 in a resolution, which declared in effect that the defence of the Soviet Union was the foremost task of the Comintern and of Communist parties all over the world. That this, in spite of the dissolution of the Comintern in 1943, still holds good was shown in an article in the Cominform journal of 1st December 1948, which declared: 'The attitude towards the Soviet Union is now the test of devotion to the cause of proletarian internationalism.' Although the Cominform, which only came into existence in the autumn of 1947, is very different in nature and composition from the Comintern, it is, as was its predecessor after Stalin's nominees had assumed control of its apparatus in 1929, exclusively the instrument and mouthpiece of the Russian state.¹ Although the subservience of all Communist parties to Russia is beyond dispute, the actual control exercised by Moscow is carefully camouflaged today behind a screen of Communist 'front' organizations, by international organs such as the Cominform journal, by the practice of one Communist party tendering fraternal advice to another on Russia's behalf, and by other devious means.

¹ Since this was written, the Cominform has been dissolved; but the Communist front organizations remain and serve the same purpose.

By this subservience, Moscow is provided with an instrument of incalculable value for carrying out whatever policy seems best suited at any time to serve Russia's ends.

Soviet policy, as Deutscher has observed [4], is marked by a strange interplay of Russian imperialist tradition and revolution, the traditionalist strand being often 'so much to the fore that Stalin's conduct, aspirations, methods of action, even his gestures and caprices, vividly resembled the behaviour, the aspirations and gestures of Alexander I at the conclusion of the Napoleonic wars'. In saying this, Deutscher was referring more specifically to the closing phase of the Second World War; but this traditionalist strand was evident in Soviet policy even in its early stages and was aptly summed up by Ruth Fischer when, referring to the 1920's, she remarked: 'Stalin transformed the internationalism of 1917 into socialism in one country, into Russian national socialism, which . . . was a bold and far-reaching assertion of Russian nationalism, the extension of every aspiration of imperial Russia' [5].

Deutscher's observation on the interplay of tradition and revolution has been succinctly reaffirmed by the authors of *Defence in the Cold War* [6] in a single sentence: 'The traditional Russian desire to expand and the Communist policy of world revolution have become intertwined.' The Soviet interest in Asia was described by the author of an article in the February 1948 issue of *Eastern World* [7], as 'a synthesis of the old Russian expansionist drive into Asia and the Communist belief that colonial and semi-colonial countries are the weak and vulnerable link of the capitalist world'.

Two other ways in which Soviet Russia has carried on the traditions of the Czars merit attention, for each has played a vitally important and thoroughly pernicious part in the campaign for World Revolution and has had a profound effect on its development. These are the attitude towards the colour question and the employment of secret police.

Although the Czarists were capable of inhumanity and ruthlessness at times towards their Asiatic subjects, they showed themselves singularly free from the colour prejudices so prevalent among most Western powers with Asiatic possessions and they treated Asiatics and other coloured peoples as equals. This in itself was a characteristic calling for praise rather than censure; but Soviet Russia, while carrying on the Czarist tradition in this respect, prostituted it in the cause of World Revolution. For the express purpose of winning

Asiatic friendship and confidence and stirring up Asiatic nationalism and hatred against the West, she has exploited her own readiness to treat all coloured peoples as equals by posing as their champion against the Western world. The effect of this pose has been tremendous. The hypocrisy behind the claim to accord equality to all, however, became apparent in the summer of 1950 when Stalin laid down the doctrine of the superiority of the Great Russians to all the other nationalities of the USSR. That the belief in Moscow's claim to treat all as equals should continue after such an exposure of its falsity is a striking commentary on George Orwell's satirical phrase, 'All animals are equal, but some are more equal than others' [8].

What Soviet exploitation of the colour question has achieved in stirring up Asiatic nationalism against the West, Moscow's utilization of the Czarist system of secret police has done for regimenting the masses and controlling or exterminating those who might endanger the Communist cause. When the Bolsheviks seized power in 1917, one of their first actions was to suppress the *Ochrana*, the security police established in 1881 for the purpose of dealing with revolutionary activities. In its place they created a similar organ, the *Cheka* or All-Russian Extraordinary Commission, 'to combat counter-revolution and sabotage', and placed the ruthless Dzerzhinsky at its head [9]. The reign of terror instituted by this body, however, caused such an outcry abroad that in February 1922, when the Soviet government was trying to negotiate a loan with the United States, it was found expedient to abolish it. But its abolition was purely nominal, for it soon became evident that the GPU (State Political Directorate), which replaced it as a branch of the NKVD (Commissariat of the Interior), was simply the *Cheka* under a new name.

On the birth of the USSR on 1st January the following year, each member state was given its own NKVD and GPU, and the notorious OGPU (United State Political Directorate) was created to serve as Headquarters for them all. For eleven years this instrument of terrorization and tyranny remained in being; but, just as in 1922 the *Cheka* had been renamed for the purpose of deluding the outside world into believing that matters had been remedied, so in 1934, with a view to preparing the way for Russia's entry into the League of Nations, the OGPU was abolished. Again, however, this involved no more than a change of name and the reorganization of the system. The Directorate of State Security, which took its place, was no less

efficient and no less ruthless and, like its predecessors, was to undergo subsequent changes in organization and nomenclature.

The effect of all these changes has been two-fold. Not only has the Soviet taken over the dreaded Czarist secret police system; it has also enlarged and developed it to such an extent that, from being a relatively small organization and minor instrument of State policy, it has now become a vast and all-powerful body, controlling the life and action of every one of Russia's 200 million population with ruthless severity and wielding the power of life and death.

The example set by Soviet Russia in this respect has been followed by all other countries under Communist control; for only by wielding the autocratic powers of a police state and terrorizing the people into compliance with their wishes are the Communist leaders able to ensure the complete suppression of any opposition or counter-revolutionary activities. This is as true of China, Outer Mongolia, Northern Korea and Northern Vietnam—so far the only Asiatic countries wholly under Communist rule—as it is of Russia's European satellites. It is, in short, the pattern of Communist domination. In its zeal to prevent counter-revolution in the Communist state, the Russian secret police has been prepared at times even to co-operate with the secret police of a strongly anti-Communist country such as Nazi Germany. Ruth Fischer asserted in her *Stalin and German Communism* that the acquittal of Dimitrov in the Reichstag fire trial was the outcome of a secret agreement between the OGPU and the Gestapo [10]. There were, too, occasions described by Jan Valtin in his *Out of the Night*, when the OGPU arranged for the Gestapo to arrest certain Communists, while readers of Margarete Buber's *Under Two Dictators* will recall how, in 1941, she and twenty-five other Communists were handed over to the tender mercies of the Gestapo by the Directorate of State Security, the successors of the OGPU.

CHAPTER XI

The Development of Asia as a Key Factor

THE First and Second Internationals had concerned themselves solely with Europe and it was not until the appearance of Lenin's famous thesis on imperialism in 1916 that the possibility of using Asia as a key factor in the cause of World Revolution came to be recognized. Little consideration had previously been given to the feasibility of stirring up and exploiting the grievances of Asiatic subject races as a means to this end, but Marx himself had taken an intelligent, albeit a somewhat dyspeptic interest in developments in China and India. He had noted in the Communist Manifesto of 1848 that the bourgeoisie had made the East dependent on the West. Two years later, as observed by Manuilsky, he had foreseen 'the imperialist march on Asia and the role that China, "the stronghold of conservatism", would play in the ripening world proletarian revolution' [1].

This is perhaps crediting him with rather more prescience than he had; but it is true, nevertheless, that in the 1850's he contributed a number of articles on China to American papers, nearly twenty such articles being written by him and one by Engels during the so-called Second Opium War. In one of these, after comparing the national sentiment of the Chinese masses in that war with the lack of it in the war of 1840-42, he predicted the near approach of 'the death-hour of Old China' and, with it, 'the opening day of a new era for all Asia' [2]. In another, written in 1853, he posed the question, 'Can mankind fulfil its destiny without a fundamental revolution in the social state of Asia?', and by 1858, as reflected in a letter to Engels, he had begun to think about the relation between East and West in connection with world markets in terms of revolution. Further than this he does not appear to have gone, and it was not until 1916 that 'the epoch of imperialism was first analysed scientifically' by Lenin [3].

It was not, however, only on China that Marx wrote at this period. He noted also with interest the current developments in India—including the Indian Mutiny—in Persia and elsewhere; and in an article on India in the *New York Daily Tribune* he predicted that British rule would destroy the isolation of the Indian village and bring the villager out of his lethargy into the forefront of India's life [4]. British teaching, which included the doctrine of 'divine discontent', was, in conjunction with Gandhi, to bring about the fulfilment of this prediction to a large extent.

Marx's three final articles on China were written in 1860, but none of them was published. From then on until the end of the century, Asia figured but little in the calculations of the exponents of World Revolution. It required the outbreak of the Boxer rebellion in China in 1900 to revive their interest. By that time Marx had been dead seventeen years and his mantle had fallen on Russian shoulders.

Lenin's article of 14th December that year, linking Western capitalism and colonial exploitation and denouncing 'the European capitalists and the European governments which are obedient to the capitalists' for plundering and making war on China, has been discussed earlier [5]. Two years later was published Hobson's *Imperialism*, which, together with Hilferding's *Finance Capital*, was to form the basis of Lenin's thesis in 1916, while the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War in 1904 was to provide one of the rare occasions on which the inclusion of Asia in the idea of the international unity of workers was to obtrude itself on the deliberations of the Second International. This was during the proceedings of the Sixth Congress held at Amsterdam when the Japanese representative, Katayama Sen,¹ publicly shook hands with Plekhanov as a gesture to show that, though their respective countries were at war, the Japanese and Russian proletariat remained united [6].

Ten years later Lenin, who at one time had looked up to Plekhanov as a revered guide and mentor, was to break with him irrevocably² when, on the outbreak of war in August 1914, Plekhanov encouraged Russians in France to join the French Army and fight the Germans. Plekhanov's deviation from the principle of the international unity of the proletariat in 1914, however, was mild in comparison with the

¹ Although Japanese, Katayama was actually representing American workers at this Congress.

² An earlier split had occurred in 1904 when Plekhanov left the newly-formed Bolshevik party and went over to the Mensheviks.

change which came over Stalin between 1904, when he denounced so strongly his country's war with Japan, and 1945, when at Yalta he demanded the restoration of the 'former rights of Russia violated by the treacherous attack of Japan in 1904' [7]. In his victory address seven months later he underlined this change still further by declaring:

'The defeat of the Russian troops in 1904 in the Russo-Japanese War left grave memories in the minds of our peoples. It was a dark stain on our country. Our people believed and hoped that a day would come when Japan would be smashed and that blot effaced. *For forty years have we men of the older generation waited for this day.*¹ *And now this day has come.*'

Strange words for one whose revolutionary activities in 1905 had helped deliberately to bring about the defeat of his own country.

In chapter II, mention was made of an article, written by Lenin in 1908, commenting on the implications of the first political general strike of Bombay workers [8]. This article was not confined only to events in India; it referred also to the Young Turk movement then taking place in Turkey, to Persia and to China, and rejoiced that 'the class-conscious workers of Europe now have Asiatic comrades and their number will grow by leaps and bounds'. From these and other observations it seems clear that Lenin at that time was going through a period of mental gestation, and it was in 1910, while his mind was working along these lines, that Hilferding's *Finance Capital*¹ was published. As noted in Lenin's Selected Works, this book prophesied that capitalism would aid the colonies to seek independence, that independence would, in turn, threaten capitalism, and that the capitalist powers would then have to resort to force in order to maintain their domination [9]. Here indeed was food for thought for those dreaming World Revolution. For Lenin it was particularly stimulating.

Barely a year after the appearance of Hilferding's book, there occurred the Chinese Revolution of October 1911, which brought about the overthrow of the monarchy and the establishment of a republic. Revolutionaries and social reformers throughout the world welcomed this outcome, and the Sixth All-Russian Party Conference, which met in Prague in the following January, found time, despite its

¹ My italics.

preoccupation with its own internal affairs,¹ to 'extend greetings to China's great revolution and publicize the world significance of the Chinese people's revolution, which bore the burden of liberating Asia' [10].

These developments in China were not lost on Lenin, and in December 1912 two articles on the subject appeared from his pen. The first of these was in the nature of a commentary on Sun Yat-Sen's 'Social Significance of the Chinese Revolution', in which Sun had expressed his sympathy for all 'toilers and exploited peoples', had spoken of forestalling the advent of a capitalist régime, and had declared that the enhanced value of land should accrue to the tillers rather than to private capitalists who became its owners. Lenin admired this militant democracy, combined as it was with socialist dreams, with hope of preventing capitalism, and with plans and propaganda for radical agrarian reform [11]. Commenting on Sun's vision of a prosperous and industrialized China in which, Sun had said, 'in fifty years we shall have many Shanghais', Lenin remarked hopefully that 'to the extent that the number of Shanghais increases in China, the Chinese proletariat will increase as well'.

The idea of a future China with an ever-increasing proletariat to provide the vanguard for a proletarian revolution pleased him greatly and he forecast that it would 'probably form some sort of Chinese Social Democratic Labour Party which, while criticizing the petty bourgeois utopias and reactionary views of Sun Yat-Sen, will certainly take care to single out, defend and develop the revolutionary democratic core of his political and agrarian programme'. In thus looking to the Chinese proletariat of the future to lead the way to revolution, Lenin was basing his forecast on orthodox Marxist lines. What he failed to foresee was that when the time came, contrary to the basic principles and practice of orthodox Marxism, Communism would be brought to power in China, not by the urban proletariat but primarily by the peasantry.

A few days after the appearance of this commentary, Lenin returned to the subject of China once more in an article in which he wrote sarcastically of the lack of European interest in 'the regeneration of China', asserting that this was because China was regarded by the Western bourgeoisie merely as booty [12]. In this assertion

¹ It was consequent upon this conference that the Mensheviks were finally expelled and the Bolsheviks renamed their party the RSDLP(B), the (B) standing for 'Bolshevik'.

may be detected the echo of comments made over half-a-century earlier in an article by Marx on China, criticizing British merchants for supporting 'every minister who, by piratical aggressions, promises to extort a treaty of commerce from the barbarian' with a view to expanding world markets [13].

While Lenin was showing an increasing interest in developments in Asia, other exponents of World Revolution were likewise turning their attention to Eastern lands, to the effect of their exploitation by Western capitalism, and to the growth of militant nationalism in them. Stalin, though referring more specifically to Europe, was writing at great length in 1913 on the right of nations to self-determination [14], while Rosa Luxemburg in *The Accumulation of Capital*, which appeared in that same year, came out with a slashing indictment of imperialism on lines similar in some respects to those of the thesis which Lenin was to produce three years later, a thesis which was to form the basis of Comintern policy soon after [15].

The outbreak of the First World War in 1914 served momentarily to divert the attention of the future leaders of World Communism from Asia to the need for creating a Third International to replace the Second, whose basic principle of 'Workers of the World, unite!' had been so shattered by the precedence given, by most of its supporters, to patriotic sentiment over the call for international working-class unity. Only two months after its start, however, Lenin was coining the slogan, 'Transform the present imperialist war into civil war!' [16] and by August 1915 he was defining China, Turkey and Persia as 'semi-colonies' [17]. This was a term which was to become current Communist jargon after the Communist *jihad* for the subjugation of the Western world through the medium of anti-imperialism had been launched.

How rapidly Lenin's mind was working towards this climax was clearly reflected in an article published two months later [18]. Referring to the war then raging, he declared that if the proletariat obtained power, they would propose peace 'on the basis of the liberation of the colonies'; if this proposal were refused, they would rouse the colonies and dependent countries in Asia to insurrection. Proletarian victory, he went on to say, would create very favourable conditions for the development of revolution in Asia.

This threat, so soon to be carried into effect, marked a tremendous advance in the evolution of Marxist doctrine from the days when Marx himself was commenting so bitingly, though withal somewhat

academically, on capitalist machinations in Eastern lands. Even Lenin himself had, until then, confined himself largely to treating Asiatic questions as a means of berating the capitalist world for its iniquities. His approach to these questions had, like Marx's, been primarily of an academic nature. But there was nothing academic about this article of 24th October 1915. To the vast majority of mankind at this time, Lenin, it is true, was unknown; and even by most of those who knew him by name, he was regarded as little more than a 'wild and woolly' revolutionary in exile, whose vapourings should not be taken too seriously. Yet this article of his in an obscure paper in the autumn of 1915 was but the precursor to his thesis on imperialism, which appeared the following year and was to touch off the powder keg in Asia with such vital consequences for the world. Like its famous forbear, the Communist Manifesto of 1848, which declared that the ends to be achieved 'can be obtained only by the forcible overthrow of all existing social conditions', so Lenin's 1916 thesis, setting forth 'the immediate liberation of the colonies' as one of its principal aims, stated unequivocally that this was 'impossible of achievement under capitalism without a series of revolutions'.

While it is true that Stalin and other Soviet leaders have from time to time since then attempted to soft-pedal the need for violence and have professed belief in the possibility of the 'peaceful co-existence' of Communism and capitalism, these two basic enunciations of Communist aims and intentions stand as witness to the Communist gospel of violent means to attain their ends. They are supported by such statements as that of Lenin in 1919 that 'the existence of the Soviet Republic side by side with imperialist states for a long time is unthinkable. . . . A series of frightful collisions between the Soviet Republic and the bourgeois states will be inevitable' [19]. That Moscow and its followers and dupes throughout the world have, since 1949, been pressing forward with their spurious World Peace campaign and posing as the champions of world peace does not in any way nullify these earlier pronouncements, as the Communists differentiate between war and civil war. The former is to be denounced, the latter to be encouraged. Their technique is similar in many respects to Hitler's before September 1939 and the object of its application is identical, namely to obtain their aims by threats and by trading on the almost universal fear and dislike of war. To them therefore, there is no inconsistency in professing an ardent desire for

peace while striving their utmost by means of propaganda and agitation activities to rouse the masses to 'armed struggle', i.e. civil war, against their rulers.

What in 1916 was no more than a thesis, pointing the way to a fundamental change in the strategy and tactics of World Revolution, became a practical proposition when, little more than a year later, the success of the October Revolution¹ brought Lenin and his Bolsheviks into power in Russia. As a result, Asia became a key factor in the Communist programme and, as Stalin reiterated on innumerable occasions, it served as a spur to 'oppressed Asiatics' to join the fight against Western imperialism and thereby ushered in a new epoch of colonial revolutions. To quote his words on this point in 1918: 'The October Revolution is the first revolution in the history of the world to break the age-long sleep of the toiling masses of the oppressed peoples of the East and to draw them into the fight against world imperialism' [20].

The expression, 'the toiling masses of the oppressed peoples of the East', has, in slightly varied forms, become a much-hackneyed cliché in Communist writings and pronouncements, and a modified form of it was used in one of the first pronouncements made by the Soviet Government after its establishment. This was in the manifesto addressed in December 1917 to 'all toiling Moslems of Russia and the East' [21]. Three-and-a-half years later, in May 1921, when a special institution was founded for training Communist cadres for Asiatic countries, it was named the 'Communist University of the Toilers of the East'. About this establishment, known also as the KUTV, more will be said later.

Following the success of the October Revolution, the newly established Soviet government, despite its own internal problems and difficulties, quickly set to work, by appeals and by its own actions, to stir up the colonies and semi-colonies of Asia against the Western 'imperialist' powers. To emphasize that the new Russian régime had ranged itself on the side of Asiatic nationalists opposed to Western domination, appeals to Moslems and to the 'enslaved peoples of the Orient' to turn against their 'oppressors' were coupled with such actions as the repudiation of Russia's own special rights and interests

¹ The actual date, as now celebrated, was 7th November 1917; but according to the Old Style Calendar, which was still in use in Russia at that time, it was 25th October. The Communist world, therefore, still refers to it as the October Revolution.

in China, Turkey and Persia. An article by Stalin entitled 'Do not forget the East' called for a spirit of revolution and development of nationalism in support of Communist policies;¹ and on 16th January 1918 the Soviet government came out with a statement advocating 'a complete break with the barbarous policies of bourgeois civilization, which builds the welfare of the exploiters and a few select chosen nations upon the enslavement of hundreds of millions of toilers in Asia, in the colonies in general, and in the small states' [22].

At an early stage, China began to figure prominently in Soviet calculations and, following the announcement of Moscow's readiness to forgo her special rights in that country, greetings to the Soviet government from the South China Assembly brought forth a letter from Chicherin to Sun Yat-Sen in August 1918, thanking him for his friendly gesture and for saying that the Russian and Chinese Revolutions had the same aim [23]. China also figured in an article by Stalin later that same year on the occasion of the first anniversary of the October Revolution, the great international significance of which, he declared, consisted chiefly in the fact that:

- '1. It has widened the scope of the national question and converted it from the particular question of combating national oppression into the general question of emancipating the oppressed nations, colonies and semi-colonies from imperialism.
- '2. It has opened up vast potentialities and revealed the proper way of achieving emancipation, and thereby greatly helped the cause of emancipation of the oppressed nations of the West and East, having drawn them into the common channel of the victorious struggle against imperialism.
- '3. It has thereby erected a bridge between the socialist West and the enslaved East, having created a new front of revolutions against world imperialism, extending from the proletarians of the West, through the Russian Revolution, to the oppressed nations of the East.' [24]

The same month, November 1918, that Stalin published this article saw also the first of that long series of meetings between Russian and Asiatic Communists to consider ways and means of spreading revolution in the Orient which have continued to this day. This went by the grandiloquent title of the First Congress of Communist Organizations of the East and was held in Moscow. Most of the delegates came from Central Asia but the gathering was attended also by

¹ The vital importance of the East in the Communist plans for World Revolution was indicated in this article by the phrase 'Without the revolutionary movement in the East, it is useless even to think about the final triumph of socialism'.

Japanese and Chinese representatives and the decision was taken to establish a Japanese Division in the Department of Propaganda [25]. The Second Congress of this body was opened in November the following year by Stalin and was addressed by Lenin himself [26]; but in the meantime the Comintern itself had been launched upon the world, and at its First Congress, held in Moscow in March 1919 and attended *inter alia* by Japanese, Chinese and Indians, support for nationalist movements in the East had been announced on the grounds that 'they tend to upset the existing authority while not opposing revolutionary aspirations'. With a view to giving this support, it was decided to establish sections of the Comintern in oriental countries, and a manifesto on colonies declared, 'The hour of the dictatorship of the European proletariat will also be that of your liberation' [27]. The RCP(B),¹ which had held its Eighth Congress at the same time and had played the leading part in the formation of the Comintern, had also announced its decision to spread revolution in the East.

That these promises and appeals fell on receptive ears is clear when one recalls that the year 1919 witnessed the launching of the independence movement in Korea to the accompaniment of anti-Japanese demonstrations, the outbreak of student demonstrations in Peking which marked the opening of the nationalist revolution in China, the Amritsar tragedy which proved to be the precursor of a long series of revolutionary disturbances in India, and the murder of Habibullah in Kabul, followed by the Afghan invasion of India. In the circumstances it was hardly surprising, therefore, if the Russian and other Communists in Moscow considered that a 'revolutionary situation', ripe for exploitation, was in process of rapid development throughout the greater part of South and East Africa.

The fact that the new rulers of Russia had, in the opening days of that same year, 1919, put down a rising of some of their own Asiatic subjects in Tashkent with brutal ferocity [28] did not in any way deter them from setting themselves up as the champions of the oppressed peoples of the East. In this guise they sponsored, organized and supervised the Baku Congress of Peoples of the East in September 1920, a meeting which had been preceded shortly before by other gatherings, with the spreading of revolution in Asia as their main

¹ Russian Communist Party (Bolshevik). At its Seventh Congress, held in Moscow in March 1918, the RSDLP(B) had decided to change its name to RCP(B).

purpose. These had included the First Far Eastern Labour Conference, the Third Congress of Chinese Workers in Russia and, most important of all, the Second Congress of the Comintern, all of which had been held in Moscow. Amongst those attending the Far Eastern Labour Conference was a young and, at that time, unknown Chinese, Liu Shao-Chi, who, thirty years later, was to spring into prominence as one of the outstanding figures in the Communist world in Asia.

It was at the Second Congress of the Comintern, held from 19th July to 7th August 1920, that the decision to hold the Baku Congress was reached. Important, however, as this decision was, it was but one outcome of the Comintern Congress deliberations, which had been concerned mainly with the problem of the colonies. Among the principal speakers had been Lenin and the Indian Communist, M. N. Roy, both of whom had emphasized the role of the national liberation movement as a mighty factor in the struggle against imperialism. India and China received special attention, as it was stressed that, if these two countries with their vast areas and population could be brought into the revolutionary camp, the goal of World Revolution would be within sight. The first step, however, would have to be the overthrow of foreign capitalism. With this object in view, therefore, the Congress resolved not only to sponsor revolutionary movements in the colonies and semi-colonies but to enter into 'temporary agreements' or even alliances with the bourgeois democratic movements in them. It was hoped by this means, as explained by Lenin in his *Thesis on the National and Colonial Question* which he presented to the Second Congress, to widen Communist influence with the masses. It was stipulated, however, that Communist parties entering into such agreements should on no account abandon either their organizational independence or their full freedom of action and agitation. It was in line with this resolution that, three years later, the ill-fated alliance between the Chinese Communists and the KMT was brought about; but the fatal mistake of omitting this all-important proviso was made. For this, Stalin was largely to blame; for, oblivious of the emphasis laid on this stipulation both by Lenin in his thesis and by the terms of the 1920 resolution, he agreed that the independence of the CCP should be subordinated to KMT discipline. As a result, when the decision to seek this alliance was finally taken at the Third Congress of the CCP in June 1923, it was laid down that the KMT should be made 'the central force of the national revolution' [29].

Although the Second Congress of the Comintern was devoted mainly to the colonial question and to the co-ordination of the Communist movement in Europe with the struggle for national independence in colonial and dependent countries, one other important result was the tightening up of the regulations for affiliating the Communist organizations, which were springing up in various countries, to the Comintern. For this purpose, twenty-one conditions for affiliation were laid down. One of these conditions had a direct bearing on the colonial question, for it compelled those seeking affiliation to the Comintern to denounce, without reservation, all the methods of their own imperialists in the colonies and to support, not in words only but by practical means as well, a liberation movement in the colonies. The effect of this was to ensure that all Communist parties throughout the world should play an active part in bringing about the overthrow of 'imperialism' and the liberation of colonial and dependent territories. Soviet imperialism was, of course, excepted, as the Soviet, in theory, could not be imperialist!

That the Soviet indulged in the exploitation of others has been freely admitted by the Moscow leaders themselves, but they qualify this admission by drawing a subtle distinction between 'imperialism' and Soviet exploitation. Thus Zinoviev, declaring to the Petrograd Soviet in 1920 that Russia had renounced this policy of exploitation, added, with unabashed sophistry, 'but we cannot do without the petroleum of Azerbaijan or the cotton of Turkestan. We take these products which are necessary to us, not as the former exploiters, but as older brothers bearing the torch of civilization' [30]. Similarly, Stalin, emphasizing, in an article in *Pravda* on 10th October that same year, the need to retain Turkestan, Azerbaijan and other 'border regions', explained this seemingly inconsistent attitude by declaring that 'separation of the border regions would undermine the revolutionary might of Central Russia, which is stimulating the movement for the emancipation of the West and the East'. It would also mean, he said, that 'the seceded border regions would inevitably fall into bondage to international imperialism' [31]. The idea that what is sauce for the goose is sauce for the gander is wholly foreign to Moscow and its neophytes throughout the world where imperialism is concerned.

It was in order to implement the resolutions passed at the Second Congress of the Comintern regarding the need for spreading revolution in the East that the Baku Congress of the Peoples of the Orient

was summoned and 15th August 1920 was set by Zinoviev as the opening day. Owing to unexpected delays, however, it was September before this gathering of nearly 2,000 delegates, representing thirty-seven nationalities, met together to express and discuss common grievances of dependent peoples. Zinoviev, president of the IKKI, presided and, with Bela Kun and Radek, represented the Politburo, while amongst the delegates from other countries were several who were to become prominent figures in the Communist movement in South and East Asia in the years ahead. Amongst these were the Annamite revolutionary Nguyen Ai-Quoc, better known today as Ho Chi-Minh, and the Chinese Communist Li Ta-Chao, who was to meet his death by strangulation in Peking seven years later after being found hiding in the Soviet Legation there when the Manchurian warlord, Chang Tso-Lin, raided the premises in April 1927.

The Congress, which was intended to show sympathy towards Islam and towards Asiatic races in general, achieved little, as few of those attending showed any great desire to be emancipated under Soviet auspices. It was, however, marked by fiery speeches by Zinoviev and others. Calling for 'a holy war against British imperialism', Zinoviev declared, 'We will throw a firebrand against its rulers; we will make life miserable for those brazen-faced British officers lording it over Turkey, Persia and India. . . . The real revolution will blaze up only when the 800 million people who live in Asia unite with us.'

Just as America is now the main object of Communist abuse and fulminations, so it was that at Baku and throughout the 1920's Britain was the principal target for such diatribes. She was regarded as the main obstacle to World Revolution and would therefore have to be overthrown before success could be achieved. If Britain could be brought to her knees, so ran the theme, the imperialist system in Asia would collapse and World Revolution would follow. Moscow accordingly set out to destroy British power, especially in India, and to undermine her influence and interests in China and elsewhere by means of a general conflagration in the East. With an element of wishful thinking, Lenin summed up the aim in his oft-quoted words, 'England's back will be broken, not on the banks of the Thames, but on the Yangtse Kiang, the Ganges and the Nile'.

In urging, at the Baku Congress, that the Eastern nations should rise and unite with the revolutionary workers of the West in 'a holy war under the red banner of the Communist International', the

Moscow leaders had this aim in view and hoped to achieve it by means of this *jehad*. The tangible results of the Congress, however, were negligible and the grandiloquent-sounding Council of Propaganda and Action of the Peoples of the Orient, to which it gave birth, lasted barely a year.¹

The Baku Congress having achieved but little, it was then decided that the best hope of stirring up the colonies and semi-colonies against their imperialist overlords lay in the dispatch of specially trained agitators and organizers. A certain amount of work along these lines had already been carried out by the propaganda centre in Tashkent; but this had been on a relatively small scale. In order, therefore, to train the necessary Marxist cadres for these liberation movements, the institution known as the Communist University of the Toilers of the East, or KUTV, was founded at Sverdlovsk in May 1921. Thither were sent Japanese Communists and Chinese, Indian and Indonesian, and other Asiatic Communists as well, for the idea was 'to train dependable Marxist cadres from among the local people, cadres who, besides being natives themselves (i.e. natives of the countries to which they were sent), were also connected with the broad masses of the native population' [32].

The students at this University were members of their own respective Communist parties and were selected from among those regarded as the ablest and most talented of the young people, who would become 'cultural and social workers of a highly responsible grade—teachers, journalists, organizers of collective farms, co-operative societies, trade unions and so on' [33]. The usual course lasted three years, the students themselves being 'representatives of not less than fifty nationalities and ethnic groups of the East',² part of them from the Soviet East and part from colonial and dependent countries. To quote Stalin's own words in a speech delivered by him in May 1925:

'Among the students of the university there are two main groups representing two series of absolutely distinct conditions of development. The first group is composed of people who came to us from the Soviet East, from lands where the rule of the bourgeois no longer exists, where the

¹ The purpose was, as stated in *Marxism and the National and Colonial Question* (p. 299), 'to organize propaganda and to support and unite the movement for the emancipation of the East in the struggle against imperialism under the slogan of a world proletarian revolution'.

² Swearingen in his *Red Flag in Japan* (p. 24) says that at one period there were between 1,500 and 2,000 students representing over sixty nations.

yoke of imperialism has been overthrown and where the workers are in power. The second group of students is composed of people who have come to us from colonial and dependent countries, from countries where capitalism still reigns, where the oppression of imperialism has preserved all its severity and where independence has still to be won by driving out the imperialists.' [34]

So much, then, for the KUTV; but, it should be added, other universities for similar purposes were established in Russia later. Notable among these were the Sun Yat-Sen University (known also as Chungshan), which was mainly for Chinese, with Radek as president and Pavel Mif vice-president, and the Lenin University, which had 6,000 students, of whom about half were Orientals. The curriculum of the last-named was said to include training in espionage, map drawing for riots and insurrections, sabotage and weapon training [35].

As indicating the importance attached by the Soviet leaders to this task of training native cadres for stirring up and leading revolutionary movements in the colonies and semi-colonies, it was in May 1921, the same month in which the Communist University of Toilers of the East was founded, that Stalin underlined the role allotted to the colonies and dependent countries in the strategy of World Revolution. Writing in *Pravda* he declared: 'If Europe and America may be called the front, the scene of the main engagements between socialism and imperialism, *the non-sovereign nations and the colonies*, with their raw materials, fuel, food and vast store of human material, *should be regarded as the rear, the reserve of imperialism*. In order to win a war one must not only triumph at the front but also revolutionize the enemy's rear, his reserves' [36]. In this same article he wrote:

'It was the Communists who first revealed the connection between the national question and the question of the colonies, who proved it theoretically and made it the basis of their practical revolutionary work. This broke down the wall between the white people and the coloured peoples, between the "civilized" and "uncivilized" slaves of imperialism. This circumstance considerably facilitated the co-ordination of the struggle of the backward colonies with the struggle of the advanced proletariat against the common enemy, imperialism.' [37]

The year 1921, which saw the founding of the KUTV and the publication of this article by Stalin, saw also the Third World Congress of the Comintern. Though not devoted as much to the colonial question as the Second Congress had been, South and East Asia

nevertheless figured prominently in its deliberations, which lasted from 22nd June to 12th July. Japan, in particular, came in for considerable attention, Zinoviev going out of his way to stress the importance of her role in the world revolutionary movement [38]. The Far East figured also in the decision that the nascent proletariat in the colonies of South and East Asia should lead the larger peasant revolutionary movement [39]. Of outstanding importance for the future tactics and strategy of World Revolution in general, however, was the recognition given to the need for Communist 'front' organizations as screens to cover Communist policy. Communism, it was realized, if fostered only by such organizations as were openly Communist, would make no rapid progress. What was required, therefore, was the creation of seemingly innocuous bodies with the promotion of peace, anti-militarism, disarmament, youth work, women's rights or some other equally laudable object as their ostensible aim. At the head of each might be a prominent non-Communist of no particular political colour, but in the background, holding the secretaryship and other key posts and exercising the real control of the movement, would be Communists or fellow-travellers. In order to build up, expand and maintain such mass organizations, however, large, firm and well-developed Communist cores would be required in the basic units. Provision was made for these accordingly.

By this means, the Communists were in a position to penetrate different groups of people through their own particular interests, while the number and names of these auxiliary bodies could be varied according to the circumstances ruling at any one time. The system was to be greatly developed in the later 1930's, when the popular front was at its height after the adoption and application of Dimitrov's 'Trojan Horse' policy; for by that time Russia had won the approval of the growing army of pacifists, anti-Fascists and other internationally-minded people by a succession of seemingly altruistic gestures. These had included her advocacy of the outlawry of war in 1928, of disarmament in 1932 and of collective security in 1934, and her pose as champion of the League of Nations, a pose which somehow contrived to obliterate among her admirers the memory of her previous abuse and denunciations of that body.¹

¹ Since the close of the Second World War, the Communist 'front' system has produced such international organizations as the WFTU, WFDY, IUS, WIDF and WPC, besides a host of lesser bodies bringing journalists, lawyers, scientists, doctors and others into the widespread net.

Many of the more important Communist 'front' organizations formed at the start were founded or directed by the German Communist, Willi Munzenberg, who used to refer to them cynically as 'Innocents' Clubs' and who, nearly twenty years later in the summer of 1940, was to be murdered after breaking with the Comintern in 1938.

In his *Problems of Leninism*, Stalin refers to these Communist 'fronts' and similar mass organizations as 'transmission belts' for transmitting Party directives to the masses and he emphasizes the important part they play in the 'mechanism' or 'system of the dictatorship of the proletariat', which he analyses as consisting of 'transmission belts', 'levers' and 'directing force'. 'The levers or the transmission belts,' he remarks, 'are those very mass organizations of the proletariat without whose aid the dictatorship cannot be realized,' while 'the directing force is the advanced detachment of the proletariat, its vanguard (i.e. the Communist Party), which is the main guiding force of the proletariat'. The 'mass organizations', which he then goes on to list, include Party organizations such as the Young Communist League and non-Party organizations such as trade unions, peasant unions and co-operative societies [40]. Briefly stated, therefore, the idea is to use these proletarian organizations for the double purpose of serving as a reservoir from which to draw new membership and as a transmission belt to connect the 'vanguard of the working class' with the masses.

The support which the Communists receive from these Communist 'front' and mass organizations is of incalculable value to the Communist cause and, to quote Koestler, himself a former Communist dupe, 'The more innocent the customer, the more easily he becomes a victim of the ideological hooch sold under the trademark of Peace, Democracy, Progress or what have you' [41]. As aptly stated by another observer of a very different nature, 'The strength of Communism as a disruptive force in the world lies in its devilish ability to enrol millions under its banner, by disguising that banner as something attractive to innocent but foolish men' [42]. The folly of these innocent dupes lies, of course, in the fact that nothing will convince them that the principles for which they stand would count for nothing if the Communists themselves were to come into power. The parallel drawn by Carew Hunt between the Communist principle and that which Montalembert accused contemporary Catholics of adopting could hardly be bettered: 'When I am the weaker, I ask

you for liberty because it is your principle; but when I am the stronger, I take it away from you because it is not my principle' [43].

The Communist predilection for sailing under false colours goes back to the very beginning of the movement, for, three years after the publication of the famous Communist Manifesto in 1848, we find Marx himself figuring as president of a 'Democratic Society' in Cologne and using the *New Rhenish Gazette* to spread Communist ideas and to attack democracy while posing as a democratic organ. In order to keep up the pretence, he even forbade the use of the words Communism and socialism in any of its articles [44]. In deciding on the need for Communist 'front' organizations, therefore, the Comintern in 1921 was running true to Communist form. It was, moreover, but following out Lenin's dictum of the previous year, when he laid it down in his *Left Wing Communism, an Infantile Disorder* that, in order to establish Communism, 'it is necessary . . . to use any ruses, cunning, unlawful method, evasion, concealment of truth'. Though not concerned specifically with the Orient, this decision was to lead later to the creation of a number of 'front' organizations, such, for instance, as the League Against Imperialism and the Noulens Defence Committee, concerned primarily with Communist policy in South-East Asia and the Far East.

The year 1922 was but three weeks old when there was opened in Moscow the First Congress of Toilers of the Far East, while about the same time there was held a preliminary Far Eastern Conference in Irkutsk. Both these meetings concerned themselves largely with Japan, which was represented not only by the veteran Katayanfa Sen but also by Nozaka, Tokuda and others who were to come into such prominence a quarter of a century later when, following the collapse of Japan and the occupation of that country by the Allies, the Japanese Communist Party was legalized for the first time in its history.

Seven Japanese were present at the Toilers of the Far East Congress in Moscow¹ and the importance of Japan's role in the Communist scheme of things was stressed by Zinoviev, who declared: 'The Japanese proletariat holds in its hands the key to the solution of the Far Eastern question', which is only soluble by 'the defeat of

¹ Other countries represented were China, Korea, Mongolia, India, Java and various Central Asian states. The largest delegation came from Korea, which sent no less than fifty-two representatives: see North's *Moscow and the Chinese Communists* (p. 60).

the Japanese bourgeoisie and the final victory of the revolution in Japan' [45]. Six months later, on 15th July 1922, the Japanese Communist Party was officially founded.

The Fourth World Congress of the Comintern was opened in Moscow in November that same year and was noteworthy for the call it made for an alliance between the Chinese Communist Party and the KMT, a proposal to this effect having been put forward some months earlier at the Second CCP Congress in Hangchow. The CCP had been formally inaugurated in July 1921, just one year prior to the establishment of the Japanese Communist Party, and its delegation, headed by the Party's secretary-general, Chen Tu-Hsiu, came in for considerable criticism at this Comintern Congress. By means of this projected alliance, which was finally brought into effect in January 1924, it was hoped to use the KMT as a transmission belt, with a function similar to the Communist 'fronts' already described. These hopes, however, were to be brought to an abrupt end as a result of the fatal omission of Lenin's proviso noted earlier in this chapter.

The Comintern Congress of 1922, which called for this alliance, discussed also the tasks of Communists in the Pacific area in general, and it was during these deliberations that the Indonesian Communist leader Tan Malaka, who was later to be denounced as a Trotskyist, showed his independence of outlook by attacking the Communist policy of hostility to such religious movements as Pan-Islam which, only a short time before, had received Soviet support [46].

As the next World Congress of the Comintern, the fifth, was not held until June 1924, it may be helpful at this point to summarize the main steps taken, since the establishment of the Soviet régime in Russia, to ensure that the countries of South and East Asia should play their allotted role in the cause of World Revolution.

First there had been the preliminary stage of preparing the ground with a view to making it receptive. This had been achieved by means of appeal to 'the enslaved peoples of the Orient' to turn against their 'oppressors' and by Russia's own seemingly altruistic action, for the purpose of showing that she herself was ranged on the side of Asiatic nationalism against Western imperialism, in offering to renounce her own special rights and interests. This preliminary stage had also been marked, at the end of 1918, by the first of a long series of meetings between the Soviet leaders and Asiatic Communists for considering ways and means of spreading revolution in the Orient.

With the establishment of the Comintern in March 1919, the stage was set for the task of setting the East ablaze. Active support took the place of doctrinaire sympathy and an international Communist body replaced Soviet Russia—at least in theory—as the leader and instigator of world revolution. The First World Congress decided on open support for nationalist movements with the express purpose of upsetting existing authority in the colonies and semi-colonies, and arrangements were made for the establishment of Comintern sections in Eastern countries to assist the work of spreading revolution. At the Second World Congress, in 1920, the role of national liberation movements as an important factor in the struggle against imperialism was stressed and it was resolved, not only to sponsor revolutionary activities in dependent and semi-dependent countries, but even to enter into temporary alliances with nationalist movements. Moreover, by laying down the rule that all affiliates of the Comintern throughout the world must support these liberation movements by all practical means, the Communist proletarian movement in Europe and America was co-ordinated once and for all with the struggle for national emancipation. The importance of this co-ordination was stressed once more at the Baku Congress later the same year, when Eastern nations were urged to rise and unite with the revolutionary workers of the West, and again in 1921, when Stalin spoke of the ‘co-ordination of the struggle of the backward colonies with the struggle of the advanced proletariat against the common enemy, imperialism’ [47].

The open acknowledgement, at Baku, that Britain was the main obstacle to World Revolution, and the consequent stress on the need for ‘a holy war against British imperialism’ in order to bring Britain to her knees and thereby cause the collapse of the whole imperialist system in Asia, may be regarded as yet another step in the development of Comintern tactics and strategy in Asia. So, too, was the establishment of the KUTV in 1921 for the training of native organizers and agitators. A further step in the same direction—though it applied more to Europe than to Asia at the start—was the decision reached at the Third World Congress to create Communist ‘fronts’ as cover for Communist activities. The important role allotted to Communism in Japan at that Congress and the resolution, at the Fourth World Congress the following year, calling for an alliance between the Chinese Communist Party and the KMT, were but additional stages in the development of Comintern policy and

tactics in the Far East up to the close of 1922, by which time fully-fledged Communist parties affiliated to the Comintern had been established, each in turn, in Indonesia, China and Japan, while Communist organizations were already active in most other countries of South and East Asia.

CHAPTER XII

Moscow and Asia

IN so far as the spread of World Revolution in the East was concerned, the year 1923 was mainly conspicuous for the swing to tactical co-operation with nationalist movements as instanced in the case of China, where the joint declaration issued by Sun Yat-Sen and Joffe on 26th January marked the opening phase in the development of a situation pregnant with disaster for the peace of the Far East. This was carried a stage further when, in June that year, the Third Congress of the Chinese Communist Party definitely decided to seek an alliance with the KMT, which accepted the proposal conditionally at its own Congress seven months later. Thus did the CCP seek to apply Lenin's technique of capturing mass movements by means of mutual short-term objectives, the mutual short-term motive in this instance being the overthrow of the existing order which denied full independence and sovereignty to China.

Three statements made by Stalin in the course of a speech delivered in the spring of 1923 have an important bearing on the Orient. Speaking at the Twelfth Congress of the RCP(B) on 23rd April, he urged the importance of industrializing the 'culturally backward regions' in order to create a proletariat as a 'bridge' between the Russian proletariat and the peasantry and toilers of those regions [1]. Later in the same speech he declared that the right of self-determination must yield to 'the right of a working class that has assumed power to consolidate its power' [2], while in an earlier passage, urging the need to stir up revolution in the East, he declared, 'Two things are possible: either we succeed in stirring up and revolutionizing the far imperialist rear—the colonial and semi-colonial countries of the East—and thereby hasten the fall of capitalism, or we muffle it, and thereby strengthen imperialism and weaken the force of our movement' [3].

It is true that in the first of these extracts from his speech Stalin was referring specifically to the Central Asian republics; but the idea

of industrializing 'culturally backward regions' in order to create a 'bridge' has persisted to this day. To give but one fairly recent example, this idea was stressed in a series of talks broadcast on the Shanghai radio in the autumn of 1952 when the CCP, which had been brought to power largely by the peasantry, considered the time had come to relegate the peasants to a secondary place, in accordance with orthodox Marxism, by emphasizing the superiority of the urban proletariat as the true leaders and the consequent need for producing more proletarians by means of industrialization [4]. The second extract quoted provides a good example of the way in which Communist leaders are prepared to qualify their principles when those principles become inconvenient. A parallel instance is the way in which the Soviet sought to justify its own exploitation of its 'border regions'. Another example of such inconsistencies that springs to mind is the subtle distinction drawn by Stalin between the kind of national movement meriting support and the type which should not be aided [5].

It was in 1924 that Stalin drew this distinction and it was in 1924 that the Borodin mission, which had been sent to Canton as a result of the agreement reached between Joffe and Sun Yat-Sen in January the previous year, set to work to help the Chinese national movement. This it did by a drastic overhaul and reorganization of the KMT on Soviet lines and by means of both military and political training and the arming and equipping of the Chinese Nationalist Army. By the time this was completed, it only required a spark to set off the increasingly explosive situation developing in China. An incident in Shanghai on 30th May the following year was to provide the spark, but before this came about there were other important developments.

With a view to exploiting Asiatic trade unionism in the cause of revolution and organizing labour for revolutionary action in the colonies, a Pan-Pacific Syndicalist Congress was held in Canton in June 1924. Strike strategy was discussed and so was the question of how best to organize seamen and dockers in the principal Pacific ports and to link them with the class struggle of the proletariat in Western countries [6]. The Fifth World Congress of the Comintern, which was held in Moscow in June and July that year, also studied this question and resolved to pay special attention to the colonies with a view to intensifying Communist activities in them. It was as a result of this resolution that the IKKI, the Central Executive Com-

mittee of the Comintern, established an Eastern Section known as the Far Eastern Bureau, which was to have the same role in the Far East as the Western European Bureau in Berlin had in Western Europe. It must remain for a later chapter to indicate something of the pernicious nature of its activities, and the way in which a chance arrest in Singapore in May 1931 led to its temporary disruption.

Two statements of special interest made by Stalin in April 1924 in the course of a series of lectures delivered by him at Sverdlovsk University must be noted on account of their bearing on the tactics and strategy of World Revolution in the East. Imperialism, he declared in one of these talks, undermines capitalism by converting colonies and dependent countries from reserves of imperialism into reserves of proletarian revolution [7], a statement which may be compared with the oft-quoted Communist axiom that capitalism bears the seeds of its own destruction. His other dictum, expounded in this same series of lectures, was that '... the road to the victory of the revolution in the West lies through a revolutionary alliance with the liberation movement of the colonies and dependent countries against imperialism' [8]. This second assertion was to be echoed in slightly different form a year later by Zinoviev, when he declared that 'the road to World Revolution lies through the East rather than through the West'.

The year 1925 saw China burst into revolutionary flame as a result of an incident in Shanghai, similar in some respects to that in St Petersburg which had set off the explosion in Russia twenty years earlier. As this marked the opening of a new phase, it can be described more conveniently in a later chapter. The year 1925 was also marked by the formal inauguration of fully-fledged Communist parties in two other Asiatic countries, Korea and India. 17th April saw the establishment of the Korean Communist Party in Seoul, and in December the newly formed Communist Party of India held its first conference.

The revolutionary disturbances which broke out in China at the end of May, and the formal inauguration of these two new Asiatic Communist parties affiliated to the Comintern, might have been thought to indicate that Soviet propaganda and intrigue were making rapid headway in the East. That the Communists were not having it all their own way, however, was shown by developments in other parts of Asia, notably in Russia's own particular sphere of Central Asia.

It was in 1925 that the nominally independent republics of Khiva and Bokhara were dissolved and absorbed into the Soviet Union. Following as this did on the overthrow of the native rulers five years earlier through Soviet instigation and support, anti-Soviet feeling was rife, and a Pan-Bokharan Congress which was held late that year passed resolutions strongly denouncing the Communists for the outrages committed in the process of absorbing this territory.

Amongst those helping the Bokharans against the Soviet was the former brilliant but ruthless Commander-in-Chief of the Turkish Army, Enver Pasha, who, on the defeat of Turkey by the Allies in 1918, had fled to Russia to escape the punishment he anticipated if he fell into Allied hands. The curious mixture of fact, fiction, surmise and legend that has woven itself around the story of his odyssey from then onward until his death, four years later, at the hands of the Bolsheviks makes it difficult to obtain a clear picture of his movements and activities during the closing years of his life. Briefly stated, however, it seems that, posing as a revolutionary nationalist striving to save his country and fellow-Asiatics from imperialist domination, he sought the aid of the Soviet and, after attending the Baku Congress in September 1920, was sent by Lenin to Turkestan to effect the pacification of that area. This done, he was to raise an army of insurgents and lead them through Afghanistan into India for the purpose of liberating the peoples of the East. By this means it was hoped to dissipate the menace of risings in the Orient against the Soviet and, at the same time, divert the attention of the West from Russia to himself.

Even in the days when he had served as an ally of the Germans, however, Enver Pasha had never been noted as a man who kept his word. Instead of carrying out his agreement with the Russians, he was soon found to be plotting against them [9]. According to one account, he became obsessed with the idea of becoming 'the Napoleon of Central Asia, a saviour who should come and deliver the people from the hands of the Philistines, in the persons of the Bolsheviks; . . . he contemplated the formation of a great Moslem state as a buffer against Russia in Asia and would lay the foundation stone of an Asia for the Asiatics' [10]. Be that as it may, he helped the Bokharans against the Soviet, but was eventually caught and killed in battle.¹

¹ Sir Olaf Caroe (p. 99) gives August 1922 as the time of his death, but according to Agabekov it was not until late in 1925.

The Bokharan episode and the part played in it by Enver Pasha may seem to have little to do with the spread of Communism in South and East Asia but it is an example of the way in which Soviet Russia's expansionist policy and her purely Communist policy of stirring up revolution in the East so frequently coincide. By first instigating the overthrow of the princely rulers of Bokhara, she was able to help the cause of World Revolution. Having thereby weakened resistance to herself, she prepared the way for absorbing that territory into the Soviet Union five years later. At this point, therefore, it is convenient to consider briefly some of the main developments in Russian policy during the early years of the Soviet régime and their bearing on the spread of World Communism, if the development of Communism in Asia is to be seen in its proper setting.

Within a few days of coming into power in November 1917, the Soviet government, in its first announcement on foreign policy, had called for a 'just, democratic peace', a peace 'without annexations or indemnities', based on self-determination for all nations by a free vote. Closely following on this came the proposal to repudiate Russia's special rights and interests in China, and January 1918 saw the publication of a Note from Trotsky abrogating the secret treaties relating to Persia. All this may have seemed very altruistic; but in so far as the offer to repudiate Russia's special rights and interests and to abrogate secret treaties was concerned, the primary aim of the new masters of Russia was to show the peoples of Asia, whose adherence to the cause of World Revolution was desired, that the Soviet government had ranged itself on the side of all those opposed to Western imperialism and domination. As for the call for a just, democratic peace without annexations or indemnities, the Bolsheviks had so undermined the morale and fighting spirit of the Russian armies during the preceding months by means of propaganda and agitation that, after coming into power themselves, they were compelled in March 1918 to submit to the humiliating Treaty of Brest Litovsk and surrender vast tracts of Russian territory to the Germans. Trotsky, it is true, had done his best to drag out the treaty negotiations in the hope that, in the meantime, the anticipated revolution in Germany might mature. With this object he had even used the discussions at Brest Litovsk as a platform from which to appeal, over the heads of the scandalized German negotiators, to the German working classes to rise against their rulers. Stalin, however,

had merely derided his efforts as useless and, together with Lenin, voted for peace.

In thus making a separate peace with Germany, Lenin had placed the interests of socialism above the principle of self-determination of nations, as he considered it essential to preserve the gains already achieved by the Bolsheviks in Russia in the socialist cause rather than to bank on the potentialities of a revolutionary movement in the West. Nevertheless, he felt so convinced at this time that a revolution in Germany was necessary for the preservation of those gains that he declared that 'without a revolution in Germany we perish'.

With the rapid collapse of Germany a few months later and the spread of revolution, strenuous efforts were made to bring it to success and, for a time, it seemed as though success might be achieved, as the close of the war brought revolutionary outbreaks not only in Germany, but in Hungary, Italy and the Balkans as well. By the autumn of 1923, however, the spirit of revolution was rapidly fading away in the West and the German revolutionaries and their Comintern friends had bungled matters badly and missed their chance. It was in order to offset the consequent loss of Russian prestige in Germany that Stalin and Bukharin then sought to achieve a Communist success in Asia, with China as the main objective.

Russian hopes had received a further setback when in July 1923 Mustapha Kemal, on whom Moscow had at first looked with favour, and the new Turkish state which he had built up, were recognized by the Allies under the terms of the Treaty of Lausanne. From then on, Turkey had become increasingly pro-British. Friendship between the powers, and more particularly friendship between Asiatic and Western countries, however, was the last thing that Moscow desired. It was, in fact, one of the main planks of her policy to drive wedges between them just as it was a first principle of Communist policy to oppose compromise between labour and capital. Lenin made this first point clear when, in December 1920, he declared that 'the main line of our policy during the last three years' has been 'to make an agreement between them difficult'. In another speech he stressed that, until Russia had 'succeeded in conquering the whole world', the rule to be followed was 'to make use of divergencies and contradictions among the imperialists. . . . We would be even safer if the imperialist powers were to start a war among themselves' [11].

This last sentiment was to be echoed by Stalin in slightly different form thirty-two years later when, on the eve of the Nineteenth

Congress of the CPSU, he came out with an article entitled *Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR* [12], in which he asserted that, in spite of the tension between the Communist and capitalist camps, war between the capitalist powers was more likely than war between the two 'camps'. Both he and Malenkov, who was the principal speaker at the Nineteenth Congress a few days later, made it clear that the main aim of the Communists was to provoke war between these same powers by exploiting the 'divisions and contradictions' among them and stirring up Britain and France against Japan and Germany and all four against the United States of America.

In 1920, the idea of making use of 'divergencies and contradictions among the imperialists' was applied to the Far East, where, as a result of the race in naval armaments and growing friction over China, a head-on collision between America and Japan was looming up as a distinct possibility. With the object of embittering the relations between these two countries still further, Lenin conceived a plan to grant extensive economic concessions to the United States, knowing that this would irritate the Japanese. 'If,' as he remarked, 'we cede Kamchatka, which *de jure* belongs to us and *de facto* is in possession of Japan, to America, we can gain' [13].

The plan succeeded in part, but only in part. An agreement for oil concessions was concluded with an American, who represented himself as having great influence in republican circles, and intense irritation was caused in Japan when news of this transaction began to circulate. Lenin was delighted and expressed his satisfaction by remarking: 'We have already set America and Japan one against the other, and in this way an advantage has been gained' [14].

Unfortunately for Moscow, it soon became clear that the American negotiator was a mere adventurer, whose pretensions rested on an extremely flimsy foundation. Apart, therefore, from the temporary irritation caused to Japan, the plan failed miserably and, thanks to the Washington Conference which opened in November the following year, the tension between the United States and Japan, which Moscow had striven to increase, was removed.

The year 1921, which saw the opening of the Washington Conference in November, was also notable for the introduction of the NEP (New Economic Policy) in Russia in March. As this entailed an attempt to negotiate a loan with America, open hostility to the Western world was temporarily damped down. Moreover, at the Third World Congress of the Comintern in the summer of that year,

armed risings were renounced for the time being and it was agreed that a longer period of preparation by means of the united front policy was required. It was because the need for foreign financial aid was in view that the *Cheka*—whose reign of terror had caused an outcry abroad—was nominally abolished in February 1922 and replaced by the GPU.

Lenin had first broached the subject of a united front with other working class parties and support for labour governments at the Second World Congress of the Comintern in 1920. In a discussion on tactics for the penetration and ultimate control of trade unions, he put forward a recommendation to 'support the Labour Party as the rope supports the man who is to be hanged', an aphorism which an English Communist is said to have interpreted as meaning 'to take them by the hand as a preliminary to taking them by the throat' [15]. It was not, however, until December 1921 that the slogan of a united front was issued by the IKKI for the first time.

The idea of the 'United Front Policy'¹ as sponsored by the IKKI was to take joint action with other left wing elements for the realization of concrete, immediate and non-revolutionary aims by such means as inducing workers to fight for higher wages, shorter hours and lower taxes. By promoting such conflicts the Communists sought to discredit the more moderate reformist leaders, to destroy liberal progressive reform movements which aimed at improving economic and political conditions, and to gain adherents to their own cause. There was no question of seeking to improve the lot of the workers; the sole object was to create a revolutionary situation by fomenting existing grievances or, if there were none, to manufacture them.

It was Radek who coined the term 'United Front' for these tactics which, in every country, were to be carried out from above by the Communist leaders in coalition with other left wing leaders—'temporary, wavering, unstable, unreliable' though these left wingers and their mass organizations might be—and from below by organized attempts of Communist workers to win recruits from the rank and file. In the years ahead, this united front policy was to play an important part in various forms and guises in every country and was

¹ Between the 'United Front' policy, formulated for the first time in 1921, and the policy of a 'Popular Front' launched at the Comintern Seventh World Congress in 1935, there is a subtle difference. The former is in the nature of an agreement between proletarian parties on certain basic issues and lines of action. The latter envisages a similar agreement with bourgeois and other non-working-class organizations.

to serve the purposes both of Russian foreign policy and of World Communism.

1924 provided a further example of the interplay of Russian foreign policy and Communist machinations. The Dawes Plan, which was adopted on 16th August of that year as a means for making Germany solvent, was promptly denounced by Moscow and by Communists in general on the grounds that it would result in Germany being 'colonized' and Balkanized, the control of banks and railways being the classic method of guaranteeing loans to such countries as Turkey, the Balkans and China. In like manner, and for similar reasons, the Marshall Plan, on its adoption twenty-three years later, became the target of Communist abuse and denunciation.

The Marshall Plan of 1947 was followed by the establishment of the Cominform; the Dawes Plan of 1924 was followed by Stalin's proclamation of the theory of 'socialism in one country'. This was a doctrine which was to play an all-important part in the development of World Communism, as it meant in effect 'Russia and its defence against the Western world by all Communists'. Though previously opposed to this theory, Stalin proclaimed it in the autumn of 1924 as though it were his own. In April the following year he advanced it as a policy, and it was adopted eight months later by the Fourteenth Party Conference. At the same time the Comintern, which likewise took it up, became more and more an instrument of Soviet foreign policy. This was clearly reflected in the constant changes and contradictions of Communist slogans and propaganda from 1924 onward: and although the Comintern was ultimately dissolved in May 1943, the role of an employee in the service of Russian foreign policy was similarly assumed by the Cominform, its metamorphosized successor.

One further example of the synthesis of Russian foreign policy and the policy of world Communism during the early years of the Soviet régime calls for mention. This was the prompt denunciation of the Locarno Treaty signed in December 1925. Like the North Atlantic Pact of 1950, and the abortive EDC Treaty of 1954, and for somewhat similar reasons, it was castigated and abused by Moscow and by Communists throughout the world. Stalin himself solemnly declared, 'Locarno is the nucleus of a new European war. . . . Locarno is a plan for the arrangement of the forces of a new war and not for peace' [16].

While Russian foreign policy and the manipulation of the Com-

•

munist movement for World Revolution were becoming increasingly indistinguishable, developments bearing closely on these shifts and changes were taking place in Russia. In March 1921, the month which saw the introduction of the NEP, the RCP(B) at its Tenth Congress placed a ban on the formation of any opposition groups within the Party itself. A drastic purge of its members followed. As the Mensheviks and Social Revolutionaries, who had served as opposition parties at the outset of the Soviet régime, had been suppressed during the later stages of the civil war, this meant a further tightening of the political dictatorship and the removal of the final impediment to the transformation of the new Russia into a totalitarian state. A year later Stalin, who had been quietly building up his position in the Party by taking over key posts in it, was appointed general secretary; and barely had he succeeded to this all-important position before Fate played into his hands. Lenin was struck down with paralysis and, despite a brief recovery, two further strokes followed. On 21st January 1924 he died and Stalin took over the reins of government from him. Stalin's bid for the leadership, however, was not uncontested and he bided his time;¹ but by the autumn of that year he had taken a definite stand to the right and was doing his best to discredit his old rival, Trotsky. The friction between the two had been increasing rapidly as a result of their divergent views, *inter alia*, on the question of China, and it was at this point that Stalin introduced his 'socialism-in-one-country' as a counter to Trotsky's doctrine of 'permanent revolution'. By January 1925 Trotsky had been forced to resign from the post of commissar of war and Stalin's succession to the mantle of Lenin was made still more assured, although for tactical purposes he continued to work with partners. A right wing in the RCP(B) and in the Politburo began to emerge and before the year was out all left wing elements had been evicted from leading positions and totalitarianism followed.

It was in this same year, 1925, that Stalin, in an article published on 30th June, took occasion to draw a distinction between revolutionary action intended merely to obtain reforms and revolutionary action

¹ In a memorandum dictated in lieu of a will on 25th December 1922, Lenin had expressed certain misgivings about Stalin; a few days later, on 4th January 1923, he added a postscript in which he criticized him strongly and proposed his removal from the post of general secretary. This was followed by a series of articles in which he openly attacked him, and in a personal letter to Stalin on 5th March he 'broke off' all personal relations with him: see Deutscher's *Stalin*, pp. 247-52.

for the purposes of 'smashing the old order, of overthrowing the ruling class'. The former he castigated as useless, as it still left power in the hands of the ruling class; the latter he applauded as 'the revolutionary path, the path making for the complete victory of the revolution' [17]. This has become a fundamental principle in the strategy and tactics of Communism in all parts of the world and serves to underline the Communist hatred of all forms of compromise. The idea behind it is that, not only does a compromise leave the ruling class in power, but the grant of reforms, even when obtained under pressure, serves to cool revolutionary ardour. Thus, as far back as 1908, Stolypin's land reform had caused considerable perturbation to Lenin, as he feared that its successful implementation might destroy peasant support for the revolution.

It only remains to add that the first day of January 1923 saw the transformation of Russia into the USSR, that its first Constitution was adopted in 1924, and that the RCP(B), at its Fourteenth Congress in December 1925, changed its name to CPSU(B), the name which it was to retain until October 1952 when, at the Nineteenth Congress, it was decided to drop the (B). This same period also saw the birth of such well-known international Communist organizations as the Comintern and the Profintern in 1919, the MOPR (International Red Aid) in 1922, the Krestintern (Red Peasant International) and VOKS in 1923, and the International Union of Revolutionary Writers in 1925.

From the Profintern, which concerned itself primarily with trade union matters, sprang such bodies as the ISH (International of Seamen and Harbour Workers). This was founded in October 1930 on the basis of the seamen's clubs which the Profintern had established in August 1921 in all the leading ports of the world for the purpose of stirring up strikes, providing couriers, and helping Comintern agents to move around. Readers of Jan Valtin's *Out of the Night* will recall some of these activities and how they were conducted.¹ Another body to which the Profintern gave birth was the PPTUS (Pan-Pacific Trade Union Secretariat), which came into being in May 1927 and was to play an important part in the Far East and to figure prominently in the Noulens case in 1931. The MOPR was also to

¹ The ISH, which only remained active about seven years, was revived in new form in July 1949, when the International Association of Dockers and Seamen was brought into being under the auspices of the Communist-controlled World Federation of Trade Unions. It celebrated its rebirth by supporting the Canadian seamen and London dockers who were then on strike.

play its part in this same case by setting up the Noulens Defence Committee; but the Krestintern, which was founded in Moscow in October 1923 as the agrarian counterpart of the Profintern for the purposes of building up Communist peasant unions and penetrating those already existing, proved to be the least effective of all the Moscow-controlled organizations. This was due to the peasant's lack of sympathy for the claims of urban workers and to his failure to be attracted to Communism, except in so far as it might enable him to obtain the ownership of the land he cultivated.

Of the other bodies mentioned, VOKS, the only one to continue to this day, concerned itself mainly with cultural affairs, the object being to spread the Communist gospel under cultural guise and to exploit individuals and organizations interested in cultural exchange and international friendship. The International Union of Revolutionary Writers was but one of its manifestations, and its real interests were clearly revealed at the International Congress of Writers which it convened in Valencia and Madrid in July 1937. The Russian delegates at this meeting said little or nothing about literature, but concentrated on abuse of Trotsky and André Gide and on praise of Stalin and the Communists [18]. Similar deviations from ostensible purposes have, of course, become common Communist practice since then, as witness the Wroclau Conference of Intellectuals in August 1948, at which abuse of America was far more conspicuous than the alleged aim of world peace, and the Asian and Pacific Trade Union Conference in Peking in November the following year, which hardly mentioned trade union matters at all but concerned itself mainly with ways and means of stirring up armed revolution in South and East Asia.

PART II

Revolutionary Developments
Between the Wars

CHAPTER XIII

The Lesson of Revolution by Alliance [1]

AN attempt has been made to show how the alliance between the Chinese Communist Party and the nationalist KMT was brought into being in January 1924 and how the peasantry, contrary to orthodox Marxist doctrine, came to play such a leading part in the Chinese Communist movement. It has also been seen how, through the split in the alliance in 1927 and through the all-important role which the peasantry had begun to assume by then, the principle of 'armed struggle', which was finally to bring the Communists into power twenty-two years later, came to be adopted.

These developments were but threads in the tangled skein of the Communist movement, but they must be borne in mind if a proper understanding of the revolution in China and its significance is to be obtained. Against this background, we can consider the main developments of the revolution itself during the 1920's and the thoroughly mischievous and bungling part played in it by Moscow.

Borodin, it will be recalled, had arrived in Canton in the autumn of 1923 and, following the decision reached by the KMT at their First National Congress in January 1924 to agree to the Communist proposal for an alliance between the two parties, had set to work to reorganize the KMT and the Nationalist Army on Soviet lines. This reorganization was in full swing when, on 12th March 1925 Sun Yat-Sen, who had played so important a part in making the alliance possible, died. Quick to appreciate the potentialities of the situation created by his death, Borodin set about deifying him in much the same way as the cult of Leninism, with Lenin as the God of the Godless, had been created after the death of that outstanding Bolshevik leader a year previously. By so doing he sought, with success, to broaden support for the national cause.

Two-and-a-half months later there occurred an incident which

Borodin and his friends proceeded to exploit to even greater purpose. This was the clash between police and strikers in Shanghai on 30th May 1925, when a British police post in the International Settlement, in danger of being over-run by an excited mob, opened fire on demonstrators led by students. Ironically, the strike itself and the demonstration to which it gave rise had nothing whatever to do with the British, but was the outcome of labour troubles in a Japanese cotton mill and it was by pure chance that this small detachment of British police was forced to take action. It was a chance, however, which gave the Russians and their Communist protégés the opportunity they wanted, for it provided them with a pretext for whipping up national indignation not only against 'Imperialist aggressors' in general but against British 'imperialism' in particular.

Britain had already been recognized as the main bulwark against the spread of World Revolution. The Soviet leaders had therefore set themselves the task of bringing Britain to her knees, for they reasoned that the imperialist system in Asia would then collapse and World Revolution would follow. To Moscow the Shanghai Incident of 30th May was a Heaven-sent opportunity and it was exploited to the full. Dissimilar as they were in many respects, there was nevertheless a superficial similarity between this incident and the incident of January 1905 in St Petersburg. In both instances revolution was precipitated by the sympathy aroused for the victims of the firing. The fact that in St Petersburg the firing had been directed against a peaceful and orderly procession whereas in Shanghai it was carried out in self-defence when a mob, whipped up into a frenzy by agitators, attacked the police station, was, of course, deliberately overlooked.

As a result of organized agitation and the prompt spate of propaganda and abuse let loose by the Communists, a general strike, accompanied by an anti-British boycott and rioting, was launched in Shanghai. These disorders spread quickly to other towns and cities, including Hong Kong, where strikes and mass withdrawals of labour paralysed the colony for many months. Although Britain was the principal target, the riots soon assumed a general anti-foreign complexion.¹ Those which broke out in Hankow on 11th June, for example, involved the looting of Japanese ships and the killing of a Japanese.

¹ The Moscow-trained labour leader Li Li-San, who was later to come into so much prominence, took charge in Shanghai, where he had been sent to organize the anti-foreign movement.

By 23rd June the rioting had spread to Canton in the south and there occurred an incident which was exploited to as great effect as the 'Shanghai Incident' of 30th May. This was what came to be known as the 'Shameen Affair', Shameen being the narrow strip of land in Canton on which stood the foreign settlements. Starting with a monster demonstration of protest against the shooting in Shanghai, a vast procession of demonstrators bearing provocative banners and shouting threatening slogans wound its way along the border of the foreign Concession. The main body consisted of unarmed persons, but the rear was brought up by some 2,000 soldiers from the Whampoa Military Academy armed with rifles. As these drew level with the small body of foreign naval guards and volunteers manning the boundaries, a rifle shot suddenly rang out and a few minutes later both sides were firing indiscriminately. In the ensuing mêlée a number of casualties were inflicted.

On the foreign side, those chiefly engaged were the French; but in their subsequent exploitation of the incident the Russians and their Chinese friends, in accordance with the policy laid down by Moscow, placed the whole blame on the British, who were accused of having started the firing and were held up to obloquy for massacring peaceful, unarmed demonstrators. It was not until some weeks later that the initial shot, which precipitated the battle, was found to have been fired by a Russian, who had taken up his position at an upper storey window overlooking the procession [2]. Here then, as also at Shanghai a few weeks earlier, was a classic example of the application of the Communist technique of organizing mass demonstrations and deliberately provoking the use of force against the demonstrators to arouse sympathy for the 'martyrs', who are always depicted as peaceful and unarmed and whose actual numbers are invariably multiplied.

In Hong Kong the strike continued for seven months and, simultaneously, a boycott of British trade was enforced in Canton by a Strike Committee, which employed an army of pickets to intimidate and terrorize anyone hesitating to comply with the Committee's demands. Not until September the following year, when a British naval force finally took action, was the boycott brought to an end.

In the meantime Russian agitators had been arriving in China in increasing numbers, the urban masses were coming more and more under Communist leadership, the organization of a peasant movement had been started in Hunan, and a left wing had been developing in the KMT itself. When the Second KMT Congress was held in

Canton in January 1926, it was this left wing which took control.

Chiang Kai-Shek viewed these developments with disfavour and decided that the time had come to curb the increasing swing to the left. After an attempt on his life he therefore carried out a sudden coup on 20th March 1926 against the Communists and trade unions in Canton and at the same time arrested and expelled a number of Russians. The honeymoon period of the CCP-KMT alliance was clearly at an end and Chen Tu-Hsiu, the secretary-general of the CCP, who had never viewed the alliance with much favour, urged the withdrawal of the Communists from the *entente*. Twice he tried to bring this about, but he was overruled on both occasions by Borodin and others, who regarded the continuance of the alliance as essential for the ultimate success of the revolution.

On 5th May, at the cost of a considerable climb-down for the Russians, a compromise was reached with Chiang. This took the form of an agreement on Borodin's part to postpone further organization of the Communist Party and trade unions and to support the KMT in their plans to launch a military expedition northwards with a view to overthrowing the existing administration and war-lords and setting up a nationalist régime. Previously he had been strongly opposed to the idea of this expedition, as he wanted to devote all his energy to completing the organization of the Communist Party itself and of the labour unions and peasant unions, which were being built up under Communist guidance and control, before resorting to armed action.

On 9th July the Northern Expedition set out from Canton. Quickly overcoming all opposition, which had been seriously weakened beforehand by skilful propaganda and the organization of armed risings by peasants and urban proletariat in the enemy's rear, it reached the Yangtse less than two months later. The great river port of Hankow was already in Communist hands by the time the Nationalist Army reached it and, early in December, left wing elements of the KMT, with Borodin as adviser, established the so-called Wuhan government¹ there, under Wang Ching-Wei who, a decade or so later, was to figure as a Chinese 'Laval' during the Japanese occupation.

Chiang, in the meantime, had set up his Headquarters at Nanchang in Kiangsi and ordered the Wuhan government to join him there; but

¹ Wuhan was a contraction of Wuchang-Hankow, the twin cities 700 miles up the Yangtse.

the newly established government refused to do so. The situation quickly developed into an open conflict between the right wing of the KMT under Chiang and the left wing in Hankow under Wang. Before this occurred, however, international complications of a serious nature had been precipitated in Hankow itself where, following the launching of an anti-Christian week by the Communists, anti-foreign demonstrations had broken out. On 3rd January 1927 the British Concession in that city was seized by a mob. A week later Chiang himself arrived to enforce his demands on Wuhan for the transfer of the government to Nanchang; but the left wingers, supported by the Communists, were adamant in their refusal to move.

Angered by the growing independence of the left wing in his own party and apprehensive of the way in which the situation was developing as a result of the tactics and increasing influence of the Communists, Chiang was pondering on what action to take to curb this leftward swing when, on 21st March, Communists in Shanghai engineered a general strike and quickly turned it into open insurrection. The object of this rising was to prepare the way for the capture of the city by the Nationalist forces, which by then had reached a point only twenty miles away. Six hundred thousand workers, all of whom had been trained and organized for the coup, seized the police station and arsenal and quickly overpowered the local garrison. The captured arms, though only sufficient for a fraction of the total number, were then distributed among the workers, who were thereupon organized into revolutionary battalions, and a 'citizens' government' was set up.¹ Chiang Kai-Shek, who arrived a few days later, was therefore able to enter the city unopposed and proceeded at once to take over control.

Valuable, however, as the Communist coup had been to him, Chiang's apprehensions regarding the growing power and influence of the Communists were aroused still further by this action and by the events which took place at Nanking a few days later. After no more than a show of resistance by its defenders, that city fell on 24th March to the Nationalist Sixth Army, a body composed largely of turbulent Hunanese, who promptly set to work systematically to loot the houses of the foreign residents. Seven of these residents—British, American, Japanese, French and Italian—were murdered and several others, both men and women, were wounded or assaulted.

¹ This rising was organized by Chou En-Lai, at that time an unknown young man of twenty-eight, but destined later to become a world figure.

The remainder fled to a small hill and were only saved by the action of British and American gunboats, which opened fire and laid down a barrage between them and their pursuers.

Whether or no this Nanking outrage was, as commonly asserted at the time, a deliberate attempt on the part of the Communists to undermine the power and influence of Chiang Kai-Shek by compromising him with the foreign powers, the effect on Chiang himself was to strengthen his resolve to break the growing power and independence of the Communists. These, he realized, were rapidly becoming a danger to the Nationalist cause. Before he had taken the drastic action he intended, however, there occurred one more incident which probably helped to strengthen his determination still further. This was the raid carried out on the Soviet Embassy in Peking on 6th April by the Manchurian war-lord, Chang Tso-Lin, who arrested seventy-five Communists found hiding there, together with twenty-two Russians, and seized a quantity of documents proving that the Nationalist movement was under Russian control.¹

As Chang Tso-Lin was one of those whom he was seeking to suppress, Chiang registered a formal protest against the raid; but six days later he launched his own coup against the Communists in Shanghai and ordered their extermination in that city on the grounds that they might rise against him and endanger his rear if he pushed on northwards to Peking. All leftist organizations were therefore disbanded and, with the help of the notorious Tu Yueh-Sen² and his gangsters, thousands of Communists were seized and butchered. Chou En-Lai, whose ability in organizing the Communist seizure of the city a month previously had marked him out as a particular object of suspicion, was specially sought and narrowly escaped death when his Headquarters were attacked. Though captured and sentenced to death, he was helped to escape by a KMT officer, who was a former student of his. Nine years later Chou En-Lai and Chiang Kai-Shek were to meet face to face once more in very different circumstances, and twenty-two years later Chou was to become Premier and Foreign Minister of the newly established Chinese People's Republic.

While Shanghai was the main scene of slaughter, similar drastic action against the Communists was taken in Ningpo, Foochow, Amoy, Swatow, Canton and other cities. Elsewhere, however, the

¹ The text of the most important documents seized is given on pp. 799-823 of the *China Year Book* for 1928.

² Known, with good reason, as 'King of the Shanghai underworld'.

Communists were endeavouring to strengthen their position, particularly in the Central Yangtse Valley, by equally forceful means and on 21st May they carried out their first military *putsch* at Changsha. Although quickly suppressed, their action aroused the apprehensions of even the KMT left wing, whose Wuhan government had, in the meantime, been recognized by the Communists as the 'centre of revolution'. The rival government established on 15th April by Chiang Kai-Shek in Nanking, had been characterized a few days later by Stalin himself as the 'centre of counter-revolution'.

The CCP Fifth Congress, which had opened in Hankow on 27th April, underlined this in a manifesto which described Chiang as the representative of the bourgeois section of the KMT and castigated him for winning foreign support in Shanghai by allying himself with the 'imperialists' and thereby deserting the revolution. By his action, it declared, the Wuhan government under the leadership of Wang Ching-Wei had been left as a purified KMT of workers, peasants and petty bourgeoisie and the struggle against imperialism was now linked with the class struggle. Communist praise of the Wuhan government, however, was destined to be short-lived. Little more than a month later a further manifesto was issued, severing relations with this KMT left wing administration which, at the same time, was formally repudiated by the Comintern.

The initial cause of this sudden change was the action of M. N. Roy, the Comintern representative in Hankow, in showing Wang Ching-Wei a confidential telegram from Moscow demanding the immediate use of revolutionary methods in the territory controlled by his government. These were to include the confiscation of land for distribution among the peasants, the formation of a revolutionary army of 50,000, the creation of revolutionary tribunals, and a 'purge' of unreliable generals. This was more than even Wang could tolerate. Instead, therefore, of falling in with the demands, he warned the military commanders of the ultimatum and of the projected coup.

The reaction to this revelation was not long in coming, the first step being a decision to expel all Communists from the KMT. Before the end of June, the Workers Militia in Canton had been disarmed and the trade unions closed by Li Chai-Sum,¹ who also raided the

¹ Li Chai-Sum, known also as Li Chi-Sen, was Chiang's Chief of Staff at this time. Twenty odd years later he went over to the Communist side and became one of the six Deputy Chairmen of the Central (i.e. Chinese) People's Government on its formation in Peking in October 1949.

Soviet Consulate there. In Hankow, where the Fourth National Labour Conference had just ended, the trade union headquarters were raided on 30th June. The situation, however, was somewhat complicated by the fact that, despite its own actions against the Communists, the Wuhan government rejected Chiang's demands for the dismissal of twenty Russian advisers and certain Communists and followed this up on 9th July by declaring war on Chiang's government in Nanking. Paradoxically, too, when the CCP issued its manifesto severing relations with the Wuhan government a few days later and declared that the revolutionary role of Wuhan was at an end, it took no similar action against the KMT itself. Instead, it endeavoured to retain its relations with that body. Its efforts, however, proved fruitless, as the KMT Political Council on 15th July ordered all Communists in the KMT to renounce their Communist Party membership. All those who declined to do so were expelled.

In the meantime Feng Yu-Hsiang,¹ who had hitherto held the balance between Wuhan and Nanking and remained independent of both, had pledged the support of his army to Chiang and, while urging the removal of the more left wing leaders in Hankow, had sought to induce the remainder of the Wuhan government to join Chiang's government in Nanking. Both Feng's advice and Chiang's subsequent demands for the dismissal of the Russian advisers, however, were disregarded. Part of the army in Hankow, which had never given wholehearted support to Wuhan, thereupon took matters into their own hands and turned against it.

Their first action was to break up the various picket corps in the city. This done, they proceeded to occupy the headquarters of all the labour unions there and forced the labour leaders to flee. A few days later Ho Chien, the Nationalist commander in Changsha, marched on Hankow and completed the work they had begun. He expelled Eugene Chen, the Wuhan Foreign Minister, together with Borodin and Galen. Chen, Madame Sun² and other left wing elements fled to Vladivostok soon after, and on 27th July Borodin was forced to leave for Russia via Turkestan. And so, ignominiously, ended the

¹ Many years later Feng Yu-Hsiang, known as the Christian General, was to make his peace with Moscow shortly before his death, and his widow, under the name of Li Teh-Chuan, was to accept high office under the Communist régime in 1949.

² Widow of Sun Yat-Sen and sister of Chiang Kai-Shek's wife. Known also as Soong Ching-Ling, she is now one of the six Vice-Chairmen of the Peking government.

Borodin mission which, by its introduction of Soviet methods of organization, training and propaganda, had enabled the Nationalist armies, with Communist help, to sweep all before them in their victorious advance northwards. It was Borodin's misfortune that, by giving the Nationalists the key to victory over the common enemy, he also enabled them to follow this up by breaking the power of the Communists whose success he had hoped to ensure.

Despite this serious setback to their plans, the Communists decided to hit back. After establishing a revolutionary committee in Nanchang, they launched an armed insurrection on 1st August. This rising, which Chou En-Lai, after his escape from Shanghai, had helped to organize, was led by four men who were destined to play outstanding parts in the years ahead: Yeh Ting, Ho Lung, Chu Teh and Chou En-Lai himself. Yeh Ting, who commanded the New Fourth Army during the war against Japan, was killed in an air crash in April 1946; but the other three have survived to the present day as an army commander, commander-in-chief, and prime minister respectively under the Communist régime.

Although too late to be of more than local and momentary effect, this Nanchang insurrection marked the Communists' final break-away from their policy of co-operation with the KMT. It marked also—and in this lies its main significance—the opening of a new and far-reaching phase in the history, not only of the CCP itself, but ultimately of Communist tactics throughout South and East Asia, for it saw the emergence of military power as a factor in the Chinese Communist movement. Twenty years later, this factor was to be introduced into the Communist movement in other Asiatic countries as well. The PLA,¹ which finally led the Chinese Communists to victory in 1949, traces its origin back to this insurrection and celebrates 1st August each year as Red Army Day, for it was with the aid of these armed insurrectionists that the Workers and Peasants Army was organized soon afterwards. From this army was later to spring the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army, which subsequently formed the basis of the PLA.

Following this successful revolt at Nanchang, Ho Lung and Yeh Ting marched on Swatow which, with the help of the local urban proletariat, they seized and held for twelve days before being compelled by superior forces to withdraw to the hills. There some months later, together with Chu Teh and others, they were able to link up

¹ People's Liberation Army.

with Mao Tse-Tung who, after the failure of the Autumn Harvest Insurrection in September 1927, had been forced to flee to the hilly country around Chingkanshan.

A week after the Nanchang Insurrection on 1st August, the CCP had held an emergency conference, which decided that the time had come to call for armed uprisings of peasants and workers and the formation of soviets. At the same time the luckless secretary-general, Chen Tu-Hsiu, was made the scapegoat for all the disasters that had befallen the Party. Deposed from leadership and replaced by Chu Chiu-Pai, he was later expelled from the CCP and subsequently arrested by the KMT.

It was as a result of the decisions taken at this emergency conference that Mao Tse-Tung was sent to Changsha to organize the Autumn Harvest Insurrection, mentioned above. Owing to the failure of this rising, he too was later dismissed from the Politburo and, according to one account [3], was even submitted to the indignity of being reduced to the position of a probationer in the Party. Mao, however, was of sterner metal than the scholarly Chen Tu-Hsiu. Although forced into the wilderness both actually and metaphorically, he quickly set to work to organize the local peasants into armed bands and by November that year had organized a soviet at Chalin in South-East Hunan. It was from this and other local soviets, established about the same time, that the first Chinese Soviet government was elected four years later. The moderate policy adopted by this government, however, based on slow and regular development, soon came under criticism from the more hot-headed elements in the Party. These were demanding a terrorist policy of raiding, burning and killing landlords; but Mao remained adamant and was bitterly attacked for his refusal to adopt such tactics.

While Mao was following out the policy of rousing the peasants and setting up soviets as laid down at the CCP Conference of 7th August 1927, the call for armed uprisings by the urban proletariat, which had been issued at the same time, was being considered elsewhere. With this object in view, the Communists seized power in Canton by a *coup d'état* on 11th December, and established a Commune. Contrary to Communist expectations, however, the mass of the workers, on whose assistance they had relied for consolidating their initial success, held aloof and no risings occurred anywhere else. Consequently, in the heavy fighting which followed, large numbers of Communists were slaughtered and by the 14th the Commune

had been overthrown and the rising suppressed. Then came reprisals in which some 2,000 Communists were executed and several Soviet officials, including a vice-consul, were shot, while the Soviet consul-general and others of his staff were arrested.

The German Communist, Heinz Neumann, who had staged the rising in accordance with Comintern instructions, escaped; but, like the hapless Chen Tu-Hsiu, who had been held responsible for the failure of the Comintern policy of CCP collaboration with the KMT, he was made the scapegoat for the Canton fiasco and was recalled in disgrace. Although he was subsequently used by the German Communist Party in their struggle with the Socialists, he was put to death in Moscow in 1936 as an alleged Trotskyist, while his widow, Margarete Buber, was imprisoned until 1941, when she was taken to the German frontier and handed over to the Gestapo.¹

The Communist uprising in Canton marked the final stage in the revolution of 1925-7 and, for the time being, the end of the Soviet attempt to bring the Chinese Communists into power. With the suppression of the short-lived Commune on 14th December, Chiang Kai-Shek ordered the closure of all Soviet consulates in Nationalist territory and the complete severance of relations with the USSR. Moscow's note of protest a week later against the closing of the consulates and the execution and molestation of Soviet consular officials was met with the reply that the consulates had been closed as a defensive measure against the illegal activities of Soviet officials, who were described as being bent on 'denationalizing the Nationalist movement and converting China into a mere appendage of the USSR' [4]. Another five years were to go by before Sino-Soviet diplomatic relations were restored once more on 12th December 1932. A further five years after that were to pass before, in very different circumstances, the CCP and the KMT were to renew their alliance.

¹ Margarete Buber, who was eventually released from a German concentration camp by the Allies in 1945, described the full story of this treacherous episode in her book *Under Two Dictators*, published by Gollancz in 1949. In that same year she figured as one of the principal witnesses on behalf of Kravchenko, author of *I Chose Freedom*, in the libel action he brought against his Communist detractors in Paris.

CHAPTER XIV

The Chinese Revolution Enters a New Phase

WHILE the Chinese Communist Party was temporarily 'down' and scattered to the winds, it was by no means 'out'. Mao and the Communist leaders of the Nanchang rising were already starting to organize those peasant bands which, evolving into the People's Liberation Army, were ultimately to bring the Communists to power. The more orthodox Chinese Communists, however, still thought of revolution in terms of towns and cities and urban proletariat and looked askance at Mao's unorthodox ways. This main body of the Party, being hunted men, established an 'underground' headquarters in Shanghai; but, as it was impossible in the existing circumstances to hold any large-scale gathering in China, it was decided to hold a congress in Moscow to discuss changes in policy necessitated by the situation in which they now found themselves.

This Sixth Congress of the CCP was opened in the Russian capital in July 1928, simultaneously with the holding of the Sixth World Congress of the Comintern there, and was attended by Chou En-Lai, Li Li-San and other prominent leaders. A ten-point programme was drawn up and a political resolution, somewhat grandiloquent in view of the sorry circumstances of the moment, declared: 'The Chinese revolution will affect neighbouring countries, large colonies like India, Indo-China, Java and Korea—arousing the teeming masses of those oppressed nations to political struggle; it will fundamentally shake the foundations of imperialist Japan and England and deal a heavy blow to capitalism in the USA. Therefore, the completion of the Chinese revolution will be the prelude to the victory of the world proletariat dictatorship.'¹ It also laid down the important

¹ In view of the way in which Peking has, since the close of 1949, become a second centre of World Revolution, this early instance of the Chinese Communists' emphasis on their own importance in achieving the ultimate aim of

principles, which Mao had previously advocated in face of Comintern opposition, that the 'best method of inducing the vast toiling masses to participate in political rule and to realize the democratic dictatorship of workers and peasants' was 'to establish the rule of councils of workers', peasants' and soldiers' deputies (soviets)' [1].

In addition a new constitution was adopted, giving priority to factories and unions over villages and looking to the Comintern as the supreme authority and guiding hand of the CCP. And here it may be noted as indicative of the changes, which were to be brought about by the somewhat unorthodox methods which Mao was just beginning to evolve in the distant hills of Hunan and Kiangsi, that when, seventeen years later, this constitution was replaced by another, it was the villages and peasantry that were then accorded pride of place over the factories and urban workers. By that time, moreover, the Comintern had ceased to exist and 'the Thought of Mao' had replaced that body as 'the guiding hand' of the CCP.

For the two-and-a-half years following the Sixth CCP Congress, it was Li Li-San who was the recognized leader of the CCP. Throughout the black days of 1928-31 he clung to the dogma of an urban proletarian base and sought to capture local towns and cities by indiscriminate uprisings; but the urban proletariat failed to rise, as he had relied on armed force to achieve his purpose without considering the need of organizing the masses and winning their support beforehand. As a result of his consequent failure, he was deposed from the leadership on Comintern instructions in November 1930. Nine months later a Comintern directive ordered the abandonment of his policy and urged, in its place, an attempt to win the support of the masses. Li Li-San himself was summoned to Moscow, where he was to remain until the summer of 1945, when he re-emerged under the assumed name of Li Min-Sen with the Soviet forces in Manchuria in their brief war against the Japanese.

Another year was to go by before the Central Committee of the CCP was to move, in the autumn of 1932, from its 'underground' world. Communism is not without interest. A year later Li Li-San was to assert that China, not Russia, was the pivot of the world liberation movement, and in June 1930 a CCP Politburo resolution declared that China was 'the place where the volcano of the World Revolution is most likely to erupt'. In the years that followed this theme was gradually developed in such a way that eventually the Chinese Communists were able to evolve the claim of China to be, not only a second centre of World Revolution but, as Liu Shao-Chi declared in November 1949, the guide and model for all Communist parties in South and East Asia to follow.

headquarters in Shanghai to the mountain fastnesses of South Kiangsi where Mao had, by then, established a provisional Chinese Soviet government. Li Li-San's removal, however, marked the virtual end of the CCP's career on strictly orthodox lines. It marked, too, the close of that phase in which the Comintern played a direct and active part in its development. Before considering the untoward results of Comintern interference, however, a brief account must be given of Mao's activities from the close of 1927 when, following his disagreement with the Central Committee of the CCP, he organized his first soviet at Chalin in South-East Hunan, down to November 1931 when, under his chairmanship, the First All-China Soviet Congress was held at Juichin in South Kiangsi and Mao himself emerged as the outstanding figure in the Chinese Communist movement.

It was in the spring of 1928 that Chu Teh, after the Nanchang uprising and temporary seizure of Swatow in the previous summer, joined Mao at Chingkanshan. There, with his own small force and some 2,000 others, the remnants of Yeh Ting's and Ho Lung's armies, he formed the grandiloquently styled Fourth Red Army in August that year, with himself as its commander and Mao as the political leader. Constantly harried by nationalist forces greatly superior in strength, this little body of Communist troops, with little to eat and desperately short of arms and ammunition, was nearly at the end of its tether when, in February 1929, it won its first military victory over its Nationalist opponents and thereupon began driving out the landlords. The effect was instantaneous. Until then, the Communists had received but little support. With this victory, however, recruits came pouring in and by the following year the Red Army had risen from a few thousands to some 61,000, while a number of soviets—akin to the national liberation committees which were to spring up for similar purposes in Eastern Europe towards the close of the Second World War—were established in the mountainous area of the Hunan-Kiangsi border.

With the Red Army well on its way to becoming a force to reckon with, basic principles for its organization and establishment on a proper footing were laid down by Mao at a military conference held in Kutien in December 1929. In the spring of the following year the revolutionary peasant army began to march north through Kiangsi and Hunan. So seriously was the growing menace of this armed force and the resurgence of revolution taken by the Chinese Nationalists that the conflicts which, in the meantime, had been taking place

between the various nationalist groups, were brought to an end and Chiang Kai-Shek, after establishing his headquarters in Nanchang, launched an 'extermination campaign' against the Communists in these two provinces in December 1930. This was the first of five such campaigns, the first four of which were to end disastrously for the Nationalists, though the fifth, which was to last from October 1933 to October 1934, was to force the Communists to set off on their famous 'Long March' of 6,000 miles to Yen-an in Shansi.

It was shortly after the close of the third of these annihilation campaigns that, on 7th November 1931, the First All-China Soviet Congress was opened at Juichin in South Kiangsi. The outcome of this meeting was the establishment of a provisional Chinese Soviet government and the adoption of a constitution for Soviet China. Thereby China became the first country outside Russia to have a Soviet government, a Red Army, and a sizeable territory under Communist control. Soviet districts had, by then, been established in five provinces—Kiangsi, Hupeh, Hunan, Anhwei and Honan—and the Red Army, characterized by great mobility and with Chu Teh as commander-in-chief, had risen in strength to about 150,000. Of these, however, only three-quarters had rifles. This was certainly a handicap; but against this was set the fact that, not only was this army supported by the peasantry, it was organically connected with the peasants.

By this time, therefore, the whole face of the Chinese revolution had been changed. Not only was the alliance with the KMT a thing of the past; even more striking and significant was the fact that the peasantry had replaced the urban proletariat as the basic force behind the movement. The Communist-controlled labour unions, which had played so important a part in the early stages, had virtually ceased to exist and from shortly after June 1927, when the Fourth National Labour Congress, attended by 420 delegates representing close on three million workers, was held in Hankow, until August 1948, when the Sixth National Labour Congress was held in Harbin—a gap of twenty-one years—the Communists received but little support from organized labour. It is true that another Labour Congress, the fifth, was held in Shanghai in November 1929; but by then the Communist Party had been shattered and the Congress, which had to be convened in secret, with only forty delegates present, merely served to emphasize the almost complete elimination of urban labour as the basic force behind the Communist movement.

For a few years longer the Central Committee of the Party, acting on Comintern instructions, refused to face up to the facts of the situation and continued with disastrous results the attempt to base its actions on the urban proletariat; but although this ostrich-like attitude was not given up entirely until about 1933, the remnants of the Central Committee showed sufficient recognition of the untenability of their stand in 1932 by fleeing from Shanghai and taking refuge in the interior with Mao Tse-Tung, who had no illusions whatsoever about the true position. From then on until the establishment of the Communist régime in Peking in 1949, it was the peasant, not the urban worker, who formed the spearhead and basic force of the revolution. At this point, therefore, it may not be out of place to note briefly the salient features in the rise and fall of the Communist-controlled labour unions which, at the outset, had played so important a part.

It was in May 1922 that, at the instigation of the Secretariat of the Chinese Labour Organization—a body established by the CCP for the express purpose of directing the workers' movement—the First National Labour Congress was held in Canton. Attended by 162 delegates claiming to represent 200,000 workers, it paved the way for the initiation of a series of strikes. Outstanding among these was the Peking-Hankow railway strike, launched in February 1923, for it opened a new phase in the Chinese workers' movement by transforming the economic struggle for improvement in livelihood into a political struggle for freedom. Its characterization by the present régime in Peking as 'a milestone in the history of the Chinese working class movement' [2] is well justified. Following this strike, which was sternly suppressed,¹ two more years were to pass before the Second National Labour Congress was held in May 1925, Canton again being the meeting place. Organized labour had already made considerable progress by this time and the 277 delegates attending represented over half-a-million workers, nearly treble the number at the time of the First Congress three years earlier. But perhaps the most striking and significant feature of this gathering was the increasing emphasis placed on the political role of the labour unions.

¹ In an article commemorating the eighteenth anniversary of this incident, the NCNA asserted that 'hundreds of strikers were massacred at the instigation of the foreign powers' by Wu Pei Fu; but this is clearly a gross exaggeration. Even Hu Chiao Mu, the official historian of the Party, only puts the number of killed at 'some forty workers', though he stated that, in addition, 'several hundreds' were injured.

The economic aspect received but little attention as compared with the political, which was summed up in the slogan, 'Mobilization of labour for the struggle against imperialism and feudalism!' It was, incidentally, at this Congress that the Chinese Labour Organization Secretariat was transformed into the All-China Federation of Labour, which name it retained until May 1953, when it became the All-China Federation of Trade Unions.

By the time the Third National Labour Congress was held in May 1926, a new and important factor had begun to make its appearance—a factor which was to change the whole face of the Chinese revolution in the years ahead. This was the organization of the peasantry into unions under Communist control. Although few, if any, of those present at the Congress could have realized the full significance of this new development, recognition of its importance was accorded in a resolution which stressed that the peasant masses were the most reliable allies of the working class in the revolutionary struggle.

Between the holding of the Second Congress in May 1925 and of the Third in May 1926, the labour unions had more than doubled their membership. No less than 502 delegates attended the Third Congress and represented 1,241,000 workers. A year later, when the Fourth Congress assembled in June 1927, the number of delegates was reduced to 420, but membership of the unions they represented had risen to 2,900,000.¹ This, however, proved to be the high-water mark, which was not to be reached again for over twenty years. Moreover, by the time this Fourth Congress met, the first signs of the coming rapid ebb were already visible.

March 1927 had witnessed the first large-scale armed rising of workers, when the urban proletariat in Shanghai had seized control of the Chinese city and thereby enabled Chiang Kai-Shek and his victorious army to enter unopposed. It was this action that may be said to have marked the turning point in the workers' movement; for it demonstrated clearly the growing power of the urban proletariat and led Chiang to his decision to curb this potential threat to himself by carrying out the coup of 12th April against the Shanghai workers. While, therefore, the Fourth National Labour Congress, which opened in Hankow on 19th June, claimed to represent close on three

¹ The figures given for the number of delegates attending each of these Congresses and the number of workers they claimed to represent are taken from an article issued by the NCNA on 13th April 1953, as a background to the Seventh Labour Congress held in Peking in May 1953.

million members—considerably more than double the number represented at the Third Congress a year previously—stern repressive measures, which were to lead to the virtual suppression of the labour unions before the year was out, were already in operation. Even while the Congress was in session, Li Chai-Sum was disarming the workers' militia in Canton and closing down the trade union organizations there, and this was followed on the final day of the Congress by the second great massacre of workers in Shanghai.

The final knock-out blow, which was to keep urban labour out of the Communist ring for more than two decades to come, came in December 1927, when the short-lived Canton Commune was so drastically suppressed and relations with Russia severed. The urban proletariat, however, had by this time learned its lesson, and the failure of this disastrous episode was, in fact, largely due to the way in which the workers, as a whole, remained aloof and passive.

CHAPTER XV

Sino-Soviet Relations and Comintern Bungling

ALTHOUGH, little by little, the interests of world Communism came to be subordinated to those of Russia on occasions when they were at variance, there was, in the opening stages of Sino-Soviet relations, an unresolved incompatibility between the Comintern's desire to develop a Communist movement in China, and the Soviet government's attempt—as shown by Karakhan's note of July 1919 proposing the renunciation of Russia's special rights and privileges and his second appeal in September 1920—to win Chinese recognition. To seek for formal recognition and the establishment of diplomatic relations while at the same time helping to develop a Communist movement, one of whose known aims would be to overthrow the government from which recognition was sought, was clearly a tricky matter. This running with the hare and hunting with the hounds was but one of several feats of jugglery which Moscow, in its dual capacity of capital of the Soviet Union and headquarters of the Comintern, attempted with varying degrees of success and failure to perform. It was, nevertheless, this conflict of interests and the clumsy attempts to work for two opposing aims at one and the same time that served to bedevil the Communist cause in China throughout the 1920's and bring it to disaster.

Some idea of the juggling which went on over the question of recognition is reflected in the instructions sent to Joffe. In 1922 he was sent to Peking to seek Chinese recognition and then, because the IKKI had accepted Mahring's recommendation of the KMT as the best hope, he was instructed to contact Sun Yat-Sen, who was in revolt against Peking, and who was then in Shanghai. The outcome of that meeting was the joint statement of 26th January 1923, leading to the KMT-CCP alliance. But although one of the main objects of this alliance was to overthrow the war-lords and the existing régime in

China, the attempt to seek the recognition of the Peking government was continued and was eventually brought to a successful conclusion by the treaty of 31st May 1924. This was followed four months later by a separate treaty with the Manchurian war-lord, Chang Tso-lin. By the close of 1924, therefore, the Soviet Union had established formal relations with three separate Chinese governments, each hostile to the other. To maintain friendly relations with three such bodies at the same time could have been no easy matter; but the main difficulty came, not so much from the juggling which went on over the question of recognition, as from the mistakes and contradictory instructions of the Comintern. It was due to these that diplomatic relations with Peking were broken off in April 1927 and that Chiang Kai-Shek ordered the complete severance of relations with the USSR eight months later and that the Communist movement met with such disaster.

Apart from the initial help given to the organization of the CCP and to bringing the Secretariat of the Chinese Labour Organization under Soviet influence, it was not until after Mahring's meeting with Sun Yat-Sen in August 1922 and the IKKI's consequent decision to turn its attention to Dr Sun that the Comintern began seriously to interfere in China's internal affairs. On 12th January 1923 came their instructions to the CCP to co-ordinate its activities with the KMT; and here, at the very outset, as already seen, they made the fatal mistake of omitting Lenin's all-important proviso regarding alliances and agreements. On the other hand Dr Sun, who only a few months earlier had declared that the Soviet system was unsuitable for China, had agreed by the summer of 1923 to adopt it lock, stock and barrel and thereby laid the way for the complications which later brought about the rupture of the KMT-CCP alliance.

Sun's agreement for its adoption having been obtained, there followed the arrival of Borodin's mission to implement it. Borodin, it is true, came as an adviser from the CPSU Politburo and not as the representative of the Comintern; but the policy which he proceeded to carry out was largely, if not wholly, that of the Comintern. His first two years in Canton, however, were spent mainly in the dual task of reorganization and training, and both the CCP and the KMT profited greatly from the ability and zeal he displayed in the military as well as the political field. They profited too from the way in which he exploited the opportunities presented by Sun Yat-Sen's death in March 1925 and by the Shanghai Incident of two-and-a-half months

later. Up to the beginning of 1926, therefore, Moscow's policy of developing the KMT-CCP alliance, although opposed by Trotsky, had proceeded without any serious hitch; but in March that year the honeymoon period of the alliance was brought to an abrupt end by Chiang's first coup against the Communists. Instead of heeding Chen Tu-Hsiu's warnings and accepting his advice for an immediate break with the KMT, the Comintern insisted on the necessity of continuing to co-operate with the Nationalists and in April, as a conciliatory gesture, even went to the length of taking the curious and unusual step of admitting the KMT into its own charmed circle by accepting it as 'a sympathizing party'.

From this time onward Moscow's obsession with the idea that the CCP alliance with the KMT should be maintained at all costs—even at the cost of running counter to fundamental Leninist principles—drove the Communists into ever deepening waters. When ultimately, rather more than a year later, the Comintern awoke to the disastrous effects of its policy, a scapegoat had to be found and it was on the luckless Chen that the vials of its wrath were poured, despite the fact that it was he who had opposed that policy.

Although Chen has, ever since, been held up to particular obloquy for his alleged sin of 'opportunism', it may be noted in passing that his immediate successors to the leadership of the Party were also made scapegoats for the follies of the Comintern, whose directives were often contradictory and almost always ill-conceived. Thus Chu Chiu-Pai, who succeeded him in August 1927, was later condemned for 'putschism',¹ though in fact he had been merely acting in accordance with Comintern instructions. Chu was followed by Li Li-San, who, in due course, suffered a similar fate after his policy—which also was that of the Comintern—of aiming to capture local cities by local uprisings had proved a costly failure.

That the Comintern had pursued a mistaken policy could never be admitted. A failure due to the luckless individual's having followed out Comintern instructions was therefore conveniently regarded as a 'deviation' and punished accordingly by dismissal. Even Mao Tse-Tung was dismissed from the Chinese Politburo in November 1927 for 'deviation'. His particular 'deviation' was ostensibly his somewhat unorthodox attitude in regard to the peasantry, but his real 'crime' was almost certainly the failure of the Autumn Harvest insurrections, which he had organized in accordance with instructions issued by the

¹ The Communist jargon for starting revolts without sufficient mass support.

Comintern representative, Lominadze, at the CCP emergency conference early in August that year.

Returning, however, to Moscow's obsession with the idea that the CCP alliance with the KMT should be maintained at all costs, an example of how this led to contradictory instructions merits notice. This was in October 1926 when the CCP, which two years earlier had been instructed to win the peasants over to the Communist cause by inciting them to turn against the landlords and seize the land for themselves, was ordered to keep the peasant movement in check so as not to anger the Nationalist generals, many of whom were landlords. While it is true that Stalin subsequently confessed that this was a mistake [1] and while it is true, too, that the order was cancelled a month later by the IKKI, which thereupon advocated agrarian revolution, it provided a typical instance of the way in which the Comintern hovered between contradictory and incompatible policies. Here it was ordering the development of the peasant movement and, at the same time, insisting that nothing should be done to upset the landlords.

Equally contradictory were the orders to ensure the continuance of collaboration with the KMT while, at the same time, seeking to bring about the overthrow of Chiang Kai-Shek. Yet, like so much else, it was simply an example of Moscow's desire to eat its cake and keep it. To strive so ardently to remain Chiang's ally and, simultaneously, to seek his downfall was folly; but the truth was undoubtedly contained in Chiang's accusation, when finally the rupture came, that Stalin was subordinating the task of Chinese national liberation to that of social revolution.

In line with this was the way in which, after Chiang's slaughter of the Communists in Shanghai in April 1927, Stalin glibly declared that events had proved the correctness of the Comintern line in collaborating with the KMT—a statement which Trotsky ridiculed with biting irony—and then proceeded to maintain that Wuhan was 'the centre of revolution' and Nanking 'the centre of counter-revolution'. Yet three months later, as a result of the developments which followed Roy's action in telling Wang Ching-Wei of the contents of Moscow's telegram, the Comintern reversed its verdict by declaring that the revolutionary role of Wuhan was at an end but that the CCP must maintain its relations with the KMT. The Wuhan government was formally repudiated and relations with it were severed, but Moscow continued to cling to the illusion that relations with the

KMT could and should be maintained. The KMT, however, held different views and decided to break with the CCP once and for all; but even this unequivocal announcement failed to dispel the Comintern's illusions entirely for, nearly a fortnight later, Stalin was still talking of gaining control of the KMT, as though this were still feasible, and was merely suggesting alternative measures to be employed in the event of failure to do so.

The alternative suggested by him was the creation of soviets. Accordingly, on 26th July, he ordered the Chinese Communists to begin injecting the idea of soviets into their propaganda so that, if they failed to obtain control of the KMT, they could lead the masses to form soviets. Here again was an example of the way in which orders and counter-orders followed each other from Moscow in rapid succession, for only two months previously, at the Eighth Plenum of the IKKI, Stalin had vigorously opposed the creation of Chinese soviets. That the unhappy Communist leaders in China became confused and bewildered by the succession of contradictory orders and instructions from the Comintern is hardly surprising.

In no instance, however, was the truth of the old military adage, 'Order! Counter-order! Disorder!', better or more disastrously exemplified than in that of the conflicting and ill-conceived orders put out by Moscow in regard to armed action. It was thanks to Comintern instructions to hide or destroy their arms that the Communists, when attacked in Shanghai in April 1927, were left powerless to defend themselves and were butchered in their thousands. It was not until later in the year, when the opportunity for effective action was past, that armed uprisings were sanctioned. This belated permission, combined with Moscow's pathetic belief in the readiness of the urban proletariat to play the leading role in the revolution long after any such likelihood had disappeared, led to the disastrous fiasco of the Canton Commune in December 1927 and subsequent costly failures. But the crowning folly of refusing to face facts was surely the order given to the CCP in mid-1928 to take the offensive, for by then the Party existed in little more than name, the labour union organizations had shrunk almost to nothing, and the Party organizations in towns and cities were scattered and crushed.

It was in May 1930 that Pavel Mif, the last Comintern representative to be sent to China, arrived. By the time of his departure some two years later, the remnants of the old Chinese Communist leadership had been forced to give up their fugitive existence in Shanghai

and had taken refuge with the future leader, Mao Tse-Tung, in the interior. A new chapter in the history of Chinese Communism was beginning, a chapter in which, free from the trammels and ill-considered meddling and muddling of the Comintern, a far more effective, finely tempered, and vigorous machine, based mainly on the peasantry and adapted to Chinese conditions, was gradually built up and painfully welded into shape. By the time direct contact with Moscow was renewed in the summer of 1945, the Comintern itself was dead and the masters of the Kremlin had learned their lesson.¹ Henceforth fraternal advice and ideological guidance were to be freely tendered, but no attempt was to be made to restore the leading strings which had proved so fatal to the prospects of Mao's predecessors and of their disciples in the 1920's.

¹ Beloff (p. 28) quotes Mao as declaring, on the occasion of the dissolution of the Comintern in May 1943, that this organization had not intervened in the internal affairs of the CCP since 1935. Chou En-Lai reinforced this statement in an interview reported in the *New York Times* of September 9th 1946, when he asserted that direct links between the CCP and the Soviet Union had been severed in 1935.

CHAPTER XVI

The Communist Movement in Japan [1]

IN an earlier chapter an attempt was made to trace the history of Communism and other subversive doctrines in Japan down to 1925, when the grant of Manhood Suffrage served to provide the more moderate elements amongst the Japanese socialists and labour unions with the chance to achieve their aims by constitutional means rather than by force, by evolution rather than by revolution.

One of the outstanding features of the 1920's was the way in which Japanese Communists looked so constantly to the Comintern for funds, instructions and advice. Since the close of the Second World War, fuller details of this situation have been made available through the publication of reminiscences by a number of former Japanese Communist leaders. From these there emerges a picture of a constant succession of Japanese Communists visiting Comintern representatives in Shanghai or Moscow for consultation and advice and returning with funds and instructions:¹ Osugi, who met his death in prison by strangulation at the time of the great earthquake in Japan in 1923; Sano and Kondo, Arahata Kanson and Sakai Toshihiko, all of whom were later to become disillusioned with Communism and leave the Party; Tokuda, who was to emerge as the fiery secretary-general after being released from seventeen years in prison on the conclusion of the war; Fukumoto and Yamakawa, who caused a serious split in the Party in 1926 and later renounced their membership of it. These and others were among the more prominent Communists of those days who paid visits to Shanghai or Moscow to obtain funds and instructions.

In addition, a considerable number of Japanese Communists went

¹ For a description of how this frequent coming and going was made possible in the face of police precautions and obstructions, the reader may be referred to pages 23-24 of Swearingen and Langer's *Red Flag in Japan*.

to Moscow for training at the KUTV, while others attended such international meetings and congresses as those of the Comintern, the Profintern, the Communist Organizations of the East, and the Toilers of the Far East. Close touch was also maintained with the Soviet Embassy in Tokyo and contact was made from time to time with Comintern agents visiting Japan. Left wing elements of the labour movement, for their part, established the Communist-controlled Japan Labour Union Council, which became affiliated with the Pan-Pacific Trade Union Secretariat, a Communist-sponsored body founded in Hankow in May 1927 as the Eastern counterpart of the Profintern. Other Japanese were appointed to the Comintern Secretariat in Moscow for limited periods or took refuge in the Soviet capital, prominent among these being Nozaka who, under the name of Okano, was later to join the Chinese Communist headquarters at Yen-an during the war and then, in December 1945, returned to Japan after fourteen years' exile, to head the post-war Japanese Communist Party.

One way and another, therefore, it will be seen that the early history of the Party was marked by close and constant supervision and guidance by the Comintern which kept it in leading strings. But it was an unruly party, given to frequent bouts of internal dissension and factionalism. It suffered, too, from the constant attempts by the Japanese authorities to suppress it and root it out. More than once it was dissolved, and on numerous occasions it was left hopelessly disorganized and virtually leaderless as a result of the wholesale arrests of its leaders and round-ups of its rank and file.

Even before the formal inauguration of the Party in July 1922, there had been bitter rivalry and conflict between the various left wing factions in Japan, the outstanding instance being in 1921, when the anti-Bolshevik anarcho-syndicalists and pro-Bolshevik socialists had come to blows. After the Party had been formed factionalism soon became rife and in 1926 was brought to a head by a serious clash between two opposing schools of thought in its ranks. To understand how this came about it is necessary to turn back to the dissolution of the Party in March 1924.

The arrest of most of the leaders and many of the rank and file in June the previous year had left the Party seriously crippled and badly disorganized. The confidence in the organization's future of those still at large had been badly shaken, and a faction centring around Yamakawa and Sakai, two of the oldest revolutionaries, began to

advocate the temporary disbandment of the Party. Despite the opposition of a small section, this view eventually won acceptance. Accordingly, in March 1924, it was decided to dissolve until such time as circumstances became more favourable. In the meantime, the Communist leaders were to concentrate on the organization and penetration of legal trade unions and political groups with a view to preparing the ground for a future revival.

On learning of this decision, the Comintern expressed its strong disapproval and sent urgent instructions for an immediate reorganization. A special committee was formed in Moscow in June that year to deal with the 'emergency' in Japan, and in January 1925 Sano, Tokuda, Arahata and other Japanese Communists went to Shanghai to confer with Comintern and Profintern representatives there.

The upshot of this meeting was the production of a thesis calling for the immediate revival of the Party and for the establishment of a propaganda organ. On their return to Japan with these instructions, however, the Japanese delegates found themselves faced with even greater difficulties than they had anticipated, as the Peace Preservation Law, which had been enacted in April, placed an effective weapon in the hands of the government for dealing with 'the spread and diffusion of dangerous thoughts'. The task of reorganization had, therefore, to be carried out with the greatest caution and circumspection.

Although the intervening months witnessed a number of secret meetings at which plans for the future were drawn up, and although clandestine visits to Moscow were paid by Tokuda and other Japanese Communists, it was not until December 1926 that a skeleton organization for the revival of the Party was finally evolved. This, together with the production of a programme, the first official platform of the Japanese Communist Party, was the outcome of the so-called Third Congress or Convention, held secretly at the Goshiki Hot Springs in Northern Japan from 3rd to 5th December by a group of Communists posing as businessmen.

The programme, which consisted of thirteen planks, together with the plans for reorganization, was taken by two of the members to Moscow, where it met with a mixed reception. The Comintern complained that the programme lacked any real plan of action and was too abstract, while the proposed reorganization was too limited in scope and insufficiently comprehensive to embrace the masses.

It so happened that most of the leading Communists were still in prison at the time of the Goshiki meeting. In their absence the leading spirit in bringing about the revival of the Party and in moulding its strategy was a young professor named Fukumoto, who had been an almost unknown figure until his return from a two-year visit to Europe and America in 1924. Briefly stated, his view was that the Japanese Communist Party should be built up on the principles of class organization and class struggle and that its leadership should be kept in the hands of true Marxists. His aim was to produce an organization of professional revolutionaries determined to avoid the danger of absorption by mass organizations tainted by the presence of reactionary labour and socialist leaders. These views, however, were strongly opposed by a section of the Party and more particularly by Yamakawa¹ and his followers, who advocated a link-up with the masses through the medium of the labour unions and farmer guilds and a broad base for both Party membership and leadership. When, therefore, some weeks after the Goshiki meeting, most of the more experienced Communist leaders were released from gaol, violent discord arose, centred around the question of 'Fukumotoism', which was strongly supported by some and vigorously denounced by others. The Comintern's under-cover representative in Tokyo took up the cudgels on behalf of the latter and, as a result of his reports to Moscow, seven of the Party leaders, including Fukumoto himself, were summoned to the Russian capital to appear before the special committee set up by the Comintern to deal with the Japanese problem.

For three months, from April to July 1927, this committee studied the Japanese programme, criticized it and the opposing views of Fukumoto and Yamakawa, and hammered out a new thesis, which was to guide the Japanese Communist Party for the next five years. This thesis, which was finally adopted by the IKKI on 15th July and became known as the Bukharin Thesis, laid down that the task in Japan was to bring about a bourgeois-democratic revolution to eliminate the remnants of feudalism and to follow this up with a socialist revolution. With this aim in view, the Party was to strive to unite the proletariat, farmers, and petty bourgeoisie into one bloc.

¹ According to Swearingen and Langer (p. 20) Yamakawa left the Party in the spring of 1924, 'never to return', but Colbert (p. 18) indicates that he did not secede until after the reorganization in December 1926 and later says (p. 339) that he was expelled 'some time before 1929'. Napier (p. 4) shows him as chairman of the Control Committee in the reorganization of December 1926, which appears to bear out Colbert and others.

Unfortunately for Fukumoto, the Japanese delegation became drawn into the controversy then raging between Stalin and Trotsky, and Fukumoto found himself identified with the Trotsky faction and branded accordingly as a left wing deviationist. While Fukumoto was denounced for holding the view that the Communist Party, as the vanguard of the masses, must remain ideologically pure and for exposing the Party to the danger of isolation from the masses, Yamakawa came in for equally strong condemnation as an opportunist and for failing to appreciate the need for an independent, strictly disciplined Communist Party.

On the conclusion of their deliberations in Moscow the Japanese delegates returned to their own country, armed with the newly prepared thesis and zealous in their determination to carry out the instructions received from their Comintern masters. At the start, fortune seemed to favour them; for a general election, the first since the introduction of Manhood Suffrage three years earlier, was to be held in February 1928. Though lacking any legal standing as a Party and liable to persecution for their activities as individuals, the Communists nevertheless sought to turn the election campaign to their own advantage by infiltrating some of their members into the Labour-Farmer Party and supporting secret sympathizers among the left wing candidates.¹ But their hopes of spreading the gospel by this means were short-lived. On 15th March, less than a month after the elections, the police carried out a sudden round-up of Communists and Communist suspects. About 500 were arrested, among them such outstanding leaders as Tokuda, Shiga and Nozaka. The first two were to spend the next seventeen-and-a-half years in prison while Nozaka, after being released on health grounds in 1930, fled to Moscow.

The round-up was followed a month later by further arrests, bringing the total number of Communists and Communist sympathizers in prison to about 1,500. At the same time the Government ordered the dissolution of such Communist 'front' organizations as the Labour-Farmer Party, the Japan Labour Union Council, and the

¹ The socialist and labour elements in Japan had undergone a succession of groupings and regroupings into parties since the passage of the Manhood Suffrage Bill, which added ten million voters, in March 1925. By the time of the 1928 elections there were four separate proletarian parties in the field, membership of these bodies varying from right wing and moderate to extreme left wing. Between them they polled 470,440 out of 9,585,129 valid votes and secured eight seats in the Diet. See Kennedy's *Changing Fabric of Japan* (pp. 79-82).

All-Japan Proletarian Youth League. The first of these three bodies was headed by Professor Oyama Ikuo, who was to play a prominent part twenty-odd years later in the spurious World Peace campaign. For his activities he was to be awarded the Stalin Peace Prize and made a vice-chairman of the Communist-controlled World Peace Council.

These successive actions by the Japanese authorities left the Communist Party in a sorry state and Sano, who had evaded arrest, slipped out of the country and made his way to Moscow to report to the Comintern on the critical situation. As a result, it was decided to strengthen the Party by ordering the return of all available Japanese Communists undergoing training in Russia.

Worse, however, was to follow. Not only did the government intensify its anti-Communist drive by dissolving all radical student organizations and forcing leftist professors to resign; it also decided to tighten up police control still further and increase the severity of legislation directed against political agitation. The Peace Preservation Law of 1925 was accordingly amended in June 1928 to include the death penalty. To the credit of the Communists it must be said that, despite this drastic threat now hanging over them, they were in no way deterred from carrying on their activities and shuttling to and fro for consultations with the Comintern Far Eastern Bureau in Shanghai and with Comintern headquarters in Moscow. The following year saw yet another large-scale round-up in April, in which a number of the remaining leaders and the bulk of the Communist rank and file were arrested. By the summer of 1929, therefore, the Party had been reduced to a handful of desperate men under the leadership of a twenty-three-year-old university student, Tanaka Seigen.

All pretence of legality had been given up by the close of 1928 when, having turned its attention towards the extreme left wing elements in the working class, the Party had set up a trade union organization under its own auspices. The virtual extinction of the Party by the round-up of April 1929 led the remnants to turn in desperation to violence, which previously they had eschewed, and Tanaka proceeded to lay the foundation for an underground organization with the eventual overthrow of the established government by force as its apparent aim.

The first manifestation of this new policy was seen during the election campaign in February 1930, when action squads under

Tanaka's orders appeared in the industrial areas of Tokyo and Yokohama armed with knives and pistols and proceeded to incite the workers against their employers and against the government. When the police arrived, these Communists, instead of taking evasive action as had been their practice hitherto in such eventualities, stood their ground and fought back. As a result, a number of policemen were wounded in the ensuing *mêlée*. Similar use of armed action squads was made in April and again in May, but the workers showed no great readiness to respond to their incitement. Tanaka was consequently persuaded by two Communists, who had recently returned from Russia to help in reorganizing the Party, that small-scale armed action of this kind did more harm than good to the Communist cause and merely provided the Japanese authorities with additional grounds for repressive measures. By the end of May, therefore, it was decided to abandon such activities and, following a raid on his headquarters in July by armed police and Tanaka's own arrest a few days later, the brief period of armed action was brought to a close.

In the meantime, the Comintern had been grooming another Japanese Communist for leadership in Japan and, after five years in the Soviet Union, he was sent back to his own country to reorganize the movement there. This was Kazama Jokichi and with him he brought a new thesis, drawn up by a special committee, to replace the thesis of 1927. This latter had been known as the Bukharin Thesis, having been named after the man who was president of the Comintern at the time it was drawn up. Bukharin, however, had been ousted in 1929 for 'right wing deviations'. His name and everything connected with him had thus become anathema to the Kremlin, and those concerned with the preparation of the new thesis had been careful to eliminate all traces of Bukharin 'heresy' from the policy now laid down for the Japanese Communist Party. The main change was in the abandonment of the bourgeois-democratic revolution as a preliminary to the proletarian revolution, which was now to be the immediate objective. Thus, for the second time, Japanese Communist policy had been directly affected by the internal affairs of Soviet Russia, the denunciation of Fukumoto in 1927 having been the first.

Within a few months of his return to Japan, Kazama had succeeded in forming a new Central Committee; but as all but one of the old experienced leaders were in prison and the one who was not had just escaped to Russia, the new committee, which sought to im-

plement the new policy, was composed of virtually inexperienced men. The one former leader who had managed to escape was Nozaka and, on arrival in Moscow, he was given the task of producing yet another thesis for the Japanese Party.¹ This was made necessary because, in the short time that had elapsed since Kazama's departure, the Comintern had been forced by circumstances to discard the theory that an immediate proletarian revolution in Japan was feasible. By the spring of 1932 Nozaka had completed his task and in July the document prepared by him was published in a special issue of the Japanese Party organ. In it the Party was taken to task for 'its mistaken views', despite the fact that it had been attempting to carry out the instructions given to Kazama in Moscow barely eighteen months earlier. Once more the Party was called upon to reverse its policy and return to the task of working for a bourgeois-democratic revolution as a preliminary to a full-blooded proletarian revolution. Communists being what they are, Kazama and his friends accepted the criticism and trimmed their sails accordingly, supporting the new 1932 Thesis with as much zeal and fervour as they had shown in their support of the previous one.

The reason for this sudden reversal of policy was the change in the international situation brought about by Japan's incursion into Manchuria in the autumn of 1931 and by the establishment, five months later, of the Japanese-sponsored Manchukuo, which had declared itself independent of China. The fighting had spread to North Manchuria, which had hitherto been regarded as lying within Russia's sphere of influence, and Moscow had taken fright. As this was looked upon as an imperialistic war attributable to the monarchical system in Japan, the Thesis laid it down that not only should the Japanese Communist Party aim to bring about a bourgeois-democratic revolution and overthrow the monarchy, 'the backbone of the exploiting class'; it should also seek to augment the revolutionary struggle in Japan itself by a determined fight against Japanese imperialism in order to 'protect the revolutions of Soviet Russia and

¹ Shortly after his arrival in Moscow in the spring of 1931, Nozaka became assistant to the veteran Katayama, the permanent Japanese delegate with the Comintern. Following Katayama's death in November 1933, Nozaka succeeded him as such and, at the Seventh World Congress of the Comintern in the summer of 1935, was elected to the Presidium. The septuagenarian Katayama, who had ranked officially with Lenin and Stalin, was given a state funeral and, with Stalin, Molotov and other high dignitaries as pall-bearers, was buried within the walls of the Kremlin.

China'.¹ The Party was therefore set the dual task of stirring up internal revolution and launching an anti-war campaign, the immediate task being defined in the words: 'All signs of dissatisfaction, protest and struggle must be channelled into the political fight against the war and the Emperor institution.'

The anti-war campaign was assisted to no small extent by the trial of the Communists arrested in 1928 and 1929, a trial which opened in June 1931 and lasted nearly eighteen months. At it the defendants made full use of the court as a platform from which to broadcast their views to the general public and, in particular, to denounce the war in Manchuria. Although this merely served to arouse the ultra-nationalists to fury and did little or nothing to stem the upsurge of nationalism in Japan, it was not without its effect on the left wing group of intellectuals, which had always been favourably disposed towards Marxism and which the Communists had contrived to form into 'cultural front organizations'. While, therefore, the actual membership of the Communist Party at this time amounted to no more than a few hundreds, its influence upon public opinion was very much greater.² Some indication of this is seen in the fact that between 1932 and 1935 some 70,000 suspected sympathizers were arrested and interrogated. Of these, over 5,000 were imprisoned.

One of the numerous round-ups during this period took place on 30th October 1932, the day after that on which the trial mentioned above ended. The police, having learned that a meeting of Communist leaders was to be held that day at Atami, a favourite hot-spring resort some twenty miles west of Tokyo, raided the meeting-place and arrested most of those present. Kazama himself and other key figures were arrested that same day in Tokyo and more than a thousand suspects were rounded up during the month that followed. A replacement for Kazama was hurriedly sent to Japan from Russia, the Moscow-trained organizer, Yamamoto Masami; but by May 1933, a bare four months after his arrival, he too was under lock and key. Other replacements followed, but each in turn was rounded up

¹ Defence of the Soviet Union as 'the base of the world revolutionary movement' had become one of the standard aims of all Communist parties. This was one of the thirteen planks of the Japanese programme drawn up at the Goshiki Spa meeting in December 1926 and it was one of the slogans put out by the Chinese Communists when, as a result of the Manchurian Incident, they grandiloquently 'declared war' on Japan in 1932.

² At no time prior to Japan's defeat in 1945 did the Japanese Communist Party have a membership of over 1,500.

and the scattered remnants of the Party were left torn by internal dissension and hopelessly disorganized.

This was not the only blow suffered by Moscow in its attempts to reorganize the Japanese Party. In the summer of 1933 came the news that two of the oldest and most trusted leaders in prison had recanted and denounced the Comintern and all its works. These were Sano Gaku and Nabeyama Sadachika; and before long their defection was followed by that of over 500 others in prison, including a number of other veteran leaders. In each instance the reason given for recantation was disillusionment brought about by disgust at the Party's 'abject submission to the Soviet Union' and at the realization that the Comintern was nothing more than an organ of the Kremlin.

Although at first it was thought that these recantations might have been forced on Sano and his fellow-prisoners by police terrorization, it now seems clear from statements made by these ex-Communists since the close of the war in 1945 that they were perfectly sincere in denouncing their former masters. Many of them remain Marxist in outlook; but their eyes have been opened and they are determined that never again will they allow themselves to be mere tools and puppets of Moscow. Without in any way underrating the danger of the Communist threat in post-war Japan, it seems clear that the inherent distrust of Russia by the Japanese people at large and their dislike of foreign dictation of any kind, taken in conjunction with the characteristic tendency towards factionalism in all Japanese left wing movements, are factors which must be taken into consideration by anyone seeking to assess the seriousness of that threat.

March 1935 saw the arrest of Hakamada, the last important leader sent by Nozaka from Moscow to reorganize the Party. From then on, until the revival of the Party rather over ten-and-a-half years later, Communism in Japan was virtually at an end. Directives and funds from the Comintern continued to come at intervals, amongst the former being a letter from Nozaka, based on the resolutions passed by the Seventh World Congress of the Comintern in August 1935, calling for a 'popular front' against fascism of all kinds. The few remaining Communists, however, were in no condition to implement these instructions to any great extent and, although periodical round-ups of Communists and Communist sympathizers continued until 1941, the last sign of organized Communist activity was eliminated in the autumn of 1938 when Kasuga, who was to figure prominently after the war, was arrested with 157 of his followers. An anarchist

plot, it is true, was discovered in November 1935, but this had nothing to do with the Communists; and in December 1937 the government ordered the dissolution of the *Hyogikai*, the most left wing of the trade union organizations. There was also the sensational discovery, in October 1941, of the Sorge spy ring;¹ but although a few individual Communists were involved in this affair, it was concerned primarily with Soviet espionage and had nothing to do with the Communist movement as such. By that time, Japanese Communist activity had, in fact, taken a new turn and was being conducted in China, from Yenan and Chungking, with the subversion of the Japanese troops there as its main objective.

While the Communist movement in Japan itself had been suppressed or driven so deep underground as to be rendered inoperative and innocuous, nationalism was becoming increasingly rampant; and amongst its most extreme exponents were many who had formerly been Communists or Communist sympathizers. At this point, therefore, it is necessary to consider this particular phenomenon and see how it was brought about.

¹ Unknown to the German Ambassador, whose close friend and confidant he became, Richard Sorge had been sent to Tokyo by the Russians in the guise of a German newspaper correspondent to organize this spy ring. Trusted implicitly by his Ambassador, he was given access to German top-secret documents and was well placed to keep Moscow fully posted on both German and Japanese policy and plans. Details of the whole case are given in Major-General Willoughby's *Sorge: Soviet Master Spy* (William Kimber, 1952).

CHAPTER XVII

The Development of National Socialism in Japan [1]

IN November 1930 a murderous attack had been made on the Prime Minister, Mr Hamaguchi, who succumbed some months later from his injuries. Political murder, in the sacred but sadly abused name of patriotism, had been an all too common occurrence in Japan ever since the enforced opening of the country to foreign intercourse in the 1850's. Hamaguchi's assassination appeared to be only the culmination of a long series of such incidents in which one statesman after another had fallen victim to reactionary assassins, moved to 'direct action' by a distorted sense of patriotic duty. It was also, however, the first direct indication of the intensity to which dissatisfaction had arisen in naval, military and civilian nationalist circles against existing conditions in both foreign and domestic affairs, especially in relation to armament reduction, naval ratios, and the government's China policy, an intensity of feelings which the outbreak in Manchuria, rather less than a year later, was to bring to a head in open revolt.

Within a few months of this outbreak, Japan was faced with the first of a succession of outrages which culminated in the holocaust of February 1936¹ and played an all-important part in Japan's fatal resort to war in December 1941. In many respects these outrages were far more significant than the occasional acts of violence in the past. It was not merely that they followed one another in such rapid succession, though this in itself was a new phenomenon. Rather did the significance lie in the fact that they were largely the outcome of circumstances, which played little or no part in the 'patriotic' mur-

¹ The victims of this outrage included Takahashi, the Finance Minister, Admiral Viscount Saito, Lord Keeper of the Privy Seals, and General Watanabe, Inspector-General of Military Training, all of whom were murdered, and Admiral Suzuki, Grand Chamberlain, who was wounded. The aged Count Makino and the Prime Minister, Admiral Okada, barely escaped with their lives.

ders carried out prior to 1931. These had been essentially political in character, and most of them had been due to dissatisfaction with the foreign policy of the victims or of the particular government they represented. The series of assassinations, which started with the murder of Inouye, Baron Dan and Inukai in 1932,¹ and the subsequent plots—some successful and some not—for the assassination of other leading personalities was, on the other hand, mainly the outcome of social unrest and grievances, and of dissatisfaction with the existing social and economic system. The tragic events of 1932 served, in fact, to reveal with startling clarity the sudden and rapid growth of a violently reactionary movement, a movement which combined an extreme form of nationalism with a hatred of both Capitalism and Communism and a contempt for ordinary parliamentary practice.

Violent reaction, like political assassination, was nothing new in Japan; but in order to understand the reactionary movement which developed so strikingly in the opening months of 1932, it is necessary to turn back to the 'eighties of last century, when the hot-headed patriots of the nation were demanding the revision of the treaties which still compelled Japan to put up with the indignity—most galling to a proud and highly sensitive people like the Japanese—of allowing the foreign powers the rights of extraterritoriality and all it implied. It was at this time that the *Genyosha*, an extreme nationalist organization, came into existence. From this body had sprung the majority of those reactionary societies which, in the 1930's, had made it their primary object to keep alive the traditional spirit of Old Japan, the spirit of loyalty and patriotism summed up in the words, *Yamato Damashii* and *Bushido*. Laudable as this motive undoubtedly was when kept within certain reasonable limits, it became a positive danger to the state when interpreted—as was too often the case—to mean the removal by forcible means of those whom its hot-headed exponents regarded as traitors to the country and the intimidation of those whose views on foreign policy or social progress were at variance with their own.

In the 1880's, it was the humiliation of the 'unequal treaties' and the government's allegedly 'weak-kneed' diplomacy that stirred up the people and brought about the organization of the violently

¹ Inouye, Finance Minister, assassinated on 9th February; Baron Dan, head of the powerful Mitsui combine, assassinated on 5th March; Inukai, Prime Minister, assassinated on 15th May.

reactionary *Genyosha*. In 1932 it was the attitude of the powers towards Japan's actions in Manchuria, following on the humiliation felt by the more excitable elements in the country at what they regarded as the unfair treatment meted out to Japan at the Washington and London naval conferences that aroused national sentiment. That Japan was compelled to accept ratios in capital ships and cruisers was considered to place her at a disadvantage in the matter of national defence and to lower her prestige in the eyes of China.

The fact that the 'self-denying ordinance', imposed by the Nine-Power Pact on all its signatories, really entailed a far greater sacrifice for Japan than for any of the others (owing to geographical propinquity and other considerations) likewise played its part. So, too, did the feeling that the British action, in retroceding the Hankow concession to China under pressure in 1927, was, to a large extent, responsible for the growth of Chinese arrogance and, in consequence, for the growing agitation in China for the return of the rights secured by Japan under the treaty signed at Peking on 25th May 1915.

Resentment, moreover, had been smouldering amongst at least a section of the people ever since the rejection of Japan's demand at Versailles for racial equality, while the scrapping of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance in 1922 and, still more keenly, the passage of the American Immigration Law in 1924, with its discriminatory clauses against Japan, served to increase this resentment and played no small part in popularizing such slogans as 'Asia for the Asiatics' and 'Back to Asia'.

But this was not all. It was not, as in the 1880's, simply a question of national sentiment having been aroused by external events. This, certainly, played an important part and was, undoubtedly, used by certain leaders of the reactionary movement to bring about the dangerous situation that came into being in 1932. But—and this was, in some respects, the most significant aspect of all—the leaders of the movement helped on their cause to an incalculable extent by utilizing the growing spirit of social unrest in Japan and guiding it into fresh channels. Communism of the Moscow brand never made, and seemed never likely to make, any very great headway in Japan; but during the First World War and the years that followed, a spirit of unrest and class-consciousness, a spirit of dissatisfaction with existing conditions, was rapidly manifesting itself in the form of industrial and peasant disputes, students' strikes, and the like. The great disparity of wealth between the rich and the poor and the frequent

exposures of bribery and corruption in high places; the close, and often unhealthy, alliance between 'Big Business' and party politics; the gross antics of all too many party politicians in the Diet and their placing of self-interest and party-interest above the interests of the country and people at large; all these things served to increase the spirit of dissatisfaction and unrest and to develop a feeling of hostility towards the landlords and capitalists and a growing loss of faith in, and respect for, parliamentary government.

If nothing had been done to rectify matters, this spirit of unrest might well have brought about a situation that would have played into the hands of the left wing proletarians and struck at the very root of Japanese polity. To prevent such a disaster, the right wing reactionaries used the national sentiment, aroused by happenings in Manchuria, to appeal to the innate patriotism of the leftist leaders and others. By doing so, they succeeded in changing them over from international socialism to national socialism. The hostility of these left wingers towards capitalism remained unchanged; so did their contempt for, and criticism of, what they were pleased to call 'the bourgeois parties' in the Diet.

In this they had always had something in common with the nationalist reactionaries. The only real change that came about—but it was an important one—was that their internationalism was turned to extreme nationalism and, though never actively anti-monarchical, they were won over to uphold the throne as the central rallying point of the nation. They embraced with fervour the two virtues which appeal more than all others to the Japanese people—patriotism and loyalty to the Emperor.

At first sight, this sudden conversion from left wing principles to right might have seemed hard to believe, but nothing demonstrated the truth of this metamorphosis more clearly than the fact that, among some twenty or thirty men listed as leaders of the reactionary nationalist groups in the spring of 1932 were several who, less than a year previously, had been leading figures in the opposite camp [2].

To those who had not been in a position to follow closely the rapidly changing undercurrents in the life and thoughts of the Japanese people in recent years, the developments witnessed that year may have come as a surprise; but indications of what might happen in certain eventualities had been clearly visible for some time past. Certain passages in a book written in 1930 [3], not only serve to show that what came about was not wholly unforeseen, but show

also why it was foreseen. The book was largely devoted to a study of the various phases of social unrest in Japan, its growth and its causes. As, however, the subject of social unrest is apt to conjure up visions of socialism, communism, and the like, it was considered necessary, in order to present a balanced picture, to include a chapter on the influence and activities of reactionary elements in the country; for these exponents of right wing doctrines were 'far more numerous, and in certain respects more menacing to peace and order' than the left wing radicals.

That this contention was justified was very clearly demonstrated by the events and developments witnessed two years later. So also was the conclusion drawn from the sudden *volte face* of the two former left wingers, Takabatake and Akao, both of whom had, but a short time before, made a complete swing from the left to the right. Commenting on their action the author wrote:

'Unpopular as the reactionaries are, this sudden swing to the Right by an influential member of the opposite camp may be regarded as almost prophetic of what may be expected in certain eventualities. The bulk of the nation has little love for the extremists of either side; but, if ever it comes to a show-down, the people are far more likely to swing to the Right than to the Left. *Even amongst the present supporters of the Left Wing, there are many who would, under such circumstances, take their stand on the side of Fascism rather than that of Bolshevism*' [4].

The last sentence is not in italics in the book itself. No better justification of this prediction could be provided than the list of former leftists already mentioned as being among the fascist leaders of Japan in the spring of 1932.

With regard to the *volte face* of Akao Toshi, the following footnote is of special interest:

'Mr. Akao's *volte face* is not, however, so complete as might appear. He still inveighs against the Capitalists, but affects a patriotic pose by contending that, just as the feudal lords handed over their lands and their titles to the Emperor, so ought the Capitalists to return their money and property to the Throne. In actual practice, this is nothing more than advocacy of State Socialism clothed in fine words.'

In adopting this attitude, Akao was merely setting the example to be followed by so many of his fellow-thinkers two or three years later.

Like Hitlerism in Germany, the driving force of this movement to

the extreme right was an accumulation of grievances. Like Hitlerism, too, it was largely an emotional outburst amongst a people who had suffered, and were still suffering, what they regarded as injustice at a time of severe economic pressure. Like Hitlerism it was a manifestation of a revolt, religious or semi-religious in nature, against the materialistic creeds of Communism and Capitalism—a spiritual striving for an ideal that found an outlet in the ancient Shinto philosophy of Emperor worship. It has been said, though some have denied it, that, in the absence of the Hitler movement in Germany, many Germans would undoubtedly have become Communists. The new 'ism' provided a channel for directing the resentment of the masses. Much the same appears to have been true of the reactionary movement which sprang into being in Japan so alarmingly in 1932.

Although Japan was lacking a Hitler or a Mussolini, all the numerous nationalistic bodies in existence had much the same object in view. They strove to bring about a rebirth of the national spirit, which was alleged to have deteriorated sadly as a result of the inrush of democracy, socialism, and other subversive ideas from abroad, and to substitute national interest and honour for material and individual interests.

While the rebirth of the national spirit was the objective common to all these bodies, opinions regarding the methods to be adopted for the attainment of this goal were by no means unanimous. Roughly speaking they were divisible into two main groups, one section relying on Constitutional means, while the other openly advocated the use of violence and direct action. The former may be said to have centred around the *Kokuhonsha* (National Foundation Society) with Baron Hiranuma, vice-president of the Privy Council, at their head, the latter around the *Seisanto* (Producers' Party). It was perhaps significant that the *Seisanto* were said to refer contemptuously to the *Kokuhonsha* as 'bourgeois Fascisti' and to regard them as little or no better than the landlords, capitalists, and party politicians at whose suppression they aimed.

It was to the *Seisanto*, a body closely connected with the ultra-nationalistic Black Dragon Society, that the majority of the former leftists turned. Its extreme complexion was strongly reflected in its programme which, except for its emphasis on patriotism and loyalty to the throne, had little to distinguish it from the creed of Moscow. It might, in fact, have been best characterized as Monarchical Com-

munism, if such a term had been permissible. Extirpation of politicians and other 'parasites of the capitalist system', the overthrow of the existing capitalist oligarchy, state control of finance and industry—and so on. These were among the *desiderata* mentioned, *desiderata* that were but a few degrees milder than those contained in the fiery manifesto appearing on the handbills scattered on the occasion of the assassination of the premier, Mr Inukai, in May 1932.

One point in this manifesto calls for special mention. The reference to the so-called Showa Restoration.¹ This 'Restoration', which a section of the extreme reactionaries aimed to bring about, was, to all intents and purposes, a return to the distant and somewhat primitive past, with agriculture as the basis of the state and the people rooted to the soil. Although obviously impractical, unless Japan was prepared to put back the clock and cast away all the benefits of the wonderful progress and developments so painfully and brilliantly achieved during the previous seventy-odd years, this 'Back-to-the-Land' movement was not undeserving of sympathy, in that it sprang largely from the grievances under which the agrarian population of Japan had long been labouring. Japan's rapid and praiseworthy development as a great industrial and commercial nation had been achieved largely at the expense of the unfortunate agriculturists, who still formed over 50 per cent of the total population. Reactionary scholars and teachers like Gondo and Tachibana, whose names figured so prominently in connection with the terrorist outrages of 1932, had long been preaching the injustice of this fact, while Kita Ikki, in his *Nihon Kaizo Hoan* ('Plan for the Reconstruction of Japan'), had expounded his views on the necessity of a fundamental economic and social reconstruction of Japan. Suzuki Kyo, another reactionary writer, had, like Kita, won many followers among young army officers and the more educated elements among the agricultural population, by his exposition of what he conceived to be the twin dangers of capitalism and Communism [5].

The fact that 80 per cent or more of the Army was recruited from the agrarian population explains in part how it came about that certain elements in the Army became interested in the movement. Through the medium not only of those serving with the Colours

¹ *Showa* (literally 'Radiant Peace') is the year-name of the present Japanese era, which was ushered in automatically on the death of the late Emperor Taisho on 25th December 1926.

but, more particularly, of the *Zaigo Gunjinkai* (Reservists' Association), with its membership of 3,000,000 or more ex-servicemen scattered throughout the length and the breadth of the country, the military authorities were particularly well placed to understand and appreciate the feelings of the rural communities. The sympathy of the Army with these feelings of discontent helps to account for the participation of young Army hot-heads with the so-called Farmers' Death Band in the outrages of May 1932. These outrages were primarily a manifestation of agrarian unrest and dissatisfaction with existing conditions, although admittedly, as shown by the testimony of the naval participants, dissatisfaction with the London Naval Treaty likewise played an important part.

While the Army, with its traditional scorn of wealth and its contempt for those who place their own interests above those of the nation, naturally sympathized with the farmers (who, with not a little justice, blamed the existing capitalist system and the self-interest of so large a proportion of the party politicians for their poverty-stricken condition), the military authorities were keenly alive to the grave danger of revolutionary outbreaks among the agrarian population. No section of the country, it is true, was more loyal to the throne than the peasants and farmers. The likelihood of an anti-monarchical outbreak amongst them could not, therefore, be considered very seriously. Disturbances, however, aiming at seizing the land from the landlords and bringing about revolutionary changes such as those advocated by the *Seisanto*—even though carried out in the name of patriotism and loyalty to the throne—would have had obvious dangers, which the military authorities could never have been expected to tolerate. There were some who believed that, if the Saito cabinet had been overthrown in 1932, through inability to provide adequate relief measures or through other causes, a political crisis of so grave a nature would have been precipitated that the Army might have been compelled to step in and set up a virtual military dictatorship, in order to prevent something very much worse.

In this connection, it seems pertinent to quote from an article appearing in the columns of the *Japan Advertiser* towards the end of 1927 [6]. Predicting the possibility of a financial panic of even greater dimensions than the one that had broken out in Japan the previous April, if proper steps were not taken in time to avert it, Dr Washio, its author, declared:

'Such a panic will mean a general collapse and will be a revolution. The immensity of the task of facing it will put to flight not only political parties but most of the present ruling interests of the country. Then the field will be cleared for the appearance of a Mussolini, and it is almost certain that the Army will rally to his support.'

In the book which has already been mentioned [7], these remarks of Dr Washio's were quoted in connection with the contention that Japan, in spite of the widespread social unrest that had sprung up in the country since the 1914-18 war, was far more likely to turn to Fascism than to Bolshevism. It was added, by way of comment:

'Many people will probably "pooh-pooh" such a prophecy; but close observers of the situation cannot but admit that there is a certain amount of evidence to support it. Reverence for their Emperor and the intense love of the people for their own country should ensure that, if discontent ever leads to revolution, the outcome will be Fascism rather than Bolshevism.' [8]

The developments of 1932 went far to confirm these words written two years previously.

That the situation in 1932 was pregnant with dangerous possibilities of the gravest concern to the future of Japan and, therefore, to the peace and stability of the whole Far East, can hardly be gainsaid. The blame lay in part with the powers assembled at Geneva and with Washington; in part with the Japanese themselves. The prevailing economic depression and social unrest throughout the world also played an important role. The Western powers caused unnecessary resentment to Japan in the opening stages of the Sino-Japanese dispute by their apparent failure to understand the national psychology of either of the two disputants and by their tendency to act, and to prejudge the whole case, in a manner damaging to Japan. The Japanese for long years past had been far too indulgent towards those who, in the sacred names of loyalty and patriotism, indulged in murder, intimidation, and outrage. Many of the utterances emanating from Geneva, Washington, and elsewhere abroad merely served to arouse Japanese national sentiment and to play into the hands of these ultra-nationalist reactionaries. The nation as a whole, feeling itself misjudged and mistreated, tended more and more to injure its own case in the eyes of the world by adopting an attitude of seemingly stubborn aggressiveness.

With national sentiment inflamed to a dangerous extent by the

attitude of Geneva and Washington; with the properly constituted authorities seemingly losing control over extremist elements as a result of failure to curb 'super-patriotic' excesses in the past; with a growing loss of faith on the part of the people in parliamentary rule because of the corruption and self-interest of the political parties; with the example of Hitlerism and Fascism to show what could be achieved by other means; with the growing economic distress and general spirit of unrest and dissatisfaction with existing conditions, especially in the agricultural districts; with the rising feeling of resentment against those who, somewhat inconsistently, demanded the 'Open Door' for all in Manchuria, yet denied it to the Japanese in other lands; and with a genuine feeling of distress on the part of many conservative Japanese at the rapid inrush of Western civilization which, while providing much that was beneficial, was at the same time destroying and rooting up much that was good and wholly admirable in the old spirit and culture of the country; with all this, and much else besides, taken into consideration, no very great effort of the imagination is required to appreciate the dangerous possibilities of the situation that existed in Japan for a time in 1932. It only required the application of a spark to set off the whole powder magazine.

A head-on collision between Japan and the League of Nations at that time might well have served as such a spark. Had it done so the Army would probably have been compelled to step in and take control. Even the Army, however, might have found it beyond its powers to prevent agrarian unrest and the national rebirth movement being brought to a head and precipitating the much-talked-of Showa Restoration.

Fortunately the creation of a national cabinet, with Admiral Viscount Saito—a sailor-statesman of sterling quality, cool-headed, dignified, and courageous—at its head, did much to restore the confidence of the country as a whole, and the danger of the situation developing in such a way was averted.

That the danger was merely averted and not wholly eradicated, was demonstrated very clearly in July the following year, when a widespread plot, for the wholesale murder of cabinet ministers and other leading personalities, was nipped in the bud only a few hours before it was due to have been put into execution. Similarly the intense feelings aroused in the summer of 1933, during the trial of the young naval officers and military cadets concerned in the outrages of 15th May of the previous year, indicated the dangerous tension still

existing. The year 1934, however, saw a lessening of this tension, and by the early months of 1935 liberalism had begun to show signs of reasserting itself, both the national socialists and the military being subjected to considerable criticism in the Diet.¹

The national socialists, as a party, had made their first appearance about the time of the outbreak in Manchuria in the autumn of 1931. There had been a constant shuffling of the labour and socialist groups ever since the grant of Manhood Suffrage in 1925. The general tendency was for these elements to split into three main groups representing right wing, left and centre respectively. In July 1931 the left and centre groups, together with a section of the right wing *Shakai Minshuto* (Social Democratic Party), had amalgamated to form the *Zenkoku Rōnō Taishuto* (National Labour-Farmer Masses Party). On the outbreak of the Manchurian Incident in September that year, the newly formed party had demanded the withdrawal of the Japanese troops from Manchuria and an anti-war committee had been set up. Certain elements in the party, however, were opposed to these demands and gave their support to the National Socialist Party (*Kokumin Shakaitō*), which had recently been formed under the leadership of a former left wing radical named Shimonaka. The right wing Social Democratic Party, for its part, had given its tacit approval to the operations in Manchuria; but as this approval was not considered sufficiently outright, a section of the party under Akamatsu, another former Marxist, seceded from it in April 1932. A similar split took place at the same time in the trade union and peasant movements. The trend towards national socialism became increasingly apparent.

Following the secession, almost simultaneously, of large sections from both the National Labour-Farmer Masses Party and the Social Democratic Party, the seceders held a joint conference for the purpose of forming a Japan People's Party. Their declared aims were to oppose internationalism in diplomacy, to oppose parliamentarianism in politics, and to advocate state control in the economic field. But a split occurred—on organization and personalities rather than on policy—between the followers of Akamatsu and those of Shimonaka. Two separate national socialist parties were therefore formed,

¹ In spite of these healthy signs, the assassination of Major-General Nagata, chief of the Military Affairs Bureau, in August that same year in revenge for his dismissal of certain officers connected with the Showa Restoration movement was a clear indication of the dangerous currents below the seemingly calmer surface.

the State Socialist Party (*Nihon Kokka Shakaitō*)¹ by Akamatsu and the New Japan National League by Shimonaka. It was these national socialists, together with the even more right wing *Seisanto* (Producers' Party),² who came under so much criticism in the Diet in 1935.

The revival of the more liberal tendencies which accounted for this criticism was reflected in the General Election of February 1936, when the Social Masses Party, which had in the meantime replaced the Social Democratic Party, secured eighteen seats in the Diet. It was further reflected in the elections of April 1937, when the same party doubled its score by obtaining thirty-seven seats and close on one million votes. These successes were followed by developments which showed the increasing dangers facing Japan, both internally and externally. Less than a week after the 1936 elections occurred the Army mutiny, in which the assassinations of 26th February took place,³ and little more than two months after the elections of 1937 the so-called North China 'Incident' of 7th July marked the opening of operations which were to continue until Japan's collapse eight years later. From North China the fighting quickly spread to the Yangtse Valley, then to South China, and by 1940 Japanese troops were in Indo-China.

The prelude to Pearl Harbour had opened and the temporary revival of more liberal tendencies was brought to an end. By the time Japan had made her fatal plunge into war with the Western powers in December 1941, all the old political parties had been abolished, a one-party system had been brought into being, and the once-flourishing labour movement had virtually ceased to exist. It was not until after the final defeat of Japan in August 1945 that the socialist and trade union movements were revived and, with them, the Communist Party.

¹ Although anti-Communist, some of the slogans put out by Akamatsu's party had a curiously Communist ring about them. One of these was, 'Liberation of the Peoples of Asia on the basis of race equality and equalization of resources!'

² The *Seisanto* had been formed under the aegis of the Black Dragon Society in November 1931. Like the national socialists, its members included a number of former left wing radicals, though most of these had swung over from the one extreme to the other in the 1920's, a period marked by the appearance of numerous reactionary bodies indulging in violence under patriotic guise.

³ See footnote on p. 182.

CHAPTER XVIII

Revolutionary Trends in Korea and South-East Asia [1]

WHILE these events were taking place in China and Japan respectively, Communist and nationalist movements were going ahead with varying degrees of success in other countries of South and East Asia as well.

In Korea the Communist Party had been disbanded at the end of 1928 by order of the Comintern. Internal strife and dissension, the besetting weakness of all Korean political organizations, had been one of the reasons for this drastic decision; but the fact that its members had been more concerned with resisting the Japanese than with pursuing purely Communist ideals was equally responsible for the dissolution order. With a view to reviving the Party at some future date, the Korean Communists were directed by Moscow to co-operate in the meantime with the nationalist bourgeoisie for the purpose of bringing about the downfall of the Japanese régime in Korea. Only after this had been achieved were they to press on with their revolutionary aims, starting with a programme of land reform as a preliminary to a bourgeois democratic revolution.

Despite these instructions co-operation with the nationalist bourgeoisie did not come easily and the years 1928 to 1935 were conspicuous for the rivalry between the Communists and the Nationalists for political leadership. Both were equally anti-Japanese; but, as so often in the past and in the years ahead, the various Korean groups were as bitterly opposed to each other as they were to the common enemy. Individual Koreans showed their hatred of their Japanese overlords from time to time by such acts of violence as the attempt in Tokyo on the Emperor's life in January 1932 and the Shanghai bomb outrage of 27th April that same year. As a result of the last outrage, General Shirakawa, commander-in-chief of the Japanese forces in Shanghai, and several others were killed; Shige-

mitsu, the Japanese consul-general, had a leg blown off; and Admiral Nomura, the Naval commander-in-chief, lost an eye.¹ Other Koreans took part in the fighting against the Japanese in Manchuria after the outbreak of the Manchurian 'Incident' in the autumn of 1931 and in China after the launching of the operations there in July 1937. Such activities reflected the widespread hatred of the Japanese among Koreans. Communism, as such, played little part in them.

It was not until 1936 that co-operation between the Communists and the Nationalists was brought about. This was the outcome of a secret meeting held in Shanghai in July that year between representatives of the two main groups, an agreement being reached between them to co-operate in a National Front for Korean liberation and in the formation of an independent republic [2]. It was presumably in connection with this agreement that in December 1937 the Communists organized a 'League for a National Front of Korea', it being emphasized that, in view of Korea's status as a Japanese colony, the aim was to establish 'not a class front, not even a people's front', but a 'national front' [3].

From then onwards until the collapse of Japan in 1945, Korean Communists and Nationalists worked together in close co-operation in this National Front; and in 1940 the Korean Provisional Government, which had been established in Shanghai in 1920, was re-organized so as to include representatives of all political parties. Here, then, we must leave Korean developments for the time being and turn to Indo-China, where Communists and Nationalists were likewise intermingled in their struggle for independence from foreign domination.

Both during and following the First World War, the French in Indo-China had had to contend with the growing problem of nationalism, which showed itself in the form of a succession of local plots and insurrections and in the organization of a number of legal and illegal parties. Some of the latter had set up a clandestine press to spread propaganda, and in 1923 the French government secured the expulsion, from Japan, of Vietnamese nationalists² who had been

¹ Shigemitsu, it may be recalled, was later to become Ambassador to the Court of St James and subsequently Foreign Minister, while Admiral Nomura rose to international prominence as Ambassador in Washington at the time of Pearl Harbour.

² Vietnam comprises the provinces of Tonkin, Annam and Cochin-China. It is not, therefore, synonymous with Indo-China, which includes also Laos and

carrying on their activities there. Most of them had fled to Canton, where they were joined by others and where, in 1924, an attempt was made on the life of Merlin, the governor-general of Indo-China, while he was on a visit to that city. The attempt failed; but a second attempt, made in Hanoi the following year, succeeded and Merlin was assassinated. His death reflected the increasing bitterness and violence of the nationalist movement.

It was in this same year, 1925, that Ho Chi-Minh founded the Annamite Revolutionary Youth League, the embryo of the Communist Party which was to be formed five years later. Communism, with its strident criticism of colonial policy, supplied the ideological weapons which the nationalists had hitherto lacked and from now onwards it provided an increasing impetus to the nationalist movement. Before the 1914-18 war the nationalist movement had aimed largely at restoring traditional institutions, but now its whole character was in process of transformation, with the establishment of an independent modern state on Western lines as its ultimate goal. There was, too, a change in its leadership, which was tending to come more and more from French-trained intellectuals instead of from the old-established and somewhat conservative aristocratic elements.

The Communist-controlled section of the movement, however, continued for some years yet to operate mainly outside the country. It was in order to remedy this state of affairs that Ho Chi-Minh, early in 1927,¹ decided to infiltrate into Indo-China six specially selected Annamite nationalist refugees, whom he had been training for the purpose in Canton. Some months previously, the Comintern had established in Singapore the South Seas Communist Group (or Party), which included a Vietnamese section. This group was under the control of the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee, which was itself responsible to the Far Eastern Bureau of the Comintern.

Influenced to some extent by the nationalist movement in India and by the revolutionary developments in China, the years 1925-30 saw further manifestations of nationalism in Indo-China;

Cambodia. These other two provinces were, at this time, virtually unaffected by either nationalism or Communism.

¹ It was a few months after this that, following the split between the Chinese Communist Party and the KMT, Ho Chi-Minh was forced to flee to Moscow. In the following year, 1928, he was in Siam, spreading his gospel among his compatriots there until about the end of 1929, when he went to Hong Kong.

school strikes, shipyard workers' strikes and demonstrations of various kinds and a constant shuffling and reshuffling of nationalist groups under various names. Finally, in 1929, a conference was held in Hong Kong by representatives of some of these groups to discuss forming themselves into a Communist party. After a heated debate, the majority of the delegates voted against such a move, whereupon three of them walked out and declared their intention of returning to Indo-China to found a Communist party on their own. Their action turned the scales in favour of the Communists. Ho Chi-Minh's Revolutionary Youth League decided to transform themselves into an Annamite Communist Party and other groups agreed to join. As a result, the Communist Party of Indo-China was formally inaugurated on 6th January 1930. By this time the Communists in the Revolutionary Youth League had become predominant, as the nationalist elements had lost their influence owing to French failure to support their mild programme of reform. The dissolution of the League on its amalgamation with other nationalist groups in the newly formed Communist Party settled the matter and the new Party sent its Central Committee to Haiphong to direct the movement.

Barely a year after the inauguration of the new Party, the first serious rising in Indo-China took place. Known as the Yenbay Revolt, it was the direct result of Communist exploitation of nationalist and economic grievances and was brought about by the mutiny of the Tonkinese garrison in Yenbay. The violent outbreaks, under the Nationalist Party leadership, which followed throughout the country, were ruthlessly suppressed and several thousands were arrested. Many hundreds of these were subsequently executed. Amongst those arrested were many of the Communist leaders and one who, twenty years later, was to become Ho Chi-Minh's right-hand man and secretary-general of the Communist Party. This was the Moscow-trained Dang Xuan Khu, better known perhaps as Truong Chinh, who, though released in 1936, was rearrested three years later, but managed to escape and fled to China.

In addition to all these arrests and executions, the Communist Party was outlawed and by 1933 the French expressed themselves satisfied that the Party, as an organized body, was dead. Many of its leaders, including the Central Committee itself, however, had evaded arrest and had either gone into hiding or had escaped over the border into Yunnan. Before long the Party was active again and, while continuing to carry on an underground movement, sent a steady

stream of new recruits to Moscow for training. Under the Moscow-trained Tran Van Giau, who was to figure so prominently from 1945 onwards, the Party was actually reconstituted in 1933, just when the French were congratulating themselves that the movement had been scotched.

In the meantime, as a result of information brought to light by the arrest of a Comintern agent in Singapore,¹ Ho Chi-Minh himself had been arrested in June 1931 in Hong Kong, where he had hoped to reorganize his shattered Party. After two years in prison there, he was banished from the colony and made his way to Moscow once more, the French having, in the meanwhile, sentenced him to death *in absentia* for having stirred up the revolt in Northern Indo-China. Although he appears to have returned to the Far East after a short stay in the Soviet capital, his movements during the next few years are somewhat obscure and it is not until 1941 that they become more definite.

During this period, the Communists continued their activities and, following a reorganization in 1935, the Central Committee was transferred to Saigon with a view to stirring up trouble in Cochinchina in the south. A further reorganization appears to have been carried out the following year and, as a result of the Popular Front policy against Nazi and Fascist aggression launched by the Comintern at its Seventh (and last) World Congress in the summer of 1935, a democratic front was set up for the purpose of uniting the masses and the petty bourgeoisie. From then on until 1939 the situation in Indo-China was relatively quiet; but, with the outbreak of the war in Europe and as a result of the Soviet Pact with Nazi Germany, the Popular Front came to an abrupt end and the Communists in Indo-China, taking their cue from Moscow, proceeded to denounce the French 'imperialists' once more and to indulge in open activities against the local authorities. The Communist organizations in Cochinchina were thereupon suppressed and the democratic front collapsed. A number of the leaders were imprisoned or deported while others fled.

Metropolitan France collapsed three months later and, taking advantage of French weakness, Japan induced Vichy to yield to her

¹ This was Ducroux, whose arrest also led to the arrest of Hilaire Noulens and his wife in Shanghai and to the sensational revelations of the activities of the Comintern's Far East Bureau and the Pan-Pacific Trades Unions Secretariat, which he was directing there.

threats in Indo-China and grant her special rights. With the invasion of Russia by Germany in June the following year and the French agreement to the establishment of Japanese military bases in Indo-China a month later, the whole situation underwent a change. In 1939, in accordance with the Moscow line, France had been denounced for fighting Germany; but now that Russia herself had become the victim of German aggression, the French were denounced for *not* fighting the Germans. Communist hostility towards the French authorities in Indo-China therefore remained unaltered, except in a polemical sense. The nationalists, on the other hand, while just as bitter against the French as before, tended to look to the Japanese as potential friends and deliverers. Some weakening in the former close co-operation between the Communists and the nationalists was the inevitable result.

The year 1940 had seen revolts in Tonkin and Cochin-China, followed by severe repressive measures by the French. Once more, however, a number of the Communist and nationalist leaders managed to evade arrest and escaped to China. Their flight was to have far-reaching results; for Ho Chi-Minh, taking advantage of their presence in China, called a meeting of Communists and nationalists at Tsingsi, in Kwangsi, in April 1941. Ostensibly this was for the purpose of reuniting the Vietnamese guerrilla groups in South China, but its primary object was to formulate a new policy for the Communist Party. The outcome of this congress was to have a tremendous influence on post-war developments, not only in Indo-China but on the Far East in general, for out of it was born the Vietnam Independence League, better known to-day as the Viet Minh. So as not to frighten the masses, this new body was outwardly a nationalist organization, with a programme only mildly Communist in complexion. Actual control, however, was in the hands of the Communists. With what skill the Communists were able to maintain its nationalist façade while using it for their own purposes in the years following Japan's defeat in 1945 requires no emphasis. Not only individuals but even some responsible governments were deluded. But this is looking too far ahead: the situation in the Far East underwent a drastic change on the outbreak of the Pacific War eight months after the birth of the Viet Minh.

Siam was in the happy position of having no nationalist movement for the Communists to exploit. Such Communism as there was prior

to the 1930's appears to have been confined to small elements among the Chinese communities in and around Bangkok and to have been introduced by Chinese Communist refugees, who began to arrive in 1927 after the collapse of the KMT-CCP alliance. Their activities were directed by a special section of the South Seas Communist Group in Singapore until after the reorganization of that body in 1930, when the Communist movement in Siam was made the responsibility of the newly formed Malayan Communist Party. It is possible, too, that Ho Chi-Minh, during his visit to that country in 1928, may have helped in the organization of Communist cells, although his main activities appear to have been directed towards the Vietnamese living there and not towards the native populace. The Chinese Communist refugees, however, indulged in a certain amount of propaganda and in 1930 the Siamese authorities hit back by meting out long-term prison sentences to thirty-one alleged Communists, who were said to be connected with the clandestine circulation of propaganda pamphlets.

Two years later, in June 1932, Pridi, who was destined to figure during the Japanese occupation of Siam as leader of the Free Thai underground resistance movement and later, as premier, to be overthrown by Marshal Pibul and forced to flee the country, carried out a bloodless revolution with the aid of his Peoples' Party and the Army. This revolution, which succeeded in its purpose of establishing a limited monarchy in place of the former absolute monarchy, had no connection whatsoever with Communism.¹ Before long, however, Pridi found himself suspected of Communist leanings and in 1933 was exiled to France, although he was exonerated a few months later and allowed to return. At the same time, an act was passed making Communism illegal, an act which was to remain in force until October 1946, when it was repealed.

From the time of Pridi's return in September 1933 until the close of 1938, the political situation in Siam was marked by a struggle for power between him and Luang Pibul, who first came into prominence as a major in 1933, when he took the lead in restoring order after the collapse of an abortive royalist rebellion. During those years the

¹ It seems probable, however, that the Comintern had hoped to exploit the resulting situation, as Tan Malaka, the well-known Indonesian Communist, who was Comintern agent for South-East Asia at the time, was arrested in Hong Kong in October 1932 while on his way to Bangkok with funds and instructions. Tan Malaka may possibly have tried to establish Communist cells in Siam earlier, as he was in Bangkok in 1927 and apparently in 1925 for a short time as well.

balance between these two was held by Pridi's friend Colonel Bahol, who had become prime minister in 1934; but in December 1938 Pibul took over from him and continued to hold the premiership until July 1944.

Since the revolution of 1932, there had been a growing tendency towards nationalism and in 1937 this trend was reflected in the passage of an act for the rigid control of the large Chinese communities in the country. A further indication was seen in June 1939 when the Siamese, who had always called themselves Thais, declared that henceforth the name Siam should be dropped and their country be designated as Thailand. Later still, in May 1941, Siam, whose nationalism was developing a chauvinist irredentist strain, proceeded to annex parts of Cambodia and Laos. This she did in accordance with the Thai-Indo-China Protocol, signed two months previously after Japan had served as mediator in the dispute which had arisen between the two countries. Of Communism, in the form of a fully organized body, however, there was still no definite sign; and although the government in 1937 had arrested a number of political opponents, exiling some and executing a few of the more prominent persons among them, there was never any question of Communists being involved in the plots which some of these luckless individuals were suspected of hatching. This was still the position when Japan invaded Siam in December 1941 and induced Pibul to enter into an offensive-defensive alliance with her against the Western allies.

In an earlier chapter, reference was made to the formation of the Filipino Communist Party in 1930. Two years previously, four Filipinos had made their way to Moscow for training and it was on their return to their own country that they had set to work to organize the Communist Party, which was formally inaugurated on 11th November 1930.¹ During the economic depression which hit the islands about this time, the Communists played an active part in instigating and exploiting labour troubles and strikes and in assisting the formation of peasant organizations in preparation for the organized struggle which they considered necessary if their aims were to be achieved. On May Day 1931, however, police carried out a raid on the

¹ It seems possible that the dispatch of these four Filipinos to Moscow in 1928 was the outcome of activities by Tan Malaka, the well-known Indonesian Communist and Comintern agent, who spent much of his time in Manila during the years 1925 to 1927.

Communist Party Congress which was being held and arrested 400 persons, including all the members of the Politburo. This was followed up the next year by a decree outlawing the Party, while the leaders arrested in 1931 were given varying terms of imprisonment.

In the meantime nationalist agitation was continuing; but it was largely reduced when, in 1934, the Tydings-McDuffie Act gave the Philippines the status of a self-governing commonwealth under American suzerainty and the promise of full independence after ten years.

By 1937 Quezon, who two years earlier had become the first president of the Philippines, had decided to take a more lenient attitude towards the Communists. The leaders who had been imprisoned in 1932 were pardoned accordingly and released on 15th October. Twelve months later, when the Socialist Party and the Communist Party merged into one, the new Communist Party was recognized by Quezon as a legal political party and took part in the general elections held that year. In 1940, however, the Party was outlawed once more and went underground, where it still was when, in December 1941, the Japanese invaded the Philippines. The Communist leaders thereupon took to the hills where, in March the following year, they organized the Anti-Japanese People's Army, better known in post-war years as the Hukbalahaps. Fuller details of this body, which co-operated with the Allies in the underground resistance movement for the rest of the war, and of the Nationalist Party, most of whose members collaborated with the Japanese, will be given in a later chapter.

Of the countries of South-East Asia, other than those under British rule at this period, it only remains to outline the main developments in Indonesia during the years preceding the outbreak of the Pacific War. The PKI (Indonesian Communist Party) was established in May 1920 and the revolutionary wing under Semaun from *Sarekat Islam* was expelled in October the following year. Their expulsion was due to Moslem antipathy to the atheistic complexion of the Communist creed, which Semaun and his followers were expounding.

Semaun had helped to form the PKI and had been elected its first president. Associated with him in its formation were four others who, like himself, were to figure prominently in the years ahead, not only in the Indonesian Communist movement itself but also in the wider field of world Communism. These were Alimin, the adopted son of a Dutch professor; Tan Malaka, son of a high official in Sumatra;

Muso, a post office worker; and Darsono. All were young men at the time and, with the exception of Alimin, still in their early twenties. A brief account of their activities during the 1920's indicates the close connection between Asian Communism and the planners and instigators of World Revolution in Moscow.

Following the affiliation of the PKI to the Comintern in December 1920, Semaun had set to work to bring the trade unions under Communist control. For this purpose he had established the Revolutionary Trade Union Central in June 1921. Four months later came his expulsion from *Sarekat Islam*; whereupon, after visiting the Comintern representative in Shanghai, he made his way to Moscow. There, in January 1922, he represented Java at the First Congress of the Toilers of the East. By the summer of that year he was back in Indonesia where, in May 1923, he was arrested for his part in instigating a general strike among the railway workers. For this he was exiled to Timor, but three months later was allowed to go to Europe on condition that he did not return to his own country. This promise he appears to have kept until some twenty years later, although it did not prevent him from playing an active part in the Communist movement both in Europe and in Asia. In June 1924, together with Alimin, he attended the Pan-Pacific Trade Union Congress in Canton, and in February 1927 he was taking part in the First Congress of the Communist-controlled League Against Imperialism in Brussels. With Alimin, once again, he attended the Comintern Sixth World Congress in Moscow in the summer of 1928 and, while there, made himself conspicuous by a passage of arms with the Dutch delegate, whose claim that the Netherlands Communist Party had organized the PKI and directed its activities he refuted.¹

In the meantime, owing to Semaun's arrest and subsequent exile in 1923, it had become necessary to find a new leader for the PKI. Darsono was accordingly appointed to succeed him as president and in December 1924, after his return from the meeting in Canton, Alimin was elected chairman. A year later, however, he too was forced to leave the country in order to avoid arrest for fomenting strikes in Samarang and Surabaya. Escaping to Singapore, he was joined by Muso, Darsono, Semaun and other Javanese Communist

¹ According to Kahin, it was at the Fifth World Congress in the summer of 1924, not at the Sixth Congress, that this clash occurred. Kahin (p. 75) quotes him as declaring that the Netherlands Communist Party was more of a liability than an asset to the Indonesian Communists.

leaders and with them drew up plans for a general uprising. Tan Malaka, who was in the Philippines at the time on behalf of the Comintern, was asked to join them in Singapore; but as he was opposed to the idea of a revolt before the situation was ripe for it, he declined their invitation. Alimin was therefore sent to see him in Manila and tried to persuade him to provide funds for the projected rebellion. Tan Malaka, however, was adamant and refused his importunings on the grounds that further preparations were necessary and that Moscow could not be asked to sanction such funds until the situation warranted it. In this he appears to have been fully justified; but his refusal was resented, especially by Alimin and Muso, and was to be held up against him later.

Before that happened, however, Alimin himself, after a visit to Moscow with Tan Malaka's reply, was arrested in Johore by the Singapore police on his return in December 1926 and deported. Proceeding to the Philippines, he later made his way to Vladivostok and in the summer of 1928, in company with Semaun, attended the Sixth World Congress of the Comintern in Moscow. There he stayed on for a time in order to study the art of Communist revolution at the Lenin University, where his fellow-students included Thorez, Browder, Sharkey, Pollitt, Chou En-Lai, and Nozaka, who were to become outstanding Communist leaders in France, the United States, Australia, Great Britain, China and Japan respectively. On completion of his studies he was dispatched about the end of 1929 with Muso to China, from which country they were to direct the revolutionary movement in Indonesia, but Alimin himself appears to have gone on to Burma, where he was joined by Tan Malaka.

Muso, who had been forced to leave Indonesia in the autumn of 1925 in order to evade arrest for his part in stirring up the strikes, had fled to Singapore where he took part in the unsuccessful attempt to persuade Tan Malaka to provide funds for a general uprising. With Alimin he went to Moscow with Tan Malaka's reply, and with Alimin he was arrested in Johore in December 1926 and deported. He therefore made his way back to Moscow, where in October 1928 he was elected to the Presidium of the IKKI. There he appears to have remained until about December 1929, when he left via Berlin for China as an adviser on Malayan and Indonesian affairs to the Far Eastern Bureau of the Comintern in Shanghai. In this capacity, it seems, he was instructed to keep in touch with Alimin and Tan Malaka in Rangoon.

Darsono, who went to Moscow with Muso at the end of 1926, had been elected vice-president of the PKI at the time of its formation in May 1920. In the summer of 1921, after a visit to Shanghai to confer with the Comintern representative there, he had made his way to Moscow to attend the Third World Congress of the Comintern. From Moscow he appears to have gone to Berlin¹ where, in March 1922, he was joined by Tan Malaka, and it was not until April 1923 that he returned to Indonesia. There he promptly set to work to help Semaun stage a railway strike. It was for his part in instigating this strike that Semaun was arrested, and Darsono thereupon succeeded him for a time as leader of the PKI. In December 1925, however, Darsono himself was arrested for stirring up further strikes,² but he managed to escape early the following year and, after fleeing to Singapore, made his way to Moscow with Muso at the end of 1926. There he spent the years 1929-30 at the Lenin University and was elected as a candidate for the IKKI; but in March 1931 it was reported in the official Comintern organ *Imprekor* that he had been expelled for the 'deviation' of favouring co-operation with the national reformists [4].

In many ways the most colourful and independent-minded of the Indonesian Communist leaders was Tan Malaka, sometimes called the 'father' of Indonesian Communism. Early in 1922 he was arrested for organizing strikes but was released soon after on condition that he left the country. Proceeding by way of Berlin to Moscow, he attended the Comintern Fourth World Congress, which was held there from November to December that year. It was at this Congress that he first showed his independent leanings by insisting, contrary to the views of the great majority assembled there, that Pan-Islam in Indonesia was an expression of national aspirations for independence and that Indonesian Communism should be adapted to such nationalism. Following this meeting, at which he was appointed Comintern agent for South-East Asia and Australia, he stayed on in Moscow to study revolutionary methods and organization until about the end of 1923 when, as a representative of the IKKI to which he had been elected, he was sent to Canton, ostensibly as a secretary to Sun Yat-Sen. His main task, however, appears to have been to take charge of party organization and to control Muso and Alimin,

¹ Like its Far Eastern Bureau in Shanghai, the Comintern maintained a West European Bureau in Berlin.

² It was typical of PKI mismanagement that these strikes broke out in Surabaya six months ahead of schedule and, therefore, without adequate preparations.

who were still at that time operating in Indonesia. He seems to have remained in China until about the middle of 1925, when he left for Manila where he had his meeting with Alimin in the spring of 1926.

In advising against the rebellion advocated by his compatriots, he was supported by Semaun; but, due to their annoyance with him for refusing to support it with Comintern funds, Muso and Alimin, on their arrival in Moscow with his reply, had set about undermining his influence. It was this, combined with his advocacy of Pan-Islam in 1922 and with his founding of a new party in 1927 based on Pan-Asian nationalism, that led to his expulsion from the IKKI. It may not be out of place to recall that some twenty years later Tan Malaka was to have his revenge. This was in August 1948 when, like the abortive uprising of 1926 which he had opposed, the Madiun rebellion staged by Muso was carried out with disastrous results owing to inadequate preparations. Muso himself was amongst those killed and it took close on five years for the PKI to recover from the severe blow it had sustained. Tan Malaka fought against the rebels on that occasion.

Of Tan Malaka's other activities it must suffice to give only the highlights. After spending some eighteen months or so in the Philippines, during which period he appears to have paid a visit to Siam, he left about the end of 1926 for Singapore. There he remained for a month or two before proceeding to Indonesia, where he was when the second part of the abortive uprising, carried out against his advice, took place in Western Sumatra early in 1927. Evading arrest, he escaped to Siam, where he set to work to organize a new proletarian body, known as the Indonesian Republic Party or *Pari*. Although its immediate purpose was to train Indonesians in Bangkok for underground activities in Indonesia, its long-term aim was to build up a co-ordinated proletarian movement in South-East Asia and Australia.

Having set up this organization, he then returned to Manila where, in October 1927, he was arrested and deported to China. In the summer of 1928, however, he turned up in Moscow to attend the Sixth World Congress of the Comintern. There he made himself conspicuous by attacking Bukharin's proposal for an alliance between the Communists and the native bourgeoisie in the colonies. The dangers of such alliances had recently been exemplified in China, and Tan Malaka contended that similar disasters to the Communist cause would be experienced in the colonies if Bukharin's plans were put into effect.

Following this Comintern meeting, Tan Malaka appears to have

returned to China and to have remained there for the most of the next four years. He seems to have gone to Rangoon for a short time in 1931 to organize a base there for Communist activities both in Burma and Malaya. In October 1932, however, he was arrested in Hong Kong while on his way from Shanghai to Siam, presumably in the hope of exploiting the situation arising from the bloodless revolution which had been carried out in that country earlier in the year. This was by no means the end of his activities, for, following his arrest, he was deported from Hong Kong and quickly set to work again in other areas, including Japan. Enough has been said to indicate the wide scope and nature of his operations.

The various sources from which these biographical details have been derived are often conflicting in their information, especially in regard to dates. While, however, some of the details given above must therefore be regarded as only approximately correct, the general picture they present is not open to question. This shows, besides much else, that from about the end of 1925 onwards the principal leaders of the Indonesian Communist movement were of necessity directing the movement from abroad—from Moscow, from Singapore, or from China.

Of their subsequent activities no more need be said here, except to note that, apart from Semaun who is still in Moscow, all of them were to figure again in Indonesia in the post-war years. Tan Malaka, who was the first to return,¹ was killed in a skirmish in 1949. Alimin returned shortly after Japan's collapse in 1945 as secretary-general of the revived PKI. Muso returned *incognito* in the summer of 1948 and was killed in the abortive Madiun rebellion which he launched in August that year.² Darsono, after twenty-five years' exile, returned in March 1950 as a disillusioned Communist. Transferring his allegiance to the Socialist Party, he was given a post in the foreign ministry under the Republic of Indonesia, which had but recently achieved the independence for which nationalists and Communists alike had struggled so long and so strenuously.

The early 1920's had been marked by the fomenting of sporadic strikes and this had led to drastic action by the Dutch. It remains to add that, contrary to the advice given by Tan Malaka, the advocates of the ill-conceived plan for a general uprising had gone ahead with

¹ Early in 1944, according to Kahin.

² He returned there secretly in April 1935 and stayed nearly a year (*see* Kahin, p. 86).

their preparations and, after several postponements, had finally launched the rising in Western Java in November 1926.¹ As forecast by Tan Malaka, the outbreaks, which had been preceded by violence and robbery directed by the PKI in co-operation with criminal elements, proved premature and were quickly suppressed by the Dutch. About 13,000 of the rebels were arrested, 4,500 of them being given prison sentences and 1,300 sent to Diguel in New Guinea for internment. The Congress of the League Against Imperialism, which was held in Brussels in February 1927, gave its moral support to the revolutionaries; but this did not help them. Following the seizure of documents during police raids on Indonesian establishments in The Hague and Leiden in June that year, documents which revealed the spread of the revolutionary movement in Indonesia, the PKI was outlawed. Eighteen years were to pass before it was legalized once more.

What the Comintern thought of this rebellion and its sequel was shown in November that year by an article published in the IKKI organ, which took the PKI severely to task for launching the uprising without adequate political preparation and organization. Having administered this reproof, it went on to urge the reconstruction of the Party, the rebuilding of the trade unions, the establishment of close contact with left wing labour movements in Australia, New Zealand, China and Japan, and the education and organization of the masses for a new offensive.

The shattered remnants of the now illegal PKI took these admonitions to heart and Indonesia was subjected to a flood of Communist literature throughout the following year. Plans were also drawn up for a new rebellion which, with the co-operation of the nationalist leaders, was to be launched in 1930. The police, however, got wind of the project and a number of nationalist leaders, including Sukarno, the future president of the Indonesian Republic, were arrested in December 1929 after their houses had been searched, and the rebellion was thereby nipped in the bud.

In the meantime, as a result of the abortive uprising of 1926 and the outlawing of the PKI, *Sarekat Islam*, whose importance in the nationalist movement had been greatly impaired in recent years by the Communists, had resumed its former position as the main organ

¹ The revolution was to have been launched in Padang, in Western Sumatra, but owing to disorganization and lack of co-ordination it broke out first in Batavia. By the time the rising in Padang took place two months later the insurrection in Java had been completely crushed. As in the case of the Canton Commune a year later, the majority of the workers remained indifferent and failed to rise.

of Indonesian nationalism. In the summer of 1927, however, a rival had appeared in the form of the PNI (National Party of Indonesia) which, with political and economic independence by non-co-operation as its proclaimed aim, had been formed on 4th June by Sukarno. Both he and his new party were to figure prominently in the years ahead. So, too, was the nationalist student Hatta who, with three others, was arrested in Holland in September that year. Although not a Communist, Hatta was strongly influenced by Communism and was a close friend of Alimin. Like many other Asiatic nationalists of that period, however, he became imbued with the idea of seeking Japanese aid in the struggle for independence. Accordingly, after being released from detention, he returned clandestinely to Indonesia in 1932 and from there, in March 1933, made his way to Japan, where he made contact with Tan Malaka, who was then in Tokyo. How long he stayed is not clear, but it cannot have been very long, as he was arrested in Indonesia in February the following year and sent to New Guinea for internment. There he remained out of harm's way until 1942, when he was released by the Japanese invading forces. This, however, is a digression and we must return to trace briefly the main developments which followed the outlawing of the PKI and the formation of the PNI in 1927.

Although the Communists had been driven underground, the nationalists, on whom devolved the task of directing the independence movement, continued to maintain touch with Semaun and Tan Malaka. Contact was also maintained with the IKKI in Moscow, although Semaun himself incurred that body's displeasure by agreeing to the PNI assuming direction of the nationalist movement in Indonesia.¹ The PNI, however, soon ran foul of the government and in December 1929, its leader, Sukarno, was arrested. Sixteen months later, in April 1931, the PNI itself was dissolved² and was succeeded eight or nine months later by a new party, the *Partindo*, which not only had almost identical aims but, like the PNI, was headed by Sukarno, who had been released in December. Almost simultaneously there emerged yet another nationalist organization, the National Education Club, whose members included Hatta and

¹ According to Kahin (p. 89), it was the *Perhimpunan Indonesia*, not the PNI, which was to take over the leadership, the agreement being signed by Semaun and Hatta in Holland on 5th December 1926, i.e. six months before the PKI was outlawed and six months before the PNI was born. As a result of Moscow's strictures it was repudiated by Semaun on 19th December 1927.

² It was to be revived after the war.

Sjahrir, both admirers of the Japanese and destined to figure prominently in the post-war period.

Neither the *Partindo* nor the National Education Club was Communistic but, like so many Asiatic nationalist parties even to this day, both were leftist in complexion. Each of them, moreover, followed the example of the Indian Congress Party by adopting the policy of passive resistance and of non-co-operation with their Western overlords. Between them they dominated the nationalist movement for the time being, although this domination was of short duration. By 1934 the *Partindo*, like its predecessor, the PNI, had been outlawed, while Sukarno, Hatta, Sjahrir and all the other outstanding nationalist leaders had been arrested and imprisoned. It was not until the arrival of the Japanese eight years later that they regained their freedom, some of them being released by the invading forces, while others were removed to Australia shortly after the outbreak of the Pacific War in order to prevent their falling into Japanese hands.

An incident which occurred early in 1933 illustrates the growing unrest of this period. The native armed forces had remained reasonably loyal and free from subversive activities, but on 30th January and 3rd February that year discontent over recent pay cuts led to acts of insubordination in Surabaya by naval personnel who refused to go on duty. These were followed two days later by a mutiny on board the Dutch warship *Zevern Provincien*, which was seized in port while the commander and most of the other officers were ashore. Having overpowered the nine officers on board, the mutineers put to sea and it was not until nearly a week later that a naval squadron and some flying-boats overhauled the ship and called on the mutineers to surrender. On their refusing to do so, the ship was bombed and twenty-three of the crew killed and twenty-five wounded, before they ran up the white flag. Although the mutiny, and the acts of insubordination which preceded it, had their origin in genuine grievances, there appears to have been clear evidence of Communist instigation and exploitation, especially in the case of the actual mutiny.¹

It was shortly after this that the *Partindo* was outlawed and, with its outlawing and the arrest of the principal nationalist leaders in 1933 and 1934, the independence movement seemed doomed; but in

¹ The *Zevern Provincien* was a 6,500-ton vessel used for training purposes. The mutiny, which was planned by both the European and native crew, resulted in the arrest and dismissal of about 400 Indonesian naval ratings and 40 Dutch marines.

1935 the Communists began to assert themselves once more and, re-establishing the PKI in secret, again took up the leadership of the national liberation movement. As they were still illegal they had to operate underground and confine themselves mainly to propagandist and other such activities among factory workers. Until the outbreak of the Pacific War in December 1941 there were few incidents.

A contributory cause for this lull was to be found in the change of Communist tactics throughout the world as a result of the decisions reached at the Seventh World Congress of the Comintern in August 1935. These called for the establishment of 'popular fronts' against Fascism and Nazi-ism and entailed a more co-operative attitude towards all democratic governments and organizations. Being itself illegal, the PKI was not in a position to offer its co-operation, but it could and did avoid needless provocation. In Holland, however, the Indonesian Communists had been gradually obtaining control of the *Perhimpunan Indonesia*, which had originally been under nationalist leadership and had produced the majority of those who had figured most prominently in the nationalist movement in Indonesia after 1927. By increasing their hold on this organization, these Communists had succeeded after 1936 in changing its policy from uncompromising non-co-operation to co-operation with the Dutch in accordance with the new line laid down by the Comintern. For its part, the Netherlands Communist Party, which had been the only political party in Holland until 1929 to advocate complete independence for Indonesia, switched round in 1938 to opposing independence and supporting the Dutch government. In explanation of this *volte face*, it contended that an independent Indonesia would be too weak to stand up to what it called 'Japanese Imperialist Fascism'. A somewhat similar fear of Japan, it may be noted, was expressed by the *Gerindo* (Indonesian People's Movement), a body formed in Indonesia in April 1937, and which included former members of the *Partindo*. Although potentially a strongly militant nationalist organization, it showed itself fully prepared to co-operate with the government against Fascism and the threat from Japan and to play its part in the *Volksraad*. This was in spite of the fact that a proposal put forward in 1936 for a conference to discuss plans for a ten-year evolutionary period towards self-government had been rejected.

During the few years remaining before the outbreak of the Pacific War, Indonesian sentiment was divided between fear of the Japanese

threat and desire to obtain freedom from Dutch rule. With the fall of Holland in May 1940, however, anti-Dutch feeling became increasingly pronounced among the masses as a whole, although a small minority of influential Indonesians held to the view that the struggle for independence should be subordinated for the time being to resistance to the Nazi threat to the free world. The outbreak of the Pacific War in December 1941 and the occupation of Indonesia by the Japanese three months later led to fresh developments; but with these we are not yet concerned.

CHAPTER XIX

British Rule and Rebellion [7]

THE South Seas Communist Group had been set up in 1926 with headquarters in Singapore. Controlled from China by the Chinese Communist Party, it embraced Burma, Malaya, Siam, the Netherlands East Indies and French Indo-China within its orbit and directed and co-ordinated Communist activities in these areas. Following a conference held by the group in April 1930, however, it was decided to carry out a drastic reorganization and to divide the countries concerned into two main groups. The South Seas Communist Group itself was dissolved and the Malayan Communist Party, after being formally organized, was to be responsible primarily for Malaya, but was to have sub-departments for Indonesia, Burma and Siam.¹ The Indo-China branch was to become a separate organization and, together with the Malayan Communist Party, was to come under the control of the Comintern's Far Eastern Bureau in Shanghai.

The object of this decentralization was to free the South Seas movement from Chinese Communist control, as Chinese control was tending to make it a purely Chinese movement. Moreover, by this time the CCP itself was in dire straits and its battered remnants were in process of reorganizing themselves on somewhat unorthodox lines in the mountainous hinterland of China. By freeing the movement from its preponderantly Chinese influence, it was hoped to develop Communism in each of these countries on an indigenous basis.

For the purpose of implementing this decentralization, the Comintern dispatched an agent to Singapore under the guise of a commercial traveller for a Parisian firm. Arriving there in April 1931 under the name of Serge Lefranc, he quickly went to work. Some indication of what this entailed can best be given by quoting the

¹ There is said to have been a scheme for forming a joint Burma-Siam Communist Party under MCP control, but it does not appear to have been implemented.

following passage from a book published by René Onraet, a former inspector-general of police in the Straits Settlements [2]:

‘His purely local activities included a thorough survey of the Malayan position and the establishment for it of direct communication with the PPTUS in Shanghai, the reorganization of Red Labour Unions, the payment of subsidies to the Malayan Communist Party, to the Malayan Trade Unions and to the Malayan Communist Youth, and finally, the proper use of 50,000 dollars (gold) set aside by the PPTUS for work in Malaya and Burma to enrol the native element.

Lefranc’s contacts outside Malaya were extensive. As the representative of the Far Eastern Bureau he contacted India, Burma and French Indo-China; and he was in correspondence with Communist centres in Paris, Brussels and Berlin.’

His movements, however, aroused some suspicion and on 1st June he was arrested, together with two leading Malayan Communists. Under interrogation he admitted that he was Joseph Ducroux, a well-known French Communist. This was the beginning of a long series of revelations, for the investigations which had led to his arrest had resulted also in uncovering the main Comintern apparatus for directing and controlling Communist movements and activities throughout the Far East. This consisted of the PPTUS (Pan-Pacific Trade Unions Secretariat) and the FEB (Far Eastern Bureau), whose functions were complementary, the latter’s function being to translate Comintern policy and directions into action for the purpose of producing, by means of propaganda and agitation, revolutionary situations enabling the urban proletariat to seize power. The PPTUS, which was the Eastern counterpart of the Profintern, was concerned solely with organizing and preparing the working masses for world revolution. It assisted the FEB by industrial agitation, which was aimed at bringing about economic dislocation through the medium of political strikes. The PPTUS, it may be noted in passing, had been founded at the Pan-Pacific Trade Union Conference held in Hankow in July 1927, those taking part in its creation including such outstanding Communists as Earl Browder, later to become secretary-general of the American Communist Party, and M. N. Roy. Working in close co-operation with the FEB, it carried out—in China, Japan, Korea, Formosa, Indonesia, Malaya and the Philippines—the functions of the Profintern, by which it was controlled indirectly through a branch in Berlin and from which it received funds and instructions. Together with the FEB which was also run from Berlin, it was staffed by about

a dozen Europeans, while Asiatic members of the staff attended to the work of translation and liaison.

Ducroux's arrest led not only to the exposure of this apparatus in Shanghai, but also to the arrest of Hilaire Noulens, who controlled it, and of three of the other Europeans on his staff. It led also to the arrest of other Communists, including Ho Chi-Minh. Noulens himself was sentenced to death by a Chinese court but the sentence was commuted.

These arrests and their aftermath dealt what seemed a crippling blow to the Communist movements in the areas concerned; but before long the FEB had revived sufficiently to organize a conference in Singapore and by 1933 it was once more paying subsidies, dispatching students to Moscow, and planning a new propaganda offensive. Communist courage, endurance and powers of rapid recuperation seemed worthy of a better cause.

In Malaya itself, evidence of Communist activity came to light in 1934 when the MCP (Malayan Communist Party) received instructions from the Comintern representatives in Shanghai. Strikes, sabotage and demonstrations of various kinds were ordered, and both the MCP and the Malayan Communist Youth Corps set to work to implement these directives to the best of their ability. Demonstrations were carried out in May the following year against the Jubilee celebrations, anti-British slogans were posted up, and pamphlets were scattered around in some places. At the same time, the MCP sought to establish relations with the Communist parties in India and Great Britain and set up a unification committee for the purpose of co-ordinating Communist activities among the Malays, Chinese and Indians in Malaya. The Party played an active part in organizing strikes in 1936, but by this time Japan was beginning to replace Britain as the main target for attack. After the outbreak of fighting in North China in 1937, anti-Japanese activities became the predominant feature of Communist policy in Malaya.

In spite of calling themselves the Malayan Communist Party, the overwhelming majority of the Party members were, and still are, Chinese. In adopting so strong an anti-Japanese stand, therefore, they were able to appeal to the patriotic sentiments of the largely non-Communist community in general as well as to the handful of full-blooded Communists. In order to make this appeal more potent, and to lull the susceptibilities and suspicions of those who would have refused to join any avowed Communist body, the Communists

changed the names of their various organizations in Malaya and established seemingly new societies and associations superficially free from the taint of Communism. Prominent among these was the AEBUS (Anti-Enemy-Backing-Up-Society) which, a few years later, as readers of Spencer Chapman's *The Jungle is Neutral* will recall, was to provide guerrillas to work with the British after the Japanese invasion of Malaya in December 1941. Before this came about, however, there was to be a period during which the AEBUS, in accordance with Moscow's instructions, was to adopt a strongly anti-British attitude.

This anti-British stand was the outcome of the Soviet Pact with Germany in August 1939. As a result, mass demonstrations and strikes were carried out in most industries and culminated in a general strike, which paralysed the local war effort for several months. Thanks, however, to an agreement reached in 1940 between the CCP (Chinese Communist Party) and the Chinese National Government in Chungking, the MCP received instructions from the CCP representatives in Hong Kong in September that year to put an end to all anti-British movements and strike agitations in Malaya and to concentrate on anti-Japanese activities. Then, nine months later, came the news that Germany had invaded Russia, and in December 1941 the Japanese launched their invasion of Malaya. The whole situation had undergone a radical change and the MCP offered to co-operate with the British against the common enemy. By the close of the year the offer had been accepted after some initial hesitation and, for the first time in its history, the Party was made legal. Arms and guerrilla training were given to selected members and many of them rendered yeoman service in the jungles during the next four years.

It was not foreseen that, by accepting their help in this way, the British authorities were enabling the Communists to obtain the arms, training, experience and influence which were to be used to such deadly effect against them in the post-war years. But in this chapter we are only concerned with tracing developments down to the outbreak of the Pacific War. We must leave Malaya and turn to Burma.

It was a Buddhist body which, in 1919, put forward the first demand for Home Rule in Burma. This was the Young Men's Buddhist Association, which had been formed in 1908 as the counterpart of the YMCA and later developed into the General Council of Buddhist Associations. In 1919, and indeed until 1937, Burma was

still a province of India and it was in part due to the resentment aroused by the exclusion of Burma from the Montague-Chelmsford Reforms, incorporated in the Government of India Act of 1919, that nationalist agitation made its appearance. The matter was righted by the Government of Burma Act of 1921, but by then the more excitable elements were claiming that the reforms were inadequate. University students, who had staged the first student strike in 1920, were becoming increasingly vociferous. It was following the grant of these reforms that nationalist organizations began to spring into being and there was a rising demand for a greater share in local and provincial government.

Major factors in this resurgence of Burmese nationalism, which was closely linked with an anti-Western Buddhist revival, were the social disintegration and unrest brought about by Indian immigration and by the problems of agricultural indebtedness in the rice-growing areas. For various reasons, mainly economic, the Indians were particularly unpopular and the first serious outbreak of nationalism was essentially anti-Indian. A dockside strike in 1930 was its immediate cause.

Burma had experienced its earliest labour troubles in 1921, when strikes occurred for the first time. These were followed two years later by further strikes, this time in the oilfields. The year 1924 was marked by a widespread strike in May, and in 1930 wharf labourers staged their second big strike in Rangoon. The strikers were Indians. Burmans, who had but recently begun to work as dock labourers, were brought in as strike-breakers. They carried out their task with success, but were then paid off and found themselves the butt of the Indian ex-strikers, who started jeering at them. Filled with indignation, they turned on the Indians and, running amok, slaughtered 120 of them and wounded 900 others, including women and children.

In December 1930 a rebellion was launched. Although not nationalist in the strict sense of the term, it was anti-foreign and was aimed particularly against Indians. Raised by a charlatan named Saya San, who professed to have occult powers, its start was marked by the murder of a forest official and before long the uprising had split into about half-a-dozen separate rebellions. Anti-foreign outbursts were followed by a month of anti-Chinese riots. These, in turn, were followed by anti-Indian demonstrations and a widespread campaign of looting. It required the employment of the best part of an Army division, composed largely of Indian troops, to suppress the

rising and before it was finally ended, some 2,000 rebels had been killed and 9,000 taken prisoner. Of these latter, about 1,000 were sentenced to heavy terms of imprisonment and 128, including Saya San himself, were hanged.

Although based on superstition rather than on nationalism, the rebellion was in effect a negative expression of general dissatisfaction with existing conditions. It sought no positive programme of reforms, but it happened to coincide with the founding of the Dobama Society, known also as the Thakin Party,¹ a revolutionary organization formed in May 1930 by leftist members of the student movement. Primarily, or at least ostensibly, a nationalist body, this society aimed at winning independence and establishing a socialist or even a Communist state. After a series of ups and downs, it was remodelled on Communist lines in 1933 and many of its members subsequently became Communists.

Even before the formation of the Thakin Party, Communism had begun to seep into Burma, although its first appearance, as in Malaya and Siam, had been through the medium of the local Chinese community. A Burmese Committee of Chinese Communists had been formed in 1928 and had kept in touch with the South Seas Communist Group in Singapore. The contact, however, had been discovered and in 1932 eleven of those concerned were deported; but by 1930 Burmese students too had begun to show an interest in Communism and some of these had joined the Thakin Party while others had joined the All-Burma Youth League, which had been formed about the same time. The world slump, which had by then set in, had reduced the cultivator class to abject poverty and consequently played some part in this Communist trend.

In the meantime, as a result of the application of the Montague-Chelmsford Reforms to Burma in 1921, dyarchy of the type introduced into India two years earlier had been established in Burma in 1923. Certain portfolios in the new government had been handed over to Burmese ministers, who were responsible to the democratically elected Legislative Council. The reforms, however, had merely whetted the appetite for more political power and nationalist demands for full self-government and separation from India became

¹ The term *Thakin*, meaning lord or master, had previously been applied solely to the British in much the same way as Indians address Englishmen as *Sahib*. By designating themselves as Thakins, the members of this body sought to emphasize that they, and not the British, should be masters in Burma.

increasingly insistent. Plans for a new constitution were therefore drawn up and in 1935 were embodied in the Government of India Act, which came into force two years later. Burma, which had been a part of India since 1886, became independent of the sub-continent and, with a British governor presiding over it, was granted a government of its own with a considerable degree of autonomy.

Even this, however, failed to satisfy the more extreme nationalists; and the General Council of Buddhist Associations, which was showing an increasing tendency to adopt the ideas and methods of the Indian Congress Party, made an unsuccessful attempt to prevent the formation of a ministry under the new constitution. Although there was no resort to political murders such as there had been in India, and attempts at violence were few, the rising tide of nationalist sentiment was reflected in such matters as the nationalists' insistence on the use of Burmese instead of English, the official language, in the House of Representatives and the renaming of streets in Rangoon which had English names. A further instance of nationalist fervour was the demand made in 1937 for the immediate and complete Burmanization of the military police.

With the rising tide of nationalism came a spread of left wing activities, and the year which saw Burma's separation from India was marked also by the formation of the clandestine National Revolutionary Party and of the more openly nationalist and revolutionary Nagani Book Club. The former was established by extremist students as an underground organization for the study of revolutionary methods as a means of obtaining national independence. The Nagani Book Club was a left wing nationalist body founded by three former members of the Dobama Society. These three were Thakins Nu, Than Tun and Soe, who achieved prominence after the Second World War as premier of Burma, secretary-general of the Burmese Communist Party, and leader of the Red Flag Communists respectively.

The Dobama Society had made its first appearance as a political party in the 1936 elections for the Legislature and had won three seats in it. Its Thakin members were by this time violently nationalist and revolutionary and were basically anti-government. As such they indulged in virulent criticism and appeared incapable of constructive ideas. They even formed a private 'army' of their own, an example followed by two other nationalist leaders, Ba Maw and U Saw. The latter, who was arrested in Palestine shortly after the outbreak of the

Pacific War for traitorous dealings with the Japanese and later hanged for the murder of Aung San and his cabinet colleagues in 1947, organized the Myochit Party, with its own private 'army', in 1938. These 'armies', however, were little more than bands of armed thugs, totalling about 4,000. They appear to have played little or no part in the formation of the so-called Burmese Liberation Army, which was formed to assist the Japanese invasion. The nucleus of that army was, in fact, organized in Japan and Siam and was recruited in Burma entirely independently of these private 'armies'. This, however, is looking ahead.

The vehemence of the nationalist and Communist agitation and the consequent growing unrest in the country were reflected in the developments witnessed during the second half of 1938. Starting in the form of serious anti-Indian riots which broke out in Rangoon in July, the disorders spread rapidly and soon included strikes by bus drivers, students and oil-field workers. So grave did the situation become that the government was forced to take steps to suppress the disturbances. Necessary as these measures were, they called forth howls of execration and abuse and led to the launching of a civil disobedience campaign in protest. As so often happens in such instances, nationalists and Communists made common cause.

It was the British who became the villains of the piece after British police had been forced to fire on anti-Japanese demonstrators in Shanghai in May 1925, and it was the British who came in for the main abuse for trying to restore peace and order in Burma after the anti-Indian riots of July 1938. The seriousness of the situation with which the authorities were faced is indicated by the fact that it was nearing the end of the year before the disorders were finally suppressed. By that time 240 persons, mostly Indians, had been killed, a bomb had been exploded in the Legislature, numerous buses and cars had been set on fire, students had staged a hunger strike, and lawless elements throughout the country had indulged in an orgy of destruction of Indian property. Amongst those arrested was the radical politician U Saw, who received a prison sentence, although two years later he succeeded by extremely questionable means in becoming prime minister.

The riots of 1938 and the necessarily stern measures adopted for their suppression had stirred the Thakins and other nationalist extremists to a state bordering on hysteria. One of these, Thakin Thein Pe, had been in India at the time, studying at Calcutta Uni-

versity and, while there, he had made contact with the Indian Communist Party. On his return to Burma he had planned to persuade his fellow Thakins to join with him in forming a Burmese Communist Party. To his dismay, however, he found, to quote his own words, that, 'in spite of the counsels of the Indian Communists to the contrary, a number of them had decided to accept the help which the Japanese agents in Burma were holding out, motivated, as they professed in wooing whispers, by a desire to set Burma free' [3]. As a result of this decision, a secret agreement was reached with the Japanese in 1939 whereby the National Revolutionary Party was to be supplied with arms and funds for the organization and equipment of a Burmese Independence Army.

For the purpose of providing officers for this army, thirty Burmans were to be smuggled out of the country for military training in Japan. These thirty men duly left Burma in 1940 as agreed and were joined soon after by the twenty-five-year-old Aung San who, after conferring with Gandhi, Nehru and other leading figures in India, had fled to China and then to Japan in order to evade a warrant for his arrest. Like other Burmese nationalists, Aung San was later to become disillusioned with his Japanese friends and it was he who subsequently led the resistance movement against them.

In the meantime, Thakin Thein Pe had gone ahead with his plans for forming a Burmese Communist Party and in August 1939 this body was brought into being. The founders included Ghosal, an Indo-Burman who was to figure prominently in the Burmese Communist movement after the war, and a number of former members of the Dobama who, impatient with its relatively modest programme, had joined the Nagani Book Club.

The year 1939, which saw the birth of the BCP (Burmese Communist Party) and the secret agreement with the Japanese, saw also the establishment of a body called the 'Freedom Bloc', which was organized by the nationalist politician, Ba Maw, from among dissident elements and had 'immediate unconditional independence' as its proclaimed aim. Ba Maw had been elected Burma's first prime minister in April 1937 under the new constitution, but he was becoming increasingly violent, and in August 1940 was arrested for the seditious statements he had made. He subsequently escaped and became one of the foremost collaborators with the Japanese.

The Freedom Bloc was essentially a nationalist body, but another organization formed in the same year reflected the leftist trend which

was developing simultaneously. This was the All-Burma Peasant Association, organized by Thakin Mya who, with Aung San and others, was to be a victim of the assassination plot instigated eight years later by U Saw. Although an ardent nationalist, Thakin Mya had interested himself particularly in agrarian and labour agitation and in organizing political training classes.

While nationalist extremists were intriguing with the Japanese, the Burmese Communists were carrying on similar intrigues with the CPI (Communist Party of India). Towards the end of 1939 or early 1940, a number of these Communists, including Than Tun, made their way to India and made contact with the CPI and with other Indian revolutionary bodies. Under this expert guidance they made a study of propaganda and agitation methods and of subversive organization. This done they returned to Burma, bringing with them an organizational plan and programme on CPI lines and quickly set to work to put into practice the lessons learned from their Indian friends. The BCP was reorganized, independence and anti-imperialism became the primary aims of the Party, peasant unions were formed and strikes organized. Adopting independence and anti-imperialism as their main battle-cries the Communists were running true to form, and were able to appeal to nationalist sentiment and to exploit the nationalist movement to their own ends.

Except that the Communists were opposed to any idea of collaboration with the Japanese, the dividing line between them and the more extreme nationalists was by no means clear. They were entirely at one in seeking to bring about the overthrow of the British and to achieve independence. When, therefore, the government attempted in 1940 to arrest the Dobama leaders, some of those who escaped promptly joined the BCP. Ba Sein was arrested while making his way to Siam, Aung San managed to escape to Japan, Ba Maw was arrested and sentenced for sedition. These arrests and evasions in 1940 reflected the growing state of unrest and tension and were followed in February 1941 by the outlawing of the BCP and the internment of some of its leaders. The climax was fast approaching.

In August that year U Saw, who had been prime minister since September 1940, sought to strike a bargain. Proceeding to England, he tried to persuade the British government to promise immediate Dominion status to Burma in return for Burmese co-operation in the war effort. The attempt failed. He therefore went on to America in the hope of inducing the United States government to bring pressure

to bear on the British. In this too he met with no success, and it was while he was in Washington that Japan launched her attack on Pearl Harbour. To return to Burma by way of the Pacific was out of the question, so he had to make his way back by the Mediterranean. But he got no further than Palestine, for the British had learned that he had been secretly in touch with the Japanese. He was arrested accordingly and was sent to Kenya for internment, the news of his detention on the charge of communicating with the enemy being announced on 18th January 1942, the day on which the Japanese launched their invasion of Burma.

Having traced the main developments of nationalism and Communism in Burma down to the outbreak of the Pacific War, we can now turn to India, whose Congress Party had served as a model for both Burmese and Indonesian nationalists and whose Communist Party had provided help and guidance in the organization of the BCP. Later it was to provide similar help and guidance to the Communists of Ceylon.

An attempt has already been made to outline the principal developments in the Indian Communist movement down to the close of 1925 when the CPI, formed after the temporary setback of the previous year, held its first conference. In 1927 Bombay experienced an eight-months' strike of textile workers, which the Communists exploited to the full, and that same year saw the downfall of the Communists in China. As a result, Moscow switched its attention in the East back to India once more. A wave of Communism began to sweep the country and there were widespread strikes in 1928 and 1929, accompanied by riots and violence instigated by the Communists, whose influence in the trade unions and labour circles in general had increased by leaps and bounds.

The Punjab in 1928 witnessed a development which reflected the close bond between the revolutionary Sikhs of the Ghadr Party and the Communists. The friendship between them had been indicated before and Communist influence was clearly visible in the Ghadr Party organ which, after being suspended since 1918, had been revived in 1925. In 1928, however, the Punjab branch of the Ghadr Party changed its name to *Kirti Kisan* (Workers and Peasants) Party and in May that year Ghate, one of the leading Communists, came out with the unorthodox suggestion that the Communists should put themselves under the control of that Party. Such a suggestion was in

flagrant contradiction to fundamental Communist principles and recalled the proposal put forward the previous year by the Indonesian Communist Semaun, who incurred Moscow's displeasure by agreeing to a nationalist organization assuming direction of the nationalist movement in Indonesia after the PKI (Indonesian Communist Party) had been outlawed.

Ghate's suggestion, however, was not so unorthodox as it appeared to be, because most of the Central Committee members of the CPI were leaders of the Workers and Peasants Party. Their position was, in fact, somewhat akin to that of the Communists in Indo-China after Japan's collapse. There the Viet Minh assumed direction of the nationalist movement; but, although it was nominally a purely nationalist body, it was controlled by its Central Committee, which was composed entirely of prominent Communists—a typical piece of Communist camouflage.

Lest it be thought that the Workers and Peasants Party was confined to the Punjab, it should be noted that the Punjab body was but one of four such regional parties, which had been built up by the Communists during the previous year or two to act as disguised branches of the CPI. Camouflaged in this way, they were able to carry out Communist policies without frightening away people opposed to the creed of Moscow. Like the Burmese Workers and Peasants Party, which was formed twenty-odd years later in Rangoon, they had the further purpose of serving as legal but covert branches of the Communist Party in the event of the CPI itself being outlawed.

The fact that these regional parties, as well as the CPI, were receiving financial aid and instructions from the Comintern was brought out in the Meerut Conspiracy Case after the arrest of a number of the principal Communist leaders in March 1929. After a long-drawn-out trial, twenty-seven of those arrested were sentenced to varying terms of imprisonment in January 1933, although most of the sentences were reduced soon after and all had been released before the close of 1935. Some of those arrested, it may be noted, were foreigners, the practice of sending British and other Western Communist agents to India having been started about 1924.

Communist activities during this period, however, were by no means the only trouble with which the Government of India had to contend. The Congress Party was becoming increasingly vociferous, terrorists continued their fell work, and enmity between Hindus and

Moslems led to serious communal riots from time to time. One such outbreak in Calcutta in 1926 resulted in the death of sixty-seven persons and injuries to over 400 others. With Moslem and Hindu feelings of animosity towards each other rising to a high pitch, the Moslem League began to revive and Hindu extremists in 1928 set about organizing the fanatical *Mahasabha*, which had an armed wing to protect its co-religionists from Moslem wrath.

Some indication of Congress sentiment towards the British *Raj* was shown in a session held in Calcutta in December 1928, when resolutions condemning various Government Bills were passed and an increasing readiness was evinced to appease and pander to the more extreme elements. There was even a tendency to make common cause with the Communists, some of whom were elected to the Congress Committee. Sentiments bordering on Communism were expressed at a Youth Conference held in Poona about the same time, when Nehru, in a fiery speech, advocated a world federation of socialist states as the ideal for which to aim and urged that revolt was necessary if freedom were to be obtained.

Earlier that same year the Simon Commission had arrived in India to carry out the promised review of the Montague-Chelmsford reforms; but it was coolly received and the Congress Party proclaimed a complete boycott. Before its findings had been published, the British government in 1929 made the public announcement that Dominion status was 'the natural issue of India's constitutional progress' and that a Round Table Conference of all Indian groups was to be called in London. The announcement, however, came too late to mollify the Congressmen, and on 26th January 1930 the All-India Congress adopted a resolution, which was to be renewed yearly thereafter on India's 'Independence Day', declaring complete independence for India as the goal to be achieved.

The Simon Report was published later that year and, after confirming the promise of Dominion status, made various proposals for giving increased political power to Indians. Like the Commission itself, the Report met with a cool reception but, nothing daunted, the British government went ahead with its announced intention of holding a Round Table Conference in London. Invitations were sent out in the autumn of 1930 but, as Dominion status remained the British target in India, Congress refused to send representatives. Instead, a civil disobedience movement was launched and quickly developed into widespread violence. Gandhi was finally persuaded to attend the

second sitting of the Conference and the civil disobedience campaign was temporarily called off; but his presence only produced fresh controversies and on his return to India at the close of 1931 the campaign was resumed. Gandhi himself and several other Congress leaders were detained soon afterwards and Congress was proscribed as an illegal organization.

From the conclusions reached at the Round Table Conference there emerged the Government of India Bill, enacted in 1935 and brought into effect in April 1937. Under its terms, self-government was granted to the provinces of British India.¹ The Moslem leaders expressed a qualified approval and agreed to take part, but Congress, adamant in its demand for complete independence, condemned the Act in general and particularly the proviso under which the governor of each province retained powers to safeguard peace and protect the minorities.

In the meantime, although the arrest of their principal leaders in 1929 in connection with the Meerut Conspiracy had dealt a severe blow to the Communists, the All-India Trade Union Congress held in December that year at Nagpur showed by its speeches and resolutions that Communism in India was still very much alive. Attempts to win over the Congress to the Communist cause were only partly successful as there were considerable differences of opinion among its members on the question of Communism; but sufficient support was forthcoming to encourage the Communists. Moreover, in 1930 the reviving Communist Party was able to exploit a widespread railway strike to its own advantage and to incite a serious riot in Calcutta. The Communist movement, however, was suffering from internal dissension and factionalism, a characteristic failing which has continued to this day. Rivalry was particularly bitter between Deshpande, the official head of the Party, and M. N. Roy, who returned to India at the end of 1930 after quarrels in Moscow which led first to his removal from the IKKI and, a year later, to his expulsion from the Comintern.

Roy's aim was to obtain control of the movement in India and then to dictate his own terms to Moscow. He succeeded in bringing about the discomfiture of Deshpande and brought new life into the move-

¹ Only three-fifths of India was British. The remainder of the country was split up among Indian rulers under indirect British rule. The 1935 Act provided for a federation comprising the provinces of British India and the Princely States.

ment, but in August 1931 he was arrested before his other plans could be put into operation. With his removal from the scene, his followers lost heart and the movement lost its impetus.

It was not until after August 1933, when most of the leaders imprisoned in connection with the Meerut Conspiracy were released, that a real attempt was made to reorganize the Party. By the following February efforts were being made to win over the rank and file of the terrorist groups and to foment strikes, strikes being regarded as providing the best training for the eventual revolution in much the same way as manœuvres are held by armies as a means of training for war. Later that year the Party was proscribed and was to remain outlawed until July 1942 when, in order to support their Russian masters, the Communists agreed to collaborate with the British in the war effort. In the meantime, although banned, they continued to work underground in town and village cells and in the trade unions.

The terrorist groups, which the Communists were trying to win over to their side, were ready enough to welcome the aid of Communist propaganda and organization in order to weaken the government by means of strikes and mass disturbances. Like the extreme nationalists in other parts of Asia, however, they were under the happy illusion that they could use the Communists for their own purposes and then crush them, or at least dispense with them, when they had achieved their aim of overthrowing the government and taking control of the country themselves. The ultimate aims of the Indian Communists and the revolutionaries were therefore conflicting. Terrorist violence and bloodshed, however, had continued throughout the 1920's and became particularly serious in the early 1930's, especially in the Chittagong area. Moreover, in addition to these bands of terrorists, a strong revolutionary movement under the Red Shirt leader and firebrand, Abdul Ghaffar, had sprung up in the North-West Frontier Province, causing serious disturbances, the gravest of which took place in Peshawar in April 1930. In August the following year this movement was formally affiliated to the Indian National Congress on the grounds that, as the British nation was the enemy of both the Congress and the Pathans, they should make common cause to get rid of the British.

Apart from a few individual Moslems, the Red Shirts were the only Moslem organization to join the Congress. The Mohammedan community as a whole had by this time come to regard the Congress as an essentially Hindu body, whose aim was not only to overthrow the

British but to impose its will on the Moslems as well. It was, in fact, a curious but inevitable outcome of the British promise of Dominion status to India and the clamour of Congress for complete independence that hostility between Hindus and Moslems had shown a marked increase. Hindu extremists envisaged the day when their own power would be supreme while the Moslems, however nationalistic in outlook, regarded this prospect with even more dislike and apprehension than the continuance of British rule. This rising animosity between the two was reflected in communal riots, which increased both in number and in violence as the years went by. A particularly ferocious one, which took place in Cawnpore in March 1931, developed into widespread murder, arson and looting for three days and resulted in 300 known deaths and an estimated death roll of between four and five hundred. Moslem sentiment was clearly reflected in a statement issued eighteen months later by Bengali Moslem members of the Indian Legislature. This was to the effect that the community was prepared to support the government in any and every measure it might take for crushing the attempts of Bengali Hindu anarchists to set up a Hindu tyranny by means that blemished the good name of India.

It was in this setting and in the knowledge that the Hindus, comprising 65 per cent of the total population of British India as against only 27 per cent Moslems, would be able to swamp them completely if India became independent, that the proposal for the partition of India into Hindustan and Pakistan was publicly voiced in 1933 for the first time. Jinnah's formal demands for a complete Moslem separation from Hindu India were to be made seven years later at a meeting of the All-India Moslem League Council in March 1940. By this time Jinnah had become the acknowledged leader of the Moslems in India and the Moslem League had become an effective political force.

In the intervening years, a Socialist Party had been founded in 1934 as the left wing of the National Congress, the Government of India Bill had been brought into force, and in April 1936 numerous local peasant organizations, which had been springing up all over the country since 1930, were welded together with Communist help into a single All-India *Kisan Sabha* (Peasant Association) under the slogan of 'Abolition of Landlordism'. Then came the outbreak of the war in Europe in September 1939, and a few days later the Congress Working Committee put forward a demand for immediate and complete

independence as the price for its co-operation in the war effort. The demand was refused, though the promise of Dominion status was re-affirmed. The Working Committee thereupon ordered the Congress provincial ministries to quit office. The Communists likewise refused to support the British war effort although, as in other Allied countries, they reversed their policy after the German invasion of Russia in June 1941.¹ The Moslem League, while allowing its members as individuals to co-operate with the British, offered its support only on condition that the Congress plans for India should be rejected and Moslems be left free to decide their own constitutional future. In spite of these obstructions, over two million Indians volunteered for military service and the munitions industries expanded steadily.

With Japan's entry into the war in December 1941 and the arrival of Japanese forces on the threshold of India after the fall of Malaya and Burma, it became imperative for Great Britain to attempt without delay to seek the moral support of the Congress Party and other major political groups. Sir Stafford Cripps was hastily dispatched with proposals for this purpose. The outcome of his mission and subsequent developments, however, must wait for a later chapter. To complete the present survey, it is necessary to turn to Ceylon to consider the developments taking place there during the same period.

In Ceylon a small body of intellectuals, mostly educated in England, had formed a secret revolutionary society in 1932. Three years later this was followed by the formation of the *Lanka Sama Samaj Party*, a Communist body, and during the early 1930's Communist influence was clearly reflected in such developments as the Youth League movement and the launching of campaigns against war and imperialism. In 1939, as a result of ideological differences amongst its members, the *Lanka Sama Samaj* experienced a serious split and the Party itself joined the Fourth International, which had recently been established by Trotsky in opposition to the Comintern. Ceylon became, and remains, the only Asiatic country with a Trotskyist Party. Such Stalinists as remained in it were expelled from its ranks the following year and proceeded to set up a new party of their own, under the name of United Socialist Party. Although this body was

¹ It was with a view to encouraging labour to play its part in the war effort that the All-India Federation of Labour was founded in 1941 as an offset to the All-India Trade Union Congress, which had always been under strong Communist influence.

subsequently banned by the governor, its formation is still described by orthodox Communists as the first attempt to create a working-class party in Ceylon on Marxist lines.

The years 1940–41 witnessed a second wave of strikes in Colombo, in which the Communist-influenced Trade Union Federation¹ played its part; but it was not until July 1943 that a fully-fledged Communist Party of Ceylon was formally established.

¹ This Federation prides itself on being one of the founder members of the now Communist-controlled World Federation of Trade Unions established in 1945.

CHAPTER XX

Evolution of Chinese Communist Policy

IN an earlier chapter dealing with China, we broke off at the point at which Mao Tse-Tung, having established his base in the mountains of South Kiangsi and set up a provisional Chinese Soviet Government, was beginning to emerge as the outstanding figure in the Chinese Communist movement. His peasant armies, which were to carry the Communists into power nearly twenty years later, were still in little more than embryo form, but were being built up and welded into shape. The fatal Li Li-San policy had been abandoned and, with it, the whole orthodox conception of an urban proletarian base. The dead hand of Comintern interference had been removed and a new chapter in the history of Chinese Communism was beginning.

Rather than trace the developments of the 1930's in strict chronological order, it seems best to deal, in this and the next chapter, with the four main features of that period. These were the gradual evolution of Chinese Communist policy and the developments influencing it, the changing relations with the KMT, the attitude of the Party towards Japan, and the growth of Communist military power. As each one of these features was affected to a greater or less extent by one or more of the other three, some overlapping is inevitable.

Owing to the fact that Mao Tse-Tung, during these formative years, was depending mainly on the peasantry, there grew up in the West the idea that he and his followers were agrarian reformers rather than full-blooded Communists. Even the Russians appear to have been deceived in this respect, as General Hurley, who was sent to China towards the end of 1944 as United States Ambassador, was assured by Molotov shortly before leaving for Chungking that 'the Soviet Union was not interested in the Chinese Communists' and that 'they were not really Communists' [1]. It might, of course, be argued that Molotov was trying to mislead Hurley; but that there was some genuine misconception on the part of the Soviet leaders has

since been indicated by Stalin's own admission that he had been mistaken about the true nature and strength of the Chinese Communists. This was when, about this same time or soon after, he told them that an uprising in China had no prospects of success and that they should join the Chiang Kai-Shek government and dissolve their own army. The Chinese, disregarding this advice, 'acted quite otherwise', and subsequently wrung from Stalin the admission that they were right and Moscow was wrong [2].

Not everyone, however, was misled as to the real nature and aims of Chinese Communism under Mao's guidance. Readers of *Red Star Over China* may recall how its author, after prolonged talks with Mao and other Chinese Communist leaders in 1936, came away quite clear in his mind on this matter. The main immediate task they had set themselves, he observed, was 'to build a military and political base for the extension of the revolution on a wider and deeper scale, rather than to "try out Communism in China" '; but their ultimate aim, he stressed, 'is a true and complete Socialist State of the Marx-Leninist conception' [3]. Subsequent events have proved the truth of this observation.

While the Communists were pressing on with their immediate task, Chiang Kai-Shek was doing his best to annihilate the military forces they were building up. With this aim in view he launched no less than five 'extermination' campaigns between December 1930 and October 1933. The last of these five continued a whole year, until October 1934, and for it Chiang mobilized nearly a million men and adopted new tactics. Faced with such overwhelming superiority both in numbers and in arms and equipment, the Communists, who had more than held their own in the four previous campaigns, decided to abandon their base in Kiangsi¹ and move to a fresh area. This would have to be one with a more dependable source of supply and where they could not be surrounded on all sides, an area far distant from Nanking and nearer to supplies from Russia via Mongolia.

Apart from this, it would seem that the decision to move north was influenced also by the belief that they would be in a better position to assist in recovering Manchuria from the Japanese [4]. Certain it is that from 1934 onwards the Chinese Communists tended more and more to adopt the patriotic pose of championing the movement

¹ Fifteen years were to pass before Juichin, the headquarters of this base, was to return to Communist hands once more. This was on 23rd August 1949, when it was occupied by the victorious Communist armies.

against Japanese aggression and to soft-pedal the cause of social revolution. In taking this line, however, they were not merely seeking to appeal to the masses. They were conforming to the increasing trend in the Communist world to support Russian foreign policy by subordinating everything else to the attempt to create a common front against the German and Japanese brands of Fascism. It was a general tendency which was to crystallize in the Popular Front policy launched at the Seventh World Congress of the Comintern in the summer of 1935. With it, and in consequence of it, the former stress on proletarian revolution receded for the time being into the background.

The decision to abandon their base in Kiangsi and to transfer their main activities to a more suitable area led to one of the great epics in the history of Chinese Communism, the famous Long March, and its results influenced the whole course of Far Eastern history.

It was in August 1934 that the vanguard of some 10,000 men under Hsiao Keh set off on this arduous journey which, after incredible hardships and the covering of some 6,000 miles of wild and often mountainous country, through Hunan, Kweichow, Yunnan and Western Szechuan on the Tibetan border, brought them fourteen months later to Shensi where, at Pao An, they established their new base and founded their Autonomous State in the North-West. Two months after the departure of this vanguard, the main body under Chu Teh and Mao Tse-Tung set out for the same destination, arriving there in February 1936 after similar perils and hardships.¹ Then came the move in December that year to Yen-an, which was to remain the seat of the Chinese Soviet government until forced to vacate it during the operations of March 1947.

It was in January 1935 at Tsun-yi in the province of Kweichow, during a halt on the Long March, that Mao was formally elected head of the Party, and never since then has there been anyone to challenge his position. Twenty months later, in August 1936, after setting up a Chinese Workers and Peasants government in Pao An

¹ This march, which involved the crossing of eighteen mountain ranges and twenty-four rivers and the passage of some of the wildest and most desolate country in Asia, was marked by almost daily skirmishes and a number of pitched battles. Sweltering heat and intense cold were faced alternately and a daily average of close on twenty-four miles, inclusive of days spent resting, was covered—'a phenomenal pace for a great army and its transport to average over some of the most hazardous terrain on earth', as Snow very succinctly observes. For a detailed account of the exploit, the reader may be referred to Snow's *Red Star Over China*.

with himself at its head, Mao renamed it the People's Soviet government and, at the same time, the Workers and Peasants Army became officially known as the Red Army. Such a change in nomenclature may seem of little consequence, but it was not without significance, for it foreshadowed the basic policy formulated three years later by Mao in his discourse on the New Democracy, a policy enabling capitalist and *kulak* elements, as well as workers and peasants, to play their part in the projected régime.

How intensely concerned Mao was with the movement of which he was now the undisputed leader and with its place in the general context of world Communism is reflected in a statement he made about this time to Edgar Snow, who was on a visit to his headquarters at Pao Nan. 'The victory of the Chinese national liberation movement will,' he declared, 'be part of the victory of world Communism, because to defeat imperialism in China means the destruction of one of its most powerful bases. If China wins its independence, the World Revolution will progress very rapidly' [5]. It was with a view to strengthening this 'national liberation movement' for the immediate purpose of driving the Japanese out of Manchuria that the famous Sian Incident was staged a few months later.

While it is true that it was a non-Communist, the 'Young Marshal' Chang Hsueh-Liang, who kidnapped Chiang Kai-Shek on the occasion of his visit to Sian in December 1936, the former Manchurian war-lord was certainly influenced, if not actually instigated, by the Communists in taking this action. His object was to persuade Chiang to divert his energies from fighting his Communist countrymen to fighting the Japanese invaders with the help of the Communists, and in this persuasion he had the direct support of the Communist leaders. It was, in fact, Chou En-Lai, Chiang's own political commissar of ten years previously, who was finally brought in to press the captive Nationalist leader to unite with the Communists against Japan.

According to some accounts, Chang Hsueh-Liang and his men threatened to execute Chiang Kai-Shek if he did not agree to oppose the Japanese and it was at Stalin's instigation that Chou En-Lai induced them to release him after extracting a promise to join forces with the Communists against the common enemy. Be that as it may, the Communists, bent on resistance to Japan, apparently felt that by themselves they could do little and that Chiang's leadership of a KMT/CCP coalition was essential for the success of this under-

taking. It was the eloquence of Chou En-Lai's arguments and pleading that finally won over the Nationalist generalissimo to agree to resist the Japanese and to accept Communist co-operation for this purpose. Having given his promise, he was released on Christmas Day. As a result, the KMT-CCP alliance, which had ended so disastrously for the Communists some nine years earlier, was revived once more. As will be shown, however, it was revived with a difference. Under the terms of the agreement issued some months later, the Chinese Soviet government was abolished and the territory administered by it became a Special Area under the designation of 'Border District of Shansi, Kansu and Ningsia', while the Red Army was placed under control of the Nationalist government in Nanking.

While, however, Chiang Kai-Shek had apparently been induced to believe that the Communists no longer aimed at social revolution, Mao Tse-Tung, in reporting to the Communist Party at Yen-an on 10th April 1937 on the compromise made with the KMT for the sake of unity, made it clear that the ultimate aims remained unchanged. 'The Communist Party,' he declared, 'retains the leadership on problems in the Soviet districts and in the Red Army, and retains its independence and freedom of criticism in its relations with the KMT. On these points no concessions can be made. . . . *The Communist Party will never abandon its aims of Socialism and Communism;*¹ it will still pass through the stage of democratic revolution of the bourgeoisie to attain the stages of Socialism and Communism. The Communist Party retains its own programme and its own policies' [6]. There was nothing equivocal in this any more than there was in the Politburo statement of six months later, which stressed that armed force was the determining factor in Chinese politics and that the Communists must therefore expand their armed might during the war with Japan in order eventually to seize the leadership in the national revolution. This second statement, it may be noted, was made barely a month after the Communists, subsequent to the outbreak of the 'China Incident' of July that year, had entered into a united front agreement with the Nationalist government and had pledged themselves to abandon armed insurrection.

The Communist view about the war, which by this time had broken out between Japan and China, was clearly reflected in a resolution passed by the Party in October 1937, apparently at the same time as,

¹ The italics are mine.

and based on, the Politburo statement above. In part this read, 'If the war results in victory, the KMT army will have been reduced to the minimum and the Red Army will have been unceasingly expanded. Thus, victory would lead directly to the victory of the "October Revolution"'.¹

The fact was that the Communists were determined to use this new period of amity with the KMT to strengthen themselves and their own armed forces. A few years later the Malayan Communist Party, which was largely Chinese in composition, was to build up its fighting strength in the same way while co-operating with the British against the Japanese during the period of the Pacific War. The main purpose was to use it against their former allies, the British, after the defeat of Japan.

An alliance in which both partners made fundamental reservations, either openly or mentally, was clearly not a very stable one. Bickerings and differences of opinion were frequent almost from the outset, although it was not until March 1940 that the first open clash occurred and skirmishing took place between the Communist and Nationalist forces. Of this growing tension more will be said in a later section of this chapter.

It was during the period of this second alliance with the KMT that Mao Tse-Tung began to produce some of those writings which Moscow has since characterized as 'enriching and developing' the teachings of Marxism and Leninism² and which are now used as text-books by the Communist parties of most, if not all, countries throughout the world. In 1937, under the title *Concerning Practice*, he wrote a thesis on the unity of theory and practice. His object in doing so, he said, was to equip Chinese Communist cadres with the basic teaching of Marxist-Leninist theory with a view to securing the ideological defeat of the advocates of dogmatism and empiricism, who had inflicted great injury on the cause of the Chinese revolution during the 1931-4 period. The empiricists, it was claimed, had failed to understand the organizing, mobilizing and transforming role of the revolutionary theory.

Although hardly known outside China previously, this work was to be widely publicized thirteen years later by being reproduced in

¹ This, of course, refers to the Bolshevik Revolution of October (Old Calendar) 1917.

² Compare, for example, the article in *Pravda* of 6th August 1952 by Pavel Yudin, who eulogizes Mao for 'applying Marxism-Leninism creatively, not dogmatically', and for 'enriching this theory'.

full in the Soviet organ, *Bolshevik*,¹ in December 1950 and simultaneously lauded in a lengthy *Pravda* editorial [7] and in the Cominform journal [8], which declared that it could be read with great profit by the activists of all Communist and Workers' Parties.

In connection with Mao's strictures on dogmatism in this article, it may be pertinent to note in passing that dogma has always been an object of derision and abuse from Mao, who has not hesitated on occasion to exercise his mordant wit when castigating it. On at least two occasions he has likened it to dung, adding in parenthesis, 'but dung at least has its uses as a fertilizer'.

Concerning Practice, which was to add to his stature in the eyes of the Communist world as an outstanding contribution to the Marxist-Leninist canon, was followed in 1938 by a number of treatises on guerrilla warfare and tactics. These were to establish his reputation as a military writer of ability. In May that year he wrote *The Strategic Problems of Guerrilla Warfare against Japan*, and followed this up with a series of lectures, delivered in Yen-an, analysing the nature of the war against Japan. Published in July that year under the title, *On a Prolonged War*, he extended this work a few months later in yet another publication, *On a New Stage*, in which he dealt not only with the stalemate in the war with Japan but also laid the basis of one of his best-known works, *The New Democracy*. A speech he made on 6th November that same year at a meeting of the Central Committee was likewise published in due course and, under the title, *Problems of War and Strategy*, has since become a text-book for other Communist parties.

It was in October 1939 that Mao delivered an eight-hour talk which, in its published form, was later to receive world-wide attention and was to be regarded by his Party as something verging on Holy Writ. In this discourse, which was first published in January 1940 under the title of *The New Democracy*, Mao essayed to outline the future development of the Chinese revolution, which he described as 'a revolution of the peasantry'. 'The politics of New Democracy,' he declared, 'is in essence the empowering of the peasantry . . . the problem of the peasantry becomes the fundamental problem of China's revolution and the force of the peasantry the main force of China's

¹ *Bolshevik* was the theoretical and political magazine of the CPSU(B) Central Committee. It was renamed *Kommunist* shortly after the close of the Nineteenth CPSU Congress in October 1953, when the Russian Communist Party, which had been officially termed CPSU(B) since December 1925, dropped the (B), which signified Bolshevik, and became the CPSU.

revolution.' His emphasis on the all-important role of the peasant was as strong as it had been twelve years previously when, on account of his report on the agrarian movement in Hunan, he had shocked the more orthodox members of his Party.

This discourse in effect laid down a blue-print for the future development of China and for the guidance of the Party in establishing a régime based on the New Democracy. This, he declared, was the first of two steps essential for the final accomplishment of the Chinese revolution and would extend over a considerable period of years. The second step would be socialism. The New Democracy is therefore a transitional stage on the road to full socialism and in some respects is akin to the classic bourgeois-democratic stage of Marxist theory. It includes a modified form of capitalism and provides for the continued existence during this period, not only of 'national capitalists', but also of the 'wealthy peasantry' or *kulaks*, both of which categories were recognized as temporary necessities for the economic welfare of the country during the transitional stage. His enunciation of this concept in October 1939 was therefore of fundamental importance, as it marked the opening of a new phase leading ten years later to the establishment of the present régime in China, based on these very principles. The conception of the New Democracy, it is true, has been further developed and has undergone certain relatively minor changes during the intervening years, but its broad principles have remained unaltered and have been written into the constitution of the Chinese People's Republic adopted by the First People's Congress in September 1954.

Defined as 'the dictatorship of all the revolutionary classes', Mao has emphasized how New Democracy differs from both Western and Russian democracy. The former, he asserts, is 'under capitalist dictatorship', the latter under proletarian dictatorship. He has also claimed that it is the form of organization best suited for all colonial and semi-colonial countries during the transition period to full socialism, a claim which was, in effect, endorsed in January 1950 by Moscow in the form of an editorial appearing in the Cominform journal [9].

Before turning on to other developments during the period immediately prior to the outbreak of the Pacific War, one further point in Mao's discourse on the New Democracy in the autumn of 1939 calls for mention. This was his reference to a phrase used by Sun Yat-Sen fifteen years earlier when enunciating his famous *San Min Chu I*,

the three principles of Nationalism, Democracy and Livelihood. In explaining the last of these three as meaning the 'Equalization of landownership' or provision of land, Dr Sun had used the phrase 'The Tiller should own his own soil'.¹ Referring to this phrase, a phrase to which he was to refer again, five-and-a-half years later, when he described it as the central feature of the CCP agrarian policy,² Mao declared, 'The ownership of land is to be readjusted, not with a view to building up Socialist agriculture, but only in order to turn the land into the peasants' own property. The economy of the wealthy peasant will also be allowed.'

Unlike the Russians, who gave the land to the peasants and then proceeded in 1929 to enforce collectivization, exterminating the *kulaks* and vast numbers of others in the process, Mao therefore pledged himself not only to allow the peasants to acquire and retain the land, but even to permit the *kulaks* to continue in existence. This pledge, it may be noted, appears to have been honoured on the whole since the Communists came to power, but it is now clear that it is to hold good only for so long as the present New Democratic transition period continues.³ As defined in May 1953 and continued since then, the policy is 'to develop mutual aid and co-operation as the form of collective labour based on individual peasant economy, with collectivization and socialization of agriculture as a prospect for the future' [10]. It is still stressed, however, in the 1954 Constitution that ownership of land acquired by the peasants should be protected.

¹ To 'equalization of landownership' was later added 'regulation of capital', i.e. nationalization of banks, railways and certain industries. The first principle, nationalism, subsequently came to be equated with anti-imperialism, while Democracy as defined by Dr Sun envisaged three stages—military government to unite the country, political tutelage to train the people in the duties of citizenship, and finally self-government. It may be added that a statement made by the Central Committee of the CCP on 24th June 1938 defined these three principles in its aim to establish a republic based on national independence, democratic liberty, and people's welfare.

² In his report to the Central Committee, *On Coalition Government*, in April 1945. A year and a half previously, in November 1943, however, after emphasizing the 'total lack of any tradition of organized co-operation' among the Chinese peasantry, Mao had uttered the warning that 'the only means of eliminating this state of affairs is gradual collectivization'. These remarks were recalled by Teng Tse-Hui in the Cominform journal of 10th September 1954.

³ Teng Tse-Hui, in an article in the Cominform journal of 10th September 1954, outlined the steps already taken and to be taken 'to change the private ownership of land . . . into common ownership'. In the same article he said that 'the rich peasants' (*kulaks*) must be regarded as 'a hostile class' and would have to be 'eliminated' accordingly.

From this it would seem that the pledge is intended to hold good only so long as the transitional stage continues and that it is hoped that, by the time this stage is completed, the peasants will have been persuaded to recognize the virtues of collectivization and to turn to it voluntarily. It is perhaps, then, to the credit of the CCP that, whereas the KMT in its heyday adopted Dr Sun's phrase in the form of 'Land to the Tiller' and failed to implement it, the Communists used the same slogan and actually put it into force, at least for the time being. In aiming at eventual collectivization they are at least endeavouring to bring it about as painlessly as possible through the medium of peasant co-operatives and patient education, gradually and voluntarily.

The CCP attitude towards this vital question is, as already observed, in strong contrast to that adopted in Soviet Russia. It may be recalled that in 1906 Trotsky, after declaring that 'The proletariat in power will appear before the peasantry as its liberator', had asserted that the socialists should not only expropriate the possessions of the landlords, but should sanction the seizure of their land by the peasants. The Mensheviks at that time, however, held that the municipalities should take over the expropriated land, while Lenin and most of the other Bolsheviks advocated its nationalization and were opposed to its partition among the peasants [11]. The Bolsheviks, it is true, after coming into power in 1917 veered round to the view expressed by Trotsky in 1906; but Stalin subsequently nullified this policy by his ruthless enforcement of collectivization.

If it is thought that Mao's discourse on New Democracy in general and its relation to agrarian policy in particular has been unduly laboured, it can be said that the thesis enunciated by him on this occasion in 1939 is fundamental to an understanding of what has happened since and what is likely to happen in the years ahead. Enough, however, has been said of his writings and speeches in the late 1930's to indicate the development of Chinese Communist policy during this important formative period. It only remains to conclude this section with a brief account of the other main developments up to the outbreak of the Pacific War.

Although relatively unimportant in itself, one of these has a close bearing on yet another contrast between the CCP and the Communist Party in Soviet Russia. This was the expulsion of Chang Kuo-Tao from the CCP in October 1938, when he finally broke with

Mao and fled.¹ Chen Tu-Hsiu, who had been expelled from the Party some eight or ten years earlier, and Chang Kuo-Tao were the only two important Communists who, before 1955, had ever been purged from the Chinese Party so far as is known. Li Li-San and one or two others, it is true, had come under its displeasure and suffered temporary eclipse, and some mystery hung over the fate of Kao Kang, who had disappeared from the scene since early in 1954; but no others had been expelled and none had been put to death. Even the announcement in April 1955 that Kao Kang and Jao Shu-Shih had been expelled left the general picture unchanged, although Kao's 'suicide' gave rise to speculation. Very different is this from the frequent purges and executions of outstanding Communist leaders in the Soviet Union. In part this may be due to differences in character and outlook between the Chinese and the Russians, but this in itself can hardly explain the contrast. To seek the main explanation it is probably necessary to consider the respective formative periods before either Party came to power.

Most of the Russian leaders, prior to the Revolution of 1917, had lived in exile, separated from one another and constantly bickering and hurling abuse at each other. They had neither fought side by side nor lived together; nor had they had any experience in the art of governing or administering territory. Mao and his fellow-Communists, on the other hand, had spent close on thirty years together before coming to power in 1949, and during much of that time they had fought and faced overwhelming danger and hardships together. They had undergone the severest discipline together and had faced almost insuperable difficulties together. Together they had rid the Party of the weaker and less reliable brethren and together they had experimented with and evolved new methods and ideas. In the process and in the comradeship of arms they had forged unbreakable bonds of loyalty and feelings of mutual respect. Furthermore, unlike the Russians, they had obtained invaluable first-hand experience in the art of government and similar experience in

¹ Chang Kuo-Tao, who had been one of the two elected as vice-presidents of the Chinese Soviet Republic in November 1931, had quarrelled with Mao Tse-Tung in the summer of 1935 when the two of them met in North-West Szechuan during the Long March. Chang had demanded that the Communist armies should remain in Szechuan instead of proceeding north to Shensi, but Mao had refused. A further quarrel had arisen between the two over the question of Chiang Kai-Shek's release in December 1936, and from then on friction had increased until this final clash in October 1938. Chang and Chen Tu-Hsiu, whose disciple he had been, have been held up to obloquy ever since.

organizing, administering and handling large bodies of armed forces in the field before ever they came to power. The Russian leaders, it is true, had had their full share of danger, hardship and difficulties during the years of preparation for the revolution and, as Party members, had been subjected to strict discipline; but for most of the time they had perforce to act individually or in small scattered clandestine groups. They lacked the opportunity to imbibe the healthy spirit of give and take with which the Chinese Communists had been inculcated. It was, in effect, the difference between the individual champion, who is sometimes apt to think primarily of his own prowess, and the member of a team, who becomes imbued with the team spirit.

From this digression arising from the expulsion of Chang Kuo-Tao, we must now turn to another feature of the closing years of the period under review. This was the attitude of the Chinese Communists towards the USSR in relation to Japan.

Anxious as they were to obtain the aid of their friends in their struggle with the Japanese, the Chinese Communists considered that, in fighting the Japanese, they were helping to deter Japan from attacking the Soviet Union. In their eyes, as in the eyes of Communists throughout the world, Russia was the sacred land of socialism and the fatherland and mainspring of the movement for World Revolution. As such it had to be saved and defended at all costs. It followed that Moscow was considered to have the right and duty to avoid being drawn into military operations.

With the outbreak of the war in Europe in September 1939, the Chinese Communists showed their continued confidence in the Soviet Union by faithfully reproducing Soviet propaganda. During the period of the Molotov-Ribbentrop honeymoon, this entailed a virulent denunciation of the Anglo-French 'imperialist war' and of America's support of it; but with the termination of this phase and the German invasion of Russia, the tune was changed.

It was towards the end of this first phase that another political honeymoon was brought to an abrupt end. This was the alliance between the Communists and the Nationalists in China. On the surface, co-operation between the two had proceeded reasonably smoothly from 1937 onwards; but it had been an uneasy alliance between two incompatible bed-fellows. It was not, however, until March 1940 that the first open clash occurred. This took the form of skirmishes between Communist and Nationalist troops, and before

long the Nationalists were diverting their attention from the common enemy, Japan, and concentrating it on their ostensible allies, the Communists. This left the Communists faced with three enemies—the Japanese, the Nationalists, and the puppet Chinese government set up in Nanking by the Japanese in March 1938 and reorganized in March 1940, at about the same time as the first skirmishes between the Communist and Nationalist forces took place. The head of this reorganized government was that same Wang Ching-Wei who had headed the left wing Wuhan government at the time when the previous CCP-KMT alliance ended so disastrously for the Communists in 1927.

Although second only to Chiang Kai-Shek in importance, Wang had broken away from the Nationalist camp and had made his way to Japan in June 1939 to discuss the terms under which a new National government friendly to Japan could be set up. He stipulated, however, that the new government should be called the National government, that it should be based on Sun Yat-Sen's 'Three Principles', that the so-called 'Reformed Government' established by the Japanese in March 1938 should be abolished, and that the national flag of China should be recognized. It was only after the Japanese had agreed to all these terms that he agreed to form and head the government which was eventually established at Nanking in March 1940 [12].

The clash between the Communists and Nationalists was still in full swing when the Pacific War opened in December 1941. The Western powers, who had hitherto been constrained to give no more than moral support to the Chinese in their struggle with Japan, thereupon entered into alliance with China against the common enemy. As the Communists and Nationalists were still nominally co-operating in a united front against the Japanese, the Allies made no distinction between them and closed their eyes for the time being to the growing rift.

CHAPTER XXI

Chinese Communist Armed Strength and Hostility to Japan

ALTHOUGH passing reference to military developments was made in the last chapter, the main emphasis was on the political rather than the military evolution in the Communist camp. In view of the all-important part played by the armed forces built up by the Chinese Communists, it may be helpful to trace and consider the main military developments during this same period.

As mentioned in an earlier chapter, the basic principles for the establishment and organization of the Communist Army had been decided at the military conference held in Kutien in December 1929. Followed as this was by the establishment of a Chinese Soviet government two years later, the Chinese Communists, as noted elsewhere, were able to claim in all truth that from 1931 onward, until the creation of the satellite states in Eastern Europe after the close of the Second World War, China was the only country outside Russia with a Soviet government, a Red Army, and a sizeable territory controlled and administered by such a government.

What the revolutionary peasant forces lacked in arms and equipment in the early stages they made up in enthusiasm and ability to withstand hardships. If active service provides the best of all military training, they had such training in full measure. Engaged in almost constant guerrilla warfare from the outset, the great majority of these peasant soldiers underwent the gruelling experience of the Long March; and by the outbreak of the Pacific War in December 1941 they had undergone the experience of operating first against the Nationalist armies, then against the Japanese, and finally against both at once. In such circumstances they were afforded plenty of scope for learning the art of soldiering at first hand and for becoming skilled and hardened veterans of their trade. This was the all-important period during which the Communist fighting forces were being trained, disciplined and hammered into shape, thereby laying firmly

the foundations of the People's Liberation Army, which was to sweep forward to victory in 1949.

With the renewal of the alliance with the KMT in 1937, a new phase had opened. The main Red Army based on Yen-an was re-organized as the Eighth Route Army under the nominal control of the Nationalist government in Nanking, while units which had remained in Central China were amalgamated to form the New Fourth Army. In line with the Politburo statement of October 1937, the Communists continued to expand their armed forces; and so it came about that before long a new formation, known as the Eighteenth Group Army, was also brought into being. The policy of using this 'undeclared war' as a heaven-sent opportunity for building up its armed strength with a view to seizing power after the war was being pursued by the CCP with great determination.

Parallel with the expansion of their armed forces went the study and application of the lessons derived from actual experience up to date. Mao's lectures have already been mentioned. The leader of the Chinese Communists did not content himself with studying and applying only the lessons derived from operations in which he and his men had been engaged, but sought to discover the fundamentals of guerrilla warfare in general; and in two papers, published in December 1939 and February 1941 respectively, he delved back into the ancient past of Chinese history and tradition for his conclusions.

The first of these two papers, *The Chinese Revolution and the Communist Party of China*, dealt with examples of Chinese peasant revolts over many centuries and included a number of observations on the military line now to be followed. Asserting that 'success can be achieved only through armed struggle', he went on to enunciate the principle that 'If the revolutionary force is to accumulate and mature its strength and avoid fighting decisive battles with powerful forces when its own strength is not yet ascertained, then it must turn the backward remote areas into progressive, strong bases, making them great military, political, economic and cultural revolutionary strongholds.' Developing this theme, he ended with explaining 'why it is that these prolonged revolutionary struggles, starting out from such special strongholds, are mainly peasant guerrilla wars under the leadership of the Communist Party' and emphasized 'the need for strenuous work among the peasants, and the need for guerrilla wars'.

Here briefly is to be seen the basis, and the explanation, of the line he followed during this period of the 'armed struggle' when the

strength of the revolutionary forces was still 'not yet ascertained'. It was not until some years later that, having assured himself that the strength of these forces was sufficient for the purpose, he turned from guerrilla warfare to more orthodox military forms of war.

The second of the two papers in question, *The Strategic Problems of China's Revolutionary Wars*, was based largely on the writings and precepts of the Chinese military commentators Sun and Wu, who lived in the fifth century B.C.¹ He carried his studies, however, back to a still earlier period and down to the five 'extermination campaigns' carried out by Chiang Kai-Shek against the Reds in the early 1930's. Most of the campaigns with which he dealt were Chinese, special emphasis being laid on those of the Han dynasty. Illustrations were also drawn, however, from European operations, including the Napoleonic wars and the First World War, and considerable space was given to a study of the numerous forms of guerrilla warfare. In view of the fact that, some eight or nine years later, the People's Liberation Army was to drive the Nationalists out of power with the aid of up-to-date American arms and equipment captured from the Nationalist forces, there is something grimly ironical in his jocular assertion that the Red Army always fought better when depending on the enemy to provide it with arms than when depending on its own sources of supply. 'We have a claim,' he declared in this paper, 'on the output of the arsenals of London and Hanyang, to be delivered by the enemy's transport corps. This is not a joke, but the truth' [1].

This paper was published at a time when the Communist forces were becoming increasingly involved both with the Japanese and the Nationalists. Only a few weeks earlier they had, in fact, suffered one of their bitterest experiences with the latter. This was in January 1940 when, in accordance with instructions issued by Chiang Kai-Shek the previous month, the Communist New Fourth Army had started to cross the Yangtse. Most of this army had already crossed over, but the remainder, about 7,000 in all, were passing through a long mountainous defile leading to the river when they were suddenly and treacherously attacked by some 80,000 Nationalist troops. In the

¹ A translation of their works by the late Lt.-Col. Calthrop, RA, was published in 1908 by John Murray under the title *The Book of War*. It is a work full of interest and well worth studying. Their tactics, which were clearly reflected in those employed by Mao, were essentially of the offensive-defensive order—manœuvre before fighting and non-committal until the enemy had shown his hand, avoiding encounter in battle until the enemy was no longer capable of offering successful resistance.

massacre that followed, 5,000 of the Communist forces were slaughtered and their commander, General Yeh Ting, after being invited under safe conduct to visit the KMT headquarters, was seized and thrown into prison. Five years were to pass before he was finally released, but he was destined never to return to the Red Army again. On his way back in April 1946, the aircraft in which he was travelling crashed and all its occupants were killed.

Although the Red Army continued nominally under Chiang's orders in the joint operations against the Japanese, this treacherous attack had left bitter feelings and mutual suspicions. These had been in no way dispelled when, in December 1941, a new phase was ushered in by the outbreak of the war in the Pacific.

From what has been said in this and the preceding chapter, it should be clear that the two outstanding factors influencing the growth and development of the CCP and its armed forces during the formative years of the 1930's were the stand taken against Japan and the changing relations with the KMT.

There is always a certain fascination in considering the 'Ifs' of history, futile and sterile though such speculation may be. When considering this particular period, however, one may well be forgiven for meditating on how far the course of Communism in China—and, indeed, Far Eastern history in general—would have been affected if the Communists had not adopted so strong an anti-Japanese policy. Had they not taken this line, there would have been no 'Sian Incident'. If there had been no 'Sian Incident', there would have been no renewal of the alliance with the KMT. Chiang might then have come to some agreement with Japan as Wang Ching-Wei did later, instead of standing up to her. If there had been no renewal of the alliance and if, therefore, Chiang had not stood up to the Japanese, what then?

To the first of these two questions one can only say that the CCP, in this event, would not have been afforded the opportunity to build up its strength and influence in the way it did. It might not, therefore, have been able to seize power in 1949. In answer to the second question it might even be argued that the Pacific War would possibly not have taken place at all or, if it had, that it would have been launched at a different time and in different circumstances. The course, and even the outcome, of the Second World War itself might have been affected very considerably.

Without delving back too far into the origins of anti-Japanese sentiment in China, it may be said that the policy adopted by the CCP stemmed from the list of 'Humiliation Days' published by the Chinese Nationalist government in July 1929. This list was accompanied by the recital of alleged facts connected with the events thus commemorated and was calculated to stir up ill-feeling against the British, Japanese, and other 'imperialist' powers responsible for humiliating China by the specific actions cited. In so far as Japan was concerned, this list of 'Humiliation Days' gave rise to the so-called 'Rights' Recovery Movement' in Manchuria which, by stirring up quite intelligible resentment in Japan, paved the way to the Manchurian outbreak in September 1931. Apart, however, from launching strong denunciations of Japan's action and attempting to induce the Western powers to pull the chestnuts out of the fire on China's behalf, the Chinese Nationalists did little or nothing to oppose the Japanese militarily. It was this inaction that first led the Communists to interest themselves in the anti-Japanese cause. If they did not actually instigate the anti-Japanese movement, which spread rapidly and soon included an anti-Japanese boycott, they gave it their support and exploited it for their own ends. Chinese students who joined the movement likewise did their best to rouse the Nationalist government against Japan, but without success.

It was not, however, until after the outbreak of the fighting in Shanghai in the early days of 1932 and the stout defence put up there by the Chinese Nineteenth Route Army, which received little support from the government in Nanking, that the Chinese Soviet government issued its first appeal for a United Front against Japan. At the same time, while calling on all groups and classes in China to resist Japanese aggression, it somewhat grandiloquently declared war on Japan.¹ Although hardly in a position at that time to implement this declaration, its gesture had the effect of gaining considerable numbers of sympathizers for the Communist cause. A year later, on 15th April 1933, after a number of similar announcements and following Japan's incursion into North China across the Great Wall, the Communists issued a 'Manifesto on the Anti-Japanese United Front' and, calling for a truce with the KMT, urged the Nationalists to join with them in forming a United Front against the common enemy, but the proposal was rejected.

That there was a division of opinion at this time among the Com-

¹ Edgar Snow gives the date of this declaration as February 1932.

munists themselves, however, is indicated by the fact that Wang Min, who was closest to Moscow, expressed opposition to the proposed United Front. The correct line to take, he contended, was for the Chinese Soviet and the Red Army to concentrate against the KMT. It was not, in fact, until the summer of 1935, when the Seventh World Congress of the Comintern passed a resolution calling for a united front in China against Japan, that he changed his tune. Performing a characteristically Communist somersault, he then proceeded, in accordance with the Comintern line, to switch round from opposing a United Front with the KMT to advocating it.¹ As a result, the CCP, at a conference held in North-West Szechuan during a halt on the Long March to Shensi, decided on a further attempt to form an Anti-Japanese People's United Front and on 1st August that year issued a proclamation calling on all classes to fight Japan.

The KMT nevertheless continued deaf to all such appeals and when, on 9th December, demonstrations were held by the student body in Peking demanding war with Japan, the demonstrators were firmly suppressed. The students' action, however, set off a nationwide anti-Japanese national salvation movement, and nine years later Liu Shao-Chi, the secretary-general of the CCP, was to characterize the demonstrations of December 1935 as the turning-point in the revolutionary movement of the Chinese students.

How, just one year later, Chiang Kai-Shek was kidnapped at Sian and induced to agree to co-operate with the Communists against Japan has already been recorded. Negotiations between the Communists and the KMT for the purpose of formalizing this agreement followed, although it was not until 23rd September 1937, over two months after the outbreak of the 'undeclared war' with Japan, that the KMT finally issued a statement confirming the alliance and its terms. Although not officially abrogated until after the collapse of Japan eight years later, the strains and stresses to which it was subjected from an early stage in its existence reduced its value as an effective weapon against the Japanese very considerably. So considerable did this reduction in its value become that by July 1944 General Stilwell, the irascible 'Vinegar Joe', was declaring in exasperation, 'Each side watches the other and neither gives a damn about the war [against Japan]' [2].

¹ It was at this Congress that Mao Tse-Tung, Chou En-Lai, Wang Min and Chang Kuo-Tao—who was to be expelled with ignominy from the CCP three years later—were elected to the IKKI.

CHAPTER XXII

Soviet Foreign Policy and Soviet Imperialism

THE last few chapters have dealt with the development of Communism and Nationalism in the various countries of South and East Asia down to the outbreak of the war in the Pacific. In order to see these developments in their proper setting, it may be helpful to consider the main changes which, during the same period, had been taking place in the international field in general and in Russia in particular. Only in this way will it be possible to appreciate the impact of international happenings on Soviet foreign policy, the bearing of this policy on world Communism in general and on Asian Communism in particular, and the interplay of Soviet internal affairs, Soviet imperialism, and Comintern tactics.

Some of this background has already been sketched in earlier chapters; but, apart from brief references to later developments, it went no further than the middle 1920's. In so far as the international picture is concerned, we can take up the story, therefore, from the close of 1925 when, following its signature on 1st December, the Locarno Pact called forth such violent denunciations and vituperations from Moscow and the Communist camp in general. This pact, taken in conjunction with Germany's request for admission into the League of Nations soon after, served to disturb the balance between East and West in German policy. It was in an attempt to restore this balance that a new Soviet-German Treaty was concluded in April 1926 after Chicherin, by paying an official visit to Warsaw, had served a clear warning to Germany of the path she should take.

In spite of this attempt to redress the balance of power in Europe, the Soviet leaders—largely, it would seem, victims of their own propaganda—were becoming increasingly convinced that the capitalist world, led by Britain, was seeking to encircle the USSR. This fear became accentuated in 1927 by a series of events gravely disturbing

to Moscow's plans for World Revolution. First came Chang Tso-Lin's raid on the Soviet Legation in Peking in April and Chiang Kai-Shek's coup against the Communists a week later. The following month saw the Arcos raid in London and the consequent severance of relations with the USSR by Great Britain. Before the year was out, China too had severed relations with Soviet Russia; the Borodin mission had been summarily expelled; the KMT-CCP alliance, the brain-child and hope of the Comintern, had been brought to a disastrous end; and the Communist movement in China, on which such great store had been set, had been dealt a blow which, at the time, appeared almost fatal. Stalin's own reaction to these successive reverses was reflected in his assertion, at the Fifteenth Congress of the CPSU(B) in December that year, that 'the period of comparative equilibrium and of peaceful co-existence¹ between the USSR and the capitalist countries . . . is receding into the past, giving place to a period of imperialist attacks and of the preparation of intervention against the USSR' [1].

While there can be little doubt that Moscow was genuinely perturbed by these developments, it seems probable that the professed fears uttered at this time, that the capitalist world was planning to attack the USSR, were deliberately fostered for internal effect. The struggle between Stalin and Trotsky was fast approaching its climax and it may well have been deemed prudent, therefore, to divert the attention of the Russian masses from the prevailing domestic crises by harping on dangers alleged to be threatening the country from without.

Two-and-a-half years previously, at the Fourteenth Congress of the CPSU(B) in May 1925, Stalin had expressed satisfaction at the 'establishment of a certain temporary equilibrium' between the Soviet Union and the capitalist world [2]. It was this temporary equilibrium which had made the period of peaceful co-existence possible. It was the apparent upsetting of this equilibrium which now led Stalin to assert that this 'period of peaceful co-existence', which incidentally had been so needful for the success of the NEP experiment, was 'receding into the past'.

The idea of encirclement and hostile intent on the part of the

¹ The term 'Peaceful co-existence' had been used nearly eight years previously by Lenin when, in answer to a question put to him by the *New York Evening Journal* about Soviet policy in Asia, he replied: 'The same as in Europe: peaceful co-existence with the peoples, with the workers and peasants of all nations.'

capitalist powers had, since the signing of the Locarno Pact, become an obsession with the Russians. Chicherin's accusation in October 1925 that the British government was pursuing a policy of encirclement [3], was followed some seven weeks later by Litvinov's characterization of the League of Nations as 'a masked League of the so-called great powers' seeking to bring Germany into it in order to 'assist in carrying out their plans in general, and their hostile designs against the USSR in particular' [4]. Nearly three years later, in August 1928, the same theme was still being ground out when Chicherin, declaring that the negotiations for the conclusion of the Kellogg Pact were 'a constituent part of the policy of encircling the USSR', quoted Litvinov's deduction that 'the prohibition of war as an instrument of national policy was a metaphorical expression of the preparation of war as an instrument of world counter-revolution' and asserted that the proposed pact was 'an integral part of the preparation of war against the USSR' [5].

By the time this last statement was made, however, Moscow had already started to apply itself to the task of trying to stop the rot which appeared to be setting in. The NEP, though nearing its end, still required the continuance of 'peaceful co-existence' if it was to achieve its aim of building up the industrial strength of the Soviet Union and helping the country along the road to socialism. The arrival of Litvinov in Geneva in November 1927 to attend the Fourth Session of the Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament Conference may be said, therefore, to have marked the first real attempt to ease the situation, even though the main purpose of his presence at this meeting appears to have been to use Geneva as a platform for Soviet propaganda. From then on until May 1939, when he was replaced as Commissar for Foreign Affairs by Molotov, Litvinov never spared himself in his efforts to break down the hostility of the other powers and to co-operate in the attempt to stabilize peace. The fact that, in spite of a poor beginning, he did succeed to a large extent must be placed to his credit. His eventual replacement by Molotov was to undo all his work.

The Preparatory Commission for Disarmament had been set up by the League of Nations in the autumn of 1925; but Russia, despite her protestations of love of peace, had refused the initial invitation to join it. The excuse given was that, as Geneva was in Switzerland, she was not prepared to send any representative there until the Swiss government had accorded adequate satisfaction for Vorovski's

assassination at the Lausanne Conference in 1923. This had finally been given; and so in November 1927 Litvinov arrived and marked his first appearance by delivering a lengthy speech, in which he roundly abused the capitalist governments and held up the League itself to ridicule and contempt.

This may not have been the best way to endear either himself or his government to the other members of the Commission. Similarly Chicherin's denunciation of the negotiations for the conclusion of the Kellogg Pact some eight or nine months later seemed hardly calculated to induce more friendly relations. Nevertheless, by the last day of August 1928, less than a month after Chicherin's tirade, Russia herself had joined the Pact. A year later the situation had been further improved by the restoration of diplomatic relations with Britain, and by the close of 1932 she had concluded non-aggression pacts with France, Poland and others and had restored relations with China.

The success of Moscow's efforts to improve its position had been helped to no small extent by the ominous clouds beginning to gather both in Europe and in the Far East. These were causing anxiety to others; but as these pages are concerned mainly with South and East Asia, it is to the Far Eastern situation that we must turn.

Following Japan's recognition of Soviet Russia in 1925, relations between the two countries for the first few years had been marked by reasonable friendship and cordiality. The main potential cause of friction was to be found in Manchuria; but Japan had made it clear that no interference in her sphere would be tolerated and the Russians had tacitly acquiesced. Two developments during this period, however, tended to disturb this harmony. One was Japan's policy of railway construction in Manchuria; the other was the rise of nationalism in China and its repercussions in these north-eastern provinces. The former, because of its economic and strategic implications, aroused Moscow's apprehensions and led her to adopt counter-measures. The rise of Chinese nationalism not only led to the Sino-Soviet armed clash over the Chinese Eastern Railway in the summer of 1929 but, by threatening Japan's vital interests in Manchuria, precipitated the 'Manchurian Incident' in September 1931 and all the fatal consequences which followed.

Throughout the greater part of the 1920's, Manchuria under its

war-lord, Chang Tso-Lin, had maintained a semi-independent status towards China proper. Even the Russians had recognized this when they entered into separate agreements with Peking and Mukden in 1924, while Japan's policy had been to support this semi-independence largely for the purpose of preserving Manchuria from the civil wars and disturbances ravaging China. For both economic and strategic reasons she wished to open up and develop Manchuria, and for the success of this undertaking peace and order were essential. Chang, however, had died in 1928 from wounds sustained in a bombing incident, and his son, the Young Marshal, who succeeded him and was bitterly anti-Japanese, had pledged his allegiance to the Chinese Nationalist government in Nanking. The semi-independent status of Manchuria was thereby brought to an end and Chinese nationalism became rampant. A 'Rights' Recovery Movement' sprang up and, although aimed primarily at forcing Japan to retrocede her special rights and interests in South Manchuria, it led first, in the summer of 1929, to a clash with the Russians in North Manchuria over the ownership of the Chinese Eastern Railway. Moscow reacted sharply and, although she had only just signed the Kellogg Pact, resorted to armed force in order to bring about a settlement of the dispute.

The controversy over this railway had its repercussions in the Chinese Communist Party; for Li Li-San, who was by this time its virtual leader, took up the cudgels on behalf of the Russians and raised the battle-cry, 'Protect the Soviet Union!' For this he was taken to task by Chen Tu-Hsiu who, it will be recalled, had been made the scapegoat for the Comintern's follies and had been removed from the leadership of the Party two years previously. In a letter addressed to the Central Committee at the end of July, Chen criticized this slogan on the grounds that it made the Communists appear to be supporting foreign aggression against China, the very crime for which the Communists themselves were denouncing others. It was for his temerity in making this criticism that Chen was later expelled from the Party itself [6].

It was while the dispute over the Chinese Eastern Railway was nearing its climax that the Revolutionary Military Council in Moscow issued a decree on 6th August, providing for the formation of a 'Special Far Eastern Army' under command of General (later Marshal) Blucher who figured earlier in these pages under the name of Galen [7]. This was but the beginning of a plan which aimed at

making Russia's Far Eastern possessions militarily and economically self-supporting in the event of war. Moscow was, in fact, becoming increasingly apprehensive, not only of Chinese nationalist exuberance and its repercussions on her own position in the Far East, but more particularly of the way in which the expanding network of railways in Manchuria was serving to divert freight from the Chinese Eastern Railway and to provide Japan with a means for the rapid concentration of troops at vital points in the event of a future war in those parts.

While the formation of a Far Eastern army was primarily a defensive measure at this time, the possibility of its future use for offence as well as for defence was perfectly clear. Sixteen years later it was, in fact, to be used for this very purpose. This was the army which was to overwhelm the Japanese in Manchuria in August 1945 and, by handing over to the Chinese Communists the arms and munitions captured from the Japanese, was to enable the Communists to seize power in China in 1949. In creating this army in 1929, therefore, Soviet Russia was preparing the way for furthering Soviet imperialism in its dual form of territorial expansion and social revolution. Nor was this an isolated instance of Soviet imperialist long-term planning at this period, for in Central Asia the Russians were hard at work constructing the Turk-Sib Railway which, like the Trans-Siberian Railway, made Outer Mongolia and Sinkiang more accessible from the Soviet Union than from China and more subject to Soviet influence. With the completion of this new line on 28th April 1930, not only was the strategic and economic threat from Russia against these two outlying areas of China increased, but so were the potentialities for Communist machinations. Before reverting to the situation developing in Manchuria, it is pertinent to consider briefly the policy followed during the 1920's and 1930's by Soviet Russia towards Outer Mongolia and Sinkiang.

The way in which a Red government on Soviet lines had been organized in Outer Mongolia in the summer of 1921, with Soviet help and with Russian troops to support it, has already been mentioned. The fact, however, that a Soviet-Outer Mongolia Treaty had been signed four months later was kept secret at first and flatly denied by Moscow. It was not until the following spring that it was admitted, the admission calling forth a protest from the Chinese on 1st May 1922 on the grounds that Mongolia was a province of China. Despite frequent subsequent assurances by Moscow that the Soviet govern-

ment recognized Outer Mongolia as an integral part of China and had no intention of separating it from China, this vast but sparsely populated territory¹ has been virtually a dependency of the USSR ever since.

One of the first of these assurances was contained in the joint statement issued by Sun Yat-Sen and Joffe in January 1923, the Russian signatory declaring that his country had no desire to separate Outer Mongolia from China [8]. Two years later this was reaffirmed in the Sino-Soviet Treaty of 31st May 1924, in which Moscow specifically recognized Outer Mongolia as an integral part of China and pledged itself to respect Chinese sovereignty over it. During the period that had elapsed between the signing of the Soviet-Outer Mongolia Treaty of 1921 and the conclusion of the Sino-Soviet Treaty of 1924, however, the Russians had not been idle. Outer Mongolia had, throughout this time, been occupied by Soviet troops, Soviet 'advisers' had been introduced, a Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party (*anglice* Communist Party) had been built up, and basic steps had been taken to integrate Mongolian economy with the Soviet system. It mattered little to Moscow that the treaty with China stipulated that Soviet troops should be withdrawn, for by then the Russians had ensured their hold on Outer Mongolia by other means. Six months after the signing of this pact, Outer Mongolia blossomed out officially as the Mongolian People's Republic, with a constitution of its own based on the Soviet pattern. By March the following year Moscow was able to notify China that all Russian troops had been withdrawn 'with the consent of the Mongolian People's Republic'.

During the next few years the Soviet government avoided any too blatantly open interference with Mongolian affairs; but the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party, which it had helped to organize, showed itself a faithful servant of its Russian masters by striving—often by violent means—to speed up the arduous task of turning a largely pastoral country into a Communist state. That the Mongolian People's Republic looked more to Moscow than to Nanking for help and advice, moreover, was clearly indicated when, in November 1934, its Prime Minister, fearful of Japanese intentions, visited Moscow for discussions on the defence of Outer Mongolia.

From these talks emerged a 'Gentleman's Agreement', which later

¹ Nearly as large as China Proper, seven times larger than France, and ten times the size of Japan.

became the basis of the Soviet-Mongolian Mutual Assistance Pact signed on 12th March 1936 [9]. The Pact itself was aimed at countering any attempt Japan might make to extend her influence into Outer Mongolia through the medium of her Manchukuo satellite; but, like the 1921 treaty, it called forth a formal protest from the Chinese government. China's complaint that it ran contrary to the Sino-Soviet Agreement of May 1924 was rejected by the Russians, who advanced the somewhat specious argument that, as the Soviet-Manchurian Agreement signed in Mukden in September 1924 had elicited no protest from China, the new Soviet Pact with the Mongolian People's Republic called for none [10].

As the Chinese National government showed by its protest that it was increasingly sceptical of Moscow's assurances regarding the status of Outer Mongolia as an integral part of China, it is interesting to recall that the Chinese Communist leader Mao Tse-Tung had no such misgivings. In an interview given shortly after Moscow's rejection of China's protest, he expressed his conviction that 'when the people's revolution has been victorious in China, the Outer Mongolian Republic will automatically become part of the Chinese federation at their own will' [11]. The people's revolution in China achieved its victory thirteen years later, but Outer Mongolia appears to be even more severed from China to-day than it was when Mao made this rash forecast. One of the basic aims set forth in the manifesto issued by the CCP at their Second Congress, held shortly after China's first protest to Moscow regarding Mongolia in May 1922, was the 'liberation of Mongolia, Tibet and Sinkiang' and their 'unification' with China proper [12]. As the Chinese Communists have never specifically rescinded their demand for the unification of Mongolia with China, it seems legitimate to speculate on whether or not their present recognition of Outer Mongolia's spurious independence had automatically cancelled this basic aim. If it has not, Mongolia must be regarded as a potential cause of friction between the present Communist régime in China and the USSR.

The fact, of course, is that from 1921 onwards Soviet control of Outer Mongolia has been virtually complete; and although the Mongolian People's Republic came into existence in 1924, the only country other than Russia to recognize it during its first twenty-odd years was the Soviet-created Tannu Tuva. Even China, whose sovereignty over it the Soviet Union professed to recognize, was unable to maintain a representative in the Outer Mongolian capital

of Ulan Bator.¹ That Moscow itself had no illusions, despite its protestations to the contrary, is shown by the fact that, in the joint declaration accompanying the Soviet-Japan Neutrality Pact of 13th April 1941, the Russians obtained Japan's undertaking 'to respect the territorial integrity and inviolability of the Mongolian People's Republic' without any qualifying clause about Chinese sovereignty [13]. The Chinese Communists, be it noted, defended this declaration, even though it also included an undertaking by the USSR 'to respect the territorial integrity and inviolability of Manchukuo', which the Communists themselves were fighting to recover. They qualified their defence of it, however, by referring to the ultimate winning back of the 'lost lands of China' as 'a sacred task'.

If it is true that Outer Mongolia is a potential cause of Sino-Soviet friction in the years ahead, this is due to its strategic position. When, in the 1870's, the Manchu court decided to sanction a campaign for the recovery of the territories in Sinkiang seized by Yakub Beg in 1864, the decision taken was the outcome of strategic considerations put forward by the proponents of such action. Briefly these were that, until Sinkiang was recovered, the safety of Mongolia would be threatened; and if Mongolia were to be lost, Peking itself would be endangered. This argument is just as apposite to-day as it was in the 1870's; in fact, thanks to railways, air transport and other developments, the potential danger is even greater. At the moment, it is true, Sino-Soviet relations appear to be sufficiently close and friendly to preclude any immediate danger; but the present rulers of China are realists enough to recognize that this happy state of affairs may not last for ever. It would not be surprising, therefore, if the idea of eventually restoring Outer Mongolia to the Chinese fold remains as firmly fixed in the minds of the Chinese Communist leaders to-day as it was when defined as a basic aim of the Party in 1922.

Bearing in mind the close strategic link between Sinkiang and Mongolia, it is perhaps natural that Soviet Russia should have carried on the imperialist policy of the Czars. So far as Sinkiang is concerned, Russian economic domination had been halted in 1904 by the outbreak of the war with Japan and again, in 1914, by the outbreak of the First World War. It was not until China had recognized her in

¹ It was not, in fact, until August 1950 that the appointment of a Chinese *Chargé d'Affaires* in Ulan Bator was permitted, although by then the MPR had been declared independent for five years and China itself had become a Communist State.

May 1924 that the Soviet Union was able to reopen in Sinkiang the consulates which the Czarists had used as the spearheads of their attempt to dominate this vast outlying province of China. These consulates were reopened in 1925 and, along with the restarting of economic domination, the Russians began to introduce Communist propaganda. Headway was slow at the start, but by the early 1930's Soviet influence was growing rapidly. The initial delay appears to have been due in part to the attitude of General Yang Tsen-Hsin, who had been governor of the province ever since 1912. He, however, was assassinated in July 1928 and was succeeded by Chin Shu-Jen, a Chinese of much poorer calibre. With him in 1930 the Russians were able to conclude a trade agreement, which removed all tariff restrictions, gave greater freedom to Soviet representatives, and opened up communication with Russia. At the same time Chin, as a result of his anti-Moslem actions, found himself faced with a revolt by the Tungs (Chinese Moslems). He gladly accepted help, therefore, in the form of arms and munitions from the Soviet who, for reasons of their own, provided similar help to the rebels. But Chin did not last long, for in 1932 he fled and, on his return to China, was imprisoned for raising an illegal loan from the Soviet.

Ready as Chin had been to accept Soviet help, his successor Shen Shih-Tsai proved even readier. On arrival at his new post in April 1933 he found the whole province in an uproar as a result of the Tungan revolt, which had been spreading ever since its inception three years earlier. With the totally inadequate forces at his disposal he was in no position to deal with the situation. A considerable body of Chinese troops, who had been driven out of Manchuria by the Japanese, however, had escaped into Soviet territory. The Russians, therefore, allowed him to bring them in via Siberia to supplement his own; but in spite of these reinforcements he was nearing defeat in 1934 when, in response to his appeal, a Soviet force of two brigades, supported by artillery, tanks and aircraft, was sent to his assistance. In order to disguise their nationality, they were put into Chinese uniform, a fact admitted five years later by Stalin himself [14].

Thanks to this timely intervention, the rebels were defeated and their leader, Ma Ching-Yin, after a somewhat mystifying visit to the Soviet consul-general at Kashgar, left for the USSR. There was nothing altruistic about this Soviet assistance. It was given only after Shen had contracted a secret loan with them in return for economic concessions and the appointment of Soviet 'advisers' to civil and

military key posts. From then on until 1941 Soviet influence increased rapidly and the Russians obtained a virtual monopoly of Sinkiang's external trade. Nor was this all, for with Shen's active co-operation Communist propaganda made considerable progress, Soviet schools and committees were established, students were encouraged to go for further training to Alma Ata and Tashkent, and Sinkiang became increasingly sovietized. At the Seventh Soviet Congress held in Moscow in January 1935, it is true, Molotov refuted what he called the 'slandorous rumours alleging the sovietization of Sinkiang' [15]. The fact nevertheless remained that throughout the ten-year period 1931-1941 the Soviet Union was increasing its economic grip on the province, pressing ahead with the work of sovietizing it, using the local Chinese minority as the instrument for its control and, under the guise of 'upholding the authority of the Chinese government in Sinkiang and helping to crush a rebellion' [16], interfering blatantly with the internal affairs of the province by military intervention.

It was not, however, only in 1934 that Soviet armed forces had played an active part in the domestic affairs of this Chinese province. In 1937 Soviet police arrested large numbers of those who they thought might hamper their activities in Sinkiang or be undesirable witnesses of what was being done; and when, as a reaction to the spread of Communism and its adverse effect on Islamic influence and authority, a further Tungan-Turki revolt was precipitated that same year, Soviet troops were again used for its suppression. By 1938, therefore, Shen's government was, to all intents and purposes, under Soviet control. As a result, moreover, of Moscow's decision to use the land route from Alma Ata, on the Turk-Sib Railway, through Sinkiang to Lanchow for the transit of arms and munitions to China after the fall of Canton in October 1938, Soviet influence in Sinkiang was consolidated still further.

By this time Shen, who at first had co-operated readily with the Russians, was feeling his position increasingly threatened by Soviet-trained officials in his administration. It was not, however, until the spring of 1942, by which time Moscow's preoccupation with the war raging in its own territories was tending to loosen the Soviet grip on Sinkiang, that he finally turned against his former Communist friends [17]. The present chapter is only intended to deal with events down to the close of 1941, so we must return to the situation developing in Manchuria in the summer of 1929.

CHAPTER XXIII

Moscow, Manchuria and Japan

By resorting to armed force in the summer of 1929 in its dispute with the Chinese over the ownership and control of the Chinese Eastern Railway, Moscow had shown its determination to retain its rights and interests in North Manchuria. By forming a Far Eastern Army it had shown similar determination to stand up to possible Japanese aggression; but Japan was soon to show equal readiness to stand up to both China and Russia.

Without necessarily condoning Japan's actions after the outbreak of the Manchurian 'Incident' of 18th September 1931, the clash which occurred that night and led to such far-reaching and disastrous consequences was the outcome of a situation brought about by a number of causes. Chief amongst these was the increasing irritation aroused by the way in which Shidehara's¹ proffers of friendship and conciliation had been so consistently scorned and rejected by the Chinese and his friendly overtures treated as signs of weakness [1]. The fact that the Russians, when subjected to similar provocation, had brought the Chinese to reason by a display of force had served to confirm the Japanese opponents of the Shidehara policy in their belief that the only way to ensure Chinese respect and compliance with international agreements was to use forceful means. But the very fact that Moscow had shown itself so ready and able to deal with the Chinese in this way, and had followed this up with the decision to form a special Far Eastern Army, had provided practical proof of Soviet military capabilities and had aroused Japanese anxieties accordingly [2]. To Japanese apprehensions concerning the steady spread of Soviet ideas and propaganda was therefore added a growing anxiety with regard to Soviet military developments and intentions. While it was against the Chinese that Japan struck when she launched her operations in Manchuria in September 1931, it is

¹ Baron Shidehara, the Japanese Foreign Minister, whose advocacy of friendship and co-operation with China was known as the 'Shidehara Policy'.

hardly too much to say that the root of the Manchurian trouble was to be found in Japanese anxiety concerning the growing power of Soviet Russia in East Asia rather than in hostility towards China.

Soviet strength in the Far East, however, was still, at this time, potential rather than actual; and nowhere was this realized better than in Moscow. When the Japanese began to extend their military operations into the Russian sphere of North Manchuria in the late autumn of 1931, Moscow contented itself with relatively mild protests and was careful to avoid provocative action. By 12th November the Soviet Section of the Chinese Eastern Railway administration was being instructed to pursue a policy of neutrality in the event of Japanese troops reaching the railway area [3], and two days later Litvinov was complaining to the Japanese ambassador, more in sorrow than in anger, about the 'anti-Soviet campaign and the inventions about the help said to be given by the Soviet government to the Chinese forces in Manchuria' [4]. From then on, in fact, the Soviet Union went out of its way to appease Japan and to remain neutral, although Molotov, in his report to the Central Executive Committee of the CPSU on 22nd December stressed the need for increasing vigilance in regard to the Far East [5].

So anxious was Moscow to remain neutral that, when the Lytton Commission arrived in Manchuria in the spring of 1932 to investigate the facts on behalf of the League of Nations, the Soviet declined the invitation to submit evidence [6]. A month later she followed this up by refusing to permit the Commission to travel through Soviet territory via Blagoveschensk to Saghalien to meet and take evidence from Ma Chan-Shan, one of the Chinese commanders who had been driven out of Manchuria by the Japanese in the course of the operations [7]. In the meantime, moreover, on the last day of 1931, Moscow had sought to ease the situation by putting forward a proposal to Japan for a non-aggression pact. No reply, however, was received until a year later when Japan intimated that the time was not ripe for such a treaty, although she suggested as an alternative that each should respect the other's sovereign rights and refrain from violating each other's frontiers [8].

It was a year after that Molotov, on 23rd January 1933, described Soviet foreign policy as being a 'consistent struggle for peace and for peaceful relations with other countries', with 'non-intervention and strict neutrality' as the guiding rule so far as the Far East was concerned [9]. Rather less than five months later, Litvinov, recognizing

that the Chinese Eastern Railway was fast becoming a liability rather than an asset and that its continued retention by the USSR might well precipitate a clash with the Japanese, put forward a suggestion for its purchase by Japan's Manchukuo protégé.¹ Two years of haggling over the purchase price and conditions of sale followed until finally, on 23rd March 1935, an agreement for its sale was signed [10]. For the time being, therefore, Russia, who had been ready enough to use military force against the Chinese six years previously in order to retain her rights and interests in the railway, gave up her last tangible assets in Manchuria and decided to bide her time. Already, however, developments in the general world situation were beginning to play into her hands and to pave the way for her eventual return to Manchuria in greater power and with greater influence than ever before.

The ten years that had passed since the conclusion of the Versailles Conference had been spent in part in painful attempts by what was left of the old Europe to re-establish what it could of the old order. The year 1929, however, saw the economic crisis which put an end to all such endeavours and, at the same time, set in motion the fatal sequence of events leading to the Second World War. By June 1930 Stalin, while declaiming against the Young Plan which had just superseded the Dawes Plan, was declaring that the world economic crisis had 'laid bare and sharpened the contradictions inherent in world capitalism'—between the imperialist countries, the victorious and the vanquished, the imperialist and the colonial countries, the bourgeoisie and the proletariat. From this he deduced that 'the war danger will grow at an increasingly rapid rate' [11]. One month later Litvinov was appointed Commissar for Foreign Affairs.

The anxiety aroused by Japan's incursion into North Manchuria the following year has already been noted. The development of the Nazi movement in Germany, however, was viewed with similar growing apprehension. This was increased still further when Hitler came to power in January 1933; but it was clear to Moscow by then that others besides itself were becoming alarmed. Little by little Soviet Russia began to feel her way towards co-operation with those who were looking askance at Japanese militancy, German Nazi-ism and Italian Fascism. By the close of 1933, not only had the

¹ The establishment of Manchukuo, at whose birth Japan played the part of midwife, was proclaimed in March 1932, although it was not officially recognized by the Japanese Government until six months later.

Soviet Union improved its position *vis-à-vis* America by exchanging Notes with the United States on 16th November regarding the renewal of relations with that country, but on Christmas Day Stalin, in an interview with the American correspondant Duranty, expressed the view that the League of Nations might act as a brake to war now that Japan and Germany had withdrawn from that body [12].¹ Considering the scathing criticisms which Moscow had hitherto been wont to direct against the League and all its works, these words of commendation served to indicate a marked change in her attitude. Nine months later, posing as the great champion of peace,² the USSR entered that much maligned organization as a member, the occasion of its entry being marked by a model speech by Litvinov at the League Assembly [13].

By her advocacy of disarmament and collective security and by her pose from now on as the champion of the League of Nations, the Soviet Union helped to build up a picture of herself as the outstanding champion of peace and goodwill. At the same time, by such actions as the renewal of relations with America, her entry into the League and, in May 1935, the conclusion of a Pact of Mutual Assistance with France, she strengthened her own security. This was, of course, her main object; and so it came about that, while her agreement of March that year to sell the Chinese Eastern Railway to the Manchukuo may be said to have marked the lowest ebb of her fortunes in the Far East, she was already by then well on the way to strengthening her general position sufficiently to stage her eventual come-back.

Only five days after the sale of this railway, the first of a number of visits to Moscow by distinguished foreign statesmen took place, Mr Eden being received there on 28th March by Stalin. Less than two months later he was followed by Laval and then, in June, by Dr Beneš. The days when Soviet Russia was a pariah and outcast were at an end. Instead, she was being courted by the leading upholders of Western democracy. The ferocity of the executions which followed Kirov's assassination in December 1934 had caused eyebrows to be raised, and the great purges of 1937 and 1938 aroused similar doubts and criticisms; but Moscow's retort to the former was to express

¹ Japan had withdrawn in March 1933 after being declared an aggressor and Germany had followed a few months later.

² This pose had been much to the fore when, at the World Disarmament Conference in 1932, she had come out as a strong advocate of disarmament.

pained surprise at the protests [14], while the subsequent purges were 'whitewashed' later by Joseph Davies, who had been American ambassador in Moscow at the time [15]. Moreover, prolonged, skilful and unremitting propaganda had succeeded in hypnotizing large sections of the people in most countries into the belief that Moscow was the champion of peace and of the under-dog. There was a growing readiness to gloss over facts to her discredit, either by finding excuses for her actions or by the simple expedient of refusing to believe them.

It was with a view to pressing still further the advantages already gained that the Soviet leaders, through the medium of that useful instrument of Soviet foreign policy, the Comintern, launched the slogan of the Popular Front at its Seventh Congress in July 1935. With the defence of democracy against Fascism as its professed aim, strenuous efforts were made to secure the co-operation of the recently vilified Social Democrats in all countries in 'popular fronts', and even liberals and conservatives were urged to join in. This, as Deutscher observes [16], was a radical departure from previous Communist tactics, and from the basic statutes of the Comintern's 'Twenty-one Conditions of Membership', which forbade Communists to coalesce with bourgeois parties. It was, in fact, a classic example of the way in which, as explained by Crankshaw [17], the conflict between Russian national interests and world revolutionary interests had been resolved by converting the Comintern into an instrument of Soviet foreign policy and by subordinating world revolutionary strategy to Soviet security on the grounds that the USSR was the base of World Revolution and must therefore be made safe at all costs. As the conversion of the Comintern in this way had never been openly admitted, the Soviet Union was able to reply blandly to an American protest in August 1935 that the Soviet government was not responsible for Comintern actions [18]. Stalin, some six or seven months later, was able with similar blandness and with equal sophistry to assure an American interviewer that the Soviet Union had never had any plans or intentions to bring about World Revolution [19].¹

¹ Stalin's assertion in 1936 may be compared with the more recent sophistry of Gromyko who, during the visit of a British Parliamentary Delegation to Moscow in the autumn of 1954, 'declared firmly that the Soviet Union did not support foreign Communist parties'. This statement was quoted by Christopher Mayhew, former Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, in an account of his talks with Gromyko and other Soviet leaders appearing in *The Observer* of 24th October 1954.

The year 1936, in which this interview was given, saw the opening of the Spanish Civil War and, a bare two months after its start, Soviet intervention in it. That same year was marked also by Soviet representations to Japan concerning the Anti-Comintern Pact, which she concluded with Germany in November.

With the outbreak of the 'North China Incident' in July the following year and the rapid extension of Sino-Japanese military operations southwards, Moscow found herself in the happy position of having her battles fought for her without any cost in Soviet lives or weakening of her own strength. The Chinese Nationalists under Chiang Kai-Shek, it is true, were not deliberately drawing Japan's fire against themselves in order to prevent its being directed against the Russians; but the Chinese Communists allied to the KMT were to no small extent imbued with just such a spirit of self-sacrifice on behalf of Moscow. Little more than a decade later the Soviet Union was once more to be in the same happy position, when Chinese and North Koreans were fighting her battles for her in Korea, Ho Chi-Minh and his Viet Minh followers were being similarly obliging in Indo-China, and Communist guerrillas were performing the same services in the jungles of Malaya. In the late 1930's, however, Moscow had the additional advantage of having her airmen obtain practical experience in the fighting in China [20] just as she had in Spain and, later, in Nomanhan.

In his report to the Eighteenth Congress of the CPSU(B) in March 1939, Stalin was able to boast of a number of important steps taken by the Soviet Union 'to strengthen its international position'. 'Those specifically listed were its entry into the League of Nations, the conclusion of treaties of mutual assistance with France and Czechoslovakia, a similar treaty with the Mongolian People's Republic, and the pact of non-aggression with China [21]. Considering that, not so many years previously, the USSR had been friendless, these constituted a striking record of achievement.

While its position had been greatly improved, the Soviet Union still felt obliged to deal circumspectly with Japan and was clearly relieved when the clash between Soviet and Japanese troops at Changkufang in the Lake Khasan area in August 1938, which might well have developed into something more serious, was resolved by diplomatic negotiations. It was Blucher, the commander-in-chief of the Soviet Far Eastern Army, who was thirsting for blood and seeking to precipitate war with Japan; but his masters in Moscow were by

no means so confident of the outcome and were not prepared to accept the risk of a full-scale war.¹ Blucher was accordingly removed from his post [22].

Less than a year later a further and far more serious clash with the Japanese occurred, but by this time Moscow felt more confident. From May to the middle of September 1939 Japanese and Soviet troops engaged in bitter fighting in the Nomanhan area, where the Mongolian-Manchukuo border was ill-defined. This was no minor skirmish such as had been the encounter at Changkufang the previous year, but a full-scale battle involving the use of aircraft, tanks and heavy artillery, with thousands of casualties on both sides. Ostensibly the fighting was between the Manchukuo and the Mongolian People's Republic, the Japanese being there merely as allies of the former in accordance with the 1932 Japan-Manchukuo Treaty of Mutual Assistance, while the Soviet forces claimed similarly to be there in accordance with their equivalent Pact of 1936 with Outer Mongolia. Some idea of the scope and severity of the operations was indicated in the subsequent admission by the Japanese War Office that the Japanese suffered 18,000 casualties [23], while Molotov, more reticent, admitted 'rather heavy casualties on our side' [24]. As neither Moscow nor Tokyo wanted war just at that time a settlement was eventually reached by negotiation.

An announcement to this effect was made on 15th September [25] and within a month Molotov was able to report 'the beginnings of an improvement in our relations with Japan' [26]. So well did this improvement develop that eighteen months later, on 13th April 1941, Japan and the Soviet Union entered into a Neutrality Pact. Along with it was signed a declaration under which the two governments bound themselves to respect the territorial integrity and inviolability of the Mongolian People's Republic and Manchukuo respectively [27]. The pact was to prove mutually beneficial until August 1945 when the Russians, in violation of their undertakings with Japan, joined in the war against her.

It was while the Nomanhan operations were in full swing that Soviet foreign policy underwent a complete and fundamental change, with the announcement on 23rd August 1939 that a Non-Aggression

¹ Tukhachevsky and about 5,000 officers had been liquidated the previous year when the Army had been purged of its pro-German elements. The consequent weakening of the Army probably helped, therefore, to cause this lack of confidence.

Pact had been signed with Germany. The announcement would have been still more staggering if it had revealed the fact that a secret protocol delimiting the respective spheres of interest of the two signatories in Eastern Europe had been signed at the same time. This *volte face* had been foreshadowed early in May by the announcement that Litvinov, who had done so much to improve the Soviet Union's international standing, had been succeeded as foreign commissar by Molotov. Litvinov, being a Jew, was no friend of Nazi Germany. His removal from office was a necessary preliminary to a Soviet-German *rapprochement*. His dismissal marked the Kremlin's abandonment of all faith in a security pact with the Western powers and the end of the anti-Fascist Popular Front initiated in 1935 by the Comintern at their Seventh World Congress [28].

The signing of the pact with Germany in August 1939 was disconcerting in the extreme to Communists throughout the world. It meant that, after years of vehement denunciation of German aggression, they had to change their tune over-night in order to keep in line with their masters in the Kremlin.¹ Molotov himself, however, appeared quite unabashed and in a speech on 31st August, replete with specious reasoning, laid the whole blame on Britain and France [30]. Two months later he followed this up with a further speech in which, after explaining away the rape of Poland and denouncing Britain and France for rejecting Germany's proposals for ending the war, he proceeded to berate the two former for their 'exploitation of hundreds of millions of people' in their colonies which, he declared, were 'the foundation of the world supremacy of Great Britain and France' [31].

The speech as a whole was an exposition of power politics, but this reference to the 'exploitation' of colonial peoples showed the inevitable link between the Soviet Union's interests as a world power and her interests as the leader of World Revolution. Before the year had ended, Russia's own imperialism had been clearly manifested by her invasion of Poland and Finland, and the USSR had, in consequence, been expelled from the League of Nations.

The year 1940 witnessed further examples of Soviet imperialism, which added Bessarabia, Northern Bukovina, Lithuania, Latvia and

¹ Although disconcerting to Communists, it is not without interest that under date of 11th September 1939 the Saionji-Harada Memoirs quote Arita as telling Harada that ex-Communists in the right-wing movement were 'the prime power behind the movement to have Japan join the German-Soviet non-aggression pact and strike at England with an alliance of Germany, Russia and Japan'. [29]

Estonia to the Soviet empire; but it was marked also by the first signs of a rift in the Moscow-Berlin lute. Although reports of friction between the two partners were strenuously denied by Molotov in a speech on 1st August, protests and representations about the division of the spoils agreed upon in the Secret Protocol began barely a month later. The German invasion of Russia on 22nd June 1941 was but the culmination of the increasing friction and marked a new turning point in Moscow's relations with the Western powers. It proved, too, to be the opening of a crucial stage in world history; for the help given by these Western powers was to ensure the Soviet Union's emergence four years later on the winning side and enabled her at the same time to impart a tremendous impetus to the cause of World Revolution at the expense of those who had gone to her aid. Nowhere was such fertile ground to be found for assisting this revolution as in the Far East, where a serious power vacuum had been created by Japan's defeat, and in South-East Asia, where the territories temporarily occupied by the Japanese had been transformed into a seething cauldron of nationalism and economic distress.

CHAPTER XXIV

Internal Struggle and International Leadership

IN order to round off this review of the period leading to Japan's entry into the war, we must consider the developments taking place in the USSR itself and in the realm of world Communism in 1925. The struggle between Stalin and Trotsky was nearing its climax and Stalin himself was striving to steer a middle course in the heated controversy over agrarian reform between the left wing opposition of Trotsky and Zinoviev and the right wing opposition of Rykov and Bukharin. The former were accused of ignoring the peasants while the latter were held to be too much inclined to pander to them.

The strife between the Soviet leaders had its inevitable repercussions in the field of international Communism. As a result, Zinoviev was removed from the leadership of the Comintern in July 1926, while his followers, as well as those of Trotsky, were condemned both by that body and by their own party. Trotsky's expulsion from the Politburo followed in October; and a year later, in November 1927, both he and Zinoviev were expelled from the Party itself. Their expulsion was followed four days later by the suicide of Adolf Joffe, whose joint statement with Sun Yat-Sen in January 1923 had led to the alliance between the Chinese Communist Party and the KMT.

The decision to expel Trotsky and Zinoviev from the Party was duly approved by the Fifteenth Congress of the CPSU(B), which opened early in December 1927, and effect was given to the ruling that 'adherence to the Trotsky opposition and the propagation of its views were incompatible with membership of the Bolshevik Party'. Seventy-five other leading members were expelled at the same time [1]. A month later Trotsky was forcibly removed from Moscow to Alma Ata, although another year was to go by before he was finally expelled from Russia. That he was not 'liquidated' or even

imprisoned was due to the fact that Stalin did not yet feel sufficiently firm in the saddle to deal in this way with one whose unbending attitude had, in the words of Deutscher, 'won him new respect from friend and foe alike' [2]. Seven more years were to pass before Lenin's successor was ready to pass death sentences on outstanding members of the 'Old Guard'.

The significance of the Fifteenth Congress lay, however, not only in the removal of Stalin's principal opponents. Even more important in some respects were the decisions reached on the collectivization of agriculture and the treatment to be accorded to the *kulaks*. The resolutions passed clearly foreshadowed the change from the relative leniency of the NEP period to a policy of ruthless enforcement.

The main reason for this change was that, although the NEP had served very largely to re-establish Russian agriculture, which had suffered severely during the early stages of the Revolution, it had also tended to bring out in the peasants, who now tilled their own land, that semi-capitalist outlook which comes to those who have property of their own. The socialization of agriculture, which was closely linked with the industrialization programme laid down by the Soviet leaders, was being impeded. As appeals to the peasantry to assist in the task of collectivization voluntarily had failed to bring adequate response, the Party considered that the time had come to adopt more forceful measures to compel them to enter the *Kolkhoz* (collective farms). Resolutions to this effect were passed by the Fifteenth Congress and the *kulaks* were singled out for particular castigation. By the summer of 1928 Stalin was calling on the Party to 'strike hard at the *kulaks*'; and although Bukharin and others endeavoured to put a stop to the new course, their efforts proved unavailing. The only result was that in April the following year Bukharin found himself being openly denounced by Stalin for opposing collectivization and the liquidation of the rich peasants. This denunciation was followed soon after by his removal from the Politburo and from other important posts, Rykov and Tomsky being expelled at the same time.

Tomsky's expulsion was connected with the question of industrialization rather than with that of agricultural collectivization, although the two were closely linked. Although previously opposed to the idea, Stalin had come out in December 1928 with a speech stressing the need for more rapid industrialization [3]. Tomsky, however, in his capacity as head of the trade unions, sought to protect the interests of the workers instead of driving them on to raise

production and strengthening labour discipline. His removal from the leadership of the trade unions was ordered some six months later [4]. With all his principal rivals out of the way, Stalin's ascendancy was now complete, and the nauseating adulation accorded to him on the occasion of his fiftieth birthday at the close of 1929 marked the inauguration of the new Stalinist cult.

It was the chronic danger of famine, arising from the stubborn refusal of the peasants to sell food to the towns at prices fixed arbitrarily by the state, that led Stalin finally to abandon any further attempt to bring about gradual collectivization and, instead, to impose the system by brute force. On 27th November 1929 he therefore issued the slogan, 'Liquidation of the *kulaks* as a class', and by the close of that year compulsory collectivization had been put into force. Local risings by embittered peasants were ruthlessly suppressed and the peasants, driven to desperation, destroyed their livestock rather than let them fall into government hands. As a result, famine spread on a vast scale and over five million peasants died, either from starvation or shooting, while close on another five million were banished or sent to forced labour camps.

The ruthlessness of these measures, however, defeated their own purpose. Early in 1930 it was necessary to ease the pressure and *Pravda*, on 2nd March, published an article by Stalin laying the blame on over-zealous officials and seeking to placate the peasants by proclaiming the principle of voluntary entry into collective farms [5]. While the progress of collectivization was thereby slowed down, the speeding up of industrialization was intensified and in June that year Stalin dumbfounded the Sixteenth Congress of the CPSU(B) by announcing: 'We are on the eve of our transformation from an agrarian into an industrial country' [6].

If the difficulties encountered by the Soviet leaders in carrying out their programme of collectivization and industrialization had been peculiar to the USSR, there would be no need to recount them in a book concerned primarily with South and East Asia. Twenty-odd years later, however, after their assumption of power in Peking, the Chinese Communist leaders were to find themselves faced with similar problems in their attempt to industrialize a vast and largely backward agrarian country and to induce the peasants, with their property instinct, to appreciate the virtues of collectivization. It was significant, therefore, that in April 1953 the edict went forth that all party cadres in China were to study chapters 9 to 12 of the *History*

of the CPSU(B)¹ as well as selected writings by Lenin and Stalin on socialist economic construction [7]. The four chapters in question cover the period 1921–37 during which the Soviet leaders struggled successively with the transition from War Communism to the New Economic Policy and the beginnings of industrialization, with the problems of collectivization in agriculture and the launching of the First Five-Year Plan, with the elimination of the *kulaks*, and with the inauguration of the new USSR constitution and the Second Five-Year Plan. By studying these chapters, the Chinese Communists sought to learn from the successes and failures of the Russians in carrying out their own programme and to avoid, if possible, such mistakes as the ruthless measures adopted by Stalin in the countryside.

Particular importance was attached to Chapter 10, dealing with the tribulation of the years 1926–29, as it corresponded to the phase of economic development with which the Chinese Communists were then, in the spring of 1953, being forced to contend. It was during this period of the 1920's that Stalin's policy of building up industrial and military self-sufficiency out of sparse agricultural resources was brought to fruition after differences among the Soviet leaders concerning the best economic policy to be pursued.

Returning to the Soviet Union, two points put forward by Stalin in 1931 call for passing reference, as they foreshadowed significant developments in Soviet policy in the years ahead and were to influence the policies of the Communist régimes set up in China and other countries in post-war years. In February 1931 Stalin made his first appeal to Russian nationalism and patriotism [8], and four months later, in June the same year, he launched an attack on egalitarianism, which had previously been an almost fundamental principle of Bolshevism. Thereby he paved the way for the creation of a new privileged class and the separation of the vast mass of unskilled workers from the privileged 'labour aristocracy' and bureaucracy [9]. By the change of one word, the second half of the former slogan 'From each according to his ability, to each according to his need', became 'to each according to his work'.

Although it was in February 1931 that Stalin, for the first time,

¹ This history, compiled by Stalin, had been sanctioned by the Central Committee of the CPSU(B) in October 1938 for publication. Although grossly biased and distorted, it was regarded almost as Holy Writ by the Communists of all countries until February 1956, when it came under trenchant criticism by Mikoyan at the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU.

adopted a nationalist pose, he continued to condemn both 'Great Russian chauvinism' and 'local nationalism' for some years more; but although he was to continue his hostility towards 'local nationalism' for the rest of his life and was still denouncing 'the deviation to Great Russian chauvinism' in his speech at the Seventeenth Congress of the CPSU(B) in January 1934 [10], his attitude towards this particular form of deviation underwent a change soon after and before long Great Russian nationalism was rampant. Bearing this in mind, it is significant that a somewhat similar change appears to be taking place at the present time in China, where Great Russian nationalism has its counterpart in Great Han nationalism. Both this and 'narrow nationalism' have been denounced by Mao Tse-Tung, but there are already indications that Great Han nationalism is beginning to play its part in Chinese Communist policy in much the same way as Great Russian chauvinism started to rear its head in the late 1930's in the Soviet Union.

In line with his attack on egalitarianism, Stalin, in his speech to business executives in June 1931, singled out the intelligentsia as meriting special consideration along with workers and peasants. 'No ruling class has managed without its own intelligentsia,' he declared [11] and thereby ensured that in future they would be regarded as one of the main supporting pillars of the Soviet edifice. By the time of his death twenty-two years later, the importance of this section of the community in the Soviet scheme of things had become so firmly established that the new masters of the Kremlin in March 1953 addressed their call for unity, not merely to the workers and peasants as had been done after Lenin's death twenty-nine years earlier but to the 'workers, collective farmers and intelligentsia'. In Soviet Russia as in Communist China, the intelligentsia now constitute themselves one of the main props of the régime.

Having noted this and other points of similarity between the Soviet Union in its formative years and Communist China to-day, we must turn to the birth of what was to become an outstanding feature in Soviet Russia, a feature which has so far been absent in Mao Tse-Tung's China. This is the purge and liquidation of leading figures in the Communist hierarchy. Trotsky, Zinoviev and others had been expelled from the Party in the 1920's, but no attempt had been made to place them on trial or to kill them. On 1st December 1934, however, Kirov, who had taken part in the anti-Zinoviev purge in 1926, was murdered, allegedly by Zinoviev's followers. The reign of terror

instituted by Stalin in consequence of the death of his henchman was but the precursor of the purges of 1935–38.

Kirov's murderer and many others were executed and tens of thousands of suspects and their families were deported to Northern Siberia for internment in prisons and concentration camps [12]. Zinoviev himself was among those arrested and, although he clearly had no connection with the assassin and his friends, he was persuaded to admit in public that the terrorists might have been influenced by the criticisms he had once directed against Stalin. Thereby he and others, who were forced into similar admissions of at least indirect guilt, destroyed the haloes of martyrdom which their treatment might otherwise have earned for them. As a result, too, they 'moved further down the slippery slope that led to the great purge trials' [13].

These trials followed soon afterwards, and in August 1936 Zinoviev and Kamenev were executed with fourteen others. Then came the Radek Treason Trial in January 1937, and before the year had ended Ordzhonikidze had met with a sudden and mysterious death,¹ Tukhachevsky and seven other prominent generals had been executed, about five thousand other officers had been liquidated, and the Army had been purged of all those regarded as pro-German. Karakhan and other well-known figures had been put to death, and in the following year Bukharin, Rykov and other prominent Old-Guard Communists suffered a similar fate. With virtually all actual or potential opponents out of the way, with the masses drilled into unquestioning obedience, with a newly created privileged class whose interest it was to support him, and with an all-pervading secret police to ferret out those who failed to express sufficiently orthodox views or to accord him the recognized adulation, Stalin was now left supreme and unchallenged in a Russia which had become a totalitarian police state and a model for future Communist régimes in other countries.

That his former opponents had failed to fight him while they still had the chance appears to have been due largely to their fear that it would harm the revolution, whose cause they had so much at heart, and that it would help the proponents of counter-revolution. That this fear was reasonable is indicated by the fact that discontent was

¹ Deutscher follows Trotsky in hinting that Stalin had something to do with Ordzhonikidze's sudden and unexpected death. Trotsky, however, had no hesitation at all in placing responsibility for the deaths of Frunze and Gorky or even of Lenin. In each instance he held Stalin responsible for having contrived their murder by carefully camouflaged means.

rife at the time in the Party and that hundreds of thousands were expelled from it during the years 1933 to 1935. Even larger numbers were expelled from the *Komsomol* during this same period and many of these, like the radical youth in Czarist days, were looking to the assassination of prominent autocrats as the best means of expressing their feelings.

In so far as the Army was concerned, it seems clear that certain generals were actually planning a coup. That they were planning it in conjunction with the Germans, however, is open to doubt. Deutscher contends they were not. In support of his contention, he points to the fact that not a single document produced at the Nuremberg trial of the Nazi leaders contained so much as a hint that the Germans had played any part in the contemplated coup [14]. Sir Winston Churchill, on the other hand, quotes Beneš as authority for evidence of collusion between the Soviet generals and the German government [15], while Trotsky, somewhat non-committally, observes that Marshal Tukhachevsky, like Frunze twelve years previously, lost his life for displaying 'too much independence in protecting the Army from the supervision of the GPU' [16]. By implication, however, Trotsky's observation, biased though it may be, would seem to support Deutscher's contention. Be that as it may, by the drastic measures adopted to deal with the widespread and deep-seated discontent reflected in Kirov's murder, and by the purge trials and executions of the Old Guard Communist leaders and Army officers that followed, Stalin had made his own position wellnigh impregnable.

His greatest opponent, Trotsky, however, still remained alive to plague him with scathing denunciations from his faraway home of exile in Mexico. There he was busy compiling a biographical study of the Soviet dictator, whom he likened to Judas. 'Of Christ's twelve apostles,' he wrote, 'Judas alone proved to be a traitor. But if he had acquired power, he would have represented the other eleven apostles as traitors, and also all the lesser apostles, whom Luke numbers as seventy' [17]. He was still engaged on this work when, on 10th August 1940, he was assassinated by a Stalinist agent. The last threat to Stalin's position was removed and, with the German invasion of Russia ten months later, Stalin emerged as the great war-time leader and saviour of his people. The internal struggle for power had ended and national salvation had, for the time being, pushed the leadership of World Revolution into the background. By the time the Pacific

War had been launched by Japan in December 1941, the battle of Moscow was at its height and Stalin had issued orders for his first counter-offensive [18].

Having traced the main developments in the internal affairs of the USSR from 1925 to the close of 1941, it only remains to bring this chapter to a close with a cursory survey of international Communism as directed from Moscow towards South and East Asia during the same period.

The years 1925 to 1927 saw the formation of three separate international organizations concerned with helping the Communist cause in that vast area. The first of these was the South Seas Communist Group which was established in Singapore. Relatively local in character, its activities were confined to the countries of South-East Asia, in which it sought to introduce Communism and to develop, direct, and co-ordinate the Communist movement initiated thereby. The formation of this Group was followed a year or so later by the inauguration of the League Against Imperialism, attended by Nehru and other Asiatic nationalist leaders. The holding of its first Congress in Brussels in February 1927 marked the introduction of a less direct but, by its camouflaged motives, more insidious means of assisting the Communist cause, not only in South-East Asia but throughout the East in general. A covert offspring of the Comintern, it aimed to spread revolutionary propaganda under the guise of philanthropy, idealism and internationalism. It was, in fact, a typical example of a Communist 'front' organization, and before long branches of this seemingly idealistic body were being set up all over the world, its well-meaning dupes blissfully unaware of Communist control and the way in which they were being exploited for Communist ends. Finally, three months after the First Congress of the League Against Imperialism, the Pan-Pacific Trade Union Secretariat was brought into being at a conference held in Hankow. This Secretariat was the Eastern counterpart of the Profintern, its main purpose being to bring about economic dislocation by means of industrial agitation and political strikes.

The League Against Imperialism, it may be noted, was based on Article 8 of the '21 Conditions of Admission to the Comintern'. Under this article, all Communist parties affiliated to the Comintern were called upon to advocate and support the liberation of

colonial and dependent peoples. A Chinese branch of this League was organized in Shanghai in 1929 and it was in that great port city that an Asiatic Congress Against Imperialist War was held under its auspices in September 1933.¹ Nineteen years later, at the Asian and Pacific Regions Peace Conference held in Peking in October 1952, Sun Yat-Sen's widow, Soong Ching-Ling, was to recall the prominent part played by herself at that congress which, she remarked, had been held under the auspices of 'the peace organization of that period, the League Against Imperialism' [19].

A revealing illustration of the way in which this League was used to disguise its true nature was seen in a letter of 30th December 1927 from the Comintern concerning the creation of a Workers and Peasants Party in India to take the place of the Indian Communist Party when the latter was outlawed. Warning the Communists against allowing the disguised party to be too openly identified with them, the letter went on to say: 'It should affiliate itself with the League Against Imperialism. That will serve our purpose. Through that you will have the relations and aid you need, but you will not be accused of having relations with Moscow. The WPP (Workers and Peasants Party) can eventually become the recognized organ of the League in India' [20].

Although not concerned specifically with Asia, another body established about the same time as the League Against Imperialism also calls for mention as, like the League, it was to reappear in different form after the Second World War. This was the Society of Friends of the Soviet Union, inaugurated under the auspices of VOKS (All-Union Society for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries) in November 1927 at a Congress held in Moscow. Essentially a body whose real purpose was to gain support from idealists and liberal elements in all countries for the main objectives of Soviet foreign policy, it set up branches in various countries. These, in due course, were transformed into national societies for the promotion of friendly relations with Soviet Russia. Like the League Against Imperialism, it included a Shanghai branch, although this did not come into being until 1932, when it was founded by a Czechoslovakian agent of the Comintern, Edmond Egon Kisch [21].

Perhaps, however, the main interest attaching to this society lies

¹ Owing to the situation in the Far East resulting from Japan's incursion into Manchuria and owing also to the growing strength of Fascism, an Anti-War Congress had been held in Amsterdam a year previously.

in the fact that in its ultimate form, after it had proliferated into a number of national societies, it was to provide the model for all the 'Friendship Associations' which have blossomed forth as Communist front organizations since the close of the Second World War—the Sino-Soviet Friendship Association in China, the Vietnam-Soviet Friendship Association in Indo-China, the Burma-Soviet Friendship Association in Burma, and so forth. The labels have changed but, just as Mme Sun has indicated that the present spurious World Peace movement is the lineal descendant of the Pre-War League Against Imperialism, so too are these Friendship Associations the counterparts of the former Friends of the Soviet Union.

A similar instance of the revival of a pre-war Communist front organization under a new name was noted earlier. This was the ISH (International of Seamen and Harbour Workers), which re-emerged in 1949 as the International Association of Dockers and Seamen. Numerous other similar examples could be given, but one more must suffice. This was a body called the International Juridical Association, which was founded in December 1929 at the International Lawyers Conference in Berlin and, in the summer of 1931, helped to defend Noulens and his wife when they were put on trial after their arrest in Shanghai. Its post-war reincarnation is to be seen in the International Association of Democratic Jurists,¹ a body which, masquerading as neutral and objective, displayed its true colours in 1952 by issuing a lengthy report alleging that the Americans had been guilty of germ warfare in Korea.

Important as all these organizations were for carrying out Communist policy by sailing under false colours, the two outstanding developments in the realm of international Communism during the period were the Sixth World Congress of the Comintern in the summer of 1928 and the Seventh World Congress held seven years later. It was at these two gatherings that the policy and tactics best suited to meet the changing circumstances of the time were formulated and approved, and that the various Communist parties were given their marching orders.

The Sixth Congress was of particular importance to the Communist movement in South and East Asia on account of the great attention paid to the promotion of revolution and of wars for national liberation in the colonies and semi-colonies. 'One of the most important and primary tasks' of the Comintern as laid down in the

¹ Founded in Paris in October 1946.

thesis adopted by this Congress was 'the building up and development of the Communist parties in the colonies and semi-colonies'. Along with this, the thesis continued, 'the most important of the immediate general tasks of the Communists in the colonies and semi-colonies is that of work in the trade unions'. Having explained how this was to be done, it then went on to emphasize the need 'to give a revolutionary character to the existing peasant movement' and, turning to the revolutionary potentialities of the younger generation, drew attention to the fact that 'the relative part played by the youth in the composition of the working class is considerably higher in the colonial countries than in the old capitalist countries'. It was therefore stressed that 'the creation of revolutionary mass organizations of the proletarian youth under Communist leadership' was 'an immediate fundamental task of the Communist Youth International in the colonies'. The fact that the women were 'gradually awakening to class consciousness' was also noted and 'the Communist parties of the colonies and semi-colonies' were enjoined 'to pay great attention to work among these strata' with a view to attracting them into the trade union organizations and 'winning over the best of them for the Communist Party'. The importance of attracting women to the Communist cause and the way in which this could be done, it may be noted, was to be stressed once more at the Seventh World Congress in 1935.

Apart from this thesis, of which only the barest outline has been sketched in above, the vital role of colonial revolutions in 'the struggle for the conquest of power by the working class' was also emphasized in the revised constitution of the Comintern adopted at this gathering.

China and India came in for more specific consideration. The Chinese Communist Party, it will be recalled, was holding its own Sixth Congress in Moscow at the same time as the Sixth World Congress of the Comintern was being held, and it drew up a lengthy political resolution. This was duly endorsed by the Comintern which, however, took occasion to censure the Chinese Communists for their former 'opportunistic errors'. The Comintern Congress also passed a resolution on 'Communist Strategy in China and Similar Colonial Countries' and sketched out a programme for attempting to link peasant uprisings with urban insurrection in China.

Similarly, in referring to India, it was laid down that 'the basic task of the Indian Communists consists in struggle against British

imperialism for the emancipation of the country'. Far from co-operating with the Indian nationalists in this struggle, however, the Communists were ordered to 'unmask the national reformism of the Indian National Congress and oppose all the phrases of the Swarajists, Gandhists, etc., about passive resistance'. It was, in fact, the application of the Communist principles regarding class warfare to the national liberation struggle. Violence, not passive resistance, was wanted, and no 'reformism' or readiness to reach a negotiated settlement was to be tolerated. Those who took the contrary view, whether they were social reformers or nationalists, were denounced as traitors and 'running dogs'.

It was for this reason that the Social Democrats in all countries came in for particularly virulent abuse at this Congress, and a resolution was passed denouncing international Social Democrats as 'the last reserve of bourgeois society'. Social Democrats were defined as the leading enemies and betrayers of the proletariat, and all Communist parties were directed to sever relations with Social Democrat parties on the grounds that they were allied with world capitalism against the Soviet Union. A ruthless struggle was accordingly to be carried out against them, and Social Democracy and Fascism were linked together as twin evils. It was at this Congress, too, that the defence of the Soviet Union was stressed as being the foremost task of the Comintern and of Communist parties in all countries. Reference was also made earlier in these pages to the strong denunciation of Gandhi by this Congress, and it is perhaps not without interest to recall that this criticism was to be reflected twenty-six years later in the 1954 issue of the Soviet Encyclopedia, which described him as a 'reactionary' who betrayed the interests of the Indian people to British imperialism. The Indian government was constrained to make representations to the Soviet government, pointing out that 'such a false account' was completely at variance with Soviet professions of friendship and respect for India [22].

Before turning on to other matters, one final comment on the Comintern Congress of 1928 may be added. In dealing with the tactics to be employed in colonial territories, it was laid down that the Communist parties concerned should advance 'partial demands' such as would attract nationalists and others to their cause. Having outlined the type of demand that would provide the necessary appeal, the statement went on to stress that 'all these partial slogans must be subordinated to the fundamental demands of the Communist

parties'. This qualifying stipulation was, of course, typical of Communist methods and remains typical of them to this day. Whether posing as the champions of national liberation, of social justice, of world peace, or of disarmament, the Communists are always ready, whenever their main purpose has been achieved, to discard the 'partial' demands and slogans, which had been used as 'bait', in favour of their own fundamental demands.

How wide a net can be cast for attracting high-minded non-Communists into a world-wide organization covertly controlled by Communists for Communist purposes is well illustrated by a resolution passed at a meeting of the Cominform in 1949 in the early stages of the World Peace campaign [23]. 'Particular attention,' it said, 'should be devoted to bringing together into the movement of the supporters of peace the trade unions, women's, youth, co-operative, sports, cultural and educational, religious and other organizations as well as scientists, writers, journalists, workers in the cultural field, parliamentary leaders who are in favour of peace and against war.'

Since this directive was issued in the autumn of 1949, the World Peace Council, which is the organization behind the campaign, has become so widely recognized as a Communist instrument that all kinds of ruses and devices have been employed to conceal the Council's directing hand behind the various proliferations of the peace movement. That peace, in the sense that the free peoples of the world understand the term, is not the true objective is shown by the fact that the Communists continue their efforts to foment civil war and insurrection, especially in the colonies and dependencies. The Communists only want peace in the sense that Hitler wanted peace—in order to obtain their own and Russia's objectives without becoming involved in open war. The term 'peace', however, exercises a kind of hypnotic spell which the Communists exploit to the full for their own purposes. It is in the nature of a 'partial demand' such as the Comintern Congress of 1928 said should be used as 'bait'. The 'fundamental demands' to which it must be subordinated are the undermining of people's confidence in the peaceful intentions of their own leaders and rulers and the exploitation of social, political and economic grievances for the purpose of creating revolutionary situations.

By the time the Comintern met for its Seventh and final World Congress in 1935, the international situation had undergone a drastic

change. Comintern policy as laid down in 1928 had therefore to undergo an almost complete reversal. The defence of the Soviet Union remained the foremost task of all good Communists; but instead of hitting out right and left at national 'reformers', Social Democrats, imperialists and the like, the Comintern, as the implement of Soviet foreign policy, found it expedient to court the friendship and co-operation of all these former foes. The Sixth Congress policy of violent opposition to established labour movements, it was now realized, had alienated far more support than it had won. How best to recover what had been lost and to win rather than repel the friendship and co-operation of all these important elements was therefore the question to be decided. And so it came about that the cause of peace and the defence of democracy against Fascism, which the Soviet Union had already professedly taken under its wing, were espoused by the Comintern as the most likely means of winning and extending this support.

For this purpose and in order to hide its own ulterior motives, the policy of the Popular Front was enunciated. It was Dimitrov, newly confirmed as secretary-general of the Comintern, who initiated this policy and who likened it to the Trojan horse which, he explained, 'managed to penetrate to the very heart of the enemy's camp'. 'We revolutionary workers,' he added, 'should not be shy about using the same tactics' [24].

The 'enemy's camp', which he had in mind when explaining this policy, was not so much the ostensible enemy, Fascism, as the democratic way which the initiators of the 'popular fronts' professed to champion. Both the united front and the popular front were, in fact, used for disintegrative attacks on the temporary friends and partners while marching together with them in apparent unity against the Fascist foe. This was most clearly demonstrated in the case of France where, thanks to the *Front Populaire*, the socialist movement in 1938 was claimed by the IKKI as becoming rapidly a Communist movement controlled and guided by the French Communist Party [25].

By resorting to what George Orwell was later to characterize as 'double-speak', replacing such unpopular words as 'war' and 'Communism' with the more appealing terms 'peace' and 'socialism', the Comintern strove hard to mask its own insidious activities behind the slogan 'Fight for Peace', while seeking to utilize it for the purpose of 'turning war into civil war against the bourgeoisie'. The way in which the Comintern engineered the civil war in Spain and rallied its dupes

into taking part in the fighting in that distracted country is but one example of the methods employed. By turning the peace movement into a demand for resistance to Fascism and raising an outcry for arms for the Republican forces, Moscow was able to turn fear of war and hatred of Fascism to its own advantage. In short, the ultimate strategic aim of World Revolution remained unaltered. It was only the tactics which had changed.

That this was so was made clear by the thesis expounded at the Seventh Congress by the Chinese Communist, Wang Min. Speaking on 'The Revolutionary Movement in the Colonial Countries', he endorsed what had been said at the Sixth Congress seven years previously and referred approvingly to the assertion that 'the enormous world of colonies and semi-colonies has been transformed into an unquenchable flame of the revolutionary mass movements'. In other words, while seeking to strengthen its own position by posing as the champion of peace and defender of democracy against Fascism, the Soviet Union, through the instrumentality of the Comintern, continued its revolutionary offensive in the 'colonies and semi-colonies' of South and East Asia. That Moscow's tactics in this respect had been changed little or not at all by the passage of time was clearly to be seen nineteen years later when Maxim Saburov spoke at the Russian Revolution anniversary celebrations in 1954. His subject was 'peaceful co-existence', a theme which had been coming increasingly to the fore during the preceding months. 'Peaceful co-existence' he declared to be 'the basis of Soviet policy'; but he appeared to see nothing inconsistent in declaring also that 'the march of Communism in Asia' would continue [26].

The gathering in 1935 was to be the last World Congress held by the Comintern, but before the close of 1941 the policy laid down by that body was to undergo two complete somersaults. With the signing of the Soviet-Nazi Pact in August 1939, Fascism ceased to be stigmatized by Communist propaganda as the enemy of mankind and so the Popular Front phase came to an abrupt end. Rather less than two years later the German invasion of Russia brought about an equally abrupt termination of Soviet-German collaboration, Fascism in all its aspects again became the main target of Comintern fulminations, and the Western democracies, which had been so strongly denounced during the period of the Pact, were temporarily restored to favour. We have already traced the repercussions of these successive turnabouts on the Communist parties in South and East Asia.

One final development during the period under review to which attention should be drawn is the World Youth Movement, which from 1935 onwards came increasingly under Communist influence. An International Youth Rally held in 1941 led to the establishment of an International Youth Council which, after a change of name, finally gave birth, at a World Youth Congress in November 1945, to what is now one of the outstanding Communist Front organizations. This is the World Federation of Democratic Youth, a body which plays a particularly active and insidious part in South and East Asia and claims a membership of over eighty million. Its activities, however, need not concern us here, as they did not start until four years after the close of the period under review. It only remains to recall that the year 1941, which saw the International Youth Rally and the formation of the World Federation of Democratic Youth in embryo form, was marked also by the German invasion of Russia and the consequent reversal once more of Comintern policy. It ended with the outbreak of the Pacific War, which set in train changes of the most fundamental and far-reaching nature in the Far East and South-East Asia.

The chain reaction set off in that vast area by Japan's plunge into the war was, in fact, to bring about changes of so revolutionary a character that few could have foreseen them. Those few who had an inkling of what might be expected were the Communists. They not only foresaw the inevitable chaos that the fighting would leave in its trail, but they started at an early stage of the operations making preparations to exploit it for their own ends. While the main contestants were preoccupied with military victory, the Communists were going ahead with their plans for achieving World Revolution after the war. In Asia as in Europe, the Communists played an important and valuable part in the resistance movements in the countries under enemy occupation; but they also made use of these movements to prepare for the day when, by availing themselves of the political and economic distress and confusion prevailing on the conclusion of hostilities, they hoped to seize power. In the chapters that follow, it is proposed to consider some of the main developments during the Pacific War period and their bearing on the creation of the revolutionary situation for which the Communists were planning.

PART III

The Pacific War Period

CHAPTER XXV

Some Aspects of Japan's Rise and Fall

WITH Japan's entry into the war, the existing military and political situation underwent a rapid and drastic change. Siam, Hong Kong, Malaya, Singapore, Java, the Philippines and Burma fell in rapid succession. Island after island in the Pacific was occupied by the victorious Japanese forces.

Spectacular as this amazing series of Japanese victories was, its true significance lay not so much in the relative ease with which these victories had been achieved as in the fact that they were to pave the way for changes of a far more revolutionary and permanent nature in South and East Asia a few years later. To understand the dangerous tensions set up by Japan's initial sweeping successes and by her subsequent overwhelming defeat, it is necessary to consider the nature of these changes and how they were brought about.

Had Japan's incursion into South-East Asia been no more than an instance of old-fashioned territorial aggrandisement, the consequences of her actions and of her ultimate downfall would not perhaps have been so profound. What differentiated her invasion from straightforward military aggression was the way in which she adopted the role of liberator and economic reformer in order to appeal to the indigenous peoples of the lands she set out to conquer. Posing as the leader of Pan-Asianism come to liberate them from Western domination and oppression, she had already sought to prepare the way for a welcome from her fellow-Asians by expounding her plans for the establishment of a New Order in East Asia. That this was her object had been officially stated in November 1938. Six months later had come the announcement laying down the principle of 'economic interdependence, co-existence and co-prosperity' between Japan and the South Seas regions, with special emphasis on the Dutch East Indies. Finally, on 29th June 1940, the Japanese Foreign Minister had declared in a broadcast that Japan's 'New Order' was to have its

sphere extended so as to cover 'Greater East Asia', a term comprising East Asia and the South Seas regions, which, in effect, meant the Far East, South-East Asia and, to some extent, India.

In building herself up in this way as an altruistic liberator and economic reformer from whose help and guidance everyone would profit, Japan adopted methods curiously akin to those of Soviet Russia. Exploitation of nationalism, promises of liberation and independence, castigation of Western imperialism and racial discrimination, visions of economic utopias, talk of peaceful co-existence: these and much else besides had a curious resemblance to Communist methods. Even the way in which political refugees—Aguinaldo of the Philippines, the Burmese Aung San, the Bengali Rash Behari Bose, and others—were produced at the appropriate moment from 'cold storage' to carry the message of liberation to their own countrymen was a foretaste of the way in which Communist leaders, who had for long been taking refuge in Moscow, were sent back after the war to their own countries to stir up revolutionary movements. There was even the occasion in July 1944 when the Japanese announced that the sole aim of their operations in China was 'to frustrate the imperialist aims of the Anglo-Saxons', an expression which might have come straight from the Kremlin.

It was this attempt to exploit nationalist and anti-imperialist sentiment for their own purposes and to play the role of leader and saviour of oppressed Asia that left such an indelible mark after Japan's own collapse. Even though her high-sounding claims had worn thin, the spirit of nationalism and anti-imperialism which Japan had aroused was not diminished by her downfall; and the successive blows which she had inflicted on the White Man's prestige by her initial victories and by her policy of deliberately humiliating her defeated enemies in the eyes of their former subject peoples had left one lasting impression on those whose lands had been over-run by the Japanese. This was that never again could they rely on their Western masters to protect them. Moreover, the brief spell of relative independence which most of these countries had been accorded by the Japanese had whetted their appetites for full and complete freedom from foreign control. When peace was restored, nationalist sentiment in the countries of South and East Asia was stronger than ever. Together with the economic and social chaos and the general state of insecurity left by the war, it provided Communist agitators with plenty of scope for exploitation.

Although the policy of extending the sphere of Japan's New Order to cover Greater East Asia had been announced eighteen months prior to the outbreak of the Pacific War, it was not until March 1942 that a GEA Deliberative Council was set up as an advisory body to the Japanese Prime Minister. This was by way of a preliminary to the establishment of a special organ to supervise and correlate policy towards the occupied regions. A further eight months had then to pass before a GEA ministry was created. Something of its nature was indicated by the immediate transference to it of a body called the International Students' Institute, which had been founded in 1935 by the Foreign Ministry to encourage foreign students to study in Japan. It was now detailed instead to train East Asian students as leaders who would co-operate with the Japanese in their own countries in establishing the Co-Prosperity Sphere.

In the meantime an Indian independence movement had been sanctioned by the Japanese and launched in South-East Asia, Aguinaldo¹ had returned to the Philippines to rouse his countrymen after a prolonged exile, Aung San and his friends were back in Burma co-operating with the Japanese, and in Indonesia a movement with the slogan, 'Japan the Saviour of Asia: Japan the Leader of Asia: Japan the Light of Asia', had been launched. But by this time the Japanese tide had begun to ebb. With an excess of self-confidence the Japanese had over-stretched themselves and had met with their first serious reverses at the battles of the Coral Sea and Midway in May and June 1942.

Twelve months after Midway there followed Japan's promise of independence to Burma and the Philippines, promises implemented in August and October 1943 respectively. A similar promise was made to Indonesia in September 1944 after the jolt inflicted on Japan by the loss of the Marianas, although it was not until 8th August the following year that preparations for according independence were announced. By the time the Indonesians declared independence on their own account nine days later, Japan had already capitulated.

By the autumn of 1943 Japan's attitude towards her friends and dependants in Greater East Asia anticipated that of Soviet Russia towards the East European satellites a decade later. Burma, as we

¹ Aguinaldo was by this time a spent force, but it is of interest to recall that, as far back as the late 1890's, Japanese ultra-nationalists had attempted to aid the Filipino revolutionaries against both Spain and the United States and several Japanese officers went to the Philippines to train Aguinaldo's army. [I]

have seen, had just been given nominal independence and the Philippines were about to receive it. As with Moscow's satellites, however, military, political and economic ties and factors ensured that independence was strictly limited. Then, early in November 1943, an assembly of the nations of Greater East Asia was held in Tokyo and a proclamation was issued at its close to the effect that Japan and the states whose territories she occupied had agreed to respect each other's sovereignty and independence and to practice mutual assistance and amity.¹

As the Soviet Union now treats Communist China as an equal rather than as a satellite, so Japan showed rather more respect to the China of Wang Ching-Wei than she did to her virtual satellites in South-East Asia. A week before the meeting of the Greater East Asia representatives in Tokyo she had agreed to a fundamental revision of the Basic Treaty of November 1940 with Wang's government and its replacement by an alliance. In addition Japan pledged herself to withdraw all her troops from China on the restoration of peace and, renouncing her rights under the Boxer Protocol and supplementary agreements to station troops in China, she announced the return of all concessions to China and the end of extraterritoriality.

There is something slightly ironical in the fact that on 30th October 1943, the day on which these significant details were announced, Stalin gave his first definite intimation to his allies that the Soviet Union intended to join the war against Japan after Germany had been defeated. It is slightly ironical too that, although Wang Ching-Wei was to die twelve months later, the anti-Western propaganda which his régime had poured out helped to prepare the ground for the similar tirades launched subsequently by the Chinese Communists. The Soviet entry into the war against Japan was to raise far more problems than it solved, while the anti-Western propaganda was to contribute to the success of the Communists in stirring up Chinese sentiment against the West.

Less than a month after the Tokyo gathering of representatives from Greater East Asia came an announcement of decisions which were to create political vacuums of the gravest danger to the future stability of the Far East and to raise still further problems of the greatest complexity. The outcome of the Cairo Conference, published

¹ Eleven years later the Chinese Communist Foreign Minister, Chou En-Lai, was to conclude agreements on somewhat similar lines with Nehru, U Nu and Ho Chi-Minh.

on 30th November, was, in fact, that Japan, when defeated, was to be stripped of all her overseas possessions and left with nothing but the four main islands of the Japanese homeland.

Whatever the justice of this decision may have been, its wisdom was extremely dubious. Without in any way condoning Japan's actions, one must admit that fundamentally they had been due to pressure of population and paucity of raw materials, combined with the tariff and immigration barriers raised against her. 'Nations in danger of economic strangulation will eventually resort to force in order to improve their positions,' a well-known Japanese of moderate views warned his fellow-delegates at an international conference in the summer of 1933 [2]. To strip her of all her overseas territories, including even those which had been hers long before 1931, and to force all her people back into the already over-populated islands of metropolitan Japan was, therefore, to aggravate the very conditions which had served to drive her along the path of aggression. Thereby was planted the seed of a possible fresh explosion in the years to come.¹

This was but one aspect of the decisions reached at Cairo. Of even more immediate danger were the political vacuums to be created by the 'liberation' of Korea, Manchuria and Formosa from Japan's grasp. It did not require a very profound knowledge of Far Eastern history to appreciate that, with Japan's removal, Russia would inevitably seek to fill the vacuum in Manchuria and Korea. That this is what she sought to do and that Communist control over Manchuria and North Korea has been the result is now a matter of history. What would happen to Formosa was not so clear at the time; but that the developments which have since taken place in connection with this strategically important island have created an explosive situation of the gravest danger can hardly be denied.

For the decisions reached at Cairo, Russia had no responsibility, as she did not take part in the conference. Fifteen months later, however, came Yalta and the fatal decisions taken there were largely due to Russian pressure. As a result of these decisions, the Soviet armies were able to sweep through Manchuria and into North Korea in the closing week of the war. By occupying Manchuria they were able to provide the Chinese Communists with an invaluable base in which to

¹ In 1939, when Japan had valuable overseas possessions of her own to ease the pressure of population and provide raw materials and markets for her manufactured goods, her population numbered sixty-eight millions. To-day, with nothing but her four overcrowded islands and with the valuable China market lost to her for the time being, she has close on ninety million mouths to feed.

reorganize, train and equip those armies which, four years later, were to place the whole of China under a Communist régime. By occupying North Korea they prepared the way for the establishment of another Communist régime there and for the invasion of South Korea in 1950 with all its fateful consequences. Also as a result of the decisions reached at Yalta, the Russians were able to seize and retain the Kuriles, including islands within a mile or so of Hokkaido, the northernmost of Japan's four main islands. That they did not occupy Hokkaido itself and place it, like North Korea, behind the Iron Curtain was due to General MacArthur, who refused absolutely to accede to the Soviet request to be allowed to assist in the military occupation of Japan by garrisoning that island. The fact that the Russians at Yalta persuaded the British and Americans to exert pressure on the Chinese Nationalist government to agree to the restoration of Russian 'rights' in Manchuria and to a plebiscite in Outer Mongolia, as a face-saving means of recognizing the 'independence' of that Soviet-controlled Chinese territory, served undoubtedly to undermine Nationalist prestige. The subsequent overthrow of the Nationalist government by the Communists was thereby facilitated.

Enough has been said to indicate how seriously the post-war situation in the Far East was to be affected by the decisions taken at Cairo and Yalta and how the cause of World Revolution was assisted. At this point we must turn once more to the development of Japan's policy towards Greater East Asia.

From information made public since the war it would seem that many of Japan's civilian administrators were perfectly sincere in their efforts to give real independence to the peoples of South and East Asia. They were frequently hampered, however, by their military countrymen, most of whom could think only in terms of strictly military requirements and often made themselves detested by acts of unnecessary harshness and arrogance. Readers of Thakin Nu's volume of reminiscences,¹ for example, will recall instances mentioned by him in support of this view. Be that as it may, even those Asiatic nationalists who had co-operated wholeheartedly with the Japanese at the outset gradually came to realize that Japan's intentions were to dominate their lands after driving out the White Man. Japan's actions in her hour of victory disqualified her claim to be the great liberator.

¹ *Burma Under the Japanese* (Macmillan, 1954).

While Shigemitsu, who by then had become Foreign Minister, may have been sincere in September 1944 when he laid down his five principles of foreign policy and pledged his country to co-operation and harmony with the peoples of Greater East Asia and to the fullest support for Chinese autonomy, the turn of the tide had already set in. By March the following year Japan's Burmese allies were in touch with the British and drawing up plans to co-operate with them against the Japanese; and although Annam and Cambodia, at Japanese instigation, declared their independence that same month and turned against the French, it was clear that they had little affection for their Japanese 'liberators'. Then, a few weeks later, after Laos had also declared its independence, came Soviet Russia's denunciation of the Neutrality Pact on which Japan had set so much store for the safety it gave to her flank. Moscow assured her that she had nothing to fear, but the writing on the wall was painfully clear. The assurances were to prove as worthless as the German Kaiser's 'scrap of paper' in 1914.

The final act in Japan's policy towards Greater East Asia was a belated promise of almost immediate independence conveyed to the Indonesian leaders on the eve of her collapse. It was to prove a political time-bomb which, on explosion, was to add to the general chaos of the early post-war period.

As a sidelight on these developments it may be pertinent to turn to one phase of Japanese policy towards Greater East Asia which merits rather more attention than has been given to it so far. This is the part played by quisling Indians in East and South-East Asia during the period of the Pacific War. These consisted of three main groups. One of them, styling itself somewhat grandiloquently the Aryan Army, was headed by the melodramatic Mahendra Pratap. More important and far more widespread was the Indian Independence League of East Asia, a purely Japanese creation, led at the start by the former Bengali terrorist, Rash Behari Bose. As a result of proposals made by him to General Sugiyama at the outbreak of the Pacific War for organizing an Indian Independence movement in South-East Asia, conferences of Indian representatives were held in Tokyo in March 1942 and in Bangkok three months later. The decision was taken to organize not only an Independence League but an Indian national army as well, recruited largely from Indian prisoners-of-war. Hesitant though the Japanese were to commit themselves on such matters as the size of the projected army, when to invade India, and the future

status of India, they endorsed the main decisions reached. Even when formed, however, the Indian national army was always regarded by the Japanese as a propaganda weapon rather than as a fighting force. The idea of using it in combat was never considered with much enthusiasm.

Although the Independence League was expanded rapidly and established branches throughout the Far East and South-East Asia, it was overshadowed at the start by the Free India movement set up in Europe by Hitler under the leadership of another and far more able Bose. This was Subhas Chandra Bose, former president of the Indian Congress Party, who had escaped from prison and made his way to Germany early in 1941. Realizing the value of having such an outstanding personality under their own aegis, the Japanese persuaded the Germans to have him sent east by submarine. At a point 400 miles SSW from Madagascar, he and one companion were transferred on 28th April 1943 from a German to a Japanese submarine, which landed him in Penang early in May [3]. His voyage was kept strictly secret until 21st June, when the Japanese scored a great propaganda success by announcing his arrival in Singapore. There he met the Burmese Premier, Ba Maw, who pledged his support and invited him to Rangoon to attend his own inauguration as the new governor of Burma.

Ba Maw was as good as his word and, following the formation of a Provisional Government of Free India in Singapore under Subhas Chandra Bose in October, he readily gave his consent for its transfer to Rangoon. Thither it moved in January 1944, the Indian national army taking part in the invasion of Manipur some weeks later after the Japanese had promised to give the Andamans and Nicobars to Free India. With the eventual failure of the attack and subsequent expulsion of the Japanese from Burma, however, all hope of bringing about a general uprising in India was gone. That many of the Indians composing this national army had already lost faith in the Japanese was indicated in the early spring of 1945, when Aung San's Burma Defence Army turned against its former Japanese friends. Although many Japanese officers attached to this Burma army were killed, the Indian troops refused to go to their aid, but, on the contrary, helped the Burmese with food and transport. It only remains to add that Rash Behari Bose, who had been replaced by his more illustrious namesake as head of the Indian Independence Movement in South-East Asia, died in Tokyo before the war ended and that Subhas

Chandra Bose himself was killed in an air crash while flying from Singapore to Japan three days after Japan's capitulation. Although these two were dead, however, the anti-British and anti-Western propaganda and other activities in which they had indulged during their lifetime had helped to fertilize the ground for Communist and nationalist revolution in South and East Asia in the post-war period.

Having now dealt with what may be called the Indian phase of Japanese policy towards Greater East Asia, we can turn to yet another aspect of the rise and fall of Japan, the effect of Japanese-Soviet relations on the Pacific War and its aftermath.

Thanks to the Neutrality Pact concluded with Moscow in March 1941, Japan felt that her flank was sufficiently protected to warrant her striking southwards. Evidence given at the War Trials in 1946 revealed the fact that, in order to satisfy his government on this score, the Japanese Foreign Minister took the precaution, just before the attack on Pearl Harbour, of sounding Moscow's reactions to a possible conflict in the Pacific. As a result he obtained the Soviet government's reassurance that it would continue to observe the Pact [4]. Even so, Tokyo clearly remained apprehensive, despite the fact that the Soviet Union went out of her way after the downfall of Malaya and the Philippines to congratulate the Japanese representatives in Moscow on their victories [5]. These congratulations seemed, however, to offer the Japanese a chance to help their German allies, whose invasion of Russia they feared might end disastrously for Germany, leaving Japan to fight alone. The belief induced by these felicitations was that the Soviet government might be prepared to accept an offer of Japanese mediation with a view to bringing the German-Soviet conflict to an end. Several attempts were made by the Japanese to persuade the Germans and the Russians to accept their mediation for the purpose of securing a compromise peace, but to no avail.

The attempts failed and meantime, in August 1942, unknown to the Japanese, Stalin had intimated to Harriman that the USSR would eventually join in the war against Japan [6]. By the autumn of the following year, Stalin had become even more explicit. On 30th October 1943 he told Cordell Hull in Moscow that the Soviet Union would turn against Japan after Germany had been defeated, and at Teheran a month later he made a similar statement to Churchill and Roosevelt. These assurances were given unconditionally, no demands for territory or any other recompense being made at the time. It was not, in fact, until October 1944, during the conference with Churchill,

Eden and Harriman in Moscow, that Stalin first hinted that he wanted something in return. His country, he declared, would be ready to attack Japan about three months after the defeat of Germany, provided certain specified help could be given in building up the necessary supplies and transport and that the political aspects of Russian participation could be clarified [7].

It was this reference to the political aspects of Russian participation that paved the way to the more specific proposals made two months later to Harriman about Soviet post-war claims in the Far East [8]. These were regarded with sympathy at the time and led to the decisions taken at Yalta in February 1945, whereby Soviet Russia was promised the return of all the territorial and other concessions in Manchuria and Saghalien lost by Czarist Russia in the Russo-Japanese War forty years previously. In addition, she was to be given the Kuriles and, in effect, Outer Mongolia as well.

The decisions were, of course, kept secret and when, soon after, the Japanese ambassador in Moscow inquired about the conference, he was assured by Molotov that there had been no discussion whatsoever concerning Far Eastern matters, as Soviet-Japanese relations were no concern of others. On 5th April, however, the Neutrality Pact was denounced by Russia, but again Molotov dissembled and assured Sato that, as the Pact, in accordance with the terms drawn up at the time of its signature in 1941, would remain valid for twelve months after denunciation, the Soviet Union would honour it until its expiry in April 1946.

After Germany's collapse in May, Japan's position became increasingly critical and on 10th July the Supreme War Council decided, subject to Soviet approval, to send a special envoy to Moscow with a personal message from the Emperor to seek the good offices of the Soviet government for restoring peace. Unofficial peace proposals had been put forward through the Swedish minister in Tokyo as far back as the previous September, and Roosevelt had been apprised of these overtures before leaving for Yalta. As they had indicated that Japan might be prepared to agree to unconditional surrender, provided the Emperor was not deposed, MacArthur had recommended negotiations; but Roosevelt had brushed the suggestion aside [9]. Approaches had also been made to the Vatican in April 1945 [10], and about the same time Shigemitsu had sounded out the Swedish minister in Tokyo about the possibilities of a negotiated peace [11]. The Supreme War Council's decision of 10th

July, however, was the first full-fledged official attempt to seek peace; but the only reply received to their proposal was non-committal and evasive.

Meanwhile Stalin had left for Potsdam, where he told Churchill privately about the message he had received from the Emperor through the Japanese ambassador. From his own account, Churchill makes it clear that he himself was opposed to any enforced 'unconditional surrender', but that he was over-ridden by Truman, who had become the American member of the Big Three since Roosevelt's untimely death three months previously [12]. The very day the Potsdam Conference opened, however, the whole situation was changed by the news, kept strictly secret, that experiments carried out in the Mexican desert had proved successful and that the first atom bomb had been exploded. By this time the Americans had already lost their initial enthusiasm for bringing Russia into the war against Japan, and the realization that the atom bomb could now be used to bring Japan to her knees without any assistance from the Soviet Union merely served to weaken their desire for Russian participation. But it was equally clear that Russia was not to be deterred and, following the publication of the Potsdam Declaration on 26th July demanding unconditional surrender, Stalin, through Molotov, asked the Americans to provide an excuse for Russia's entry into the war by formally requesting the Soviet Union to do so. Though hesitant to make a formal request to the Soviet to violate their pact with Japan, a formula was eventually found whereby a somewhat specious moral and legal gloss was provided for an attack more treacherous even than Pearl Harbour.

All this was still unknown to the Japanese who, placing reliance on Soviet assurances to them, instructed Sato, their ambassador in Moscow, to negotiate with the Russians on the basis of the Potsdam Declaration. Sato took steps accordingly; but no notice of his attempt to stress the urgency of the matter was taken by the Soviet government until the evening of 8th August, when Molotov informed him, too late for any warning to reach Tokyo in time, that the Soviet intended to launch war on Japan the following morning. The first atom bomb had been dropped on Hiroshima two days before Molotov's declaration of war, and the second bomb, on Nagasaki, was dropped on the 9th, the day the Russians launched their offensive.

Sato's warning telegram was apparently held up by the Russians,

as it never reached Tokyo; but on 10th August the Japanese indicated what they thought of the Russian action by publishing a Note, revealing publicly for the first time that 'several weeks ago the Japanese government asked the Soviet government . . . to render good offices in restoring peace' [13]. Four days later Japan capitulated and her Emperor, announcing the decision, added, 'We see only one way left for Japan to save herself. That is the reason why we have made this determination, enduring the unendurable and suffering the insufferable' [14].

By the decisions reached at Cairo, Yalta and Potsdam, by Russia's last-minute entry into the war, and by the use of the atom bomb, Japan had been laid prostrate, the balance of power in East Asia had been upset, leaving Soviet Russia and the Communists a far freer hand in the Far East than ever before; political vacuums had been created in Korea and Manchuria; the Chinese National government's authority had been seriously undermined; the Chinese territory of Outer Mongolia had, in effect, been handed over to Soviet control; the surplus population question, which had played a part in leading Japan to war, had been exacerbated; and the use of the atom bomb had not only paved the way for serious world tension in the years ahead but had provided Asian nationalists and Communists with the propaganda theme that it had been used against Japan because she was an Asian nation. That political time-bombs had been left by the Japanese in Indonesia and Indo-China; that Western prestige had been seriously impaired by the defeats and deliberate humiliations inflicted by the Japanese in their hour of victory; and that racial hatreds had been stirred up between East and West by Japan's activities during the war years cannot be laid to the charge of Cairo, Yalta or Potsdam; but, added to the results of the decisions taken at those conferences, they provide a formidable list of consequences of the Pacific War playing into the hands of those seeking to exploit the East in the cause of World Revolution.

CHAPTER XXVI

Nationalism and Communism in the British Sphere of Greater East Asia

HAVING seen in the last chapter how Japan, to serve her own ends in the Pacific War, sought to exploit the desire for independence in the countries of South and East Asia, it is now necessary to consider the nationalist and Communist trends in those lands during that same period.

In India there was the curious spectacle of a widespread but unorganized revolt against British rule, ostensibly unarmed and non-violent but actually accompanied by armed action and violence of a particularly ferocious nature. There, it might have been thought, were the ideal ingredients for a revolutionary situation such as Communists delight to encourage and utilize; but the Communists did nothing of the sort. On the contrary, they sided for once with the British rulers and denounced the Congress leaders and others for impeding the war effort. Equally strange was the fact that, far from responding to the Japanese appeals for co-operation in driving the British out of India, the great majority of Indian leaders, including even some of those most rabidly anti-British in their pronouncements, were as opposed to the Japanese as they were to the British Raj and refused to have anything to do with them. As a further paradox, Indian volunteers, in spite of this Congress-inspired revolt, poured in in their hundreds of thousands to offer their services to their King-Emperor, and the Indian Army with few exceptions—mostly Sikh prisoners-of-war—remained loyal to the Crown and fought with their accustomed gallantry and fervour.

It will be recalled that the arrival of Japanese at the gateway to India, after the fall of Malaya and Burma, led to the dispatch of Sir Stafford Cripps with proposals aimed at procuring the moral support of the Congress Party and other major political groups. Arriving in April 1942, Sir Stafford quickly got to work and put forward his proposals. Briefly stated, these consisted of the grant of complete

freedom and self-government in a Union as soon as the war was over, and the right of such Indian provinces as had Moslem majorities to form a separate Union of equal status if they wished to do so. Both Unions were to be free to accept Dominion Status within the Commonwealth or not as they chose. The major political parties were to be represented in a new central government and, in return for these promises, were to give their immediate support to the war effort.

The prospect that the predominantly Moslem provinces would almost certainly secede aroused Congress apprehensions, while the failure to offer an outright grant of partition disappointed the Moslem League; but this realistic approach to a solution of the existing situation was generally recognized as reasonable. Congress, however, wanted all or nothing and demanded the immediate establishment, at the centre, of 'a National Government [which] must be a Cabinet Government with full power' [1]. With the Japanese already on the threshold of India, the British government decided that this was impracticable.

With the rejection of the offer, Gandhi, supported by Congress, launched his 'Quit India' movement in August and called for an 'unarmed revolt against British rule' by way of enforcing his demands. As with the Mahatma's previous campaigns of non-violence, however, outbreaks of violence and sabotage spread rapidly, and in the first few weeks over 700 persons were killed, 1,200 injured, 258 railway stations were destroyed or seriously damaged, and 210 government buildings were wrecked [2].

Meanwhile the Congress had been declared an unlawful association, and Gandhi and its leaders interned until the end of the war; but the damage had been done. Fortunately, however, the uprising had been unorganized and unco-ordinated and was of a sporadic and localized nature. Possibly because its instigators had called for an 'unarmed revolt', they had overlooked the implications of Lenin's *dicta* that armed insurrections must be planned and offensive, not spontaneous and defensive, and that a revolutionary theory and a centralized disciplined party were essentials for a successful revolution. Moreover, the army had remained loyal and, with the police, had helped to ensure the suppression of the revolt.

While this insurrection was taking place in India itself, another was being staged nearby but outside. This was the movement led first by Rash Behari Bose and later by his more outstanding namesake.

As this has been described in the previous chapter, it need only be noted that, although it met with no great response in the Indian homeland, it had the sympathy of some prominent Congress leaders. It was one of these, Jaya Prakash Narayan, leader of the socialist bloc in Congress and a former member of the American Communist Party, who, after escaping from prison, formed a branch of Subhas Chandra Bose's Indian national army, the only branch of that body to be established on Indian soil. For this he incurred the animosity of the Indian Communist Party, which had been strongly critical of Bose from the outset.

The Indian Communists, like their comrades in other allied countries, had refused to support the war effort against Germany and Italy at the opening of the war in 1939 and had fomented strikes for the express purpose of impairing war production and hindering the war. Then came Hitler's invasion of Soviet Russia and a change began. The anti-war attitude persisted among some of the Communist internees, however, for a further six months, until a letter came from Pollitt, secretary-general of the British Communist Party, ordering a complete reversal of policy [3]. From being an 'imperialist war', which had to be opposed and obstructed at every point, the war became a 'people's war', meriting all-out support. The ban on the Party, which had existed since 1934, was therefore lifted in July 1942 and the Communist leaders under detention were gradually released. For the first time for nearly a decade the Party became legal and, in its new and unaccustomed role, gave full support to the government of India, attacked Congress for rejecting the Cripps proposals, and sternly denounced the 'Quit India' movement.

With the Congress leaders in prison, the Communists were able to make considerable headway in gaining control of labour, youth, student, peasant and women's organizations; but the refusal of the Party to support the 'Quit India' campaign was to cost it dear in the post-war years, when it was held up to obloquy by Indian nationalists for having acted as British 'stooges' against the interests of those striving to 'liberate' the country from foreign domination. In one other important respect, too, the Communists were to suffer a serious handicap in the post-war years for having supported the government: being in open support of the legal Administration, they had had no need to build up, equip, and train armed forces of their own. When, therefore, the war ended, theirs was one of the few Communist parties in South and East Asia without a para-military force of its

own. Furthermore, not only were they without arms or military training; they lacked also the first-hand experience of guerrilla warfare common to most other Communists of the war period.

In spite of the damage done to their own cause in India by the drastic changes in the Party's war-time policy, the Indian Communist Party continued to assist the Communist movements in neighbouring countries, notably in Ceylon and Burma. It was, in fact, as a result of his visit to India in March 1943 that Keuneman, a graduate of Cambridge and now secretary-general of the Communist Party of Ceylon, formally established that Party four months later. This he did after returning to his own country with notes on the training of students in revolutionary activities and with a message from Joshi, secretary-general of the Indian Communist Party, pledging his assistance. Two years later, in April 1945, the newly-formed Party held its first Congress and it was noticeable that, among the 109 delegates attending it, there were several who had played leading parts in the Colombo strikes and other similar activities in the 1920's.

The year 1945 in Ceylon was marked by a second split in the Lanka Sama Samaj Party, the Communist body which had joined Trotsky's Fourth International in 1939 after a split resulting from ideological differences amongst its members. As a result of this second split in 1945, the seceders formed a new Leninist body calling itself the Bolshevik Sama Samaj Party. And so it came about that Ceylon, on entering the post-war era, had the unusual experience of having no less than three Communist parties, all bickering among themselves and breaking up the unity of what might otherwise have been a dangerously strong Communist movement.

As already noted in an earlier chapter, the Burmese Communist Party had been formed under the inspiration of the CPI (Communist Party of India) in August 1939. It was perhaps not surprising that, after going underground and taking to guerrilla warfare against the Japanese at the start of the Japanese invasion of their country, some of the Burmese Communists got into touch with the CPI leaders in India. Moreover, like the Indian Communists, who by this time were beginning to give their support to the government of India, some of these Burmese Communists made contact with the British military authorities and offered their services to them. Amongst those who did so was Thein Pe who had helped to found the Party after his return

from India in 1939. His offer was accepted and from 1942 until the close of the war he served in India as the representative of the Burmese Resistance movement.

While most of the Communists had resisted the Japanese invaders almost from the outset, the first reaction of the nationalists as a whole was to welcome the Japanese as liberators and to collaborate with them in driving out the British. Those nationalists who had entered into league with the Japanese and made their way to Japan before the invasion was launched returned with the invaders to organize and lead the so-called Burmese Independence Army or to assist the Japanese in the task of administering the country.

By mid-May 1942 the last British and Indian troops and civilians had crossed the frontier into India and the Japanese had assumed control. Thakin Tun Oke, who was one of those who had escaped to Japan before the war and had been trained in Japanese administrative methods, was placed in charge of the civil administration, and a body calling itself the Burmese National Proletarian League was formed by the amalgamation of all parties willing to collaborate with the Japanese. But Tun Oke did not last long. On 1st August he was replaced by the former premier, Ba Maw, as head of the new government, which was made subordinate to the Japanese Command. The independence of which the nationalists had dreamed was postponed for the time being. Combined with the rough treatment meted out to many of them by the Japanese, this aroused feelings of resentment and frustration, which the Communists were quick to exploit. Under Communist instigation, the Independence Army mutinied and, after the suppression of its malcontents, was reorganized by the Japanese under the title of Burma Defence Army, with Aung San once more in command.

At last, in June 1943, came the Japanese promise of independence. Two months later, on 1st August, independence was granted; but it proved to be more nominal than real, and grumblings of discontent continued to grow. These grumblings and rumblings took more concrete form when, in August the following year, the AFPFL (Anti-Fascist Peoples' Freedom League), a body which was to wield considerable influence in the years ahead, was brought into clandestine existence. With the organization of resistance to the Japanese as its main purpose, it centred around the Burmese Communist Party and had the Communist leader, Than Tun, as its secretary-general. For its first six months or so it had to work underground in conditions of

secrecy, and during that period gradually built up its strength by attracting an ever-increasing number of sympathizers to its ranks. Foremost among these was Aung San, who, while maintaining close contact with Than Tun, had hitherto been one of Japan's principal collaborators and had commanded the Burmese forces fighting on the Japanese side. To him, therefore, was allotted the task of preparing for the projected armed insurrection against the Japanese.

Although the Communists provided the hard core of the AFPFL, other bodies composing it included the National Revolutionary Party, which later gave birth to the Socialist Party, and the Myochit Party which, under U Saw, had been the leading party in Burma before the war.

By early March 1945, preparations were sufficiently advanced for contact to be made with the British who, by this time, were beginning to drive the Japanese out of North Burma. Referring to these clandestine activities, Thakin Nu, who was ostensibly collaborating wholeheartedly with the Japanese, but was active in the resistance movement, tells how he received a surprise visit one evening that month from five of the resistance leaders. They included Than Tun, who produced 'a flimsy sheet of paper with a document in English printed on it', telling him to meet a Major Carew at a specified point on 18th March [4]. The meeting was held, the AFPFL and its armed forces under Aung San came out into the open against their former Japanese friends, and Aung San himself went off to Kandy to sign an agreement with Lord Mountbatten.

So it came about that those Burmese nationalists who had been most bitterly opposed to the British and had co-operated most closely with the Japanese against them, ended the war fighting on the British side. The Communists for their part, though normally the most implacable enemies of British rule, had ranged themselves against the Japanese invaders from the start and had throughout played the principal part in the resistance movement. The close union which existed between Communists and nationalists during the later stages of the war, however, was not destined to survive the peace. Aung San and Than Tun, though brothers-in-law, were to break apart, and splits were later to occur even among the Communists themselves, notably between Than Tun and Thakin Soe.

With the re-entry of the British into Rangoon on 3rd May marking the virtual close of the Burma campaign, Communists and nationalists alike spent the few remaining months of the war planning and

organizing for the future. Following a Party Congress held in July, the Burmese Communist Party was reorganized and set to work to build up peasant unions and trade unions under its own control. The formation of the All-Burma Peasant Union, which was to play a prominent part in the years ahead, was one result of this activity. In this, and more particularly in the work of organizing a youth movement, the Burmese Communists appear to have received help and encouragement from British Communists serving in RAF units in Burma.

The Communists were not alone in taking advantage of the lull which followed the expulsion of the Japanese from Burma. The Socialist Party, to which the National Revolutionary Party had given birth, also settled down to the task of building up its own trade and peasant unions, while Burmese nationalists in general busied themselves in readiness for the independence which they were determined to extract from the British now that Japan's final collapse was in sight. The conflicts and uncertainties of the post-war situation were already beginning to emerge.

In Malaya as in Burma the Communists played the leading role in the resistance movement established shortly after the Japanese launched their invasion. For this there was a double reason. It was not merely, as in Burma, that the Communists were following the established policy laid down for Communists in all countries since Hitler's invasion of the Soviet Union—of aiding Russia's allies. There was the further reason that the great majority of Communists in Malaya were Chinese, and were, therefore, as virulently anti-Japanese as they were pro-Soviet. In view, however, of their pernicious activities in the past, it was only after some hesitation that the Communist offer of co-operation against the Japanese invaders was accepted by the British and that arrangements were made to provide them with arms and with training in guerrilla warfare. In Malaya, as in India, the ban on the Communist Party was lifted, and the Malayan Communist Party was legalized for the first time since its formation in 1930. Its members were to prove doughty jungle fighters and in that respect played a valuable role. As readers of Spencer Chapman's *The Jungle Is Neutral* will recall, however, it soon became clear to those most closely in touch with them that, while co-operating with the British for the time being, their ultimate aim was to rid the country

of both Japanese and British and to set up a Communist Republic in Malaya.

While the Communists and the Chinese in general were anti-Japanese from the outset, there were many Malaysians who, at the start, welcomed the Japanese invaders. Except in the case of a few individuals, who saw the Japanese as liberators ready to help them to obtain independence for their country, this was not so much due to anti-British sentiment as to the belief that the Japanese would assist them to get rid of the Chinese who had obtained such a firm grip on the whole economic life of Malaya. The fact was that in Malaya as in other countries of South-East Asia, the large industrious Chinese communities settled in them were as unpopular with the indigenous inhabitants as the Jews are apt to be in Western countries, and for similar reasons. Like the Jews, the Chinese are hard-working, thrifty and possessed of a natural business acumen and ability. At the same time they tend to retain their own ways and outlook on life and fail to become assimilated with the people of the countries in which they have settled. By obtaining control of the financial and economic life of the country they arouse the envy and dislike of the native population and by remaining foreigners they incur the odium which is the lot of the foreigner in any country with xenophobic tendencies. Although this problem of the Chinese communities is common to all the countries of South-East Asia in varying degrees, it is, and for long has been, particularly acute in Malaya where, if Singapore is included, the Chinese now comprise nearly half the total population. Since the close of the war, and especially since the Communists came into power in China in 1949, it has become further aggravated and needs to be borne in mind in any assessment of future developments in the Far East and South-East Asia.

Returning, however, to the welcome extended by many Malaysians to the Japanese invaders, it may be noted that their hopes of help from the Japanese against the Chinese were justified only in part. At least 5,000 Chinese are said to have been executed by the Japanese shortly after the fall of Singapore [5], and in August 1942 the Japanese arrested and killed all the leading Communists on the island, most of them Chinese [6]. This was followed on 1st September by the slaughter of a number of Communist leaders, again mostly Chinese, who were caught in the act of holding a secret meeting on the mainland. These Japanese actions, however, were for purely Japanese reasons. They were not in any way carried out for the

benefit of Malaysians, who soon had reason to realize how little the Japanese cared about them and their problems except in so far as they could be used to assist the war effort.

How it was that the Japanese were able to discover the whereabouts of the Communist leaders in Singapore and on the mainland of Malaya only became known in 1948, when copies of a Communist document denouncing Loi Tek, the war-time leader of the Malayan Communist Party, fell into the hands of the police [7]. This showed that it was apparently Loi Tek himself who, having been caught by the Japanese military police, had turned informer against the Party in return for his release. Being secretary-general, he was able to provide the Japanese with all the details required, including times and places of secret meetings of Communist leaders arranged by himself. Being secretary-general he was, moreover, above suspicion amongst his own comrades, who trusted him implicitly as their leader. So well did he do his work for the Japanese that by March 1943 all Communist activities on Singapore island had been brought to an end. From then until the close of the war, Singapore was entirely free from Communist trouble. It was not until some eighteen months or so after the war, in March 1947, when Loi Tek suddenly disappeared and was found to have decamped with the Party's funds, that they had the first inkling of the dual role he had been playing.

While Loi Tek's information enabled the Japanese to put a stop to all Communist activities on Singapore island, those Communists who had contrived to evade arrest escaped to the mainland and helped to build up new secret organizations in the various States and Settlements on the peninsula. But even there the Party suffered a number of blows from betrayal, the most serious of these being on 1st September 1942, when Japanese troops, placed in hiding beforehand, killed or captured nearly one hundred Communists, including a number of the most experienced leaders, who had been summoned to a secret meeting in an isolated cave.

Bitterly as the Communists hated the Japanese, it has since become clear that their leaders were more concerned with plans for establishing a Communist Republic of Malaya after the war than with fighting Japan. Chen Ping, the present head of the Party, who during the war was on particularly close terms with the British officers operating with the Communists in the jungle, was perfectly frank in telling them of the Party's ultimate aim and in warning them that there was no intention of returning either revolvers or pistols after the war [8].

What he apparently failed to tell them was that the MPAJA (Malayan People's Anti-Japanese Army) which, under an agreement reached in January 1944, was being supplied with new weapons, ammunition and explosives by the Allied Command, was to be maintained after the war as the Party's permanent armed force.

The decisions to maintain an armed force of its own and to aim at the establishment of a Communist Republic of Malaya were incorporated in a nine-point long-term programme drawn up at a meeting of the Central Executive Committee in the jungle in 1943. This programme also included the significant decision to 'combine with Russia and China and support the struggles for independence of the oppressed nations in the Far East' and to 'give help to the Japanese people to fight against the Fascists' [9]. Clearly the Party was thinking in terms of international Communism and not merely on local lines.

Even without knowledge of this programme the small handful of British officers living in the jungle with the Communist guerrillas saw and heard enough to realize something of what was going on. Discussion of politics with these jungle fighters was forbidden, but it was noted that books on Russia and on the Chinese Communist Eighth Route Army were being studied assiduously. It was noted, too, that the guerrillas were 'brought up' on such Eighth Army traditions as quick meals without speaking, the singing of propaganda songs and of the Red Flag and *Internationale*, and the practice of austerity [10]. What was not known for certain was what was said at the conferences and other gatherings held from time to time. These were conducted in Mandarin, and the British officers were discouraged by the guerrilla leaders from learning that standard Chinese language.

When Japan capitulated and the war came to an end, the Communists in Malaya were left with an armed force of hardened jungle fighters, experienced in the art and craft of guerrilla warfare, and with the Party itself well organized and well grounded in the Marxist-Leninist doctrine. Communism therefore emerged for the first time as a real force in Malaya. With racial riots, industrial and social unrest, an upsurge of Malayan nationalism, the shattering of the White Man's prestige, and the inevitable confusion left by the war years, the ground was well prepared for the Communists who were not slow to turn the situation to their own advantage.

Nationalism and Communism in other South-East Asian Countries

ALTHOUGH it was not until shortly after the close of the war that a Malayan Nationalist Party was formed, certain Malayan nationalists had, for some time past, been dreaming of solidarity with the Indonesians and of an eventual Malayan-Indonesian federation embracing not only Malaya and Indonesia but even parts of the Philippines. At this point, therefore, it is necessary to consider the developments that had been taking place in the Netherlands East Indies during the period of its occupation by the Japanese.

At an early stage in the Pacific War the Japanese had started the process of 'softening up' this Dutch territory by dropping paratroops at key points, raiding airfields, and seizing some of the smaller islands. With the surrender of Java on 8th March 1942 the fighting had been brought virtually to an end and the Japanese were welcomed by the native inhabitants as liberators. The welcome, however, was by no means universal and even those who had been best pleased at the outset were soon disillusioned by the treatment meted out to them and by the way in which the Japanese resorted to economic exploitation in the cause of their own war effort without providing compensatory advantages.

As in the case of the other countries invaded by the Japanese, the main resistance came from the Communists. One anti-Japanese underground organization, composed largely of Communists, was actually established shortly before the Japanese landed. Its leader was Amir Sjarifuddin who, though not an openly confessed member of the Party at the time, was to reveal eight years later that he had been a Communist since 1935. Even after the Japanese had arrested him in January 1943 for his activities, he continued to keep in touch with the underground movement from the concentration camp to which he had been sent and from there issued pamphlets telling the Communists to seize power as soon as the Japanese had been

defeated. The strongest underground organization, however, was headed by Sjahrir who, together with other nationalist leaders imprisoned by the Dutch, was released by the Japanese but disappeared immediately into hiding. The organization directed by him consisted largely of peasants, while another such body was composed of university students.

Most of the Communists interned before the outbreak of the Pacific War had been sent to New Guinea and in order to prevent their falling into Japanese hands the Dutch, before leaving, had transferred them to Australia. There they remained for the rest of the war and, while there, developed a close liaison with the Australian Communist Party. The friendly relations thus established between the two parties were to play an important part in the post-war years after the return of the Indonesian Communists to their own country. A number of leading Australian Communists have, in fact, visited Indonesia since early 1947 with fraternal advice and guidance for the Indonesian Communist Party and its subsidiary organizations.

Towards the close of 1942, the Japanese, realizing the growing antipathy caused by the behaviour of some of their troops, decided to seek the support of such nationalist leaders as seemed likely to command popular support. In order to attract them, the Japanese promised the grant of self-government in the near future. As a preliminary, they agreed to the establishment of a central national organization known as the *Poetara*. This came into being on 9th March 1943 and amongst the more outstanding nationalist leaders brought in to co-operate with the Japanese in this undertaking were Sukarno and Hatta, who were to emerge in post-war years as president and vice-president of the Indonesian Republic respectively. For their part in collaborating with the Japanese in this and other ways, they have been strongly criticized; but from information that has come to light since the war ended, it is clear that their collaboration was more apparent than real. Sukarno, it seems, after being released from detention by the Japanese on their arrival, had immediately set about contacting Hatta and Sjahrir, who were already in touch with Sjarifuddin's underground organization. In the discussions that followed, it was decided that the best hope for the nationalist movement was to prosecute it at two levels. Sukarno and Hatta therefore agreed to work openly with the Japanese, while Sjahrir was to maintain contact with these two leaders and, at the same time, build up an underground resistance movement [1]. This was, in fact, the

pattern followed with success, a pattern similar to that employed in Burma and Siam, where Thakin Nu and Pridi respectively, as well as others, appeared to collaborate with the Japanese while clandestinely assisting the underground activities.

While the Japanese looked to the *Poetara* to assist in rallying Indonesian support for their war effort, the Indonesians used it to spread and intensify nationalist propaganda and to force the Japanese to grant concessions towards self-government. So nationalistic did it become, in fact, that after an existence of less than a year it was dissolved by the Japanese, who replaced it with a new organization, which they hoped could be controlled more effectively. Before its dissolution, however, the *Poetara* sponsored the establishment of a Japanese-trained military organization officered by Indonesians. This body, known as the *Peta*, was a kind of Home Guard, intended for use in helping to defend Indonesia against Allied invasion. In the years ahead it was to become the backbone of the Indonesian Republic's army. Nationalist influence spread gradually within its ranks, as it had in its parent body the *Poetara*, and became particularly marked after members of the underground had penetrated the *Peta* for the purpose of influencing its personnel to turn against the Japanese when the Allies launched their anticipated invasion. If such an uprising against the Japanese could be induced simultaneously with the Allied landings, Indonesia, it was reasoned, would be in a good position to bargain with the Allies for independence.

Although stimulated by the underground movement in this and other ways, the growth of nationalism in Indonesia was helped also by Japanese educational policy. With a view to enabling the masses to read their propaganda pamphlets, the Japanese sought to reduce illiteracy in Indonesia by means of free tuition. Consciously or unconsciously, they were following the example of the Chinese and other Communists who, in their own countries, have striven to reduce illiteracy for the primary purpose of providing the people with the ability to read Communist propaganda. In order to assist the battle against illiteracy, however, the Japanese, through the medium of the press and the wireless, also encouraged the development of a single Indonesian language in place of the numerous provincial dialects. This standard form of the language spread rapidly and thereby helped to stimulate a consciousness of national unity, which previously had been somewhat lacking. From consciousness of national unity to active nationalism is but a small step, and while the

anti-Western and Pan-Asian propaganda inserted by the Japanese in Indonesian school text-books, in the press, and in radio broadcasts was to have a lasting effect, the attempt to explain Japanese aims and to inculcate pro-Japanese sentiment was not so successful. Indonesian nationalism, which the Japanese did so much to encourage, ended by becoming even more anti-Japanese than anti-Dutch, and the resistance movement, largely under Communist instigation, assumed a mass character.

Meanwhile, further steps towards self-government had been taken and by January 1944 the Japanese had established a Preparatory Committee for Indonesian Independence for the purpose of drawing up a draft constitution. Eight months later, on 7th September, a definite promise of independence was made in Tokyo, but it was not until 7th August the following year that preparations for according independence were announced. Four days later the nationalist leaders were informed that independence was to be granted on 24th August; but by then it was clear that Japan's days were numbered. Those in the resistance movement were opposed to accepting independence as a gift from the Japanese and were determined to wrest it unconditionally by force. The Allies, they considered, would be more likely to recognize Indonesian independence achieved in this way than if it had been granted by the Japanese.

Sukarno and Hatta, however, were by no means convinced that Japan would surrender and they feared that a premature rising by the underground might merely result in useless bloodshed. They refused, therefore, to sanction such action. They were accordingly kidnapped on the morning of 16th August by some of the more excitable elements in the movement, who tried to persuade them to declare independence there and then. It was only on learning that Japan had already capitulated and that the Japanese, being now 'merely agents of the Allies', were in no position to recognize a declaration of independence, that the two leaders realized that a bloodless revolution was no longer possible. On the morning of the 17th, therefore, in defiance of Japanese warnings, Sukarno proclaimed the independence of Indonesia and the revolution was launched.

The Japanese took prompt action; but the movement spread and, urged on by the Communists and the more extreme nationalist elements, quickly developed into a veritable reign of terror. This, however, takes us into the post-war period, with which this chapter is not concerned. It may nevertheless be noted that amongst those

encouraging this outburst of violence was the veteran Communist leader, Tan Malaka, who, after eighteen years' absence, had returned secretly to Indonesia early the previous year. Also amongst those playing a leading part in the revolution were large numbers of students and former members of Japanese-sponsored youth organizations. Many of these had been purposely trained by the Japanese on left wing lines, partly on the grounds that, as Sjahrir once put it, 'Nationalism is worthless without socialism' [2], and partly in order to inculcate hatred of Western imperialism and capitalism. Although it was apparently only in Indonesia that the Japanese deliberately encouraged a modified form of Communism,¹ left wing principles are, in fact, a marked feature of all the régimes set up in the countries of South-East Asia since the close of the war; and in each of these countries the student and other youth movements, imbued with similar principles, have played a prominent part.

The one country in South-East Asia in which Communism and Nationalism played little part during the Pacific War period was Siam. The reason for this should be clear from what has been said in a previous chapter about Siam having no need for an independence movement. That after little more than a token show of resistance she came in nominally on Japan's side and signed an Offensive-Defensive Alliance with the Japanese invaders on 21st December 1941 was due, not to any strong bias against the West, but solely because her only hope of avoiding complete subjection appeared to be to humour the seemingly all-powerful Japanese. For a small, defensively weak country like Siam, prudence of this kind is perhaps natural; but it is a factor to be borne in mind in any attempt to assess the part likely to be played by the Siamese in the event of a future armed collision in East Asia between the Communists and the free countries of the world. The present régime in Thailand, it is true, has shown itself to have little love for Communism; but, if faced with a Communist invasion, it might feel impelled by prudence to come to terms with the Communists, just as it did with the Japanese, unless assured of immediate and adequate assistance from outside.

Fortunately for the Siamese, it suited the Japanese to encourage them to remain at least superficially friendly during the years of the Pacific War. Even before that period the Japanese, acting as media-

¹ As an interesting example of the way in which this modified form of Communism was encouraged in some Japanese quarters, the reader may be referred to pp. 115-19 of Kahin's *Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia*.

tors in the clash with Indo-China, had given a verdict favourable to Thailand. In July 1943 the Japanese again ingratiated themselves with the Siamese by ceding two of the Shan states and four Malayan states to them. While Pibul, who had been prime minister since December 1938, had all along pursued a pro-Japanese policy, his old rival Pridi was strongly opposed to any collaboration with Japan, and, although serving during the occupation as Regent, he used this high office as cover for secretly directing the underground resistance, the Free Thai movement as it was called.

Just what part the Communists played during these war years has never been clear, and even to this day they have remained a somewhat elusive and enigmatic body. All that can be said for certain is that, as the great majority of them were Chinese, they suffered the double disadvantage of incurring the inherent anti-Chinese sentiment of the Siamese people in general and the anti-Chinese and anti-Communist persecution of the Japanese military police.

While neither Communism nor nationalism, except in its anti-Chinese form, underwent any marked development in Siam during the Pacific War period, both made great headway in neighbouring Indo-China. Outwardly it was nationalism which made the most progress, as Ho Chi-Minh was at pains to make it appear that the Viet Minh, which he had formed in May 1941, was a purely nationalist body. The political programme adopted by it in 1943 was calculated to appeal to all good patriots and democrats, being based on the twin goals of independence and democracy. The Viet Minh was, however, still operating from Chinese territory; so, too, was the Vietnam Revolutionary League, which had been formed in October 1942 at Liuchow by various exiled nationalist groups under KMT sponsorship. Ho Chi-Minh himself had been co-operating with the Chinese against the Japanese, but in the autumn of 1942 he was arrested by the KMT as a Communist. He might have remained under detention indefinitely had he not contrived, in February 1943, to persuade the governor of Kwangsi to release him in return for an offer to organize and direct an intelligence system in Tonking for the Chinese. It was a private arrangement and it was in order to keep Chungking ignorant of it that Nguyen Ai-Quoc, as he was still called at the time of his arrest, hid his identity by adopting the Chinese name of Ho Chi-Minh, by which he has been known ever since.

It was nearly two years later, on 22nd December 1944, that there occurred a development which was to have a tremendous effect in the

years ahead. This was the formation of a small band of Indo-Chinese guerrillas under a young Communist professor of history named Vo Nguyen Giap.¹ From this insignificant handful of armed men was to spring the Vietnam People's Army [3], with Giap as its commander-in-chief. With its help the Communists were to gain military successes sufficiently outstanding to induce the French at Geneva, less than ten years later, to agree to withdraw from Northern Vietnam. 22nd December is now celebrated yearly as the anniversary of the founding of this Communist army.

While these various developments were taking place, the Japanese, noting the rapid advance of the Allied land, air and sea forces in the Pacific area, were becoming increasingly anxious about the war situation. Fearing that Indo-China itself might become an operational area before long and that the local French, hitherto their reluctant collaborators, might turn against them, they delivered an ultimatum to the Governor-General, demanding absolute obedience to Japanese orders. The ultimatum having been rejected, the Japanese carried out a military coup on 9th March 1945 and seized control of the whole country by force. At the same time, in order to curry favour with the indigenous population, they declared that they had no territorial designs on Indo-China and granted independence to Annam, Tonking and Cambodia. Cochin-China, which had been a colony, not a protectorate of France, was placed under a Japanese civilian governor, and a Japanese replaced the former French resident superior in Laos.

Following the Japanese coup, the Viet Minh, which refused to recognize the Japanese gift of independence, held a revolutionary military conference, at which it was decided to unify its military organizations, create a North Vietnam army headquarters, and prepare for a general uprising. The end was drawing near and on Japan's capitulation in August the Viet Minh came out into the open. As in Indonesia, the declaration of independence in Indo-China immediately following Japan's surrender was to have the effect of a political time-bomb on the post-war situation in South-East Asia.

One more South-East Asian country remains to be mentioned: the Philippines, where collaboration with the Japanese was confined almost entirely to a section of the Nationalist Party.

¹ According to Bernard Fall's account, Giap had been operating in the mountainous regions of North Vietnam with partisan groups since 1942: see his monograph, *The Viet Minh Regime*, p. 2.

As in other countries of South-East Asia, the Communists in the Philippines were anti-Japanese from the start and by the end of December 1941 their representatives had met secretly with representatives of socialist, labour, peasant, youth and other bodies to devise a common plan of action. Amongst those who had come specially to Manila to attend these talks was Luis Taruc, who was to play a leading part in the Communist Party after the war. His instructions were to mobilize labour against the invaders.

It was, however, the peasants who suffered most from Japanese depredations and they were not slow in retaliating. Arming themselves with any weapons they could obtain and with anything that would serve as a weapon, they formed themselves into roving bands, raiding Japanese garrisons and murdering individual soldiers. From these guerrilla bands operating in the Central Plains of Luzon was formed, on 29th March 1942, the Anti-Japanese People's Army, better known to-day as the Hukbalahaps or Huks. A new peasant military government was set up, with Luis Taruc as chairman, and as time went on the Huks were given both military and political training, the latter being of strongly left wing complexion. In effect, the Huks gradually became the armed force of the Communist Party, although it is not strictly correct to say, as some have said, that they were a purely Communist body. Their attachment to the Communists was mainly due at the start to their mutual hatred of the Japanese and to their desire to abolish the archaic feudal form of land tenure, which left the peasants almost wholly at the mercy of unscrupulous landlords. This desire was inevitably exploited to the full by the Communists who, as in the jungles of Malaya, spent much of their time evolving plans for post-war organization and activities.

By June 1943 Japan deemed it expedient to make a definite promise of independence, and four months later, on 14th October, the independence of the Philippines was proclaimed. It made little impression, however, on the Huks, who by this time were fighting not only the Japanese but also the guerrilla force sponsored by the USA in Central Luzon. This force included a number of nationalists and landlords, who were more fearful of agrarian revolution and its consequences to themselves than they were of the Japanese. The fighting between them and the Huks was, therefore, bitter at times and brutalities were perpetrated by both sides. The parallel with the KMT and the Chinese Communists during the days of the ostensible alliance between them at once springs to mind, for there, too, the

peasant-landlord question played an all-important part. In the Philippines the outcome of this hostility between the two groups of guerrillas was that, when finally the Americans arrived and re-occupied the islands, they were welcomed at first as liberators by both. Before long, however, the Huks, who had never been officially recognized as an allied force by the Americans, found themselves and their National Peasant Union, which had been formed in June 1945, regarded as Communist bandits and treated as such. Taruc himself, together with other Huk leaders, was arrested; and so began the post-war phase, in which Huks and Communists became virtually indistinguishable and provided a further serious source of trouble in that inevitably troubled period of reconstruction.

CHAPTER XXVIII

The Chinese Ferment and Japanese Communist Aid

EXCEPT that it led to an open declaration of support for China by Britain and the United States and thereby helped to raise Chinese morale, the outbreak of the Pacific War in December 1941 had little immediate effect on the Chinese situation. Ostensibly the Nationalists and the Communists continued to co-operate in close alliance against the common enemy, and the government in Chungking detailed some of its forces to assist in the Burma campaign under command of the American General Stilwell. But apart from this, the general situation in China underwent no great change.

The Communists took every opportunity to press ahead with their plans for improving their own ideological unity and for strengthening their own military position in preparation for the day when they hoped to seize power for themselves. It was for the first of these two purposes, therefore, that on 1st February 1942 Mao Tse-Tung inaugurated what, in Communist jargon, became known as the 'ideological remoulding movement'. In a speech that day, Mao, echoing Stalin's dictum that Communism is not merely a dogma but a guide to action, vehemently denounced dogmatism and stressed the fact that Marxist-Leninist ideology was not a dogma to be followed blindly but a guide to action. Theory and practice, he declared, had to be combined and he emphasized the need for Communist cadres to have a 'full education', a term which he defined as 'book study applied to practical experience'.

Nearly a decade later, Chen Po-Ta was to throw some light on the reason for the choice of this particular moment to call for a reconsideration of the Communist tenets and their correct application when he revealed that it was not until 1941 that the works of Lenin and Stalin became available in Chinese. It was after this that Mao decided to launch this 'ideological remoulding movement', with its

emphasis on the need to combine theory and practice and to oppose dogmatism, empiricism and sectarianism [1]. With a view to strengthening the Party both ideologically and organizationally the practice of criticism and self-criticism was widely developed and members were enjoined to study twenty-two key documents by Lenin, Stalin, Dimitrov, Mao, Chen Yun and Liu Shao-Chi [2]. As a result of this highly organized campaign for controlling Party thought the unity of the Party was strengthened and orthodoxy imposed.

If Mao is to be believed—and in this particular instance there seems no reason to doubt his words—this campaign to do away with all deviationist tendencies and to ensure unity owed nothing to any direction from outside. The days when the Party was kept in leading-strings by Moscow were past and when, in May 1943, the disbandment of the Comintern was announced, Mao declared emphatically that the Chinese Communists had received neither assistance nor advice from that body since its Seventh World Congress in 1935. It may be noted, incidentally, that when making this statement he made a passing reference to the 'ideological remoulding movement', which he called the 'study movement'. Its aim he defined as being 'to make the Chinese Communist Party more national and more suited to the needs of the war of resistance and national reconstruction' [3].

While the Communists were going ahead with their self-imposed task of 'ideological remoulding', their relations with the Nationalists were deteriorating rapidly; and by the summer of 1943 Chiang Kai-Shek, in an attempt to bring them to heel, was demanding the dissolution of the autonomous Communist administration and the merging of the Communist Eighth Route Army into the National Government Army. Though ready enough to leave their armed forces nominally under Chiang's command for operations against the Japanese, the Communists were aware of what the proposed merger would mean. Their own armed strength, which they had been building up strenuously as their main means of eventually seizing power, would be broken up and dispersed. Any hope of overthrowing their nationalist adversaries, at least in the foreseeable future, would be gone. For similar reasons they were determined to retain their autonomy in the areas under their control.

With Chiang insistent in his demands for the dissolution and the merger and the Communists equally adamant in their refusal to comply, relations between them became increasingly strained and

embittered. Both sides became more absorbed in the conflict with each other than in the war against Japan and by July 1944 Stilwell was giving vent to the remarks quoted in an earlier chapter, 'Each side watches the other and neither gives a damn about the war.' This he followed up with a prophetic observation. 'If this condition persists,' he added, 'China will have civil war immediately Japan is out. If Russia enters the war before a united front is formed in China, the Reds, being immediately accessible, will naturally gravitate to Russia's influence and control. The conditions will directly affect the relations between Russia and China, and therefore indirectly those between Russia and the United States' [4].

For the dual purpose of pleasing the Soviet Union and of inducing the Chinese to fight the Japanese instead of fighting among themselves, the United States government by this time was doing what it could to sponsor talks between the Communists and the Nationalists. While it was exerting pressure on Chiang to make concessions to the Communists, it discouraged any criticism of his régime and was, therefore, much upset by the increasingly vitriolic outbursts which Stilwell was directing against it. He was accordingly recalled in October that year and was held more or less *incommunicado* in order to prevent his criticisms being made public. But it was clear that something was wrong and although, apparently under political pressure, the paper changed its tune the following day, the *New York Times* published an article on 31st October 1944 revealing the rotten state of China.

Stilwell may have been indiscreet in some of his strictures; but in accusing the Chungking government of 'greed, corruption, favouritism, more taxes, a ruined currency . . . callous disregard of all the rights of men', he was by no means guilty of an overstatement. It was, in fact, the combination of KMT corruption, incompetence and tyranny that played so much into the Communist hands, and Stilwell was well justified in saying: 'He [Chiang] cannot see that the mass of the Chinese people welcome the Reds as being the only visible hope of relief from crushing taxation, the abuses of the Army and the terror of Tai Li's¹ "Gestapo"' [5].

Five years later the United States State Department was to admit, in its White Paper on China,² that Stilwell had 'predicted in 1944 that

¹ Tai Li, who was to meet his end a few years later, in an air crash, was the energetic but thoroughly ruthless Chief of Chiang Kai-Shek's secret police.

² Published on 8th August 1949.

the Chinese Nationalists would refuse after the war to reform their régime but would try to go on milking the United States for money and munitions'. The prediction proved well founded.

It was in the late summer of 1944, shortly before Stilwell's recall, that General Hurley, after consultations in Moscow, arrived in China in an endeavour to mediate between the Communists and the Nationalists with a view to inducing them to co-operate for the defeat of Japan. There he remained until November 1945, when he was succeeded by General Marshall. The attempt to bring the two sides together, however, proved fruitless. In some ways it even made matters worse and led to misunderstandings with both. The initial reaction on the part of the Communists was that Hurley had come to champion their cause and accordingly they became more adamant than ever in their refusal to compromise and more vehement in their denunciation of the Nationalists. By the autumn Chou En-Lai was castigating the KMT for despotism, corruption and non-co-operation and holding them responsible for making it impossible to fight the Japanese effectively [6].

While the Communists and Nationalists were indulging in mutual recrimination and the Americans were striving vainly to mediate between them, both sides were planning for the struggle for power which they foresaw would follow the defeat of Japan. The KMT was determined to crush the Communists after the war and the Communists were equally determined to overthrow the Nationalists. It was significant of the Communist aim that, amongst fifteen points outlined in an address delivered on 15th December 1944 under the title 'Our Task in 1945', Mao stressed the need for the Communists to train a regular army on modern principles. The days when he was content with guerrilla forces were coming to an end. At the same time he delivered a warning against the danger of over-confidence and pride—a warning he was to repeat five and a half years later, after the Communists had fought their way to power—and declared, 'If we are proud, comrades, we shall fall' [7]. It was in this same speech, while engaged in his favourite task of denouncing dogmatism, that he came out with his dictum, 'Dogmas are more useless than cow dung. Dung can be used as a fertilizer'.

It was four months after this address that the Chinese Communist Party held its Seventh National Congress in Yen-an. There, on 24th April 1945, one day before the opening of the United Nations Conference in San Francisco, Mao delivered his political report on the

theme, 'On Coalition Government' [8]. In this he called on the National government to give up its one-party control and form a coalition government with the Communists and other political groups, on the lines of the 'New Democracy' which he had enunciated five years previously. In effect he offered the KMT the choice of coalition or war. While he was strongly critical of the Nationalists, he spoke in the most friendly terms of 'the three great democracies, Britain, the United States and the Soviet Union'. Although singling out Soviet Russia for specially favourable mention, he underlined the value he placed on the continued friendship of the other two. Later in the same discourse he appealed in friendly vein to Britain to grant independence to India and expressed the hope that 'the British, American, French and Dutch governments, after helping the peoples of Burma, Malaya, the Netherlands East Indies and French Indo-China to defeat the Japanese aggressors, will give them the right to build up their own independent, democratic nations'.

Although speaking in friendly and conciliatory terms on this occasion, Mao's plea for the grant of independence to these Western possessions was to be the precursor of the strident demands made subsequently by Communist China for the 'liberation' of those countries. There was no hint of this, however, at the time, although the shadows of coming events might have been detected by an acute observer in the way in which he harped in this speech on the freeing of China from imperialist and feudal oppression, on the need for freedom and equality, and on the gratitude due to the Soviet Union for being the first country to treat China as an equal. 'China can be prosperous,' he declared, 'only if she is not colonial or semi-colonial but independent, not semi-feudal but free and democratic, not torn into pieces but unified.' Throughout this speech there was, in fact, a restrained but definite emphasis on the twin foes, imperialism and feudalism, which were to be held up to such vehement denunciation after the war.

Of the Communist agrarian policy as outlined on this occasion, the central feature was the phrase, 'The tiller should own his own land', which had figured prominently in Mao's exposition on 'New Democracy' in January 1940. The tribute paid to the peasants as 'the main foundation on which China's democracy rests' was also a marked feature and showed Mao's continued reliance on them as an all-important factor. He did, however, go on to explain that he used the term 'main foundation' because 'the working class', not the

peasantry, was 'politically the most conscious of all classes of the Chinese people and the qualified leader of all democratic movements'.

The implied sop to Marxist orthodoxy was evident and should be set against Molotov's assertion to Hurley a few months earlier that the Soviet was not interested in the Chinese Communists, as 'they were not really Communists' [9]. The relative importance attached at that time to the Chinese peasantry and 'working class' respectively, however, was indicated in the revisions made in the Party constitution at the Seventh National Congress. The previous constitution, that of 1928, gave priority to factories and labour unions over villages in the Party organization; but the new constitution, bearing in mind the all-important part played by the peasantry, reversed the position. Another significant change was that the 1928 constitution had mentioned the Comintern as the supreme authority and guiding hand of the Chinese Communist Party no less than sixteen times and had devoted a whole chapter to the Communist Youth Corps. The revised version of 1945 made no reference to either. Both were dead by then and the CCP was free at last from Moscow's hampering leading-strings.

It was perhaps a reflection of this greater freedom that in the preamble to the new constitution Mao himself was, in effect, raised to the level of Marx, Lenin, and Stalin as a contributor to the Communist canon. 'The ideas of Mao, the combined principle derived from the practical experiences of the Chinese revolution', it was stated, are added to Marxism-Leninism as the 'guiding principles of all its [the Party's] work'. This term, 'the ideas of Mao', or 'the Thoughts of Mao', has since become a recognized expression, as sacrosanct as though it were 'the Gospel According to St Mao'.

It was shortly before this Congress of the CCP was held that the fateful meeting at Yalta between Stalin, Churchill and Roosevelt had taken place. The more outstanding results of that gathering, in so far as the fortunes of the Communists were concerned, have already been discussed. There is no need to repeat them, but it may be added that under the Sino-Soviet Treaty, which was the outcome of the pressure brought to bear on the Chinese National government at Stalin's request at Yalta, the Soviet Union pledged itself to assist the National government only and to refrain from any interference in China's internal affairs. The worthlessness of this promise, signed on the very day that Japan capitulated, was soon exposed by the way in which the Soviet enabled the Communists to use Manchuria as a

base in which to reorganize, train and equip their armed forces for the subsequent overthrow of the Nationalist régime.

One further aspect of the war-time situation in China must be mentioned; the use made of the Chinese Communist headquarters at Yen-an by other Asian Communists, especially Japanese. Even before the Pacific War had opened, a sprinkling of Japanese political refugees was at work in China, some with the Nationalists and some with the Communists. By the close of 1939 an Anti-War League had been formed for the purpose of trying to persuade Japanese soldiers to desert, the first branch of the organization being established in Kweilin, in Nationalist China. Its director was Kaji Wataru, a Japanese radical who was to figure some thirteen years later in a much publicized but curiously enigmatic spy case in Tokyo. Together with another exiled radical, he operated two small psychological warfare units consisting of a handful of Japanese prisoners-of-war.

More or less simultaneously, the Communist Eighth Route Army, with the help of two other Japanese, set up a similar organization known as the Awakening League, its aim being to spread anti-war and anti-militarist propaganda among the Japanese troops. The aims and objects of the two bodies being much alike, it was not long before the Awakening League decided to merge with Kaji's Anti-War League. This, in turn, was dissolved four years later and replaced by the Japanese People's Emancipation League, a body with a far wider and more insidious purpose. Before describing it in greater detail it may be helpful to sketch in something of its background.

In an earlier chapter mention was made of how the Japanese Communist Nozaka had managed to escape to Moscow in 1931 and, on the death of the veteran Katayama there in November 1933, had succeeded him as the permanent Japanese delegate with the Comintern. He remained in the Soviet Union until early 1940 when, under the assumed name of Okano Susumu, he made his way secretly to Yen-an.¹ In his own account of this journey, which he only made public nine years later, he described how he decided to make it after discussing with 'a certain Chinese Communist leader', who was on a visit to Moscow, the possibilities of smuggling himself back into

¹ Nozaka was later to reveal that he was accompanied by 'a famous Indonesian Communist'. Although he did not mention him by name, it seems probable that this was Alimin, who is known to have been in Yen-an for a time.

Japan. His Chinese friend suggested that, if he could get to Yen-an, it might be possible to arrange ways and means from there. From this it would seem that Nozaka's original intention had been to make his own way back to Japan in a vain endeavour to revive the Communist movement in that country. Shortly after he got to Yen-an, however, he was invited by Chou En-Lai to take over the task of directing psychological warfare against the Japanese armed forces in China, special attention being paid to the indoctrination of Japanese prisoners-of-war. To this he agreed and by October 1940 he had opened a Japanese 'Peasants and Workers School' for training purposes.

The immediate aim of these subversive activities was, by playing on feelings of war-weariness and anti-war sentiment, to persuade Japanese soldiers that they were being exploited by the militarists and to induce them to desert; but the long-term goal was to build up cadres for revolutionary work in Japan after the war by training and indoctrinating those who surrendered or were captured. Prisoners were therefore welcomed as comrades and were treated with special kindness and leniency. To such an extent was this policy carried out that those who wished to return to their units were given every assistance to do so. It was hoped, of course, that men who took advantage of such offers would influence their friends to appreciate the kindly treatment they might expect from the Chinese Communists if they surrendered to them.

Meanwhile Nozaka was carrying on with his school at which care was taken in the opening stages of the course to avoid frightening 'students' by direct instruction in Communism. Indoctrination, however, was carried out gradually and almost imperceptibly until the stage was reached at which the subtle propaganda was considered to have done its work sufficiently for the full-blooded creed of Moscow to be expounded. As in the dubious World Peace campaign of to-day, genuine distaste for war was developed into wholehearted espousal of the Communist cause, carefully camouflaged at the start as freedom and democracy.

Within a year of the opening of the school, the first batch of those who had undergone this training was dispatched for propaganda work with the Anti-War League. Various methods for making contact with the Japanese forces were used. These included talks and nostalgic songs over loud-speakers, the distribution of leaflets, and the dispatch of messages to individual soldiers by secret means. By

1943 the number of these trained propagandists had increased to one hundred or more, operating with Chinese Communist units over a wide area [10].

It was at this stage that Nozaka, who had adopted a Chinese name for the purpose of posing as a Chinese and thereby hiding his identity, decided, at Mao's suggestion, to reveal himself as a Japanese under his Moscow pseudonym of Okano Susumu. On 7th July, the sixth anniversary of the North China 'Incident', he therefore came into the open with a fiery 'Appeal to the Japanese People', in which he predicted the coming defeat of Japan and called on the proletarian and peasant masses to seize the opportunity to overthrow the existing social order and set up a 'people's government' of their own. At the same time he set about preparing plans for an organization to deal with the situation he envisaged. A preparatory committee was set up in January 1944 and from this there emerged a Japanese Emancipation League, which superseded the Anti-War League and took over its slogans.

The new League, however, went much further than its predecessor and was considerably broader in scope. While avoiding any specific reference to either Communism or socialism, it laid down certain political and economic principles of a professedly democratic nature which, its organizers hoped, would serve as a first step to the eventual transformation of Japan into a socialist state. The programme was deliberately moderate, with Communist and socialist tendencies soft-pedalled, the object being to make as wide an appeal as possible and to avoid arousing the apprehensions of the Western Allies. The ultimate aim, however, was the typically Communist one of manipulating a united front as a stepping-stone to power. In this they were to fail; but the reasons for the failure relate to the post-war period.

One of the few Japanese Communists of any importance to be arrested in those war years was Nakanishi Ko. An advocate of immediate social revolution, he was to come into some prominence in January 1950 when, after coming out in support of a Cominform attack on the Japanese Communist Party leadership, he was expelled from the Party and was then denounced by *Pravda* for 'subversive intra-party activities' instead of being commended for his support of the Cominform [11].

Nakanishi had been employed as an adviser to General Tojo's private intelligence organization in Shanghai; but, as an indirect result of the Sorge affair of October 1941 mentioned earlier in these

pages, he was arrested early in 1942 on a charge of spying for the Chinese Communists. About one hundred others were likewise placed under arrest, although of this number only twenty were actually prosecuted. Nakanishi's trial dragged on until the closing days of the war, when he was given a life sentence. Within a few weeks, however, he was a free man once more, as he was released from prison in October 1945, together with all other political prisoners, in accordance with Allied orders [12].

CHAPTER XXIX

Soviet Plans and Calculations

FULLY engaged as she was in a life and death struggle during the greater part of the Pacific War period, Soviet Russia had little time or opportunity to devote much attention to large-scale activities in the cause of World Revolution. Moreover, the help and sympathy of the Western Allies, which were so essential to her, would have been seriously jeopardized if she had openly engaged in such measures. It was to her advantage to suggest that she had turned over a new leaf and had no intention of seeking to stir up revolution on a world-wide scale. Some of her actions, it is true—especially after the tide of war had begun to turn in her favour—aroused apprehensions on the part of her allies; but Britain and America were just as anxious to ensure her continuance in the war on their side as she was to assure herself of their continued assistance in arms and munitions. She was therefore given the benefit of the doubt and her misdemeanours were hidden from the general public.

No country can regard the possibility of its own defeat in war with equanimity, and for Soviet Russia to avoid defeat everything else had to be subordinated for the time being to that one purpose. Like other countries, she fought for national salvation, but she knew also that, if she were to be overthrown, the ultimate goal of World Revolution would be postponed indefinitely, and might, in fact, be made unattainable, since Moscow was the dynamo and main source of power for the Communist movements throughout the world. Without that power and without that central directing force, world Communism would be dealt a blow from which it might never recover. Lenin in 1917 had urged peace with the Germans at Brest-Litovsk for the sole purpose of preventing the Russian Revolution—not just Russia—from being crushed by German arms. Stalin, from June 1941 onwards, was equally determined to prevent 'the Socialist motherland of the world proletariat' from suffering the same fate. In this he had the wholehearted support of Communists throughout the world who,

since the Sixth Congress of the Comintern in 1928, had regarded the defence of the USSR as 'the holy duty of every honest man everywhere' [1].

Where the Far East was concerned, we have already seen how Stalin, in spite of the Soviet Neutrality Pact with Japan, had sought to ingratiate himself with the Western Allies by intimating to Harri-man as early as August 1942 that Russia would eventually come into the war against Japan. He had reinforced this statement fourteen months later with an unsolicited and unconditional promise to Cordell Hull to the same effect. Although far-reaching conditions were subsequently to be attached for Soviet participation, the original promise was made at a time when the Western Allies would clearly have been particularly gratified at the prospect of Russian assistance for the overthrow of the Japanese.

When this pledge was made in October 1943, the belief in Moscow's good intentions was further strengthened by the Soviet Union giving her support to the establishment of an international organization for the maintenance of world peace and security after the war. She promised, too, 'to continue the present close collaboration and co-operation (with Britain and the United States) in the conduct of the war into the period following the end of hostilities' [2].

These apparent proofs of Russia's honesty of purpose had been preceded on 15th May that year by the announcement that the Comintern had been dissolved. Although it had been clear to close observers for some time past that this body had outlived its original purpose and had become largely superfluous, it was still generally regarded as the central organization for directing and controlling the forces of World Revolution. The psychological effect of the announcement that it had been dissolved was therefore very considerable; it appeared to indicate that the Soviet Union had decided once and for all to give up the plans for World Revolution¹ and to devote herself after the war, in close collaboration and co-operation with her war-time allies and other peace-loving states, to the task of establishing an enduring peace.

Officially the reason given for the dissolution was that the original need for an international body to organize and guide what Mao

¹ In *The Second World War*, Vol. VI (p. 201-3), Sir Winston Churchill prints a letter, which he wrote to Stalin but then decided not to send to him. In it occurs the passage: 'We feel we were right in interpreting your dissolution of the Comintern as a decision by the Soviet government not to interfere in the internal affairs of other countries.'

Tse-Tung—in his statement on its disbandment—called the ‘genuine revolutionary working-class parties throughout the world’ no longer existed, as ‘the leading cadres of the Communist parties in various countries have already grown up and become politically mature’. The disbandment of the Comintern, he explained, would not weaken these parties but, on the contrary, would ‘strengthen them, making them more national and more suited to the necessities of the war against Fascism’.

The implication which such statements were intended to convey to the Western Allies was that, instead of retaining an international organization to direct the forces of World Revolution, the individual Communist parties would be left free to direct their energies towards working for the overthrow of the common enemy, Fascism, as represented by Germany, Italy and Japan. The prime object, however, was to ensure the continued and unstinted aid of the United States. For this purpose it was necessary to lull American suspicions of their own Communists. It was necessary, also, to soothe the apprehensions aroused by the Polish-Russian dispute and by the recent formation of the Lublin government. By dissolving the Comintern it was hoped that these objects would be attained.

When, nearly four and a half years later, the creation of the Cominform was announced, Zhdanov was to refer to the official explanation as to why the Comintern had been disbanded, and he laid special emphasis on the way in which that body, ‘from a factor promoting the development of the Communist parties, began to turn into a factor hindering their development’.¹ While for this reason its dissolution had been necessary, its disbandment, he admitted, had resulted inevitably in some loss of cohesion.

Apart from the resultant loss of cohesion, the dissolution of the Comintern was, in fact, of great benefit to the Soviet Union and to world Communism in general. Outwardly the link with Moscow had been severed. In point of fact, however, contact remained unbroken, as daily broadcasts over the Soviet radio conveyed to Communists in all countries the general line to be taken on any and every matter

¹ The actual wording of the statement accompanying the announcement of the decision to dissolve the Comintern had read: ‘The organizational form for uniting the workers chosen for the First Congress of the Communist International has . . . more and more become outgrown by the movement’s development and by the increasing complexity of its problems in the separate countries and has even become a hindrance to the further strengthening of the national working-class Parties.’

of importance. These directives, in the form of news bulletins, were made available for closer study by being reproduced in local Communist papers and pamphlets and, in countries which had a Soviet diplomatic mission, in publications sponsored by the Soviet embassy. Readers of Douglas Hyde's *I Believed* will recall in this connection how invaluable the British Communists found the Embassy's war-time *Soviet Monitor* for guiding them as to the correct line to be taken on such matters as the dissolution of the Comintern or the Polish request for a Red Cross inquiry into the mass graves at Katyn. While, therefore, Allied suspicions were lulled by the announced disbandment of the Comintern, Moscow remained in a position to direct and control the thoughts and actions of Communists throughout the world. Moreover, the many prominent foreign Communists who had been on the staff of the Comintern remained in Moscow, working and preparing for the day when, the war having ended, they would be able to return to their own countries to lead the post-war revolution.

What they planned to do was to capitalize the goodwill engendered by the valuable part played by the Communists during the war in the countries under enemy occupation. The National Liberation Fronts, on which the resistance movements had been based, were to be converted into National Front governments. Through the medium of these governments, in which the Communists would covertly retain the real power, it was hoped to obtain the assistance of unsuspecting liberal and democratic elements in building up the machinery of state. This done, the bourgeois parties would be eliminated by suppression and the socialists by fusion. It was, in fact, a projection of the cynical principle enunciated in the thesis on parliamentarianism adopted by the Second World Congress of the Comintern in 1920. The fixed aim of Communism, this thesis had declared, was to destroy parliamentarianism. 'Therefore,' it went on, 'there can be a question only of using bourgeois state institutions not in order to do constructive work, but in order to direct the masses to destroy from within the whole bourgeois state machine and Parliament itself.'

To what extent these plans for utilizing the resistance movements as stepping stones to the seizure of power after the war succeeded need not concern us at this stage. They are mentioned here to indicate that, although they were subordinated for the time being to the more pressing task of winning the war, the ultimate goal of World Revolution was never overlooked and was never allowed to disappear into the background.

It was not only on these plans for bringing National Front governments into being after the war that Moscow was basing its hopes for attaining its ends in the post-war world. Plans were also maturing for the establishment of those Communist-controlled international organizations which, since the war ended, have sought to harness the youth, students', women's, trade union, and other such movements in every country to the Communist machine and to use them as 'transmission belts' to the masses. How the International Youth Rally held in 1941 led, step by step, to the formation of the WFDY (World Federation of Democratic Youth) three months after the close of hostilities has already been noted. In much the same way the WFTU (World Federation of Trade Unions) was brought into being as a result of the World Trade Union Conference held in London in February 1945. Certain fundamental and unexceptional principles were laid down on that occasion in a declaration which was to be confirmed and embodied in the WFTU constitution by the World Trade Union Congress in Paris eight months later. The establishment of these two bodies was to be followed soon after by the creation of the Women's International Democratic Federation and the International Union of Students, which before long were, like the WFDY and the WFTU, to develop into Communist Front organizations.

Although none of these bodies emerged until the war had ended, the plans for their creation and ultimate use as instruments in the cause of World Revolution were being thought out before either Germany or Japan had collapsed. To these international organizations, nominally free and independent but actually controlled by a small body of international Communists under directions from the CPSU Politburo, were to be fused their Communist-controlled counterparts in every country. Well does Deane in his *Military Attaché in Moscow* declare: 'The strength of Communism as a disruptive force in the world lies in its devilish ability to enrol millions under its banner, by disguising that banner as something attractive to innocent but foolish men' [3].

The national counterparts of these great international bodies have since been set up in all the countries of South and East Asia as well as in Europe and the Americas—and in Africa too. They serve the disruptive purposes of the international Communist Front organizations to which they are fused. Through them the masters of the Kremlin seek to capture the machinery of the democratic trade unions, the youth, students', women's and other such national bodies and then

turn them into political instruments for the advancement of the 'mass struggle' out of which they hope to produce Communist-dominated states.

A word must now be said about developments in Moscow's plans for combining social revolution with Soviet imperialism in Outer Mongolia and Sinkiang during the period of the Pacific War. During the 1930's, despite Molotov's indignant denials, Sinkiang had become largely sovietized. Then had come the German invasion of Russia and, in its preoccupation with its own struggle for existence, Moscow had of necessity to concentrate its attention on more urgent matters nearer home. The control which it had been extending to an ever-increasing degree over this outlying Chinese province gradually relaxed and Shen Shih-Tsai, the Chinese governor whose former readiness to collaborate with the Russians had contributed so greatly to the strengthening of the Soviet hold on Sinkiang, decided to take advantage of the situation to turn against his former Communist friends. This was in April 1942 when he disbanded the local Anti-Imperialist League, which he had previously supported in its anti-British activities, and arrested a number of Communists and others. To celebrate the reunification of Sinkiang with China resulting from this action, Mme Chiang Kai-Shek herself paid a visit there four months later, the KMT opened a branch headquarters in the provincial capital and, early in 1943, Chinese troops entered the area for the first time for several years. The restoration of Chinese control was virtually completed that same year when Sovintorg, the Soviet agency which had previously monopolized the trade of the province, closed down and the Soviet government withdrew all the industrial equipment and transport facilities which had been set up there during the previous decade.

By that time, however, Soviet fortunes in the war had already taken a turn for the better. Moscow was therefore able to turn its thoughts once more to the question of extending its influence in Sinkiang and thereby retrieving its lost position. With this end in view it decided to try out new methods. Instead of relying on the Chinese minority as previously, it turned to the local peoples as the instrument by which to achieve its aims. From the close of 1943 onwards, therefore, one rising after another took place against the Chinese authorities, the main areas affected being the Ili district bordering the Soviet Union to the North-West and an area from Chenchwa to Kitai bordering on Outer Mongolia to the North-East. In both areas the

rebels were in a position to receive surreptitious aid in arms, munitions and advice from sources outside Sinkiang, those in the Ili district obtaining it from Soviet Russia direct while those in the Chenghwa-Kitai area obtained it indirectly from the Russians through the Soviet-controlled Mongolian People's Republic.

Being hard pressed to cope with the succession of revolts with which they were faced, the Chinese were driven to seeking Soviet 'mediation', thereby playing still further into Russian hands. By the close of the war in 1945, Soviet influence in this outlying province of China was well on its way to being restored to what it had been in the 1930's. In view of the way in which it had been restored, however, it is apposite to note that under the Sino-Soviet Treaty, signed on the day that Japan capitulated, the Soviet government pledged itself to refrain from interference with China's internal affairs.

It was during this same period that Tannu Tuva which, like Sinkiang, had been coveted by the Russians since Czarist days, finally became incorporated into the USSR. Although originally a part of Outer Mongolia and therefore Chinese territory, this sparsely inhabited district, with an area almost as large as Great Britain, had been a Russian protectorate from 1912 to 1917. Following the outbreak of the Bolshevik Revolution it had shared much the same fate as Outer Mongolia itself, being occupied in turn by the Chinese, the White Russians and finally by the Soviet Red Army. With the arrival of the last-named, the Soviet government in 1921 announced the final abolition of the Russian protectorate and proclaimed Tannu Tuva as an independent state. Thereafter developments followed the pattern of those in Outer Mongolia. A People's Revolutionary Party, later to emerge in its true colours when it was renamed as a Communist Party, was established; a Tannu Tuva People's Army was formed; 'purges' were carried out; Soviet troops were brought in to quell the popular uprisings which broke out, and a Soviet trade monopoly was established. Although declared independent of Outer Mongolia, it was made subordinate to Moscow; and on the very day that Russia was invaded by Germany it declared its readiness 'to participate in the struggle of the Soviet people against Fascist aggression'. By August 1944 Tannu Tuva had petitioned to be incorporated into the Soviet Union. The Soviet having graciously agreed to accede to its wishes, the Tuvinian People's Republic became an Autonomous Region of the RSFSR on 13th October that same year.

And so we come to Outer Mongolia itself. As shown earlier in these

pages, the Mongolian People's Republic, the name by which it had become officially known, had been a virtual Soviet satellite since the early 1920's in spite of Moscow's frequently reiterated recognition of China's sovereignty over it. Under the Sino-Soviet Treaty of August 1945, which had been forced on China by the decisions reached at Yalta, the Chinese government was induced to express its readiness to recognize the independence of Outer Mongolia if a plebiscite of its people confirmed that they desired it. That no less than 98.4 per cent of the half-million voters—largely nomads—cast their votes on the day that the plebiscite was held, and that every man jack of those who voted declared himself in favour of separation from China, was a phenomenon which could only have been conceivable in a Communist-controlled state under Soviet domination.

With Japan out of the way as an impediment to Soviet designs in the Far East; with political vacuums left in Manchuria and Korea as a result of Japan's downfall; with the Chinese Nationalists seriously weakened by years of fighting Japan and the Chinese Communists alternately, and by the blow to their prestige inflicted by the loss of Outer Mongolia; with the Chinese Communists correspondingly strengthened; with Moscow's own hold on Outer Mongolia and Tannu Tuva more firmly fixed than ever; and with Soviet influence restored to a large extent in Sinkiang once more, Soviet Russia's prospects in the Far East were vastly brighter than ever they had been before.

PART IV

Post-War Developments

CHAPTER XXX

The Aftermath of War

WAR creates more problems than it solves: nowhere was this trite saying more applicable than in South and East Asia at the close of the Pacific War. To the inevitable social, political, and economic chaos which follows any war were added the problems posed by the loss of Western prestige arising from Japan's initial successes and from her deliberate attempts to humiliate the white man in the eyes of her fellow-Asiatics. Among other factors raising serious difficulties were the numerous armies and guerrilla bands—many of them under Communist leadership—formed from the resistance movements which the Western Allies had helped to organize, train and equip; the large quantities of arms and ammunition dropped by the Allies for the use of these resistance groups or dumped by the Japanese and still lying around in secret caches throughout this vast area; the political 'time-bombs' left by the Japanese in the form of independence governments in Indonesia and Indo-China; a corrupt, ruthless and inefficient régime in China in open conflict with its equally ruthless and totalitarian, but far more efficient and less corrupt, Communist fellow-countrymen; communal friction and rivalry between Moslems and Hindus in India, between Burmese and Indians in Burma, between Javanese and the other races in Indonesia, and between the large Chinese communities and the native inhabitants in all the countries of South-East Asia; the barely concealed struggle between China and India for the cloak of leadership in Asia now stripped from Japanese shoulders; a spiritual vacuum in Japan left by her defeat and by her consequent loss of faith in herself; and the political vacuum in Korea and Manchuria arising from the removal of Japanese domination.

These were but some of the elements in the situation in South and East Asia at the close of the war. Each raised a problem requiring almost limitless skill and patience on the part of those whose task it was to face it. Given time and freedom from outside interference,

solutions for each of these problems might eventually have been found; but Communism, which had remained relatively quiescent during most of the war years, saw its chance and took it. Solutions or semi-solutions were found for some of the problems posed, despite Communist machinations; but most, if not all, were exploited to a greater or lesser extent by the exponents of World Communism.

To these factors in the post-war situation were added further problems arising from the artificial division of Korea into American and Russian spheres and of Indo-China into British and Chinese zones of occupation; the disruption of rice production in Burma, Siam and Indo-China, which in pre-war days not only provided enough for these countries' own requirements, but also a surplus sufficient to supply threequarters of the total world imports of this staple food of India, China and other Asian countries; the tendency of Americans, with their traditional dislike of colonial rule, to oppose the restoration of Western domination in Asian territories; the promotion of China to the status of one of the Big Five—a position of responsibility which the Chinese Nationalist régime could in no way claim to merit; and last, but by no means least, the advent of the atom bomb.

Whatever the rights and wrongs of the decision to use the atom bomb to shorten the war, the fact that it was employed against Hiroshima and Nagasaki gave rise to a belief among a large section of the Asian peoples that the Western Allies would have hesitated to use it if Japan had not been an Asian country. The belief may have been wholly without foundation, but it was firmly held nonetheless and reflected the lively susceptibilities, sensitivity and emotion which account for the Asian complex about racial equality. It is hardly too much to say that this burning concept of racial equality has been one of the main revolutionary factors at work in South and East Asia ever since the close of the war. It has been accompanied by political discontent in the form of ardent nationalism founded on revolt against foreign domination and by a desire for social reforms which would abolish landlordism and all other forms of feudalism. These three factors, of course, existed even before the war; but they have become accentuated since and have been exploited to the utmost by the Communists under the battle-cries of equality, anti-imperialism and anti-feudalism.

As anti-imperialism has always been the main plank in the Communist programme for Asia, the blow to Western prestige struck by

Japan's initial successes probably served more than anything else to strengthen the Communists immediately after the war. Japan, it is true, had eventually suffered defeat herself at the hands of the Western powers; but Japan's conquests in the opening stages of the Pacific War, combined with the barrage of anti-Western propaganda she put out throughout the war years, had served to lower Western prestige to such an extent that even Japan's own ultimate downfall was insufficient to restore it. Eastern dependencies such as Malaya, Burma, Indonesia, Hong Kong and the Philippines had always, before 1941, trusted in the power of their Western rulers to protect them from invasion, but this trust had been shattered once and for all by an Asian invader.

This feeling of having been let down by their Western overlords was effectively exploited by the Communists, many of whom had played active parts in the resistance movements. Not only, as in Malaya and Burma, did they attempt to arrogate to themselves the full credit for the liberation from the Japanese; they played also on the growing desire for independence and for the abolition of poverty which, they declared, would be the natural outcome of the overthrow of Western domination. Thus the alliance between Communism and nationalism received under Communist guidance a fresh impetus as a result of the war.

The strong tide of nationalism in India and South-East Asia swept forward and was marked by demands which took little or no account of inescapable facts and conditions; but it was in Indonesia and Indo-China that the Communists saw their best chance of turning the situation to their own advantage. There, owing to last-minute changes in Allied plans necessitated by the suddenness of Japan's collapse, an unavoidable time-lag occurred between Japan's surrender and the arrival of Allied occupation forces. In Indonesia there was a lapse of forty-five days and in Indo-China of over a month. In that interval not only was independence declared in both countries by the exuberant nationalists, but full use was made by the newly established independence governments of this heaven-sent opportunity to extend their control. Thus it came about that, when eventually the British arrived to take over the duties of occupation preparatory to restoring Indonesia to the Dutch and Indo-China to the French, they found themselves faced with a situation very different from what had been

contemplated. The new governments were only prepared to co-operate with the occupation forces provided that their newly-won independence was recognized. The Allied commanders, on the other hand, had no authority to agree to such stipulations. Both in Indonesia and in Indo-China, therefore, the British were compelled to use force in order to maintain law and order, which had been seriously disturbed by nationalist and Communist activities after Japan's capitulation. Ironically, it was even found necessary to use for this purpose the Japanese troops whose disarmament and repatriation had been the primary object for which the Allied forces had been sent. In Java the position was even more difficult than in Indo-China, as the nationalist movement there disintegrated and was dominated for a time by bands of irresponsible youths organized on the lines of Fascist youth organizations.

Although the early cabinets of the newly established Republic of Indonesia contained a sprinkling of Communists or Communist sympathizers, they were primarily nationalist in composition. In Indo-China, on the other hand, the independent republic which had been set up—the Democratic Republic of Vietnam or DRV as it came to be known—had the veteran Communist leader Ho Chi-Minh as president, while the newly formed government included a number of Communists. Realizing, however, the importance of rallying the whole country to the support of the new régime and of the need therefore to pander to the susceptibilities of those who might have been frightened off if its Communist complexion had been too conspicuous, the Viet Minh, which had played the leading part in its establishment, announced on 11th November that the Communist Party, in the interests of national unity, had very patriotically decided to liquidate itself. This seemingly altruistic action proved highly effective and when, a year later, the civil war, which was to continue until the summer of 1954, broke out, the great majority of Ho's supporters were nationalists. Actual control of the movement, however, though carefully hidden from the public eye, was in the hands of the Communists. As was to be revealed when the Lao Dong (Workers') Party was formed in February 1951, the Communist Party had been dissolved in name only. Organizationally it remained covertly in being and its Central Committee became the Central Committee of the Viet Minh. As such it was able to direct and control this seemingly nationalist body and the whole nationalist movement.

Although the Communists in the various countries of South-East

Asia appeared at the start to be acting on their own initiative without any special guidance or co-ordination from Moscow, Soviet interest in developments in that area soon became apparent. By November 1945 *Pravda* and the Soviet *New Times* were denouncing Britain for helping to restore Dutch and French rule in Indonesia and Indo-China respectively and Manuilsky was, in effect, launching a world Communist campaign in favour of Indonesian independence. Two months later the Soviet delegate in UNO, after alleging that the presence of British troops in Indonesia constituted 'a threat to world peace', demanded their withdrawal and the recognition of Indonesian independence; and at a session of the Security Council in February 1946 the Ukrainian delegate put forward a proposal to send a commission of investigation to Indonesia. From then on, the Soviet Union spared no pains to exploit the facilities offered by the United Nations for the purpose of dislodging the Western powers from South-East Asia.

This professed concern for the peoples of South-East Asia was but the logical outcome of the stand the Soviet Union had taken at the San Francisco Conference in April 1945. There she had stressed that it must be seen that 'dependent countries are enabled to take the path of national independence' and proposed that all colonies, not only mandated territories and ex-enemy possessions, should come under the Trusteeship Council which was to be set up by UNO. The fact, however, that she took up the cause of Indonesia, where the Communists were relatively weak, rather than that of Indo-China where they held the key positions, would seem to reflect the Communists' preference for loose national coalitions with inexperienced leaders and an emotional following, which they hope gradually to control after the departure of the colonial power.

Western apprehensions about the machinations of their wartime ally were by this time becoming thoroughly aroused and only two days after the close of the February session, at which the Ukrainian delegate put forward his proposal, the first arrests were made in Ottawa in connection with the sensational Canadian Spy Case.¹ This was on 16th February, just one week after Stalin, in a statement reaffirming the doctrine of Marx and Lenin, had announced the

¹ Gouzenko had defected from the Soviet Embassy in Ottawa five months previously, but his disclosures had been purposely hushed up for the time being, lest their publication should damage the prospects of the Moscow Conference scheduled for December 1945.

continued adherence of the Soviet government to the basic doctrine of World Revolution. Following, as these two developments did, so closely upon one another, it was little wonder that Churchill, in his Fulton speech on 5th March, was constrained to launch his first broadside against the Soviet Union by stressing the danger of the World Revolution doctrine to the United States. Another fifteen months, however, were to go by before Marshall, in June 1947, outlined plans for US aid to Europe. As these proposals spelt the postponement of the anticipated economic collapse in Europe, Moscow countered soon after with a new offensive in South-East Asia to deprive the Western powers of the great natural resources of that area and thus to prevent the success of the Marshall Plan.

Before dealing with this development, however, it is necessary to return to the immediate post-war period in order to see how the situation was developing in South and East Asia generally.

In Japan disarmament and the destruction of her war potential were carried out with unexpected smoothness and an attempt was made to introduce social, political and economic reforms of various kinds. Moreover, at a very early stage of the Allied occupation, orders were given for the release of all persons imprisoned by the Japanese for their political beliefs or activities. At the same time, the disabilities to which they had previously been subjected were removed. Thus, after seventeen years of incarceration, Communist leaders like Tokuda and Shiga became free men once more and Communism was, for the first time in Japan, made legal. Trade unionism, socialism, and left wing movements of all kinds were similarly relieved of all restrictions. On the other hand, all right wing organizations were, on account of their war-time activities, disbanded and right wing supporters debarred from holding any public office.

The way was therefore clear for the revival of leftist activities of every kind, from the mildest to the most extreme, and in a very short time socialists and Communists were competing vigorously with each other to build up their own shattered fortunes and to develop trade unions under their own control. This feverish competition between the advocates of social democracy and Communism, and the rapid growth of their respective wings of the trade union movement were, in fact, amongst the most striking and significant developments during the first post-war years in Japan. It was only later,

after the Communists had overstepped the bounds by instigating nation-wide strikes for political purposes, that the occupation authorities were compelled to step in and curb their excesses.

Japan was fortunate in being spared the fate of her former mainland possession, Korea, with its Iron Curtain across the 38th Parallel. Molotov had wanted Vasilievsky as joint Supreme Commander with MacArthur, and Moscow had also proposed that the Hokkaido, the northernmost of the four main islands comprising Japan, should be occupied by Russian troops; but both proposals were firmly rejected [1]. Had they been accepted Japan would have been partitioned as completely as Korea or Germany.

In Korea the 38th Parallel had been laid down as a temporary demarcation line between the southern half, which was to be occupied and administered by the Americans, and the northern half, for which the Russians were to be responsible. As in Germany and other parts of Europe, however, the temporary demarcation line quickly hardened into an Iron Curtain, behind which the Russians, secure from outside observation, set to work to sovietize the territory under their control. Their first step was to make use of the local 'people's committees' which, under encouragement from the Japanese in the last days of their administration, had been established to maintain order and facilitate the transfer from Japanese to Korean rule. The more moderate elements in these committees were soon eliminated and replaced by Korean Communists brought in from Eastern Siberia and China. This done, the Russians were in the happy position of being able, through the medium of these pliant tools, to exercise remote control. Thereby they obviated the need to establish an inevitably unpopular military government of their own as the Americans had been forced to do in the south, where the United States commander, General Hodge, refused to recognize these committees [2].

The reason for his refusal was similar to that of the British in Indonesia and Indo-China in declining to recognize the newly established independence governments. Like them he found himself confronted with an entirely unexpected situation. In some respects he was even more unfavourably placed—he had been sent off at a moment's notice to take over command and arrived in Korea without briefing, without experts and without even officers who knew the Korean language, or had any knowledge of Korean customs, history

or psychology [3]. The Soviet commanders, in contrast, had known exactly what to expect and had laid their plans long beforehand. They had interpreters and experts in plenty and brought with them Korean Communists, trained in Siberia and Yenan, to implement these plans and to take control.

Following a conference in Pyongyang, the capital of Northern Korea, in October 1945, a central 'Interim People's Committee' was set up in February 1946 as a provincial government under the chairmanship of Moscow's protégé Kim Il-Sung. A few months later, in preparation for elections to be held in November, elements of the Korean Communist Party and the Yenan Independence Alliance—a body formed in the Chinese Communist capital, similar to Nozaka's Japanese Emancipation League—amalgamated to form the North Korea Workers' Party. At the same time a Democratic People's Coalition Front, later to be reorganized under the name of Unification Front, was founded. Thus the way was paved for the subsequent emergence of a North Korean government, controlled by the Communists under the guise of the Workers' Party, with the so-called Coalition Front serving as a 'transmission belt' linking it with the masses. Kim Il-Sung, of whom little or nothing had been heard previously, was rapidly built up by propaganda as a Korean Tito and 'darling of the Kremlin', but the Titoist appellation was dropped hurriedly later on when the Yugoslav leader fell foul of his Moscow masters.

In South Korea, where the Russians lacked the facilities they had in the North, Communist attempts to extend their influence met with only partial success. Nevertheless, in the immediate post-war period, they took advantage of the removal of the ban on Communism to set up Communist cells and to pour out extensive propaganda. Various actions of the Americans, inevitable in the circumstances, were played up for propaganda purposes by the Communists and vigorously denounced by Communists and nationalists alike. The general attitude of the latter, however, was reflected in the words of Syngman Rhee, on his arrival in Seoul in October 1954 after thirty-three years in exile, when he expressed the hope that both the Americans and the Russians would soon be gone and leave Korea to the Koreans.

Rhee, indeed, was invited on his return 'to become chairman of the South Korean Communist Party, but declined [4]. He had always been opposed to Communism and, realizing its inherent dangers, he

refused even to consider a coalition of nationalists and Communists. Three years previously, in fact, he had strongly criticized Kim Koo, the Premier of the Korean Provisional Government which had transferred from Shanghai to Chungking, for admitting Communists into the new cabinet formed in February 1942 [5]. Since then his opposition to a coalition had been hardened by his increasing conviction that the Russians were aiming to seize control of Korea after Japan's defeat. He had fought all his life to free his country from Japan and was not prepared to see Japanese domination replaced by Soviet enslavement. However much Rhee may have laid himself open to criticism later by his intransigence and high-handed methods, it must be said to his credit that he showed a far greater prescience at that time than did the Western Allies.

Two months after Rhee's return to Korea an event occurred which showed how completely the Communists were under the control of their Russian masters. This was the reaction to the announcement, made on the conclusion of the Moscow conference at the end of December, that the establishment of a four-power trusteeship for Korea for five years was under consideration. The immediate response of Communists and nationalists alike was a vehement denunciation of the proposal. But within a day or two, while demonstrations against it were actually in progress, the Communists, on instructions from the Kremlin, made one of their characteristic turn-about and came out in strong support of the proposal.¹

The months that followed the trusteeship proposal were marked by increasing friction and bitterness between the Russians in the North and the Americans in the South and between the numerous conflicting groups of nationalists and the united Communists. The clumsiness of the tactics used by the latter, however, made the very name of Communism so unpopular that the South Korean Communist Party decided in the summer of 1946 to follow the example of its comrades in the North and renamed itself the South Korean Workers' Party. Four years later, by which time the Communists

¹ The two outstanding Communists in South Korea at that time were Pak Heung-Yung and Lyuh Woon-Hyung, both of whom were later to be 'liquidated' by their fellow-Communists. Pak, who was secretary-general of the South Korean Communist Party and was Moscow-trained, became foreign minister in the North Korean government in 1948; but, while still holding that post, he was arrested in the Party purge of August 1953 and sentenced to death. Lyuh, who had headed an underground resistance movement of genuine patriots and Communists during the war years, was assassinated in July 1947, after having fallen foul of the North Korean leaders.

in the South had been largely eliminated or driven underground, the two Workers' Parties were to be amalgamated under the name of Korean Workers' Party.

While the Russians were proceeding with the sovietization of North Korea, they were also actively engaged in paving the way for the subsequent control of Manchuria by the Chinese Communists. Under the terms of the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship signed in August 1945, they had pledged themselves to non-interference in China's internal affairs and to assist the Nationalist government only; but it was very soon clear that they were helping the Communists in numerous ways. By the end of October, government and Communist forces were fighting in Shantung and several other provinces of China proper and by mid-November Shanhaikwan, the gateway to Manchuria, was in government hands. The main body of the Communist troops was by this time being concentrated in the north-east provinces constituting Manchuria. The Russians, who had ferried large numbers across by sea from Shantung, not only placed obstacles in the way of their pursuit by the Nationalists but provided them with arms and munitions taken from the Japanese. Not until they had ensured that the Communists would be able to give a good account of themselves did the Russians begin to withdraw their own troops from Manchuria in accordance with the agreement.

This withdrawal was completed by May 1946; but, thanks to the port and railway concessions extracted at Yalta, the Russians were still in a position to exercise a considerable degree of control over the Manchurian provinces and to provide both moral and material aid to the Communist forces in the north-east. The extent of this aid was only to become clear when, after their initial reverses in the fighting in North China—reverses which compelled them to transfer their headquarters from their old stronghold in Yen-an to Chiamussu in North-East Manchuria—the Communists in May 1947 passed over to the offensive.

Meanwhile, the policy which the Russians had been following during the closing months of the war had resulted in the severance of their Outer Mongolian satellite from China and, to a large extent, the restoration of Moscow's lost influence in Sinkiang. The policy of inciting the native peoples of Sinkiang to rise in rebellion against their Chinese rulers was continued and pressed with even greater

vigour after Japan's defeat, and Soviet propaganda made great play of the 'blood relationship' between the 'oppressed' peoples of Sinkiang and the happy, free and prosperous Kazakhs, Kirghiz, Uzbeks and other national minorities in the Soviet Union.

By their actions during the immediate post-war period in the outlying provinces of China—Manchuria, Outer Mongolia and Sinkiang—the Russians quickly made it clear that their pledges given in the Sino-Soviet Treaty of August 1945 were completely worthless. The Chinese Nationalists, however, were not in a position to do anything about it. Their greatest problem was the growing power of the Communists who, while just as anxious as the Nationalists to unify the country, held very different views as to how this should be done. The Americans did their utmost to mediate between the two opposing forces, and within a week or two of Japan's capitulation Mao Tse-Tung arrived in Chungking for talks with Chiang Kai-Shek. A temporary agreement was concluded, but two months later fighting broke out afresh in North China. This continued until January 1946 when, as a result of decisions reached at the Moscow conference in the previous December, General Marshall was able to bring the Communists and the Nationalists together again and a cease-fire agreement for a fifteen-days' truce was reached. Once more, however, fighting was quickly resumed and by July Chiang had decided that further negotiations were useless. The Communists by then had made clear their refusal either to enter a coalition government on Chiang's terms or to agree to the absorption of their own armed forces into a National Army. Further negotiation, it was felt, would therefore not only be futile but would merely enable the Communists to take advantage of the delay to strengthen their position. Mobilization orders were therefore issued.

Once mobilization had been ordered, the chances of a peaceful settlement receded rapidly and the United States became increasingly the butt of Communist propaganda. Moscow radio joined in the swelling chorus of denunciation of Americans, who were accused of shattering the last hopes of a peaceful settlement by their intervention, and the Communist leaders vied with one another in demanding that the United States should cease to aid the National government and withdraw their forces from China. A policy statement issued by President Truman⁹ in December 1946 was in effect an acknowledgement of the failure of American efforts to secure peace in China and final attempts at mediation ended early the following month,

when Marshall was recalled to Washington after issuing a statement blaming Nationalist and Communist extremists alike. By the end of January 1947 the United States had formally announced the abandonment of their efforts to mediate and Liu Ting-Yi, the head of the Communist Party Information Department, had solemnly denounced America as 'the heir of the German and Japanese Fascists'. He had also announced the alignment of Chinese Communist policy with that of the Soviet Union. In February the Nationalists launched an all-out offensive and the final struggle began which, after initial successes by the Nationalists, was to end two and a half years later with the establishment of the Communist régime in Peking.

In the Philippines, the Hukbalahaps, who at first welcomed the Americans back as liberators, found themselves treated as Communist bandits. They were therefore driven more and more into the arms of the Communists. As a result, the years immediately following Japan's defeat were marked by peasant insurrections directed, under Communist guidance, against existing agrarian abuses. The implementation of the United States promise of independence by the establishment of the Philippine Republic on 4th July 1946 made little difference, as peasant grievances remained unremedied and armed revolts continued. The resultant bitterness and unrest were grist to the Communist mill and were exploited to the full, both by the indigenous Communists and by their local Chinese comrades.

The fundamental reason for these peasant risings was that land reform was long overdue and the peasant remained virtually a serf.

In Siam conditions were very different. There, too, the population was largely composed of peasants; but the Siamese peasant was reasonably prosperous and satisfied with his lot. With the end of the war, he wished for nothing more than to be left alone to till his fields. Apart, therefore, from the inevitable dislocations caused by the war and by her alignment with the losing side, Siam, who was bothered moreover by no independence movement, emerged in a more stable condition than any other country in the area. Pridi, who had led the underground resistance against the Japanese, took over the Premiership in March 1946 and the prospects of a relatively smooth transition from war to peace seemed reasonably assured. It was unfortunate, therefore, that three months later the King was found shot. At first

it was thought that he had killed himself accidentally; but rumours soon spread that either Pridi or someone whom he sought to shield had been responsible for his death. Innocent or not, the tragedy had serious repercussions, as it led to Pridi's flight abroad after the coup of November 1947 by his old rival Pibul, and to his subsequent apparent link up with the Chinese Communists in Peking nearly seven years later.

Returning to 1946, the final quarter of that year was marked by developments which were to have a close bearing on the South-East Asian situation in the years that followed. In October came the ratification of the decision to restore the provinces in Cambodia and Laos, which had been ceded to Siam by the French under the treaty of May 1941. The whole of these two kingly states therefore reverted once more to Indo-China and were afterwards to play an important part in the struggle between the Viet Minh and the French. Two months later, as the result of a bargain with Moscow to support Siam's claim for admission to the United Nations, the Siamese Anti-Communist Law of 1933 was repealed in anticipation of an agreement to establish diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union. This agreement was reached in January 1947, although another year passed before the actual opening of a Soviet Embassy in Bangkok, the first Soviet diplomatic mission ever to be established in South-East Asia. Although very much smaller numerically than commonly reported at the time, it was considerably larger than legitimate Russian interests in Siam appeared to warrant and that its activities were not confined solely to diplomacy and trade there can be little doubt.

As in Indonesia and Indo-China, so also in Malaya Japan's sudden collapse resulted in a time-lag between the close of hostilities and the arrival of British and Indian forces to take over the country and its administration.¹ This interval was used to good effect by the Communist-controlled MPAJA (Malayan People's Anti-Japanese Army), whose Chinese guerrillas acted as though it was due to them alone that the war had been won and Malaya liberated. Before the year had ended, however, the MPAJA had been officially demobilized and had handed in their arms. On the other hand, they contrived to retain their organization by forming MPAJA ex-Service associations and, in addition to having secret caches of arms and

¹ This refers, not to Singapore, where the British were soon in control once more, but to the mainland.

munitions, they were believed to have kept in being a secret army some 4000 strong. The returning British were also faced with other disquieting results of the war years: armed robbery and murder by criminal elements; labour unrest which manifested itself in transport and dock strikes; and loss of white prestige. There was also a new and growing national spirit among the Malays and Malaya-born Chinese. The majority, however, sought independence by peaceful evolutionary means and were opposed to revolutionary violence, and it was from the more extreme Indonesian elements among the Malays that the Malay Nationalist Party, which the government was compelled to ban later, was formed in November 1945.

The initial mishandling of plans for a new political constitution in Malaya brought about in March 1946 the establishment of another, but more constitutional, nationalist body. This was the UMNO (United Malay Nationalist Organization), whose aim was to unite Malays in an effort to secure the reversal of the policy of the mis-conceived Malayan Union. A moderate body with no taint of Communism, its formation had been preceded a few weeks earlier, however, by the foundation of the Communist-dominated Pan-Malayan Federation of Trade Unions, which was used by the Communists to promote strikes and labour unrest.

In January 1946 Loi Tek had been re-elected as secretary-general of the Malayan Communist Party. For the next twelve months he set himself to prepare the way for implementing the Party's decision to overthrow the government and establish a People's Republic. In addition he contacted fraternal parties in the neighbouring countries of South-East Asia and in India, China and Britain. Then in March 1947 came his sudden disappearance with the Party's funds. The leadership of the Party thereupon devolved on his former boon companion, the twenty-six-year-old Chen Ping,¹ who, in the meantime, had taken part in the Victory Parade in London and had, ironically, been awarded the OBE for his war-time services. Under his leadership the direction and control of Communist affairs were reorganized and the objects of the Party redefined, with self-government for Malaya as the immediate objective and the establishment of a Communist régime as the ultimate goal. Further contacts with European Communist parties were established by the dispatch of delegates to conferences and meetings in Prague, Belgrade and other capitals, and return visits were made to Malaya by delegations from inter-

¹ Also known as Chin Peng or Chan Peng.

national Communist Front organizations and by 'fraternal' delegates from other Communist parties. The way was therefore set for the outbreaks of violence which in Malaya and other neighbouring countries were to follow soon after the holding of the South-East Asia Youth Conference in Calcutta in February 1948.

In Burma also nationalist sentiment ran high. Although the various elements in Aung San's AFPFL (Anti-Fascist People's Freedom League) were at one in demanding political and economic independence, it was the Communists who opposed the return of the British most vehemently. As the months went on, however, the more conservative nationalists became increasingly apprehensive of the dangerous potentialities of the Communist programme and by the close of 1945 the Communists were calling forth protests against themselves for launching attacks on Buddhism. The war-time unity was wearing thin. Two months later the Communists suffered a split in their own ranks when Thakin Soe, denouncing Than Tun as an opportunist, broke away from the BCP to form a Communist party of his own, which became known as the CPB (Communist Party of Burma) or Red Flags. The revolutionary activities in which he proceeded to indulge led to the proscription of the new party five months after its formation. This ban was lifted in October 1946, but was re-imposed two months later.

Meanwhile the growing friction between the Communists in general and the nationalists had led to Than Tun's enforced resignation as secretary-general of the AFPFL in July 1946, and in October that year the whole of his Communist Party was expelled from the organization for its anti-government propaganda and its fomenting of labour unrest, just at the time when the AFPFL itself had decided to collaborate with the government in setting up an Executive Council as a preliminary to the grant of independence. Thereafter the Communists became increasingly active in preparing the ground for the insurrection which was to be launched in Burma in March 1948. Like their comrades of the Malayan Communist Party, they also sent delegates to the British Empire Communist Conference in London early in 1947 and to various parts of Europe, both to make contacts and to study Communist-controlled youth movements and Communist organization in general.

With independence at last in sight as the result of an agreement signed in London in January 1947, nationalist ferment was already

subsiding and the prospects of a smooth transfer from British to Burmese rule becoming increasingly favourable when, in July that year, Aung San and six other cabinet ministers were assassinated at the instigation of the disgruntled pre-war political intriguer, U Saw. Thus, at a most critical stage for her future, Burma was deprived of some of her all too few qualified leaders. On attaining independence six months later, she was, in consequence, to be seriously handicapped in the great tasks with which she was faced.

Britain's decision to grant Burmese independence had been the result of developments in her post-war policy in India, and to complete this survey of the war's aftermath in South and East Asia we must consider the Indian sub-continent, where nationalist sentiment had been aroused and Moslem fear of Hindu domination was leading to increasingly bitter communal strife.

From the close of the war until the independence bill received the royal assent just on two years later, the British were striving to find some formula acceptable to all parties on the sub-continent for the eventual transfer of power. Until almost the last moment they were aiming for a solution which would preserve the political autonomy of the Moslems within the framework of an undivided India. One proposal after another was put forward and meeting followed meeting, but no such formula could be found. Meantime, political tension was increasing steadily. By the end of June 1946, it is true, an Indian 'caretaker' government had been appointed and two months later Nehru formed an interim government, which the Moslem League finally decided to join in October; but the month which saw the formation of the interim government was marked also by an outbreak of communal massacres on an unprecedented scale in Calcutta and other cities. The prospects of agreement between the Congress Party and the Moslem League on how the power which Britain sought to transfer should be divided seemed more remote than ever. Then came the announcement from London in February 1947 that power was to be transferred into 'responsible Indian hands' by June 1948. This was followed four months later by the verdict in favour of partition. Finally, on 15th August 1947, India and Pakistan were brought into being as two independent Dominions. The long struggle for independence was over, although its advent was marked by communal violence and bloodshed on a scale vastly greater than ever before.

By its opposition to the nationalist 'Quit India' campaign and its

war-time support of the British, the Indian Communist Party found itself at the close of the war discredited and isolated. Its prestige and influence in the youth, women's, peasant and trade union movements suffered accordingly. Moreover, having had no part in any underground resistance movement during the war, the Party lacked an armed force of its own. It suffered from the further handicap of factionalism within its ranks, one faction opposing any revival of revolutionary mass activity, the other, under the future secretary-general Ranadive, favouring a militant policy of insurrection and guerrilla activity [6]. The Royal Indian Navy mutiny of February 1946 appears to have been helped by Communist agitators of this latter faction as well as by Congress politicians [7]. Whether for or against a more militant policy, however, the Communists in general soon reverted to the Leninist doctrine of anti-imperialism by exploiting the struggle for freedom from British rule. It was only on the advent of independence in the summer of 1947, when this principle seemed no longer applicable to India, that, for a brief space, they gave their support to Pandit Nehru and his government.

CHAPTER XXXI

The Coming of the Cominform

WAR-TIME partnership with the Russians and the dissolution of the Comintern in 1943 had led the Western powers to hope that, when victory came, the Soviet Union would show herself ready to co-operate wholeheartedly with them in the peaceful rehabilitation of the world. Stalin's statement of 9th February 1946 that the Soviet Government remained wedded to the basic doctrine of World Revolution shattered this wishful thinking. It remained, however, for the announcement of the formation of the Cominform on 5th October 1947, to confirm Moscow's determination to integrate and co-ordinate all the forces of international Communism for an all-out offensive against the free world. This was, in effect, the answer to the Marshall Plan.

Zhdanov's analysis of the international situation, which he presented at the inauguration of the Cominform, clearly indicated a reorientation of Communist strategy in South-East Asia, where a crisis in the colonial system appeared imminent.

'World War II,' he said, 'aggravated the crisis of the colonial system as expressed in the rise of a powerful movement for national liberation in the colonies and dependencies. This has placed the rear of the capitalist system in jeopardy. The peoples of the colonies no longer wish to live in the old way. The ruling classes in the metropolitan countries can no longer govern the colonies on the old lines. Attempts to crush the national liberation movements by military force now increasingly encounter armed resistance on the part of the colonial peoples and lead to protracted colonial wars.' [1]

It was perhaps fortunate that, only a few months previously, India and Pakistan had been given their independence and that both Burma and Ceylon were on the eve of receiving theirs. To that extent Zhdanov's plans were handicapped, as movements for liberation no longer 'placed the rear of the capitalist system in jeopardy' in those particular areas. This, however, did not in any way deter the Com-

munists, who not only had 'protracted colonial wars' in Indonesia and Indo-China to exploit but were very soon taking the line that the independence granted by Britain to her former Asian subjects was a bogus independence and that the peoples of those territories should therefore rise and demand true freedom. This line was reflected in an article by Zhukov, 'The Deepening Crisis of the Colonial System', which appeared two months later in the 15th December issue of the CPSU Central Committee organ *Bolshevik*.¹ Developing Zhdanov's thesis, Zhukov observed that whereas between the wars nationalist movements were led by the bourgeoisie, who regarded revolutionary peasants and proletariat as greater enemies than foreign imperialists, the liberation movements since 1945 had become more truly revolutionary and were aimed at the bourgeoisie, who now had independence and were allied with the foreign imperialists.

If Zhdanov's analysis of the international situation was in the nature of a directive to Communists in South-East Asia to analyse the situation in their respective countries on similar lines with a view to considering the best ways and means of co-ordinating activities in the whole area, Zhukov's article was a signal directed especially to the Communists in India, Pakistan, Ceylon and Burma to turn against their new rulers. Such analyses were, in fact, worked out; and it was only after this had been done and the South-East Asia Youth Conference, which was attended by representatives from the Soviet Union and European satellite states, had been held in Calcutta in February 1948, that the results of Moscow's new offensive became evident. Hardly had the conference ended, however, before the Communists in Japan, asserting that their country was threatened by foreign capitalist domination, had launched a campaign for 'racial independence'. Following quickly on this, the Indian Communists on 3rd March adopted a policy of opposition to the Nehru government. Three weeks later the Communist insurrection in Burma was launched. In May the advocates of armed struggle gained control of the Communist movement in the Philippines. By June Malaya was ablaze with revolution, and two months later the abortive Madiun rebellion was launched in Indonesia by the veteran Communist leader Muso, who had but recently returned there under an assumed name after over twenty years of exile in Russia and other foreign

¹ Founded in April 1924, *Bolshevik*, a theoretical and political magazine, was renamed *Kommunist* in November 1952, following the decision of the CPSU at its Nineteenth Congress to drop the designation of the Party as *Bolshevik*.

lands. The results of Zhdanov's call for a more militant policy were all too evident. His action had, moreover, been echoed in China by Mao Tse-Tung who, on Christmas Day 1947, had called on 'all anti-imperialist forces of the various Eastern countries to unite to oppose the oppression of imperialism and the reactionaries within each country'.

It was on 5th October that year that the world learned that a Communist Information Bureau, the Cominform, had been established in Belgrade a short time previously and that on the occasion of its formation Zhdanov had delivered a report analysing the international situation. The full text of this oration was published a month later in the first issue of the Cominform organ, a fortnightly paper with the curiously cumbrous title, *For a Lasting Peace, For a People's Democracy*. More compendiously known as the Cominform journal, this mouthpiece of Moscow has since then been the main printed medium through which Communists throughout the world have been given ideological guidance and shown the correct line to follow in every circumstance affecting Soviet foreign policy. At the present time it is published simultaneously in some twenty languages, including Chinese, Japanese and Korean.¹

With regard to the Cominform itself, Zhdanov made it clear that one of its main purposes was, by 'mutual consultation and voluntary co-ordination of action between individual Communist parties', to sabotage the Marshall Plan—'the American plan for the enthrallment of Europe' as he called it. Concerning its aim, therefore, he was reasonably frank; but his depiction of the Cominform as a body for 'mutual consultation and voluntary co-ordination' was soon shown to be sheer sophistry. As Tito was to discover, it had been founded, 'not as a consultative body for the exchange of views between Communist parties, but as a weapon by which to impose their [the Russians'] will upon the other Parties'² [2].

In explaining the need for consultation and co-ordination, Zhdanov let drop a remark which, at the time, may have seemed no more than a trivial sarcasm, but which, in the light of subsequent developments, clearly foreshadowed one of the outstanding features of the Kremlin's new policy. Asserting that 'some comrades (had)

¹ With the dissolution of the Cominform in April 1956, this journal ceased publication; but its functions as ideological guide and purveyor of the party lines are continued to a large extent by Moscow radio and other means.

² At its inauguration, the Cominform consisted of two delegates from each of the nine Communist parties represented.

understood the dissolution of the Comintern to imply the elimination of all ties, of all contact, between the fraternal Communist Parties', he had gone on to say: 'The Communists even refrained from meeting one another, let alone consulting with one another on questions of mutual interest to them, from fear of the slanderous talks of their enemies regarding "the hand of Moscow".' In contrast to this, he remarked ruefully: 'Representatives of the most diverse fields of endeavour—scientists, co-operators, trade unionists, the youth, students—deem it possible to maintain international contact, to exchange experience and consult with one another on matters relating to their work, to arrange international congresses and conferences.'

The significance of this plaintive contrast soon became clear. Unlike its Comintern predecessor, the Cominform proved to have no widely ramified organization or executive power, nor did it summon world congresses or conferences of its own or under its auspices. Instead of reviving a highly organized and purely Communist body like the Comintern as its instrument, the Kremlin had, in fact, decided to disguise its control of the revolutionary machinery by relying primarily on seemingly harmless neutral bodies representing such 'diverse fields of endeavour' as those mentioned by Zhdanov and using them as 'transmission belts'. By building them up into world organizations and infiltrating active Communists into the key posts in these organizations, it only required a skeleton bureau—professedly international, but actually the mouthpiece of Moscow—to provide these key men with the ideological guidance necessary to ensure that the organizations themselves followed the policy line laid down by the Kremlin. Some of these international organizations, it is true, were already in being before the Cominform was created, but it remained for the Cominform to weld them into a closely integrated instrument of Soviet foreign policy.

As time went on, the extension of Communist control over these organizations became increasingly evident and disillusionment set in in some quarters. Thus, for example, it came about that the WFTU was split in January 1949, when its main British, American and Dutch components, thoroughly disillusioned, withdrew. A similar split had occurred in the IUS a year or so previously, many student unions of non-Communist countries leaving it in protest against its subservience to Soviet policy. By 1949 most of the non-Communist members of the WFDY (World Federation of Democratic Youth)

had likewise resigned for similar reasons. But the frequent conferences, congresses, festivals, and international junketings of various kinds held by these world Communist Front organizations of trade unions, youths, students, women, scientists, lawyers, journalists and the like, appeared to hold a peculiar fascination for the less sophisticated elements, especially in the under-developed countries of Asia and Latin America.

It was to the youth of South and East Asia that particular attention was paid, and it was following a tour of that area by a combined commission of the IUS and WFDY in 1947 that the IUS, with its headquarters in Prague, set up a special bureau with the resounding name of Bureau of Youth Fighting Against Colonialism. The WFDY, for its part, established its own Colonial Bureau. It was also under the joint auspices of the IUS and WFDY that the South-East Asia Youth Conference, the precursor of the armed Communist revolts in Burma, Malaya and Indonesia, was held in Calcutta in February 1948. And here it may be interjected that, in spite of the flood of reports then and later alleging the formation of a Far-Eastern or South-East Asian Cominform, evidence of the existence of such a body has never been forthcoming. Those responsible for these rumours appear to have envisaged the Cominform as a highly organized body with world-wide ramifications and executive powers like the Comintern; they therefore assumed that an off-shoot would be set up in the Far East or South-East Asia, akin to the former Far-Eastern Bureau of the Comintern. But the Cominform, in so far as it could be said to exist as an organization, was nothing more than a bureau serving, through the medium of its journal, as Moscow's mouthpiece for the ideological guidance of the faithful.

For a Lasting Peace, For a People's Democracy—The first half of the title of this journal is significant, as Moscow has, since its early days as the prime instigator of World Revolution, sought to pose as the champion of peace; and within a year of the Cominform's birth came the launching of the spurious World Peace campaign, which has been one of the main and most closely co-ordinated preoccupations of the various international Communist Front organizations ever since. Zhdanov himself had foreshadowed the exploitation of the peace theme when, in his inaugural address to the Cominform, he had declared: 'The Soviet Union in its foreign policy . . . strives for a lasting peace.' It was not, however, until August 1948, when the World Congress of Intellectuals for Peace was held in Wroclaw, that

the first real move in the campaign was made and an initial liaison committee was set up to co-ordinate the work of the various national committees established at the same time. It is significant that the first World Peace Congress, which was held in Paris eight months later, was sponsored by this liaison committee in conjunction with the Women's International Democratic Federation, as it was recognized that the peace theme would make a particular appeal to women. It was at this congress that the World Committee of Partisans of Peace, later to be known as the World Peace Committee and later still as the World Peace Council, was established; and it was this newly formed body which, in March 1950, launched the Stockholm Peace Appeal with its demand for 'the total banning of the atomic weapon'.

Moscow's hand in preparing the way for this appeal had been indicated four months previously by an article in the Cominform journal, declaring that the struggle for peace 'should now become the pivot of the entire activity of the Communist parties and democratic organizations' [3]. The 'democratic organizations' to which this referred in particular were the international Communist Front organizations. To them the phrase served as a directive and they have followed it faithfully and vigorously, giving wholehearted support not only to the general theme of 'a lasting peace', but also to the varying phases of Soviet foreign policy reflected in the resolutions passed by successive peace conferences, congresses and meetings of all kinds. These have varied from appeals for a Five-Power Peace Pact, condemnation of colonialism, and demands for the lessening of international tension, to resolutions on Germany, Japan, China and Korea and to denunciations of America's alleged resort to germ warfare in Korea. The prime object of the campaign was, of course, to divide and confuse the free world by endeavouring to persuade its peoples that Soviet policy was peace-loving and therefore constituted no danger to anyone. It sought to depict Western defence measures as not only unnecessary and a waste of money, but as dangerous sabre-rattling. Blatant Communist aims were studiously avoided, as these would only have served to frighten off prospective recruits who, though opposed to Communist dogma, could be induced to support Soviet foreign policy if suitably disguised, in the belief that they were fighting for peace.

Although the World Peace Council and all the other international Communist Front organizations had their headquarters in Europe,¹

¹ The WPC had its headquarters in Prague until April 1954, when it moved to

national committees or other similar affiliated bodies were set up in other parts of the world. Thus each of these international organizations had its own national counterparts in every quarter of the globe, serving as local 'transmission belts' to their own particular sections of the populace in each country¹—trade unions, youth, women and so on. The channels and instruments for communicating guidance and directives from Moscow in the dual cause of Soviet foreign policy and World Revolution were therefore, and still are, remarkably simple and effective. With the Cominform journal as mouthpiece—supplemented by Moscow radio transmissions—the Communist parties and the Communists controlling the international organizations were kept constantly guided along the policy lines required by the Kremlin. The international organizations then ensured that the appropriate propaganda and directives were transmitted to the affiliated bodies in each country for consumption by the unsophisticated masses. To assist further in the work of personal contact, co-ordination and dissemination, individual representatives of the various national bodies are elected to serve on the permanent apparatus of the international organizations to which they are affiliated and take part in their deliberations, while delegations from the national bodies are sent to attend the periodic world congresses and conferences staged by these world organizations.

This, then, is roughly the pattern introduced and developed since the birth of the Cominform in the autumn of 1947 for countering the Marshall Plan and subsequent Western policies and for furthering the cause of World Revolution and Soviet domination. It applies as much to the countries of South and East Asia as to those in other parts of the world. The legitimate interests of the trade union, youth, women's and other movements affected by it, are subordinated entirely to the political interests of the Soviet Union.

Vienna. The IUS has been in Prague since its inception. The WFTU, WFDY and WIDF were based on Paris until January 1951, when they were banned in France on account of their activities and moved to Vienna, Budapest and Berlin respectively. Five years later in February 1956, the Austrian Government ordered the WFTU to remove its headquarters from Vienna, as it was 'endangering the national interests of Austria'.

¹ Although the designations of the national counterparts of the particular international organizations mentioned varied from country to country, the general pattern is illustrated by the names of those in China—the China Peace Committee, All-China Federation of Trade Unions, All-China Federation of Democratic Youth, All-China Students' Federation and All-China Democratic Women's Federation.

These various national mass movements affiliated to the Communist world front organizations, it should be stressed, are not actual organs of the local Communist parties. But they do, in fact, carry out the Party directives and, by serving as 'transmission belts' linking the Party with the masses, enable the Party to 'exercise the dictatorship of the proletariat' through their medium in Communist-governed states. This has been fully explained by, amongst others, Lai Jo-Yu, secretary-general of the All-China Federation of Trade Unions, who, though dealing more specifically with the trade unions as 'transmission belts' and as 'schools' for 'persuading and educating' the masses, wrote an enlightening article on the subject in December 1954 under the title of *How to Treat the Masses* [4].

In so far as the world organizations and their off-shoots in the Far East are concerned, it only remains to be added that, as a result of the WFTU Asian Labour Conference held in Peking in November 1949, a WFTU Liaison Bureau for Asia and Australasia was established in the Chinese capital. Three years later, in October 1952, a Peace Conference of the Asian and Pacific regions set up a Peace Liaison Committee and Secretariat for those regions in the same city. The WFTU, however, appears to have had considerable trouble with its Peking Bureau from the start and it is significant that the Chinese have shown themselves averse to taking orders from the foreign-controlled parent body in Europe, especially when they concern the laying down of policy for Asian countries. The Chinese attitude, in fact, appears to have been that if an international organization such as the Liaison Bureau was established in their capital, it should be virtually autonomous under Chinese control. Chinese susceptibilities appear to have been upset, therefore, by the idea that it should be under the directions of a foreign-controlled body in Europe when it was concerned primarily with Asia, of which China regards itself as the leader. This would seem to explain why it was that the Bureau seemed virtually moribund for its first few years of existence and why, on at least one occasion, an invitation to Asian trade union organizations to send delegates to Peking for talks came from the All-China Federation of Trade Unions rather than from the WFTU Liaison Bureau. Since the withdrawal of its Australian member—its only non-Asian member—in 1954 and the addition of an Indian, an Indonesian and a Japanese member a year later, however, there have been signs of a revival and greater activity. The Peace Liaison Committee, on the other hand, was never seemingly

affected in the same way, although its main purpose appears to have been largely restricted to the welcoming of foreign delegations visiting Peking.

The Communist conception of trade unions is, of course, as different from the democratic idea in the international field as it is in the domestic sphere. Both in the Soviet Union and in China, for example, the 'constant and primary task' of the trade unions is defined as being 'to organize healthy and constant emulation' among the workers, to 'strengthen labour discipline', to 'raise labour productivity', and to 'fulfil and overfulfil production plans'.¹ How much this differs from the Western conception of trade union functions needs no stress. That the difference is not confined to the domestic field, however, was fully demonstrated at the Asian Labour Conference which, in November 1949, gave birth to the WFTU Liaison Bureau in Peking. Whereas trade union matters received but perfunctory attention, the main feature of the meeting was an undisguisedly incendiary address by the Chinese Communist secretary-general, Liu Shao-Chi. Speaking in his capacity as a vice-president of the WFTU, he called on 'the peoples of the various colonial and semi-colonial countries' to follow 'the path taken by the Chinese people' and, 'whenever and wherever possible', resort to 'armed struggle' as the best means of 'defeating imperialism and its lackeys' and seizing power [5]. Again, two and a half years later, during the reception given to visiting trade union delegates by the WFTU Asian Bureau after the May Day celebrations in Peking in 1952, Thornton, the Australian member of the Bureau, declared that the condition for normal trade union activity was the 'liberation of colonial and semi-colonial countries from oppression and exploitation by foreign imperialists and their lackeys', and the placing of the WFTU 'unhesitatingly' in support of national liberation struggles. The machinery of the WFTU is, in fact, specially designed for political and economic disruption.

One final feature of the Communist Front organizations calls for mention. This is the rather pathetic attempt made to convey the impression that the high-sounding congresses and conferences held under their auspices are wholly impartial in character and convened for purely altruistic purposes. This is particularly true of the gather-

¹ The definition used by Shvernik at the Eleventh Congress of Soviet Trade Unions in June 1954 and that used for the Chinese in an article in the *Peking People's Daily* of 13th May 1953 are almost identical in wording.

ings concerned, directly or indirectly, with the peace campaign; but it applies likewise to other meetings as well, and every subterfuge possible is used to hide the cloven hoof behind the proceedings. No better example of the anxiety to disguise the true nature could be found than the admission made at the Third Congress of the WFTU in October 1952 by its chairman, the Italian Communist, di Vittorio. After declaring, 'The WFTU aims to win over people of all political beliefs', he went on to say with great earnestness, 'but if it is to enlist the support of both artisans and intellectuals, it must not be officially labelled Communist or Soviet-run.'

CHAPTER XXXII

The Chinese Path to Power

THE initial successes scored by the Chinese Nationalists after the launching of their offensive early in 1947 were followed by a period of see-saw fighting in which first one side and then the other registered gains. By the close of the year, however, the Communists had more or less restored the situation to what it had been in June 1946 when the first large-scale fighting had broken out, and by 21st April 1948 they had recovered their war-time capital of Yen-an, from which they had been driven just thirteen months previously.

Both in North China and in Manchuria, the Communists were rapidly gaining the upper hand and consolidating their hold, and four months after their return to Yen-an they were able to announce the formation of a North China People's Government, with the striking down of 'American imperialism and Kuomintang rule in China' as its declared aim. By the end of October the whole of Manchuria was in their hands and 1948 closed with Chiang Kai-Shek announcing his readiness for conditional peace talks. Flushed with success, however, the Communists rejected his proposals. The revolution, they retorted, could not be stopped in mid-stream and would therefore be carried through to the end. Three weeks later, on 21st January 1949, Peking was surrendered to them.

It was 1st April before formal peace negotiations were opened, only to break down within a week when the Nationalists rejected an ultimatum to place their armies under Communist command. The tables had been turned completely since the days when, three years earlier, negotiations for a peace settlement had been brought to an end by the refusal of the Communists to place their armies at the disposal of the Nationalists.

On the rejection of their ultimatum, the Communists launched a general offensive on a hundred-mile front along the Yangtse and by 21st April had crossed the river at Wuhu and forced the Nationalist government to leave Nanking for Canton. Nanking itself fell two

days later, Soochow on the 24th, and a month after this the great port of Shanghai was in Communist hands, its capture having been preceded on 16th May by the fall of Hankow. By the end of May 1949, therefore, the Communists were in control of the main Yangtse Valley area with all its wealth of cities and industry and they were faced with the multitudinous and unaccustomed problems of organization and administration which this involved. A halt in large-scale military operations was consequently inevitable while the work of consolidation was proceeding and preparations for the next stage in the advance southwards were being made. By August, however, city after city south of the Yangtse was falling into Communist hands and on 23rd August the Communists were back in Juichin, the seat of the Chinese Soviet government until the start of the Long March in 1934. There followed a revolt in Yunnan against the Nationalists and on 4th September came a semi-official announcement that the PLA¹ intended to liberate Tibet. The days of the Nationalists, even in the outlying territories claimed by China, were numbered and, following the submission of the provinces of Suiyuan and Sinkiang late that month, the decision to establish the People's Republic of China was announced. On 1st October the Central People's Government came into being, Mao Tse-Tung as chairman proclaiming the inauguration of the new régime.

That Peking was selected as the capital of what now became known as New China was no chance choice. Rather does it seem to have been a piece of calculated policy. Western imperialism and the Chinese Nationalists might be denounced in the most vehement terms, but the Chinese Communists, with a keen sense of history, were determined to make the New China as widely revered and respected as ever Imperial China had been in its heyday. To them, therefore, Peking was symbolic and their aim appears to have been to restore the former imperial glories, making of Peking a Mecca—or a second Moscow—towards which Chinese everywhere, at home and abroad, together with the Communists of all the countries of South and East Asia, would turn and render homage.

One small point of interest may be noted in connection with the celebrations ushering in the new régime. As though to illustrate the truth of Mao's former quip, 'Washington is our arsenal and Chiang the organizer of our transport', the troops taking part in the military

¹ The Communist armed forces had adopted the name of People's Liberation Army in July 1946.

parade on that occasion wore American uniforms and were well supplied with American arms and equipment. These had been taken from the Nationalist forces who had surrendered or come over to the Communist side in such large numbers.¹

While it was largely by force of arms—the policy of the armed struggle on which Mao had placed such store—that the Communists had been brought to power, the growing discontent of the Chinese people with Nationalist corruption, incompetence and high-handedness had also played its part; so, too, had Communist propaganda which, in addition to undermining Nationalist morale, had harped on the virtues of the principles laid down by Mao in his discourse on the New Democracy. Memories of the stand taken by the Communists against the Japanese from the early 1930's onward until the collapse of Japan in 1945 also served to rally to their cause many for whom Communism as such made little or no appeal. Thus it came about that not only the vast peasant population, which had so much to gain from the agrarian reforms promised by the Communists, but also the student class, social reformers, and even large numbers of businessmen had been attracted increasingly to the Communist cause. The Communists for their part had shown no small skill in winning over this varied assortment of non-Communist elements and by the close of 1947, when Mao put forward a plea for a revolutionary national united front of all classes other than the big landlords and big bourgeoisie [1], their success in this respect was becoming ever more apparent.

Since the end of the Pacific War, a number of organizations had been formed by KMT elements opposed to Chiang's dictatorial methods and in January 1948 these had been amalgamated to form the KMT Revolutionary Committee. Under the chairmanship of the former war-lord, Li Chai-Sum, it had as its declared aim the overthrow of the Nationalist régime and the establishment of a coalition government. That same month had seen the revival, in Hong Kong, of the Chinese Democratic League, a bourgeois democratic body which had been outlawed in China two months previously on account of its outspoken criticisms of KMT tyranny and corruption. Connected with the first of these two bodies at the outset was

1

¹ Already a year earlier Mao had claimed that the Communist forces had killed, wounded and captured '2,649,000 Kuomintang troops' by June 1948; See his article in the Cominform journal on the occasion of the thirty-first anniversary of the October Revolution.

another former war-lord, the 'Christian General', Feng Yu-Hsiang. He, however, died at sea in September 1948 while on his way to Communist China; but his widow, Li Teh-Chuan, was later to figure prominently in the deliberations of the Communist-controlled WIDF and as a member of the World Peace Council.

By September 1948 representatives of the KMT Revolutionary Committee had left Hong Kong for discussions in Communist China, and the Chinese Democratic League Headquarters had been invited by Mao to send delegates to North China for consultations on the question of co-operation. Twelve months later delegates from both these bodies, and from other non-Communist organizations as well, took part in the first plenary session of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference in Peking, when the finishing touches were put to the establishment of the new régime and its Communist-controlled coalition government.

It was at this meeting that the new national flag was adopted, with its symbolic device of a large star representing the Communist Party, flanked by four smaller stars representing the workers, peasants, bourgeoisie, and 'patriotic' capitalists. It thus reflected Mao's conception of a coalition as opposed to an outright, undisguised Communist régime, a coalition of Communists and non-Communists under the guidance and control of the Communist Party. The co-operation of the non-Communist bourgeoisie and 'patriotic' capitalists, with their technical knowledge and business and administrative experience, was considered essential at the outset for the proper functioning of the new régime. These elements in China's vast population¹ had therefore to be encouraged to co-operate to the full by being given posts in the government and being made to feel that they had a real say in the government of the country. That this was but a temporary expedient and that, unless they had become 'politically educated' in the meantime, they would be dispensed with as soon as they had served their purpose, was carefully hidden from them. Had they shown greater perspicuity in interpreting Communist pronouncements or taken warning from what had been happening in Eastern Europe, they might not have been so ready to co-operate. One such hint had been given just three months before the inauguration of the new régime when Mao, in his address on 'People's Democratic Dictatorship' [2] on the occasion of the twenty-eighth

¹ According to the census figures announced from Peking in June 1954, the population now numbers 602 millions, including those overseas and in Formosa.

anniversary of the founding of the Chinese Communist Party, had referred to the necessity of 'suppressing counter-revolutionary and reactionary elements of all types' and had gone on to say: 'Benevolent administration would definitely not be applied when dealing with the counter-revolutionary activities of the reactionary cliques and classes.' His words were perhaps intended primarily as a warning to the latter to watch their step; but as the term 'counter-revolutionary and reactionary elements of all kinds' would, in Communist parlance, include all who were not either revolutionary workers or peasants, the implication should have been clear.

Mao, however, showed wisdom in encouraging the support of the so-called 'patriotic' or 'national' capitalists,¹ as their knowledge and experience were essential in the early stages for the economic welfare of the country. His retention of this modified form of capitalism, however, was misunderstood by some of the more fanatical members of his Party as well as by some Communists of other nationalities—in much the same way as Trotsky's retention of Czarist officers for building up and training the Red Army in Russia had been by the Bolshevik extremists. The pre-war Chinese Communist leader, Li Li-San, who had been summoned to Moscow in disgrace in 1933 and had returned to China under an assumed name with the Russian troops invading Manchuria in August 1945, was amongst those who had criticized Mao's policy in this respect and had been forced to make a public recantation in May 1949. Eight months later Moscow, through the medium of the Cominform journal, was to take to task Ranadive, secretary-general of the Indian Communist Party, for similar criticisms of Mao's policy; and Ranadive was likewise compelled to indulge in abject recantation.

Important, however, as it was to encourage the bourgeois elements and national capitalists to give their support, it was on the peasant masses that Mao had mainly relied during his rise to power. These, in his discourse on Coalition Government in April 1945 [3], he had described as 'the basic foundations of a democratic China'. But in the months immediately preceding the final overthrow of the Nationalist régime there were already signs that Marxist orthodoxy, which gave pre-eminence to the urban proletariat, was beginning to reassert itself. Chinese urban labour, it will be recalled, had learned

¹ This designation was applied to those engaged in purely Chinese trade and industry, in contradistinction to the maligned compradore class, which in Communist eyes was linked with foreign imperialists as enemies of the people.

its lesson in the summer of 1927 at the time of the violent break-up of the CCP-KMT alliance, and for the next twenty-one years organized labour had played but little part in the Chinese Communist movement. In the summer of 1948, however, workers representing the areas 'liberated' by the Communists in North China and Manchuria met for a conference in Harbin and, shortly after, the All-China Federation of Labour was re-established when the Sixth All-China Congress of Labour was held in that same city. With final victory almost in sight, the Communists were clearly preparing the way for a return to more orthodox principles. Seven months later, in March 1949, came the announcement that the Communist leaders had decided that the time had come to 'shift the centre of gravity of Party work . . . from the rural areas to the cities' [4].

Although the peasants were to continue to play an all-important role, it was, from now on, made increasingly clear that this was to be subsidiary to the role of urban labour. Growing attention was accordingly paid to the building up of organized labour to play the leading part in the years ahead and by May 1949, when the First North China Labour Congress was held in Tientsin, Liu Shao-Chi was pointing the way when he declared to the assembled delegates that the time had come to consider the organization of twenty million workers of the whole country on industrial lines¹ [5]. Plans for the industrialization of the country and the development of organized labour were to go hand in hand, with industrialization serving the dual purpose of strengthening the country economically and increasing the numbers engaged in urban labour. Organized labour, moreover, was to play an increasing part in international Communism and on 29th May, at a meeting held in Peking, the All-China Federation of Labour not only expressed its approval of the consolidation of Sino-Soviet friendship but chose delegates to attend the WFTU Conference, which was to be held in Milan a month later. From then onwards, China was to play a leading part in all WFTU deliberations and in November 1949 was selected as host for the WFTU Asian Labour Conference, which resulted in the establishment of a permanent WFTU Liaison Bureau for Asia and the Pacific regions in Peking.

¹ Even today, Chinese industrial workers still form a very small minority of the total population. Figures published at the end of 1954 put the total labour force at only fifteen million, including some eleven million office workers within industry. Actual industrial workers, therefore, numbered only about four million compared with over five hundred million peasants.

While organized labour was being built up in this way and the All-China Federation of Labour had become bound up with the WFTU, other sections of the Chinese people were being similarly organized as 'transmission belts' linked with the corresponding international Communist Front organizations. March 1949 saw the birth of the All-China Students' Federation and its affiliation to the IUS. A month later the All-China Democratic Women's Federation was brought into being as the Chinese counterpart of the WIDF, and in May the All-China Federation of Democratic Youth was inaugurated for affiliation to the WFDY. That each of these bodies was founded at successive congresses of students, women, and youth held in Peking so shortly after the surrender of that ancient and historic city to the Communists in January that year, was indicative of the speed and energy with which the victors had consolidated their position. Organizations of writers and artists, journalists, scientists, lawyers and the like were also formed to serve as 'transmission belts' and were similarly geared to equivalent international Communist Front bodies.

In addition there was founded in April 1949 another youth organization; but with a different purpose. This was the New Democratic Youth League, a body which was to serve, not as a Communist 'front' but as a 'leadership training cadre' or training centre for youths aspiring to eventual membership of the Communist Party. The Party had always, from the time of its inception in 1921, paid special attention to attracting youth into its ranks and, having first set up a Chinese Socialist Youth League, had later built up youth units. It was, therefore, to continue the work of these former youth groups that the New Democratic Youth League was established in May 1949. The importance attached to it was to be indicated four years later when, at its Second All-China Congress in June 1953, Liu Shao-Chi described it as 'the lieutenant and reserve force of the Party' and stressed the duty of its members to work for 'the fulfilment of the industrial and agricultural production plans of the state' and 'loyalty to the Motherland'. Other tributes paid to it on that same occasion included its characterization as 'the powerful helpmate of the Communist Party', 'an important shock force in China's national construction', and 'the nucleus round which all the youth of China shall be organized for the building of the New Democratic Society'. By that time this Chinese version of the Hitler *Jugend* claimed a membership of nine million, including over one million in the Army,

in which it served as 'a strong political organization under Chinese Communist Party leadership' [6].

In the years that have passed since then, this youth organization has risen steadily in numbers. By September 1955 it claimed to have increased its membership to thirteen million and its Central Committee decided to submit a proposal for renaming it the Young Communist League of China. This proposal was to be put forward on the occasion of the Third Congress of this 'militant reserve of the Party', due to be held in the latter part of 1956. The projected new name, recalling its forerunner, the Chinese Socialist Youth League, would seem, therefore, to reflect the gradual transition of China from socialism to Communism. It invites comparison, too, with the Russian claim to have reached 'the completion of the building up of socialism and of the gradual transfer from socialism to Communism' in the Soviet Union, the claim made in connection with Molotov's 'major ideological error' in his statement before the Supreme Soviet in February 1955.

While all this regimentation was proceeding as a preliminary to the inauguration of the new régime, the Chinese Communist leaders were almost going out of their way to emphasize their alignment with the Soviet bloc. Yugoslavia's expulsion from the Cominform at the close of June 1948 was followed ten days later by a broadcast by Mao berating Tito and supporting the Cominform. The signing of the Atlantic Pact the following April called forth an immediate denunciation of it by the CCP and a pledge to support Russia in the event of war. Three months later, in his speech on the twenty-eighth anniversary of the founding of the CCP, Mao stressed the alignment of Communist China with the Soviet bloc and China's position as part of the 'anti-imperialist front' [7], while the slogans issued on that occasion included 'Joint defence of the Far East by the USSR and China'. Then came the announcement on 30th July 1949 that a Manchurian Trade Agreement had been signed that day in Moscow by Kao Kang¹ and on 2nd October, the day following the inauguration of the Communist régime in China, the Soviet Union, which had just sent a Cultural Delegation to Peking headed by Alexander Fedeyev, announced her recognition of the newly-established Chinese People's Republic and her readiness to enter into diplomatic relations with it.

¹ After rising to fourth or fifth place in the Party's hierarchy, Kao Kang fell into disgrace early in 1954, although it was not until April the following year that his expulsion from the Party and his suicide were announced from Peking.

Three days later a Sino-Soviet Friendship Association for all China was inaugurated in Peking.

The close alignment thus established between Peking and Moscow has, as yet, shown no open signs of weakening, in spite of occasional wishful thinking by Western observers. On the contrary, it has been strengthened. It is, however, possible to detect a number of points of potential friction in the years ahead—notably over Mongolia, Manchuria, Korea, and Sinkiang—and it is perhaps not wholly without significance that, even in the earliest days of the new régime in China, Chinese Communist leaders were at pains to emphasize differences between their own revolution and that of Russia, the implication being apparently that their own was possibly superior. Thus, Liu Shao-Chi, in an address delivered on 11th November 1949 at a Sino-Soviet Friendship meeting in Peking, declared: 'The nature of the Great Revolution of the Chinese people is, generally speaking, still a New Democratic Revolution against imperialism and feudalism and not a revolution of a socialist nature, on which point it is different from the Soviet October Revolution.' Four days later the Cominform journal published an article on 'The October Socialist Revolution and the Revolution in China' by Chen Po-Ta, who stressed in it that the CCP was 'founded on the pattern of the Bolshevism of Lenin and Stalin without the traditions of Social Democracy'.

While it would clearly be unwise to read too much into such attempts as these to emphasize minor differences of approach to revolution, Chen's concluding words, 'without the traditions of Social Democracy', have a rather wider implication. They serve to recall that social democracy, which Moscow regards with contempt and abhorrence, did in fact exercise an influence on the revolutionary movement in Russia in its early days. The Chinese Communists, on the other hand, can claim in all truth to have been wholly free from its 'taint'.

Although alignment with the Soviet bloc was constantly being stressed and Western, particularly American, 'imperialism' denounced, the Communists were clearly anxious, when taking over control, to make a good impression on the Western world and, subject to certain conditions, to enter into amicable relations with it. With this end in view, Mao and Chu Teh had issued a proclamation on 25th April laying down eight principles, one of which was the security of foreign lives and property. Together with freedom of religion, which was also promised, this was later to be embodied in

Article 5 of the Common Programme laid down in the autumn as a provisional form of Constitution.

After the occupation of Peking in January, foreigners on the whole were, in fact, agreeably surprised to find how leniently they were treated and how quickly and efficiently the Communists set about restoring and maintaining law and order. In particular, the discipline and efficiency of the Communist troops made a marked impression on the foreign community, familiar as it was with the slovenly, ill-disciplined soldiery of former days. If complaint there was, it was not with bullying or regimentation but with the inclination of the new masters of China to ignore the existence of foreign residents. While, however, the individual foreigner had little cause for complaint at the outset, the Communists very soon made it clear that they were more nationalist than the Nationalists; and within a week of the proclamation guaranteeing the safety of foreign lives and property, a demand was made for the withdrawal of all foreign warships from Chinese waters and of all foreign armed forces and military establishments from Chinese territory. Such open manifestations of foreign 'imperialism', impinging as they did on China's sovereign rights, could no longer be tolerated. This was understandable; but a year later even missionary work was to be denounced as an instrument of Western imperialism and treated accordingly.

While determined to root out all forms of Western influence or interference, the Communists continued nonetheless to stress their desire for intercourse with the outside world, and on 15th June Mao declared his readiness to establish diplomatic relations with any foreign country ready to negotiate on a basis of equality. A fortnight later he added that, in order to make China an industrial nation and economically independent, he was prepared to trade even with imperialist powers [8]. It was but the logical outcome of all those earlier pronouncements that, on the formal establishment of the new régime on 1st October, foreign governments were promptly notified of its readiness to establish normal relations.

That the Soviet Union was the first to respond has already been noted. The satellite countries of Eastern Europe were quick to follow Moscow's lead and in December Burma, and then India, led the way for the Asian powers to accord recognition. When early in the New Year, on 6th January, Britain took the same step, she was influenced to no small extent by the lesson learned from withholding recognition of Soviet Russia when it came to power in 1917 and by the fear that

failure to recognize the new régime in China might serve to drive it still further into Moscow's arms. Viewing the whole matter dispassionately, historians of the future will probably agree that Britain was justified in the step she took. Through circumstances beyond her control, however, she failed to achieve her purpose.

In concluding this survey of developments leading up to the establishment of the new régime in China, two further points must be mentioned. The first concerns the switching over of the main Communist effort from the countryside to the towns and cities. Not only did this raise vast new problems of organization and administration for the inadequate and largely inexperienced staffs at the disposal of the new masters; it also placed the temptations of town life and civic office before those who, during all the years of fighting, had lived lives of hardship and austerity. That Mao recognized the danger of the weaker brethren lapsing into evil ways, when suddenly confronted with the joys of relative ease and comfort and with the opportunity of indulging in the corrupt practices so prevalent among the bureaucracy of former régimes, was shown by the warning he gave when addressing a session of the Party's Central Committee on 12th March 1949. Some Party members who had resisted real bullets while fighting in the civil war, he declared, might not be able to stand up to the 'sugar-coated bullets' they would encounter in taking over cities [9]. That the warning was well justified was shown nearly three years later when Chen Yi, Commander of the Third Army, called for a clean-up of those elements who had 'fallen into the quagmire of corruption and degeneration' and recalled this phrase about the 'sugar-coated bullets' [10]. It was to be recalled yet again in July 1952 in an article in the Cominform journal by An Tzu-Wen, the vice-director of the Chinese Communist Organization Department [11].

The final point deserving notice is Liu Shao-Chi's address at the opening session of the Political Consultative Conference in Peking on 21st September, in which he explained that the ultimate goals of the new régime were Socialism and Communism, but that the time was not yet ripe for attaining them. Some delegates, he complained, wish 'to write down the future socialism of China into the Common Programme';¹ but this, he declared, was inappropriate, as 'the

¹ The Chinese Communists had a Minimum Programme and a Maximum Programme. The former pointed to its immediate aims, the latter to its ultimate goals. This 'future socialism' was included in the latter and was purposely played down in the former. It is now, however, definitely included in the new Constitution, which replaced the Common Programme in September 1954.

taking of considerably serious socialist steps in China is a thing of the rather far future. . . . Without doubt, in the future, China will travel to Socialism and Communism, because the outcome of the industrialization of China will either lead her to Socialism or turn her into an imperialist country' [12].

The significance of this statement needs no emphasis. It showed clearly the ultimate aim of the new régime which was to be formally inaugurated ten days later, and it showed too that the Communist leaders realized the need for curbing the impetuosity of those who wished to hasten the attainment of the Communist Utopia. It indicated, also, a recognition of the fact that industrialization, which was indispensable for the creation of a numerically strong urban proletariat as the basis of a Communist régime and for the economic independence of the New China, would add greatly to the military power of the country and might even divert its leaders to imperialist aspirations. Remembering how Soviet Russia had become the heir to Czarist expansionism, and remembering too how Peking's dreams of extending its control over the lands whose allegiance was claimed by Imperial China in bygone days have been reflected in maps published by the present régime [13], one cannot ignore the possibility that these words, spoken by Liu Shao-Chi in September 1949, may foreshadow a time when Chinese imperialism may prove an even greater danger to the peace of the world than Chinese Communism.

CHAPTER XXXIII

The Chinese Model

'COMMUNISM is able to appeal to Chinese nationalism and to present the imperialist, not the capitalist, as the real enemy,' wrote an astute observer in November 1950 on his return from China [1]. It was, in fact, largely through this appeal to national pride and patriotic sentiment that the Communists won the support of such diverse elements as ex-war-lords, merchant princes, students and peasants.

By standing up to the foreign powers in the way it did, and by the speed and energy with which it set about carrying out its plans, the new régime quickly made it clear that it was totally different from anything that had been seen in China for well over a century. Here at last was a strong central government, seemingly efficient and free from corruption, which knew its own mind and was prepared, not only to enforce its will on its own people, but to ensure that the New China and its people received from other powers the treatment and respect due to equals. No longer would China tolerate any treatment short of equality; no longer would she permit any of her own nationals to be knocked around or slighted in any way by foreigners, either in her own ports or in foreign lands. A Palmerstonian attitude in this respect began to assert itself and the governments of Hong Kong, Malaya, Indo-China, Siam and the Philippines were, each in turn, subjected to denunciations and warnings for alleged persecution or ill-treatment of the Chinese communities in their territories. That the 'persecution' in most instances amounted to nothing more than deportation of Chinese guilty of subversive activities was considered no excuse.

This readiness to enforce respect for itself and to protect the rights and interests of its countrymen abroad made a particularly favourable impression on the overseas Chinese, those large communities living in the neighbouring countries of South-East Asia. Numerically these ten or twelve million Chinese may have seemed but a small

fraction of the total of close on six hundred million in China itself; but economically, politically and morally they exercised, and always had exercised, an influence far in excess of their actual numbers. From them had come the moral and financial support for the revolution which overthrew the Manchu rulers of China in 1911. From them had come similar support for the nationalist revolution a few years later. Moreover, in the Eastern lands in which they had settled, they had, by their ability and industry, obtained an economic grip which made them an important factor in the life and welfare of those countries.

The Chinese Communists had been quick to recognize the importance of winning the support of these overseas Chinese and Mao, in his speech on Christmas Day 1947 [2], had been careful to include them specifically in his plans for a National United Front. It was not without significance therefore that, when the Communists came into power, particular attention was paid to gaining their allegiance and a special government organ, the Commission of Overseas Chinese Affairs, was set up to enable them to do so.

While one section of the overseas communities remained loyal to the KMT and another espoused the cause of the new rulers of China wholeheartedly, the great mass of these Chinese—as is the Chinese way—remained ‘fence-sitters’, ready to give their support eventually to whichever side appeared to be the victor. Therein lay, and still lies, the great danger of these large potential Fifth Columns. In the event of further Communist expansion in those regions, they will tend more and more to ingratiate themselves with the winning side by actions inimical to the countries in which they dwell. Moreover, the problems raised by dual nationality and divided loyalty have been further complicated by the fact that, under the 1954 Constitution, all persons of Chinese origin living abroad are regarded as Chinese citizens and each of the communities is represented by one or more deputies in the new Chinese parliament, the National People’s Congress. The fact, however, that Chou En-Lai, while attending the Afro-Asian Conference at Bandung in April 1955, signed a treaty with Indonesia, providing for the abolition of dual nationality within two years among the 2,500,000 Chinese in that archipelago, gives grounds for the hope that similar agreements with other countries in South-East Asia will follow.

While the nationalist aspect of the Peking government’s policy made a strong appeal to the Overseas Chinese, the Communist

leaders, in the period immediately before their seizure of power, had been preparing the way for China to become the focal point for Asiatic Communist activities in general throughout the Far East and South-East Asia. Mao's appeal at the end of 1947 to 'all anti-imperialist forces' in Asia to unite has already been noted. That Mao should have addressed himself in this way to 'all anti-imperialist forces of the various Eastern countries' was a matter of very great significance. Previously there had been some discreetly veiled indications that he had ambitions towards becoming leader of the movement for the liberation, not of China alone but of all South and East Asia; but this was the first time that he had made such a clear bid for this leadership. A year later Liu Shao-Chi was linking the 'liberation movements of the Chinese people' with the 'national liberation movements' of India, Burma, Siam and other Asian countries and advising Communists in colonial and semi-colonial countries to 'enter into co-operation in the anti-imperialist struggle with that section of the national bourgeoisie which is still opposing imperialism' [3]. In effect he was urging them to follow 'the path taken by the Chinese people in defeating imperialism and its lackeys and in founding the People's Republic of China'. In November 1948, however, he had only hinted at this. In November 1949, six weeks after the formal establishment of the new régime, he was to use these actual words and went on to declare that this was 'the path that should be traced by the peoples of the various colonial and semi-colonial countries in their fight for national independence and people's democracy' [4].

It was at the All-Asian Trade Union Congress held in Peking under WFTU auspices that Liu put forward this claim for China to be regarded as the model for other Asian countries to copy, and before long the claim had been endorsed by Moscow. From that time on, therefore, Peking became increasingly the Mecca, or second Moscow, towards which the Communists of many Asian lands turned their eyes. There, too, were held important international Communist gatherings.

Moral support and encouragement, and sometimes material aid, were given to fellow-Asian countries 'groaning under imperialist oppression' and, when considered necessary, criticism and rebukes were administered to them as well. Thus the [appeal] made by the twelve-year-old Panchen Lama in November 1949 for the 'liberation' of Tibet was promptly answered by Mao with the promise that this would be done. Two months later Peking led the way in recognizing

Ho Chi-Minh's government. From then onwards she gave increasing help in the training and equipping of the Viet Minh forces and by December 1954 had signed an agreement to help in restoring communications, services and water conservancy works in Northern Vietnam. How Chinese 'volunteers' saved the situation for the North Koreans in the autumn of 1950 and, later, provided the bulk of the fighting forces on the Communist side in Korea is too well known to call for further mention. It merits recall, however, that in November 1953, in an apparent attempt to outbid the Soviet Union in its efforts to hold first place in Pyongyang's affections, Peking signed a ten-year agreement for economic and cultural co-operation with North Korea on terms extremely generous and favourable to the latter. Peking also played the role of Big Brother when she provided the former Siamese Premier, Pridi, and the Nepali revolutionary, Dr Singh, with moral support in the summer of 1954; and she played a similar role, albeit in a different way, in 1950 when, after first supporting the Cominform's castigation of the Japanese Communist leadership, she sought later, by fraternal advice, to end the factional strife which the Cominform's action had stirred up in the Japanese Party.

Apart from all this direct assistance and advice to other Asian 'younger brothers', Chinese Communist influence was greatly extended by the translations of Mao's writings and those of Liu Shao-Chi. These were studied on an ever-increasing scale, almost as Holy Writ, by the Communist parties of India, Burma, Indonesia, Vietnam and other neighbouring countries. In the Indian Party, it is true, the Ranadive faction was extremely critical of certain features of the Chinese policy and was taken to task by Moscow for its criticisms. Generally speaking, however, China was accepted as the model to be followed, with modifications to suit local circumstances; and Moscow, while continuing to stress the virtues of 'the Chinese path' as the one to be pursued by the 'colonial and semi-colonial peoples of the East', was, by the autumn of 1953, lauding China as 'the powerful bulwark of the oppressed peoples of the East in their struggle for freedom and independence' [5]. Mao himself came in for special praise as a contributor to the Marxist-Leninist canon when the Russian translations of his collected works began to appear in 1952 and Stalin's death in March the following year increased Mao's stature still further. It was with reference to the translation of his earlier writings that Pavel Yudin lauded him for his 'independent contribution to the cause of world revolution' and for 'applying

Marxism-Leninism creatively, not dogmatically, and enriching this theory' [6], while Federenko declared: 'These works will give considerable help to the brotherly Communist Parties, in particular in colonial and dependent countries, in the strategy and tactics of the revolutionary struggle and in the setting up of a democratic régime' [7]. Similar tributes to China in general and to Mao in particular came also from Burma, Vietnam, and North Korea and from Communists in other countries of South and East Asia.

So far as Moscow was concerned, however, such laudatory remarks did not constitute a wholly one-way traffic. In November 1952 a Sino-Soviet Friendship Month was proclaimed in China and from then onward increasing stress was laid by Chinese Communist leaders on the debt owed to the Soviet Union, which was depicted in glowing terms as China's model. 'The Soviet Union of today is the China of tomorrow', declared Mao Tun,¹ vice-chairman of the All-China Federation of Literary and Art Circles, early that month [8]. 'Learn from the Soviet Union, not only from Marxist-Leninist-Stalinist theories, but also from its advanced scientific techniques', Mao Tse-Tung told his audience three months later [9]. Liu Shao-Chi followed this up: 'The Soviet Union is our model and teacher. The path followed by the Soviet Union is, and will be, our path. . . . We must step up our task of learning from the Soviet Union' [10].

These sudden tributes to Moscow may have been intended in part to counteract any misgivings or jealousy arising from the chorus of praise to which China herself had been subjected. Peking might have felt flattered to be depicted as a David who had slain his tens of thousands, but had no desire at that stage to incur the active displeasure of the Muscovite Saul. Indeed, an article inspired by Moscow in the Cominform journal about this time emphasized China's reliance on, and indebtedness to, the USSR [11]. If this did reflect a trace of annoyance, it was apparently but a passing phase. By February 1954 the same journal was declaring that 'the great friendship of the peoples of the USSR and China is a powerful bulwark of peace' [12], and seven months later Khrushchev himself declaring that 'the world camp of socialism and democracy' was 'headed (jointly) by the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China' [13].

¹ Although better known by this name, Mao Tun is, in fact, the pseudonym of Shen Yen-Ping, the Minister of Culture.

While these exchanges of compliments reflected the growing interdependence of Peking and Moscow, the increasingly close relations between them were shown more positively by the thirty-year Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Aid signed in February 1950 and by its subsequent developments. So far as Manchuria was concerned, this treaty, it is true, appeared at the start to undermine China's sovereign rights very considerably, as it permitted the Russians to retain certain rights in the Chinese Eastern Railway,¹ to maintain troops and installations in Port Arthur, and to continue administering and leasing property in Dairen. Mao, who went to Moscow in person with Chou En-Lai to negotiate it, was able, however, to extract promises for the eventual restoration of all these rights and privileges, which have since been implemented. The agreements for establishing certain joint companies for economic development in Sinkiang, which were concluded six weeks later, likewise seemed to bode ill for Chinese independence, as they conjured up memories of similar forms of Soviet interference in the economic affairs of the East European satellites. Subsequent adjustments, however, have worked in China's favour and by October 1954 the Russians, who had already relinquished most of the 'rights' accorded to them in Manchuria under the 1950 treaty, had undertaken to surrender control over Port Arthur by the following May, to give up their holding in some of the mixed companies in Sinkiang, to co-operate in providing new railway links between the Soviet Union and China, and to give China further technical and financial assistance. Nevertheless China, striving though she might be for eventual economic independence, remained to a large extent geared to the Russian economy.

Besides strengthening its bond with Moscow, Peking was increasing its control over its own people. In part this was achieved by adoption of the police state methods common to all Communist régimes and in part by governmental centralization. Before the new government was three months old, the Minister of Public Security had declared ominously that without a strong public security force 'to wipe out bandits and secret agents and suppress sabotage and disturbances by enemies both inside and outside the country', the New Order could not be safeguarded. This was followed in the summer of 1950 by the publication of instructions for 'the suppression of counter-revolutionary activities', making any activity judged

¹ Now known as the Chinese Changchun Railway.

dangerous to the state punishable by death [14], and by early the following year the last signs of moderation had ended. By that time the Chinese, having seemingly regarded MacArthur's rapid advance towards the Yalu as a threat to Manchuria, had joined the struggle in Korea. Rightly or wrongly some observers linked China's fear of this threat to her frontiers with the ending of internal moderation and drew a parallel with the French Revolution, when the Terror was precipitated by the Prussian and Austrian crossing of the French frontier. Be that as it may, eighteen months later the Chinese Finance Minister was boasting that 'in the past three years we have liquidated more than two million bandits' [15], meaning, of course, that two million 'counter-revolutionaries' and deviationists had been exterminated.

Closely connected with the suppression of 'bandits' were the campaigns to 'purify' the official and commercial life of the country. The first of these, known as the 'Three-Antis Campaign', was launched in September 1951 against corruption, waste and bureaucracy and was aimed mainly at officialdom. Three months later there followed the 'Five-Antis Campaign', directed against bribery, tax evasion, fraud and similar corrupt practices in business circles. Since then there have been other campaigns. The process of cleaning up the business and official life of the country, and of regimenting, disciplining and, where necessary, 'purging' has therefore been continuous. And along with all this has gone the gradual centralization of government control.

In the early days of the new régime, the country had been divided up for administrative purposes into six main regions, each with its own People's Government or Military and Administrative Committee. By November 1952, however, the 'Greater Administrative Areas' as they were called were considered to have been sufficiently moulded into shape to warrant their being brought more closely under the control of the central government. The People's Governments and the Military and Administrative Committees were therefore replaced by Administrative Commissions, representing the central government. At the same time a State Planning Commission was established under Kao Kang 'to centralize work after three years of devolution of power and to move on to industrialization'. Owing to the uneven development of the revolution in different parts of China, this initial devolution of power had been unavoidable and the change brought about in November 1952 was wholly in line with

Chinese precedent—each succeeding dynasty of Imperial China went in for intense centralization when once it had been firmly established. In June 1954, the process of centralization was carried further still; the six Administrative Commissions and their regions were abolished and each of the provinces comprising these former regions was placed directly under the central government's jurisdiction.

The object of this move was said to be 'to strengthen the unified leadership of the Peking government in the interests of planned economic construction'; but there seems little doubt that it was aimed also at reducing the power of the regional leaders, some of whom had been tending to regard themselves as local war-lords. Something to this effect had been indicated in February that year by Liu Shao-Chi, when, after stressing the importance of Party unity and collective leadership, he had strongly criticized 'the conceit and arrogance' of certain unspecified cadres and had intimated that 'strong disciplinary action, including some expulsions', would probably be taken. Kao Kang's sudden disappearance from the political stage about that time gave rise to the belief that he was probably one of the offenders. The announcement of his expulsion and suicide in April 1955 left little doubt that this deduction had been correct.

By the time that this further step in the process of centralization had been carried out in the summer of 1954, China's first Five-Year Plan had been launched, preparations were in progress for electing the National People's Congress, the draft of the Constitution to replace the Common Programme had just been published, and China's leaders had begun to refer to the existing phase as the 'transitional period to Socialism'. By February 1954, in fact, Liu Shao-Chi was declaring, 'China is now in the stage of the socialist revolution', adding ominously that 'this revolution is even more far-reaching and broader than the revolution against imperialism, feudalism and bureaucratic capitalism' [16].

It was on 15th September 1954 that the much-publicized First National People's Congress was opened and five days later the equally publicized Constitution was adopted by it [17]. Chou En-Lai, recently back from his triumphs in Geneva, Delhi and Rangoon, declared significantly in a speech that 'Formosa must be liberated' and called on China to build up 'a powerful and gigantic army, navy, and air force to counter imperialist armament expansion' [18]. Mao, for his part, emerged with his position as head of the state confirmed;

Chu Teh, the Chinese commander-in-chief, was appointed as his political heir.

Taken in conjunction with the importance attaching to the newly-created National Defence Council, Chou En-Lai's call for 'powerful and gigantic' armed forces reflected China's increasingly military tendencies. Five months later, in February 1955, the military trend was seen once more in the government's approval of the new conscription law. This made nearly eighty million Chinese liable to military service, and in March the final change-over from a revolutionary to a conscript army, with badges of rank, was marked by the creation of six Marshals. Mao himself, as Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, assumed the rank of Grand Marshal. Thereby China joined the Soviet Union and Poland as the only Communist states boasting Marshals. That the government was determined to keep the new conscript army properly under control, however, was indicated by the fact that the four Field Armies into which the land forces had previously been divided were replaced by seventy-five Armies, each of whose commanders came under the direct orders of the Defence Council, whose chairman was Mao Tse-Tung.

The maintenance of powerful armed forces calls for a high degree of industrialization. Since the inauguration of the new régime in 1949, increasing attention had been paid to speeding up industrialization and to increasing production. Patriotism, the new Marriage Law, the support of organized labour, all had been invoked to these ends. Even the Korean War was made to serve its purpose and by the close of 1952 Chou En-Lai was loudly applauding the part played by the policy of resisting America and aiding Korea in accelerating political unification and facilitating industrial development. Two months later he reiterated this when, in emphasizing that the strengthening of the 'Resist America, Aid Korea' movement was the primary task for 1953, he described that movement as 'a tremendous driving force in every aspect of our work of transformation and rehabilitation' [19].

It was, however, on organized labour that the new régime mainly counted for the promotion of 'mass measures of social and economic transformation', and at the Seventh All-China Federation of Labour Congress in May 1953,¹ the part allotted to the trade unions was made abundantly clear. Apart from serving as 'transmission belts' linking the Party with the masses, the unions were directed to recog-

¹ It was at this Congress that the Federation changed its name to All-China Federation of Trade Unions.

nize that their 'basic responsibilities' were 'to develop production and strive for industrialization'. 'The basic role of the trade unions,' the directive went on, 'is to absorb those workers who are not highly politically conscious so as to educate them and heighten their class consciousness' [20]. This followed the emphasis, in the opening speeches, on the need for 'the rapid development of industry, especially heavy industry, and for the gradual attainment of socialist status'. There was no mistaking the implication, therefore, when Lai Jo-Yu, secretary-general of the All-China Federation, warned that no improvement in living conditions in China could be expected until 'heavy industry for strong national defence' had been built up. 'If we do not build up heavy industry, we cannot have strong national defence,' he declared [21]. That national construction must take priority over immediate improvements in the people's livelihood thereafter became a recurring theme, and in September 1953 the Trade Union Federation directed all trade unions to increase production and conduct political education among the workers for this specific purpose [22].

Along with the emphasis on industrialization and increased production has gone an attempt to redress the balance between labour and peasant membership in the Communist Party and a tendency to discriminate against the peasantry in favour of the urban proletariat. According to an article appearing in the Cominform journal of 25th July 1952, Mao had recently initiated a three-year 'rectification movement' to overcome the preponderance of peasantry and petty bourgeois elements in the Party; and eighteen months later, by which time a total of 6,500,000 members was claimed, Liu Shao-Chi stressed the need to 'purify' the Party of all bourgeois influences. Although he made no mention of peasant members, indications are that the attempt to reduce the percentage of peasants in the Party continues.

The peasant, however, remains a problem and, as in other Communist countries, is likely to continue to be so. His former preponderating influence, it is true, has been much reduced and his privileges have been curtailed since the Communists came to power; but the attempts to force him into a strait-jacket have shown the Peking leaders that coercion cannot be used with impunity. Concessions have had to be made. Nevertheless, just as Socialism, which Mao declared in June 1950 to be 'unsuitable for China at present', is now the declared aim, so the preservation of a 'rich peasant economy', which was still the declared policy in March 1953 [23], is now a

thing of the past. By March 1954 Chen Yun, on the anniversary of Stalin's death, had shown what was in store for the Chinese 'rich peasant' by praising the late Russian dictator for having 'rooted out the kulaks' [24]; six months later the intention eventually to 'eliminate rich peasants as a class' found definite confirmation in an article in the Cominform journal by Teng Tse-Hui [25].

The most significant development in China's rural economy has been collectivization. Gone are the days when the slogan, 'The land for the tiller', drew the land-hungry peasants flocking to the Communist cause. Collectivization as an ultimate policy had been foreshadowed since the spring of 1951 or earlier,¹ and two years later Party leaders were referring to the efforts being made to 'push the rural economy on the path to collectivism' by developing 'mutual aid and co-operation as the form of labour based on individual peasant economy' [26]. Since then the process of 'educating' the peasants to appreciate the blessings of collectivization has continued, although, until the summer of 1955, the ruling was to avoid coercion and to persuade the peasant to adopt collectivization voluntarily. It was indicative of the difficulties of solving the peasant problem that this 'education of the peasant masses' and the need to 'awaken their class consciousness and elevate their ideological standards' was stated in November 1953 to be 'one of the most serious tasks facing the Party and the government' [27].

How serious this task had become since then was made clear in the autumn of 1955, when Peking radio broadcast the text of a resolution passed by the Central Committee of the Party at its sixth plenary session on 11th October.² This resolution, which was based on instructions given by Mao Tse-Tung at a conference of the Party secretaries on 31st July and indicated that there was considerable dissension within the Party, severely castigated those Party members who favoured a slowing down in the pace at which collectivization was being carried out. This 'wrong approach', it said, would 'give free rein to the peasants to take the road towards capitalism and impede the growth of industry'. The progress of collectivization must therefore be accelerated by means of compulsion, and not be

¹ As far back as November 1943, when referring to the total lack of any tradition of organized co-operation in China, Mao had said: 'The only means of eliminating this state of affairs is gradual collectivization'; see Teng Tse-Hui's article in the Cominform journal of 10th September 1954.

² It was also decided at this session to convene the Eighth Party Congress in 1956, the first to be held since the memorable Congress of April 1945.

allowed to set its own pace by the gradual and leisurely process of education. By this means, Mao hoped 'that China's five hundred million peasants, except for a section in the border areas, will have taken up co-operative farming by 1960' [28]. He was to underline this hope some months later, early in 1956, when, after calling for the expansion and acceleration of China's industrialization, he forecast that, 'by the year 1959 or 1960, the switch of co-operatives from a semi-socialist to a completely socialist character can be completed' [29]. The October resolution, it should be noted, had also called for 'an acute struggle' against the rich peasants (kulaks) and had declared that the mass of the middle peasants must be helped to overcome 'the wavering between the path of Socialism and that of capitalism'.

The significance of the Central Committee resolution and of Mao's statement on which it was based, needs no emphasis. It showed that, despite the lessons that should have been learned from Russia's mistakes, Mao had apparently decided to ignore the warnings and apprehensions of even some of his own subordinates in the Party and to follow the ruthless policy launched by Stalin in 1929 in an attempt to solve the agrarian problem, which was so closely linked with the plans for industrialization. Between 1929 and 1934 that policy had led in Russia to millions of peasants being starved to death or killed, millions of alleged kulaks deported to forced labour or slaughtered, and the reduction by famine of something like half the total livestock in the Soviet Union.¹ Yet, knowing this, Mao had no hesitation in declaring, with reference to the agrarian question, that 'The Soviet Union encountered a similar problem in socialist construction and solved it. . . . We can solve the problem only by using the same methods.'

In reaching this decision, Mao was faced by the dilemma which is bound to confront the leader of any régime which attempts to carry out industrialization on the Communist pattern in a country with a predominantly agrarian economy based on the slogan, 'Land to the Tiller'. Collectivization may not increase productivity, but it provides a valuable means of control. Apparently, therefore, it was felt by Mao to be the answer to the problem which he himself had

¹ Characteristically, the official history of the CPSU summarizes these appalling results as 'a number of difficulties of an organizational character'. The term 'organizational work', it may be noted, has been defined by *Pravda* as 'primarily work dealing with people'.

posed when he had said: 'Unless we can basically solve the problem of agricultural co-operatives within the period of about three Five-Year Plans . . . we shall be unable to accomplish socialist industrialization.' 'Socialist industrialization and the socialist transformation of agriculture,' he had added, 'cannot be separated.'

It is slightly ironical that when, in April 1953, Communist cadres in China were directed to make a special study of Chapters 9 to 12 of *The History of the CPSU(B)*, three of which deal with the fateful years of 1929-34 in Russia, it was thought that the idea was to impress on them the mistakes to be avoided.

Just as the Korean War and its 'Resist America, Aid Korea' movement helped to unite the country and rouse the ardour of its people for increased production, so too the subsequent campaign of vituperation against the United States and Chiang Kai-Shek accompanying the demands for the recovery of Formosa served, by its appeal to national pride and patriotic sentiment, to strengthen that unity still further. It seems likely, however, that when the Communist leaders launched the slogan 'Formosa must be liberated' in the late summer of 1954, they had more than one object in view. Quite apart from a genuine feeling of resentment at having been balked from recovering what they held to be Chinese territory, they were anxious to liquidate the remnant of the Nationalist forces. These, so long as they remained in being, provided a rallying centre for all dissident elements and therefore constituted a potential threat to the régime. In so far as resentment was concerned, it was a simple matter to communicate this feeling to the people as a whole and to exploit it for the 'dual purpose of ensuring support for the government and of diverting it against an external enemy—a common ruse of governments throughout the ages. But this was not all. In addition to this purely Chinese aspect of the matter, the policy laid down at the Nineteenth Congress of the CPSU in October 1952 for international Communism in general was also concerned—the policy of 'exploiting divisions in the imperialist camp'. Britain and America, it was clear, did not see eye to eye on the matter of Formosa any more than they did on the Chinese question as a whole. By the constant reiteration of their intention to 'liberate' Formosa and by the threat to peace which their fulminations clearly implied, the Chinese Communist leaders sought to exploit these 'divisions' in the Anglo-American camp. It was, in fact, a striking example of the interplay of national aspirations and world Communist policy.

CHAPTER XXXIV

Japan and Korea

IN the two years after the war Japan suffered the pains and anguish of a vanquished nation, but at the same time the way already began to be paved for her return to strength and influence and for her alignment on the side of the Western democracies in the coming Cold War.

If Moscow had hoped that the Japanese masses, in the bitterness of defeat and its accompanying economic distress, would provide fertile ground for the spread of Communism, it was to be disappointed. For a while, it is true, the Communists made considerable headway, especially among urban labour; but by the time that the Cominform was proclaimed, the tide had begun to turn and the occupying powers were beginning to consider the wisdom of encouraging Japan to side with them against the forces of World Revolution and subversion. Japan, for her part, was quick to appreciate the improvement that this would bring in her own position—if she played her cards with proper care. No longer a defeated enemy, derided and distrusted by her conquerors and compelled to conform to their orders, she would be courted by her recent adversaries and become able to bargain with them.

Three measures in particular thwarted Soviet hopes of exploiting Japanese distress. First, the Western Allies' decision to retain the Emperor and monarchical system saved Japan from the chaos and civil war into which otherwise it would almost certainly have been plunged. Secondly, by working through the administrative structure of the Japanese government instead of setting up its own machinery of direct rule, SCAP¹ was able to evade many of the difficulties and much of the odium inevitably attaching to a purely foreign administration. Thirdly, by General MacArthur's refusal to agree either to

¹ Although, strictly speaking, it applied to General MacArthur himself, the term SCAP (Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers) was also used to denote his Headquarters when issuing orders and guidance.

Vasilievsky's appointment as joint Supreme Commander or to the occupation of Hokkaido by Russian forces, Japan was saved from partition. The dangers which Prince Konoye had always feared in the event of defeat and the hopes of revolutionary outbreaks which Moscow had undoubtedly nurtured were thus largely falsified.

Where the Communists were helped, however, at the outset of the Occupation was by the halo which their leaders had acquired by virtue of their firm stand against Japanese militarism. When they were released from gaol with other political prisoners in October 1945, they were accorded privileges and a freedom of which they took full advantage. It was not until some seven months later when Communist-inspired demonstrations in Tokyo showed clearly the dangers ahead if steps were not taken in time to curb them, that SCAP began to clamp down on them. The 500,000 demonstrators on May Day 1946 demanded the removal of restrictions and the creation of a democratic government. Their demands were declined and stigmatized as Communist propaganda. A fortnight later, after a further series of labour demonstrations, Communism was sternly denounced by Atcheson, the American representative on the Allied Council for Japan. Almost immediately there followed SCAP's denunciation of 'the growing tendency towards mass violence and physical processes of intimidation under organized leadership' and in July 1946 the attack on the internal Communist movement was brought into the international field when Atcheson accused his Russian colleague on the Allied Council of responsibility for Communist propaganda.

In December 1945 the newly-revived Japanese Communist Party had held its Fourth Congress, its first since 1926 and its first to be held openly. Although the Party claimed only 1,200 actual members at that time, its membership was to rise rapidly in the months ahead. Four months later it was able to boast not only of nearly two million sympathizers as indicated by the number of votes polled in the first post-war general elections in April 1946, but also of being perhaps the best organized and best led political party in Japan. It could also pride itself on having made spectacular headway in the organization of trade unions under its control. Within three months of the passage of the Labour Union Law in December 1945, when the total trade union membership in Japan stood at a mere 149,000, the Communists and the Socialists¹ between them had raised it to no less than

¹ In this section on Japan, the term 'Socialists' means the Social-Democratic Party.

1,700,000. By August 1946, when the Communist-dominated *Sanbetsu* (NCIO or National Council of Industrial Organizations) was formally inaugurated and the Socialist-sponsored *Sodomei* (JFLU or Japan Federation of Labour Unions) also held its inaugural Congress, the Communists were able to claim 1,500,000 members for their trade union organization as against barely half that number, 855,000, claimed by their Socialist rivals for *Sodomei*.

In the meantime, Japanese Communist policy had been undergoing changes which were to have their repercussions four years later when the party leaders were to come under Moscow's lash for their ideological misdemeanours. The Fourth Congress in December 1945 had expressed the Party's readiness to use force, if necessary, in order to achieve its objectives. These included the abolition of the Imperial Household and the end of private ownership and of the existing system of land tenure. Early in the New Year, however, Nozaka returned to Japan to head the Party after fifteen years of exile in Moscow and Yenan, and at once set to work to introduce greater moderation, for the purpose of forming a 'popular front' with the Social-Democrats and left wing Liberals. In line with this policy of securing the support of the less radical groups for 'peaceful revolution and a popular front', the Central Committee issued a statement on 13th January, soft-pedalling its stand regarding the Emperor and the Imperial Household. Five months later Nozaka's thesis on 'peaceful revolution' was published in one of the national newspapers. Although subsequently modified, it was to be used against him by his opponents in the Party after Moscow's attack on him in January 1950 through the medium of its Cominform mouth-piece [1].

Nozaka's moderating influence, which reflected divided opinion in the Communist ranks, was seen again when, at the height of a series of strikes and threats of strikes openly instigated in September 1946 by the Communist Party and the NCIO for political purposes, he warned the unions that their political activities, which were debarred by law, might lose them their freedom of action. His warning, however, had little effect and both bodies went ahead with their plans for an October offensive, with the overthrow of the existing government as their avowed aim.

Having failed in their attempt to turn a recent strike of seamen and railway workers into a nation-wide strike, the Communists, through the medium of the NCIO, sought to cover up their failure and achieve

this same purpose by exploiting the newspaper and radio workers' strike, scheduled for 5th October. By supporting this strike they hoped, too, to obtain control of the press and radio organizations, thereby providing themselves with a ready means of disseminating propaganda. In like manner, they sought to bring the Communications Workers' Union under their control and, had they succeeded, they would have had in their hands a powerful weapon for paralysing the economic life of the country.

Fortunately for Japan they failed in all these aims. On 9th October came a warning from the Welfare Minister that the strikes were Communist-instigated and that the Labour Union Law could be invoked against trade union political activities. The more sober elements in the labour movement began to take fright, and by mid-October the Social-Democratic Party and the JFLU had withdrawn their support from the proposed general strike. At the same time, they came out with an open denunciation of both the Communists and the NCIO and charged the NCIO leaders with attempting to seize political power by instigating labour unrest. Their stand was reinforced next day by the Prime Minister declaring that the strikes were designed for 'a minority group of dictators to violate the new Constitution, to deny parliamentary government, and to plunge the country into chaos'. It was becoming increasingly clear to the country at large that the Communists were seeking to wreck the nation's economy and to produce a situation facilitating the overthrow of the Government without any regard to the suffering imposed on the people, and it was in this context that the Socialists and the JFLU followed up their denunciation of 14th October by a further denunciation of the Communists, a month later, for using general strikes to create political and social confusion.

The Communists, however, continued their activities and were aided to no small extent by the hostility of the Socialists and the trade unions in general to the Yoshida Government, which they condemned as reactionary. The Premier's last-minute offer of the immediate resignation of the cabinet and the organization of a coalition government, which would include the Socialists, failed. Plans already drawn up for a general strike on 1st February were reaffirmed and the critical situation which this threatened to bring about was only averted by the intervention of SCAP who, twenty-four hours before the strike was due to start, issued an order banning it. The ban, it was explained, was imposed in order to 'forestall the

deadly impact on the already gravely threatened public welfare' by 'so deadly a social weapon in the present impoverished and emaciated condition of Japan'. The country, it was added, might be plunged into ruin 'not unlike that produced in the immediate past by the minority which led Japan into the destruction of war'. The acute crisis which had threatened was thus averted and, although attempts were made to circumvent the ban by calling nation-wide 'independent strikes', the Communists were led to realize that they had overplayed their hand and that the disfavour and suspicions they had brought upon themselves might tell against them in the coming elections, if they failed to heed the writing on the wall.

In the meantime, however, during the interval between the 'October offensive' of 1946 and the abortive general strike of February 1947, the Communists and other left wing elements had been diverting their activities to some extent from urban labour to the farming districts. As a result of their efforts they had gained control of the Farmers' Union. From Russia, too, there came reports of at least partly successful attempts to indoctrinate Japanese prisoners-of-war, who would form useful Communist cadres when they returned to Japan. The link-up with international Communism which this reflected was further strengthened when, in March 1947, the first WFTU delegation to visit the Far East arrived in Japan.

The WFTU, at that time, was not the fully-fledged Communist Front organization that it was to become later; but already the Communists were manipulating matters in such a way that, before another two years had passed, the British, American and Dutch components were to announce their decision to withdraw, explaining that they had been forced to this decision by virtue of the fact that the WFTU was 'completely dominated by Communist organizations which are themselves controlled by the Kremlin and Cominform' [2]. The circumstances leading to this break-away throw a revealing light on the subtle methods used by Communists in all parts of the world, including South and East Asia, for gaining control of mass organizations.

When the WFTU was first formed, the Communists demanded, as the price of their co-operation, that the key position of secretary-general should be given to one of their nominees. In return, the Western unions were allowed to nominate Sir Walter (now Lord) Citrine as president. The Communists, however, saw to it that the full-time secretary-general, directing the secretariat, would control

the WFTU organization and that the holder of the honorary position of president would be little more than a lay figure. The secretary-general was therefore able to fill the salaried posts with Communists or Communist sympathizers obedient to the dictates of Moscow. At the same time, to quote from a TUC pamphlet describing how Communist control was obtained,¹ it was noted at an early stage that 'a stream of newly-created organizations in economically backward countries, which used to count membership in tens of thousands, were announcing membership figures, which there were no means of checking, in the neighbourhood of a million. These paper figures threatened to submerge those organizations with long experience, well-established reputations, memberships and traditions'. After the subordination of the satellite states of Central and Eastern Europe to Soviet Russia, control of the elective offices of the WFTU was carried a stage further, as this brought under Soviet control trade union movements which had previously been either neutral or pro-Western. It only required the entry of China into the Soviet bloc to complete the process.

While the visit of the WFTU delegation gave great delight to the Communists and other left wing elements in Japan, the growing influence of the Communists in the labour unions was arousing increasing disquiet in the minds of the more moderate elements in the labour movement. Even some of those who had formerly been noted for their radical views came out with warnings and denunciations against the Communist Party and its doctrines. In addition, Sano Gaku and Nabeyama Sadachika, whose defection from the Communist cause in 1933 had caused such a stir at the time, set up an organization of their own aimed, in part, at exposing Communist machinations.

The victory of the Socialists in the general elections at the end of April 1947 and the formation of a coalition cabinet soon after under the moderating guidance of the Socialist leader Katayama Tetsu, further eased the general situation in the labour unions. By then, moreover, in accordance with the two basic objectives of preventing Japan from ever again becoming a menace to the peace and security of the world and of establishing 'a peaceful and responsible government which would respect the rights of others and would support the ideals and principles of the Charter of the United Nations' [3], a

¹ *Free Trade Unions Leave the WFTU*, a pamphlet issued by the TUC in March 1949.

series of far-reaching social, political and economic reforms had been instituted. In addition, a new Constitution had been proclaimed, the armed forces demobilised and disarmed, the administration of the country thoroughly purged, the great *zaibatsu* combines broken up, and a measure of democratisation enforced.

Another two years passed before any appreciable ebb in the Communist tide became evident. By 1948 it was estimated that over five million workers in the unions were under Communist influence or control, and Communist influence in the country at large was reflected in the General Elections of January 1949, when the Communists secured thirty-five seats in the Diet and polled nearly three million votes. This, however, was to be the Party's high-water mark, and before the year was out Communist popularity had slumped heavily. A growing anti-Communist movement in the trade unions had reduced the Communist hold over organized labour to about one and a half million and Communist acts of violence in the summer of that year had aroused the hostility of the general public. Public opinion was also alienated by the arrogant behaviour of Soviet-indoctrinated prisoners-of-war on their return to Japan and by Moscow's demand for the trial of the Emperor as a war criminal. Further blows to the Party followed.

The first of these came in the opening days of 1950 when Moscow, through the medium of *Pravda* and the Cominform journal, criticized its leaders for their 'opportunistic' policy. The serious internal dissensions and factionalism which this attack brought about bedevilled the Communist cause in Japan for the next two years. Party unity was nominally restored by the summer of 1951, but another six or eight months passed before the reverberations on the Party fringes were finally quietened. Even so, there have been repercussions at intervals ever since.

When this factionalism was at its height in June 1950, General MacArthur ordered the suppression of the whole Central Committee of twenty-four members and the dismissal of the seventeen members of the Party organ's editorial staff. In view of their subversive activities this action was well merited, as also was the similar 'purge' of fifteen months later; but it sent the principal Communist leaders underground. There most of them remained for the next five years, until the general easing of the world situation which followed the 'summit' talks at Geneva in July 1955. From June 1950 until the summer of 1955, therefore, there were in effect two Communist

parties in Japan, the official and relatively innocuous rump leading a legal existence in the open, while the more active and dangerous body operated beneath the surface under the real leaders. It was these underground members who, for a time, directed the campaign of violence which the Party decided to launch in 1951; but, following the Communist-inspired riots of May and June 1952, the veteran leader Tokuda, who was himself underground, ordered a reversion to less aggressive tactics when it became evident that Communist violence was merely antagonizing public opinion.¹ That Tokuda's warning against the bad effects of violence was needed was shown when the Communists lost every seat and polled only 891,000 votes in the General Elections of October that year. Anger at Russia's veto on Japan's admission to the United Nations and disgust at Communist hypocrisy in the peace campaign were contributory causes of their defeat, but objection to Communist violence also played an important part. The lesson, however, was taken to heart and a policy of relative moderation was introduced for the time being.

A marked feature of Japanese Communist tactics has been the patriotic pose adopted by the Party ever since the summer of 1947. At that time the nationalists were still under a cloud on account of their chauvinist activities during and before the war. The Communists were therefore in a position to steal their thunder by appealing to national sentiment and they raised the cries of 'racial independence' and opposition to foreign capitalist domination and colonialism. Military occupation by a foreign power, however benevolent the temporary overlords may be, is never popular with the people of the occupied country. There was no great difficulty, therefore, in stirring up anti-American feeling; and, although the Occupation has now ended, the retention of United States troops and bases in Japan, under the Security Pact of September 1951 and the administrative agreement of February 1952, provides the Communists with plenty of material for exploitation. Since the peace treaty came into effect in April 1952, moreover, the ultra-nationalists, now freed from restrictions, have come into prominence once more and have made common cause with the Communists in rousing and exploiting anti-American sentiment.

¹ Tokuda's directive was given in the form of an article in the Cominform journal of 4th July 1952 commemorating the thirtieth anniversary of the founding of the Japanese Communist Party.

Disturbing and potentially dangerous though this may be, it is fortunate that, in their conflicting attitudes towards the Emperor and towards Russia, the nationalist extremists and the Communists are natural and inveterate enemies. With the developments of the 1930's in mind, however, what is perhaps more disquieting is the discredit which the party politicians are once again bringing upon themselves by their undignified actions and corrupt practices. The possibility that the people, in their disgust, may some day be driven to turn from parliamentary democracy to the support of either the Communists or the extreme nationalists cannot be wholly discounted. Except, however, in the event of a severe economic crisis—another possibility which cannot be ignored—the country as a whole would be more likely to turn to the extreme right than to the extreme left, in much the same way as it turned to the military in the 1930's.

Along with their anti-American campaign the Communists have followed the Moscow line of denouncing Japanese rearmament. Like Western Germany, the Japanese have been encouraged by the Western allies to rearm sufficiently to protect themselves; and from the National Police Reserve formed in August 1950 there has gradually been evolved the present National Defence Force, which came into being four years later. While Moscow's denunciation of Japanese rearmament and of the establishment of American bases in Japan may be due in part to genuine fear, it also serves a useful propaganda purpose and is faithfully echoed, not only by the Japanese Communists but by international Communism in general. The United States, with their troops and bases in Japan, are the main target of this propaganda and Japan has been treated in Communist propaganda and tactics since 1952 as a semi-colonial country calling for 'liberation' rather than as an imperialist state to be denounced as such. This attitude was reflected in Stalin's 1952 New Year message to *Kyodo*, the leading Japanese news agency, in which he expressed his sympathy with the Japanese people for being 'under foreign occupation'.

An analysis of Communist policy in Japan since 1947 appears to indicate that up to about March 1950, when the Party for the first time openly flouted SCAP's warning against attacks on American policy, it was primarily concerned with disrupting the existing social, political, and economic systems. The launching and exploitation of strikes, attempts to extend Communist control over organized labour,

demands for agrarian reform, the 'development of a peaceful democratic revolution in preparation for eventual social revolution', and attacks on the monarchical system; these were the principal preoccupations of the Party until early in 1950. By the close of 1947, it is true, there were already signs that the Communists were beginning to look to the international aspect of Communism as well as to the purely internal field, and in February 1948 they adopted the slogan of 'racial independence' and began to make veiled attacks on the United States by asserting that Japan was threatened by 'foreign capitalist domination'. But it was not until March 1950, when the Communist organ *Akahata* ('Red Flag') published an eighteen-point programme, that United States policy was openly attacked for the first time. This was a clear reflection of the Moscow line, and from then onwards such reflections of Soviet foreign policy became increasingly evident. On 1st May that year the Party issued parts of Tokuda's thesis, *On the Fundamental Duty of the Japanese Communist Party in the Coming Revolution*, the main burden of which was the need to build up a national movement against the colonization of Japan and to oppose the use of Japan as a military base.

The way in which the Communists of the country most immediately concerned—in this case Japan—take their cue from Moscow and have their denunciations or demands re-echoed soon after by their 'comrades' in other countries is one of the striking features of world Communism. It has been well demonstrated in Japan ever since the JCP was brought to heel by the Cominform in the opening days of 1950. Thus the disclosure made by the Party on May Day that year, that opposition to the use of Japan as a military base had been adopted as one of the main planks of Japanese Communist policy,¹ was followed in December by Peking's accusation that the United States were preparing to use Japan as a base for the invasion of Korea [4]. Similarly, in August 1951, Pyongyang broadcast the text of a warning given by the JCP six months previously to Japanese workers and 'patriots', that Japan was being rearmed by the United States and that military bases were being established in Japan in order to force Japan into war with the North Koreans.

This emphasis on the rearming of Japan and the establishment of American bases was but another reflection of the Moscow line, which

¹ This was disclosed in the report on the nineteenth plenary session of its Central Committee issued by the Party, which also published parts of Tokuda's thesis.

stemmed from the talks held with the Japanese Premier by Foster Dulles on his visit to Tokyo in February that year. From these talks there developed the American plan to hold the San Francisco Conference, which drew up the Japanese Peace Treaty in September, and to enter into a Defence Pact with the Japanese in order to ensure that Japan was not left defenceless after the restoration of her sovereignty. The Soviet Union accepted the invitation to the Conference, but she denounced the proposed treaty and the rearmament of Japan in no unmeasured terms some months before the meeting was held; and her denunciations were faithfully echoed by the Japanese Communists. Then, in November, came the Japanese ratification of the Peace Treaty, which the Russians had refused to sign, and of the Defence Pact. Again came the echo of the Moscow line, this time in the form of a statement issued on 19th November by the JCP which asserted that the San Francisco agreement aimed to 'turn Japan into a miserable colony of a foreign power', and ended with an appeal 'to the eighty million Japanese' to 'unite around the united front of national liberation and democracy and to co-operate closely with the forces of peace in the world in the struggle for peace and national independence' [5].

This appeal not only followed the Moscow line in denouncing both the treaty and the pact, but was clearly aimed at stirring up national sentiment, an aim which the Communists had been steadily pursuing for the past three or four years. They have since continued to pursue it with no small success—it might, in fact, be regarded as their strongest card. In so far, however, as the appeal reflected the Moscow line, it is pertinent to recall that Gromyko, who represented the Soviet Union at the San Francisco Conference, revealed there that the four main Russian aims were to get all American forces out of Japan, to ensure that Japan remained militarily weak, to hamper the Japanese government in taking measures against the Japanese Communist Party, and to obtain a naval monopoly in the Sea of Japan. This last goal was made clear when Gromyko, after intimating that Russia had annexed the Kuriles for good, proposed a new article in the treaty, which would provide for the demilitarization of all points of strategic importance guarding entry to and egress from the Sea of Japan. 'These straits,' the proposed new article declared, 'shall be open for the passage of only those naval ships which belong to the powers adjacent to the Sea of Japan.' As Japan, if the Russians had had their way, was to continue to be debarred

from having any army, navy or air force, this would have meant a naval monopoly in those waters for Russia and China and would have left Japan entirely at their mercy.

The JCP appeal of 19th November also reflected another feature of the Moscow line in its reference to 'the forces of peace in the world in the struggle for peace', for the peace campaign was by then a major weapon in the Soviet armoury. Its real aim was to spread discontent with Western defence programmes and their economic consequences and to divide and weaken the free world. It was, moreover, linked increasingly with the demand for the banning of nuclear weapons, a demand which was to receive special attention at the emergency session of the World Peace Congress meeting in Berlin in May 1954 and which was strongly reflected in the thirteen-point programme issued by the JCP six months later.

Numerous other examples of the way in which the Moscow line was reflected in Japanese Communist pronouncements could be given, but three more must suffice. In an article published in the *Cominform* journal of 15th February 1952, Tokuda stressed the need to foster anti-Americanism and to undermine the United States 'occupation régime' by overthrowing the Japanese government, which was described as 'the moral pillar' of that régime. This was fully in accord with the Moscow line, and attempts to implement it were seen in the widespread demonstrations and disturbances which marked the celebration of Anti-Colonial Day¹ six days later. They were seen, too, in the serious riots on the following May Day, riots which were clearly aimed at provoking the police, the American troops, and the government into repressive action.

There followed in December that year a reflection of the Moscow line on another matter. This was the disclosure, by the Communist-controlled Radio Free Japan, of a political report approved recently by the underground Central Committee of the JCP. While repeating the usual denunciations of the United States and of the alleged revival of militarism in Japan, it set itself to exploit the discords between the United States, Britain, France and Japan on the lines laid down at the Nineteenth Congress of the CPSU in Moscow two months previously and in Stalin's fifty-page article, 'Economic Prob-

¹ 21st February, representing the anniversary of the Indian Naval Mutiny of 1946, was selected in 1948 by the WFDY and the IUS for annual commemoration by their affiliates in all countries as the 'International Day of Solidarity with Youth Fighting Against Colonialism'.

lems of Socialism in the USSR', which had been published on the eve of that gathering. Two years later, on 24th November 1954, in the thirteen-point programme already mentioned in connection with the demand for the banning of nuclear weapons, the JCP offered to support any Japanese government which was prepared to 'adjust' Japan's relations with the Soviet Union and Communist China. This again was a reflection of the line put out by Moscow, a line crystallized a few weeks later by Molotov in a statement to the press intimating Moscow's readiness to establish normal relations with Japan.

That it was from about March 1950 that the JCP first began openly to echo the battle-cries selected by Moscow in support of Soviet foreign policy was no coincidence. In January that year, through the medium of the Cominform journal, the Party leaders had been severely taken to task by the Kremlin and, after a brief show of fight, had meekly accepted the reproof and come to heel. From then onwards, apart from ignoring the succession of appeals made by both Moscow and Peking for putting an end to factional strife, the Party has been completely subservient to Cominform guidance, both in the domestic and in the international field.

It was, in fact, for their internal policy that the Party leaders were censured so severely. Nozaka's thesis, that the establishment of a revolutionary government by peaceful means was possible even while Japan was under foreign occupation, was stigmatized as 'opportunistic deviation'. Seen in the light of Liu Shao-Chi's directive of the previous November calling on all the Communist parties of South and South-East Asia to follow the Chinese path of armed struggle, a directive which had Moscow's blessing, this was a particularly black crime in Communist eyes. And so it came about that, following Nozaka's recantation of this heresy, the Party set to work to revise its policy. It was not, however, until August 1951 that the Central Committee, at its twentieth plenary session, finally gave its approval to the plans drawn up for implementing the policy of the armed struggle.

The delay in giving this approval was due to a number of factors. The chief was the serious internal dissension precipitated by the Cominform's reproof in January 1950 and the disappearance of the principal leaders underground, which followed SCAP's purge of the whole Central Committee and other Party organs in June that year. By the time that the so-called 1951 Thesis, with its emphasis on the

armed struggle, had been adopted at the Fifth National Conference of the JCP in October 1951,¹ the Peace Treaty and the Security Pact with the United States had been signed. The Party hoped, therefore, to exploit the increasing anti-American sentiment aroused by the Pact in support of its resort to 'armed struggle for national liberation'.

The factionalism which had rent the Party asunder from January 1950 until the summer of 1951 was the cause of serious perturbation in Moscow, and numerous appeals were made to the Japanese Communists to sink their differences. Some of these appeared in the form of leading articles in the Cominform journal. Some were in the form of fraternal advice and criticism published in Peking and subsequently reproduced in the Cominform journal. Others, again, appeared first as Party resolutions castigating factionalism and demanding unity and were later republished in full in the journal [6]. In order further to underline the Kremlin's concern, the full texts of some of these appeals were broadcast by Moscow radio.

Although the main internal divisions were nominally healed in the summer of 1951, there have since been plenty of indications that factionalism is by no means dead. In September 1953 came the announcement that Ito Ritsu, whose name had figured in the Sorge spy case twelve years previously, had been purged for 'pro-Beria tendencies'. In June 1954 two other leading Communists, Kamiyama Shigeo and Kasuga Shoichi, were severely taken to task, the former for 'vicious deviations', the latter for his thesis on racial problems. In October 1955, the Cominform journal was remarking plaintively that although the JCP had 'begun to overcome the differences in its ranks', it was 'still far from being up to the level of the demands made on it by the situation' [7].

By this time, however, unexpected developments had taken place in the Party. The most sensational was the strangely casual announcement on 29th July 1955 that the veteran secretary-general Tokuda, who had been underground ever since SCAP's purge of the Central Committee in June 1950, had died in Peking in October 1953. His whereabouts had always been a matter of speculation, although articles by him giving directives to the Party had appeared from time

¹ The programme adopted by this conference was published on 23rd November 1951 in the Cominform journal, which showed its approval by stressing the impossibility of establishing a 'national liberation democratic government' by peaceful means and declaring: 'The peaceful way of liberation and democratic transformation of Japan is the way of deception.'

to time in the Cominform journal. Moreover, on New Year's Day 1954, more than two months after his death, *Akahata*, the Party organ, had published a photograph of him taken on his sixtieth birthday.¹ Possibly even *Akahata* was not in the secret. It certainly failed to give any suggestion that he was no longer alive when it published his picture.

Almost equally sensational was the sudden emergence, about the same time as the announcement of Tokuda's death, of Nozaka himself and of two other Communist leaders who, like Tokuda, had been underground since June 1950. Shiga, who had led the faction opposed to Tokuda and Nozaka,² had emerged from hiding in time to win one of the two seats obtained in the Diet by the Communist Party in the general elections of February 1955.

The reappearance of these leaders, who had been in hiding all these years and had waged such bitter feuds against one another, coincided with the declared decision of the Party to turn over a new leaf, at least temporarily, in line with the spirit of the Geneva meeting. This was announced at the conclusion of the Sixth National Council of the JCP at the end of July 1955, when the Party, in a fit of abject self-criticism, admitted that it had 'committed several big blunders in tactics'. These included the sin of 'ultra-leftist adventurism' which, in the mistaken belief that 'the time was ripe for revolution', had merely served to isolate the Party from the masses. It had accordingly decided to dissolve its para-military organization and sabotage units and to switch from illegal underground activities to unfitted front tactics and constitutional methods, with the formation of a United People's Liberation Front as its primary task.³ The Council also dealt at length with the problem of penetrating the trade unions and recognized the need to win their confidence by gradual means [8].

Another important outcome of this meeting was the abolition of the Central Directorate, a kind of provisional directing body, which had operated in the overt section of the Party ever since SCAP's

¹ 12th September 1953, i.e. one month before his death.

² The two main factions were the so-called International Group under Shiga Yoshio and Miyamoto Kenji, and the Centrist Group under Nozaka and Tokuda. The difference between the two was one of personalities rather than of policies.

³ According to Radio Free Japan of 15th July 1955, the Party had 'openly admitted the error of left-wing adventurism' on 1st January and had thereupon started to shift from underground to lawful activities.

purge of the Central Committee had driven the principal leaders underground in 1950, and the revival of the Central Committee as the supreme Party organ. In conformity, moreover, with the emphasis on 'collective leadership' in Russia after Stalin's death, the post of secretary-general was abolished and Nozaka, who was nominated to succeed the deceased Tokuda, the previous holder of that post, was made first secretary instead.

While outwardly the Communists had turned over a new leaf, it seemed clear that it was only their immediate tactics that had changed. Their long-term strategic aim of social revolution remained unaltered. Within a month of the meeting at which these decisions were announced, Kasuga was explaining in the Party organ the difficulties of achieving a revolution and the need and means of overcoming obstacles [9]. It was impossible, he said, for the relative handful of Communists to bring off a revolution unaided. Tenacious efforts were therefore necessary 'to combine the labouring classes and the masses into organized power and indoctrinate them with revolutionary ideas'. He argued that it was too early for active revolt, so a halt was necessary until such time as the masses had been sufficiently indoctrinated and the trade unions and peasant unions adequately infiltrated. A month later, lamenting that only six million of Japan's fourteen million workers had joined trade unions, Radio Free Japan intimated that a drive to organize the missing eight million had already begun.

The extension of their control over the trade and peasant unions by infiltration has, of course, always been one of the primary aims of the Communists; and although, as we have seen, they had suffered a serious setback by the end of 1949, the trade union movement has been marked by the changing fortunes of the Communists ever since. Thus the *Zenroren* (All-Japan Council of Trade Unions), which had been formed in October 1946 as a mid-way body between the Communist-controlled *Sanbetsu* (NCIO) and the Socialist *Sodomei* (JFLU), had by August 1950 come so strongly under Communist influence that SCAP felt compelled to purge twelve of its leaders. Its dissolution followed. One month earlier, the anti-Communist *Sohyo* (General Council of Labour Unions) had been established, but within two years it, too, had come strongly under Communist influence and the left wing had gained control. By July 1953 its clamour for closer association with the Chinese Communist trade unions and with the world peace movement had caused so much

apprehension among its more moderate elements, and even among its left wing socialist supporters, that many of them broke away and thereby removed such moderating influence as they had hitherto been able to exert.

The Socialist Party itself had split, in January 1950, into two separate parties, a right wing Socialist Party and a left wing Socialist Party, and it was not until October 1955 that they were reunited into a single party once more.¹ During nearly six years of separate existence, the left wing Socialist Party had steadily improved its position in successive general elections, and in those of May 1953 and February 1955 was well ahead of the right wing party in the number of seats obtained. Although on their reunification the two parties came out with strong condemnation of Communism for 'destroying democracy and human personality, freedom and dignity', it was significant that in the elections of 1953 and 1955 the Communist Party withdrew a number of its candidates in order to improve the prospects of the left wing Socialists.

In view of the Communist campaign against Japanese rearmament and for the 'adjustment' of relations with Russia and China, it is significant that in the general election campaign of 1955 there was strong opposition in all parties to rearmament and constitutional revision (especially to the revision of the clause in the Constitution renouncing the right to maintain armed forces), and at the same time advocacy both of close relations with the West and of 'normalization' of relations with the Soviet Union and Communist China. Anti-military sentiment, especially among the younger generation of Japanese, is a factor which has to be taken into consideration in any attempt to assess the situation in Japan today, and with it goes the desire to return to normal relations with Japan's two great neighbours, Russia and China.

The business community in particular is anxious to see the restoration of friendly relations with China. The reason is obvious: not until this has been achieved will the Chinese market, so vital to Japan's own economic life, be opened once more to Japanese trade. Moscow,

¹ The reunification of the two socialist parties was followed a month later by the amalgamation of the Democratic and the Liberal parties (both thoroughly conservative despite their names) under the name of Liberal Democratic Party. In effect, therefore, if we except the Communists, the two-party system was re-established in Japan for the first time since before the war. Even more strikingly it marked the first clear-cut division between the political right and political left in Japan since the introduction of the parliamentary system in 1890.

Peking, and the Japanese Communists themselves are fully alive to the valuable bargaining counter which this gives to them. The tempting bait of trade with China is accordingly dangled freely before their eyes in the attempt to induce Japan to 'adjust' relations with China. Thereby it is hoped to cause a rift with the United States and to break down the embargo on the export of strategic materials required by both Peking and Moscow. Moreover, if the bait were taken, it would also entail the withdrawal of the recognition which Japan accorded to the Nationalist régime in Formosa in January 1952.

Japan's refusal at that time to recognize the Peking régime, it may be recalled, was due primarily to the existence of the Sino-Soviet Treaty of February 1950, which was regarded as 'virtually an alliance aimed against Japan', and to the support given by the Chinese Communists to the JCP's machinations, which were aimed at overthrowing the Japanese government by violence. In May 1952 the Japanese foreign minister had included the abolition of the Sino-Soviet Alliance, together with the ending of Peking's attempt to undermine democratic government in Japan by an active propaganda campaign, amongst the prerequisites for restoring diplomatic relations with Moscow and Peking. Subsequent official and unofficial attempts to work out a *modus vivendi* had still proved fruitless at the end of 1955; but, in view of the anti-military and anti-American sentiment aroused by the questions of Japanese rearmament and American bases in Japan, the possibilities which the situation provided for Communist exploitation remained.

No consideration of the various factors affecting the situation in post-war Japan would be complete without reference to the Korean question. Stripped though Japan now is of all her former overseas possessions, she is left with a legacy of her previous hold on Korea in the large number of Koreans in her towns and cities. Composed largely of labourers and students, these Korean communities have always been of special interest to the Japanese Communists. Individual Koreans have been included in their higher Party organs, charged with the task of organizing and controlling their compatriots in Japan. The Korean riots which broke out in Western Japan towards the end of April 1948 and the serious riots and demonstrations by Koreans in Kobe and Osaka four years later, on the second anniversary of the Korean War, were but two examples of their activities. The formation of the *Choren* (League of Korean Residents in Japan)

and *Minsei* (Korean Democratic Youth League), whose terrorist activities led SCAP to order their dissolution in September 1949, was but another product of Communist instigation. Later their place was taken by the *Minsen* (United Front of Korean Residents in Japan), which likewise developed an aptitude for violence. Its close adherence to the Moscow line, however, was seen in the early summer of 1955 when, like the openly Communist bodies everywhere at that time, it decided to turn over a new leaf and condemned its own former resort to violence. It was largely through the aid of such bodies as these that liaison was maintained by devious means between the Japanese party and the Communists in North Korea.

The sovietization of Korea north of the 38th Parallel proceeded apace in the period immediately following the collapse of Japan. The Russians refused to co-operate in the United Nations proposal to end the division of Korea by the election of an independent government for the whole country, and in February 1948 the North Koreans set up their own régime under the name of the Democratic People's Republic. At the same time the formation of a North Korean People's Army was announced. The new régime claimed jurisdiction over the whole peninsula and a conference of North and South Koreans was held in April, but no basis for unification was possible and by August the Southerners had set up their own Republic of Korea in Seoul with Syngman Rhee as President. American recognition of the Southern republic was followed in October by Moscow's recognition of the Northern régime. The rival camps were set in battle array.

Having helped the Northern Koreans to establish their own régime and build up an army for their own defence,¹ the Russians were able to complete the withdrawal of their troops by the close of 1948. The South Koreans, on the other hand, had nothing more than a lightly armed police force and were in no position to defend themselves if attacked. The Americans were therefore entreated to retain their troops in South Korea until adequate defence measures had been taken. The United States forces remained, indeed, until June 1949,

¹ Nearly five years later, speaking in the UN Assembly in October 1952, Acheson was to accuse the Russians of having started, as far back as 1945, to train in Siberia the nucleus of this army in the handling of tanks and aircraft, and to equip and advise them.

but they then withdrew, leaving nothing but a military mission of about 500 officers and men to assist in organizing and training the new South Korean Army. This was the position when, twelve months later, the North Koreans launched their invasion and came within an ace of seizing the whole peninsula. Had they succeeded, or had the United Nations failed to act as they did, the effect on the morale of countries in South-East Asia might well have proved disastrous.

The general course of the Korean War need not be described here in detail; but certain features and phases of the struggle call for comment.

First came President Truman's action in linking up the Korean invasion with the question of Formosa. By the prompt and vigorous steps he took to stem the rapid advance of the invaders he saved Korea from forcible seizure¹ and prevented the rot which would almost inevitably have set in in the other countries of South and East Asia if South Korea had been left to its own fate. But by simultaneously ordering the United States 7th Fleet to prevent a Chinese Communist attack on Formosa, he dangerously aggravated an already grave situation by introducing this new and largely irrelevant issue. By checking the new Central Government of China just as it was on the point of delivering the final *coup de grâce* to its main opponents, the United States laid themselves open to the charge of active interference in the Chinese civil war. In this way they not only supplied valuable ammunition for Communist propaganda; they played also into Communist hands by increasing the bitterness of the new Chinese régime and its supporters towards the Americans themselves. This, of course, suited the Russians admirably and undoubtedly played its part in bringing China into the Korean conflict a few months later. At the same time, the linking of the Formosan question with the Korean issue embarrassed America's allies and aroused concern among her potential supporters among the Asian countries.

Asian doubts were reflected from the start in the attitude adopted by India. So long as it was merely a question of restoring the situation in Korea to what it had been before the invasion was launched, the moral support of India for the UN forces was assured; but, following

¹ It was characteristic of their methods for winning the support of the all-important peasantry that one of the first actions of the Communists during their brief hold on South Korea as a result of this advance was to carry out a drastic land reform on the lines of what had already been accomplished in North Korea.

the advance from Inchon in the autumn of 1950, even though every effort had been made to allay Asian apprehensions by assurances that no new bases would be set up and that the UN troops would be withdrawn as soon as circumstances permitted, India abstained from the voting when the Assembly authorized MacArthur to cross the 38th Parallel. As the victorious Allied forces swept forward and drew near to the Yalu, it was India who warned them that the Chinese were genuinely fearful of the danger that this presented to the Yalu dams and the hydro-electric installations on which their factories in Manchuria were dependent. She warned them, too, that the Chinese threat to intervene militarily in order to safeguard those vital sources of supply must be taken seriously. It was India again who, at the end of January 1951, sought to warn the UN that any condemnatory finding against China would 'finally extinguish all hope of a peaceful settlement'.

It was unfortunate that the lesson of the 1930's, when the League of Nations condemned Japan as an aggressor, had not been taken to heart. This had clearly shown that moral condemnation, unless followed by punitive measures, was worse than useless. It merely aggravated national sentiment in the country stigmatized and played into the hands of the extremists by encouraging them to flout world opinion still further in the happy assurance that no one was going to stop them. The Chinese Communists, like the Japanese before them, merely became resentful. On the other hand, as Sir Gladwyn Jebb pointed out at the time in the UN Assembly, it was doubtful whether any such punitive measures as economic or political sanctions could be found which were not 'dangerous, double-edged, or merely useless'. The Indian warning would therefore seem to have been well merited.

It was not merely that the Indians, through their Ambassador in Peking,¹ were better placed than most to gauge Chinese reactions correctly. There was much more in it than that. India's attitude throughout was, in fact, compounded of a number of emotions, chief of which were an underlying suspicion of Western motives and a determination to avoid being drawn into either of the two opposing camps. It is hardly too much to say that, as one development followed another, the Korean campaign served to confirm the tendency of the Asian bloc, headed by India, to let unconscious pride in the achieve-

¹ This was Panikkar, whose book, *In Two Chinas*, throws an interesting light on the reasons for his warnings.

ments of their fellow-Asian Chinese Communists blind them to the real threat of Communist domination and allow fears and suspicions of Western colonialism in new guise to blur their better judgment. The tragedy is that, although the Syngman Rhee and Chiang Kai-Sheks bolstered up by the West are Asians, they are not of the type to make any 'fellow-Asian' appeal to the non-committed Asian states headed by India.

In so far as the actual operations were concerned it was the Chinese who, having committed themselves in the autumn of 1950, bore the brunt of the fighting on the Communist side while the Russians, whose battles they were in effect fighting, shed neither blood nor tears. Both the Chinese and their opponents, however, gained in military experience; for the Korean War, like the Spanish Civil War and the North China 'Incident' of the 1930's, provided both sides with a valuable means of training in modern warfare and of trying out new weapons and equipment. The results of this first-hand experience were clearly seen in the later stages of the campaign when the Communist forces, which had been composed mainly of infantry during the first two or three years of the fighting, were well supplied with artillery and heavy weapons and showed skilful planning of their operations.

It was not only in front-line combat that the Communists showed careful planning. It was seen also in their creation of what General Mark Clark, in June 1953, called 'a Second Front' in the Korean War. By this he meant the instigation of riots in the prisoner-of-war camps for the express purpose of pinning down as many United Nations troops as possible by forcing them to detach large numbers of guards to watch over the prisoners. These riots, which first occurred in February 1952, served, moreover, the further purpose of producing 'martyrs' and thereby embarrassing the United Nations Command in the eyes of the world. For propaganda purposes these disorders and the casualties caused in their suppression were exploited as fully as were the allegations of germ warfare by which the Communists also sought to discredit the Americans.

In making these and other equally preposterous accusations against the United States, the Chinese and Korean Communists not only contrived to unite their own people behind them in their war effort; they also provided international Communism with a valuable new propaganda weapon. It was on 22nd February 1952 that the alleged use of bacteria by the United States forces in Korea was first

reported and, following quickly on an official protest by the North Korean foreign minister, the Chinese premier, Chou En-Lai, launched his campaign of violent denunciation. At the same time Kuo Mo-Jo, president of the Chinese People's Committee for World Peace, addressed an appeal to the World Peace Council against the alleged resort to germ warfare by the United States. 'Peace' organizations throughout the world took up the cry and the prompt dispatch of an International Lawyers' Commission to investigate the 'evidence' on the spot was followed in June by the arrival of an allegedly 'impartial and independent' International Commission of Scientists.¹

Both bodies produced voluminous reports, but the complete absence of either impartiality or independence was as evident in the reports as it was in the composition of the commissions. As an example of the workings of international Communism, however, the vast scale on which this germ warfare campaign was handled serves to illustrate the truth of Hitler's contention that even the biggest and most blatant lie will gain credence if sufficiently reiterated.

Throughout the Korean War and its aftermath Syngman Rhee's intransigence, irresponsible actions and autocratic behaviour caused great trouble and concern to his Western supporters as well as to India. At the end of May 1952 his high-handed and arbitrary actions and his totalitarian methods brought a protest from the United Nations Command in Korea. Rhee promptly responded by threatening to withdraw all his armed forces from the fighting line. A year later, when agreement was reached for the exchange of all POWs as soon as an armistice had been concluded, he refused to sign and followed this refusal by releasing 25,000 of the prisoners in his hands in order to sabotage the armistice negotiations. Fortunately he failed to do so; but his irresponsible action in releasing the prisoners was assumed by the Chinese to have been due to American instigation and they accordingly accused the United States of conniving with him in this breach of the agreement on repatriation.

After the conclusion of the armistice on 27th July 1953, Rhee's intransigence remained a frequent cause of concern to his Western supporters. From August 1953 onwards, threats to reopen the war and unify the country by force, or to drive the Indians out of Korea for alleged partiality to the Communists or, in August 1955, to expel

¹ A year earlier, in May 1951, another of the international Communist Front organizations, the WIDF, had shown its 'impartiality' by sending a Commission to North Korea.

the United Nations Supervisory Commission¹ followed hard on each other. After the breakdown of the discussions on Korea at Geneva in June 1954, Rhee was invited to address the United States Congress on his way home from that meeting. With no hesitation he proposed to Congress a war to unify Korea, and as his embarrassed listeners failed to respond, he proceeded, three days later in New York, to castigate the United States for their 'short-sighted policy' and lack of 'common guts' in failing to face the problem of unifying Korea by force of arms.

Nor did his recalcitrance end with his attempts to renew the Korean War. He added further to the tense situation in the Far East by provocative action against the Japanese, when in January 1953 he laid down the so-called 'Rhee Line' to restrict Japanese fishing vessels, and declared that any found within were liable to seizure by South Korean patrol ships.² The frequent seizure of Japanese vessels in the forbidden area has been the cause of constant friction and considerable indignation ever since and it led the more extreme Japanese nationalists in October 1953 to demand the deportation of all Korean residents in Japan and other similar measures.

Before considering developments since the armistice came into effect in July 1953, however, two other aspects of the Korean War call for notice. One was the introduction of the barbaric practice of 'brain-washing' prisoners who fell into Communist hands, a practice with consequences which require to be taken into serious consideration in the event of any future war with Communist opponents. The other was the effect that this conflict had on Soviet and Chinese influence in North Korea.

Before the outbreak of the war, North Korea was a model Soviet satellite, relatively free from Chinese influence. By the close of the fighting three years later it contained over a million Chinese troops and owed its continued existence as a separate entity to them. Apparently in an attempt to recover their lost influence, the Russians in September 1953 invited Kim Il-Sung and other outstanding North Korean leaders to Moscow and backed up a pledge of full support

¹ Rhee's threat to the UN Supervisory Commission followed soon after the UN Command had protested to the North Koreans against the illegal building up of their armed forces since the Armistice.

² This enclosed some 35,000 square miles of international waters around South Korea and extended to within sixty miles of the main islands of Japan and within five miles of Tsushima.

for the rehabilitation of North Korea by the grant of 1,000 million roubles and the provision of technical and other assistance. If, however, the Russians hoped to woo the North Koreans in this way they were disappointed, as the Chinese promptly went one better. Much the same delegation was invited to Peking in November and, under a ten-year agreement on economic and cultural co-operation signed while they were there, they were provided with an even larger grant of money and better terms all round. Goodwill missions were subsequently exchanged between the Chinese and the North Koreans, and by May 1954 Pyongyang radio was describing the Chinese People's Republic as 'the bulwark of peace in Asia' and in similar fulsome terms.

That the struggle for the North Koreans' favours still goes on was indicated by the account given in the Cominform journal of the meeting in Pyongyang in August 1955 to celebrate the tenth anniversary of the 'liberation of Korea by the Soviet Army' [10]. Kim Il-Sung was quoted on that occasion as expressing 'deep gratitude to our liberator and true friend, the great Soviet people, the CPSU, the Soviet Government and the Soviet Army'. To the Chinese he merely 'expressed his thanks'. Korea as a potential cause of friction between Moscow and Peking in years to come, it would seem, cannot be wholly discounted.

The Chinese agreement of November 1953 followed close on the signing of an American Security Pact with South Korea. The prospects of unification in that distracted peninsula were thus made more remote than ever. Nor were they enhanced by the failure of the discussions at Geneva in June 1954. What has to be recognized is that a united Korea under Communist control would be a threat to Japan and therefore to the whole Western system of defence in the Pacific. On the other hand, a united Korea under democratic auspices would mean the extension of American influence to the Yalu, which would be regarded by the Chinese as a threat to Manchuria. It is difficult to see how a way is to be found to reconcile this direct conflict of interest.

If Rhee has proved a thorn in the flesh of his supporters in the South, the North Koreans have been beset with internal troubles of their own. Barely a week after the signing of the armistice, the Korean Workers' Party,¹ following the pattern of its Moscow

¹ The KWP (*anglice* Communist Party) was formed in August 1949 by the amalgamation of the North Korean and South Korean Workers' parties. The

masters, carried out a drastic purge in its higher ranks. Seven members of the Central Committee were expelled and five suspended; twelve senior government officials, including Pak Heung-Yeung, the foreign minister,¹ were arrested; and ten death sentences were announced. The usual fantastic charges were levelled against the wretched victims—'supplying national secrets' to the British and Americans; plotting armed rebellion under American instigation; and so forth. The real cause of the purge, however, appears to have been connected with internal dissension among the three factions in the Party—the pro-Soviet, pro-Chinese, and pro-Korean. Most of those liquidated appeared to be good Marxists, who had the temerity to put the interests of their own country before those of either Moscow or Peking.

Another significant development since the armistice has been the energetic way in which the two-fold task of industrialization and rehabilitation has been tackled in North Korea. Within two months of the armistice Kim Il-Sung was emphasizing the need to press on with this work, and by April 1954 a Three-Year Plan had been outlined and launched.

North Korean and South Korean Labour Unions, which were closely linked with the Party, had been similarly merged in January 1951 to form the Korean Labour Union, and the North Korean Peasant League and South Korean National Union of Peasants had been fused together under the name of Korean Peasant League about three weeks later.

¹ Nothing more was heard of him until 18th December 1955, when *Tass* announced that he had just been sentenced to death 'for treason' by a special tribunal in North Korea.

CHAPTER XXXV

Indo-China and Siam

ON 2nd September 1945, Indo-Chinese independence was proclaimed and the DRV (Democratic Republic of Vietnam) established. The situation was extremely complicated. The Viet Minh, under the veteran Communist leader Ho Chi-Minh, set up the new government in Hanoi and rapidly extended its influence from Tonking into Annam and Cochín-China as well. Whereas, however, in the British zone of occupation south of the 16th Parallel, all reasonable assistance was given to the French to restore their authority, the Chinese, who had been allocated the territory north of the Parallel, put every obstacle they could in their way. Not only was permission refused for the French to land troops in the northern zone and restore the civil administration, but nothing was done to prevent the Vietnamese from consolidating their position. On the contrary, the Chinese showed a positive readiness to co-operate with the new Republic and, in addition to allowing the Vietnamese to keep their weapons, did nothing to prevent some of the Japanese troops from handing over their arms to the Viet Minh and even joining forces with them. There is irony in the fact that Chiang Kai-Shek's Nationalist China, which was fighting its own Communists at the time and was to be overthrown by them four years later, helped thereby to strengthen the grip of the Viet Minh at a critical period and to pave the way for the subsequent establishment of a Communist régime as China's southern neighbour.

While the British had no wish to become embroiled in the dispute between the French and the local nationalists in their zone, it was as impossible for them to avoid this as it was to evade entanglement with the contending parties in Indonesia. When, therefore, towards the end of September, after French control had been restored in Saigon, the Annamites launched a large-scale attack on the Cochín-China capital, General Gracey, the British commander, felt compelled to intervene with military action in order to prevent the col-

lapse of the French administration and the outbreak of civil war. The situation was brought under control; but Gracey was thereafter instructed to confine himself to the task of mediating between the French and the Annamites and only to hit back when, as happened on some occasions, British detachments, or Japanese acting under their orders, were attacked.

By early March 1946 adequate French forces had arrived and the situation in Cochinchina and southern Annam had been sufficiently restored to admit of the British being withdrawn; but although by then the French had negotiated a treaty in Chungking under which the Chinese agreed to withdraw all their forces from Indo-China by the end of May, armed clashes with the Chinese occurred at Haiphong when the French began to land and, later, in Hanoi as well.

By the time that the French had replaced the Chinese north of the 16th Parallel, the DRV had established itself reasonably firmly to ensure its own survival. Realizing the need, however, to rally all the forces of nationalism behind the new régime if it were to survive, and realising too that this could only be achieved by reassuring those who were fearful of its Communist complexion, the Viet Minh had announced in November 1945 that the Communist Party had decided to liquidate itself in the cause of national unity—a purely nominal liquidation as subsequent events were to show. This was followed soon after by the formation of a new government, which included other parties besides the Viet Minh; and in January 1946, elections were held for the National Assembly set up by the Republic. Held overtly in the Chinese zone of occupation, the DRV claimed that they had been held covertly in the French-occupied areas as well. Be that as it may, the results showed, or appeared to show, an overwhelming victory for the Viet Minh, who claimed to have won 330 of the 400 seats.¹ Before a year had passed, Viet Minh predominance was to be made still more marked after the suppression of many of the non-Viet Minh members and the flight of many others to China. The nationalist cloak donned by the Communists was already becoming a bit threadbare and the reorganization of the Republican administration which then took place, in November 1946, produced

¹ These are the figures given by Professor Pearn in *The Far East, 1942-1946* (p. 271), in the Chatham House series of surveys of international affairs. They appear to be at variance with those quoted on p. 13 of Bernard Fall's monograph on the Viet Minh régime; but the same conclusion is clearly reflected in both sets of figures.

a preponderatingly Viet Minh government with six Communists in key positions.

The Communist Party, which had nominally gone into voluntary liquidation in November 1945, had thus in point of fact merely withdrawn under cover and taken control of the ostensibly nationalist Viet Minh. The first step had been to extend its control by building up a mass organization embracing all strata of the people instead of the relatively limited section covered by the Viet Minh, all the time using nationalism as window-dressing. On 27th May 1946, the *Lien Viet* (Vietnam National Union League), a glorified form of Popular Front controlled by the Viet Minh and therefore by the Communists, was brought into being. More or less simultaneously, as a propaganda machine for providing news for both home and foreign consumption, the Communist-controlled Republican Government set up its own news organization, the VNNS (Vietnam News Service), on the lines of the Soviet *Tass* Agency. Following hard on this came the unification of all youth organizations into the Vietnam Youth Group in June and the founding of the Vietnam Confederation of Workers the following month. Four years later the Youth Group was to be developed into the Federation of Vietnam Youth and, as such, became the Vietnamese affiliate of the WFDY, the international Communist youth front organization. The Confederation of Workers was similarly geared to the WFTU. By the end of October 1946 a mass organization of women had likewise been set up, ostensibly in the cause of nationalism but actually for gradual incorporation into the Communist machine. This was the Vietnam Women's Union, which later was to be linked to the World Communist apparatus by becoming the Vietnamese affiliate of the WIDF. By the time, therefore, that the Cominform was formed, the ground had already been well prepared for the emergence and operation of the main Vietnamese 'transmission belts', geared into the Communist Front machinery of world Communism.

By the end of 1946 a series of discussions between the French and the Vietnam Republic had been held with a view to reaching an amicable agreement satisfactory to both; but at each stage, just when a reasonable solution appeared imminent, new obstacles had arisen. Under an agreement signed on 6th March the French recognized the Republic as a Free State, with its own government, parliament, army and finances, but remaining part of the Federation of Indo-China within the French Union. This seemed a hopeful start, but it

left unresolved a number of fundamental differences between the two signatories. These centred mainly around the Republican demand for the union of the '3 Kys'—Tonking, Annam, and Cochin-China—and for complete autonomy. Tonking and Annam had always had the status of protectorates, whereas Cochin-China was juridically French territory. France was therefore loath to agree to its inclusion in the proposed Vietnam union and the question of Cochin-China became one of the principal stumbling-blocks.

Further negotiations in France, attended by Ho Chi-Minh himself, and at Dalat in South Annam, followed; but the ill-feeling aroused by the continued frequent clashes between Viet Minh partisans and French troops and by developments in Cochin-China, where in June the French established a provisional government without awaiting the referendum promised in the March Convention, merely added to the difficulties of the negotiations. To the Vietnamese charge of bad faith in setting up this government, the French countered with the assertion that it was purely a provisional one pending the contemplated referendum; but the talks broke down. Ho Chi-Minh, however, stayed on in France until September, when he signed a *modus vivendi* which, if implemented, would have been a great step forward. But by then the situation in Indo-China had deteriorated still further; and although a cease-fire was ordered on 29th October and discussions were resumed in November, anti-French acts of violence continued. These culminated in a serious armed conflict in Haiphong on 20th November and the outbreak of civil war on 19th December, when a Viet Minh force of some 30,000 launched a premeditated attack on the French in Hanoi.

At this time the great majority of the Viet Minh supporters were still nationalists rather than Communists. The Communist predilection for eliminating opposition, however, had already been demonstrated by the fact that, of the 444 delegates present at the first session of the newly-elected National Assembly held in March that year, only 242 remained as members eight months later, all but two opposition members having been arrested or otherwise removed.[1]

The French, for their part, were anxious to win the nationalists away from Communist control, but this could only be done by granting a greater measure of independence than they felt it was safe to give. It was the old dilemma of aggravating the situation by giving too little too late or risking chaos by granting too much too soon, before the people were sufficiently advanced to wield the powers and

responsibilities accorded to them. Faced with this dilemma, the French tended to adopt the former course with results that proved disastrous.

By March 1949 France had agreed to recognize the unity of Annam, Tonking, and Cochinchina under the collective name of Vietnam and to grant it a certain measure of independence under Bao Dai, the former Emperor of Annam, whom, after protracted negotiations, they had appointed as Head of State. To him the agreed powers were transferred accordingly at the end of the year. Laos, by then, had also been granted limited independence and a treaty had been signed giving autonomy to Cambodia within the French Union. A year later, as a result of the Pau Conference in November 1950, further administrative functions and financial institutions were handed over to all three states.

The more extreme nationalists within the Viet Minh ranks,¹ however, were still far from satisfied and the civil war continued. There followed further promises in July 1953 to 'complete the independence and the sovereignty' of the three states, and in October that year a treaty of friendship was signed recognizing Laos as a fully independent and sovereign state. It remained for the bitter experience of Dien Bien Phu in the spring of 1954 and the conference at Geneva, however, to force the French finally to agree in July that year to the partition of Vietnam and the holding of elections for the whole country within two years. As a result, the cease-fire was sounded on 11th August after eight years of civil war. Two months later the Viet Minh took over Hanoi as their capital and the French withdrew south of the 17th Parallel. Complete independence for the three states of Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia was finally confirmed by the signature of a quadri-partite agreement in Paris on 29th December 1954.

In the years of fighting, the Communist-controlled Viet Minh, like the Chinese Communist Party before it, made a particular point of building up an army of its own with a view to the eventual seizure of power by armed force. Starting with a mere handful of lightly armed guerrillas, the Communist commander-in-chief, Vo Nguyen Giap, gradually expanded and developed his forces into a well-organized, well-disciplined army, trained and equipped on modern

¹ Properly speaking the Viet Minh had ceased to exist under that name since March 1951, but the term is still used to denote the Ho Chi-Minh camp in general.

lines. Much of the training of the regular troops was given by the Chinese, who also helped in the provision of arms and equipment. Such assistance was gladly accepted, but Ho Chi-Minh had the wisdom to recognize that, in view of the inherent Vietnamese dislike of Chinese of any kind, it would have been fatal for his cause to seek the active participation of Chinese troops.

It was in order to counter this growth of the Viet Minh's armed forces that General de Lattre de Tassigny set to work in 1950 to create a Vietnamese National Army, in much the same way as the Americans had helped to build up a South Korean Army for defence against the North Korean forces. The parallel with Korea was seen even more strikingly by the way in which the Ho Chi-Minh government's recognition by Peking, Moscow, and the Eastern European satellites in the opening weeks of 1950 was promptly followed by the recognition of the Bao Dai régime by Britain, the United States and others in the Western camp.

While the recognition of the Ho Chi-Minh and Bao Dai governments by the Sino-Soviet bloc and the Western governments respectively served to clarify the position in Indo-China in the general framework of the Cold War, it was not until a year later, when the Lao Dong (Workers) Party replaced the former Communist Party in February 1951, that the Viet Minh camp openly declared that the 'Vietnam revolution forms an integral part of the world movement led by the Soviet Union'. Nearly two more years were to go by, however, before the Western powers, at a meeting of the North Atlantic Council on 18th December 1952, passed a resolution recognizing that the French effort in Indo-China was 'part of the whole effort of the free world'. By that time the Viet Minh camp had become an undisguised, albeit not openly admitted, Communist régime, with fully-established Communist fronts corresponding to the international Communist Front organizations, with the Lao Dong Party representing the Communist Party of Vietnam linked in a united front with embryo Communist parties of Laos and Cambodia, and with a mass 'transmission belt' in the guise of the Lien Viet Front.

This last-named body had been formed in February 1951 by the amalgamation of the Viet Minh and the closely allied Lien Viet. The so-called Free Laos and Free Cambodia movements, professedly nationalist but actually Communist-controlled, had also been brought into being, the former even with a government of its own

under the name of Pathet Lao. By April 1953 Viet Minh broadcasts were declaring that the Lao Dong and Viet Minh people had 'a mission to create revolution in Laos and Cambodia and to bring about their union with Vietnam', while Viet Minh troops were advancing into Laos and helping to establish this Pathet Lao or Free Laotian government on a small section of Laotian soil.

In view of the important part played by Laos and Cambodia in Communist calculations, it may be as well at this point to consider the developments in these two former protectorates.

Towards the close of the war, as a consequence of the Japanese *coup* against the French in March 1945, both had declared their independence under Japanese pressure. The great majority of the native inhabitants were politically unsophisticated and remained unconcerned by this change of status; but in both countries there were small groups bitterly hostile to the French. After the Japanese surrender, these launched the *Lao Issarak* (Free Laos) and the *Khmer Issarak* (Free Cambodia) movements.

The French had little difficulty in reinstating themselves in Laos south of the 16th Parallel, but the greater part lay to the north of it, in the Chinese zone of occupation. There, as in the rest of their zone of occupation, the Chinese placed every obstacle in the way of the return of the French and openly encouraged the *Lao Issaraks*, who were led by Prince Petsarath and his half-brother, Prince Souphavong. With the aid, therefore, of the large Annamite community and the encouragement of the Chinese, these two leaders were able to establish a Free Laos government in Vientiane in October 1945 and depose the King, who had remained loyal to the French; and it was not until the withdrawal of the Chinese in May 1946 that they and their supporters were driven out by the French. Most of them, together with many of the 30,000 local Annamites, thereupon fled to Siam, where a Free Laos 'government in exile' was set up in Bangkok under Prince Petsarath, with Souphavong as minister of foreign affairs and defence minister.

In conjunction with the large number of pro-Viet Minh Annamites living in the Laos border regions and, more particularly, in the territory west of the Mekong (ceded to Siam in March 1941 and restored by her to Laos in December 1946), the subsequent alliance of Prince Souphavong and his *Lao Issarak* movement with the Viet Minh was to prove a factor of no small importance in the Communist plans for securing control of the whole of Indo-China. Had the

movement attracted more adherents from among the Laotians themselves, the situation might have become far more serious than it did; but there was little social, racial or economic discontent among the people of Laos as a whole and political consciousness was confined to the few. The country in general was perfectly satisfied, therefore, with the reorganization carried out by the French in August 1946 whereby all the Laotian principalities and territories were formed into a single kingdom of Laos, with King Sisavang Vong of Luan Prabang as sovereign and with a considerable degree of autonomy within the Federation of Indo-China.

From his exile in Siam, Prince Souphavong looked increasingly to the Communist-controlled Viet Minh in Tonking for sympathy and support and this soon began to arouse apprehensions among the purely nationalist elements in the *Lao Issarak* movement. He was consequently dismissed from office in May 1949 and withdrew with his own personal followers to a region close to the Laos-Burma border. There he proceeded to set up a provisional 'Committee of Laotian Liberation', with the declared aim of 'co-operation with resistance movements in Vietnam and Cambodia against French colonialism'. On the other hand, Prince Souvanna Phouma, half-brother of Souphavong and Petsarath, influenced by the large measure of independence granted to his country by the treaty concluded with the French in July that year, decided that the time had come to rally to the royalist government. After three years of internal dissension over the attitude to be adopted towards the Viet Minh, the Free Laos government was dissolved in October and Petsarath, though himself electing to remain in Siam, called on all its supporters to return to Laos. All that remained of the *Lao Issarak* movement, therefore, were the pro-Viet Minh elements under Souphavong, whose Committee of Laotian Liberation was transformed in August 1950 into a Laotian Resistance government, which proclaimed itself to be 'the only legal government of Laos' and adopted a national flag and a national anthem. On the Communist model it established a 'transmission belt' in the form of a National Liberation Front under the name of the United Front of Pathet Lao. It also set to work to build up a Laotian Liberation Army, the first units of which had been formed earlier in the year. As the total strength of the movement amounted to no more than a few thousands, the descriptive terms adopted were somewhat grandiloquent; but by March 1951 the task of integrating it with the rapidly developing Communist

movement in Vietnam was facilitated by the establishment of a Joint People's Committee of Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia, with the formation of a Joint United Front as its primary aim.

Meanwhile a parallel development took place in Cambodia. Although the Free Cambodia movement, the *Khmer Issarak*, did not come fully into being until some months after Japan's collapse, Son Ngoc Thanh, a Cambodian political refugee in Japan, who was later to play a prominent part in it, had arrived in Cambodia in May 1945 and had taken over the post of foreign minister in the Cambodian government set up after the Japanese overthrow of the French administration and the declaration of independence two months earlier. In August, Son Ngoc Thanh took over the premiership after a *coup d'état*; but the Cambodians as a whole showed little interest in his anti-French activities and the French, on their return soon after, had no difficulty in restoring their authority. Son himself was arrested in October and exiled; the King affirmed Cambodia's loyalty to the French; and in January the status of protectorate was abrogated and a large measure of autonomy granted.

It was shortly after this that the *Khmer Issarak* movement, which was launched by a small body of Son Ngoc Thanh's partisans based on the North Cambodian provinces ceded to Siam in 1941, first came into prominence. On the restoration of these provinces to Cambodia in December 1946, some of its members, like those of the Free Laos movement, fled to Siam; but there were others who remained and these continued their activities against the French. In this they were helped by the local Annamites, who in Southern Cambodia numbered about 400,000. The large Annamite communities in the border regions of Cambodia and Laos, and in Siam too, were to prove thorns in the flesh of all three states. An increasing number became adherents of the Viet Minh as the years went by and it was they, rather than Laotians, who were to provide the bulk of the self-styled Liberation Army which, in the spring of 1953, invaded Laos.

In April 1950, the *Khmer Issarak* movement held a three-day congress to elect a provisional 'Committee for the Liberation of Cambodia' and created a National United Front of Cambodia (*Khmer Issarak* Front). As president of these two bodies, they elected a Buddhist monk who had turned Communist. This was Son Ngoc Minh, a kinsman of Son Ngoc Thanh who, it will be remembered, had been exiled to France after his arrest in October 1945. The pro-

visional committee had been transformed before long into a Committee of Liberation and in March 1951, the *Khmer Issarak* movement was integrated with the Communist-controlled Viet Minh and with the Free Laos movement by the establishment of the Joint People's Committee of Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia.

The integration of these three marked the opening of an extremely significant new phase in the Communist movement in Indo-China. The Communist Party of Indo-China, which had been ostensibly dissolved in November 1945, reappeared in a new guise on 3rd March 1951, when the Vietnam Lao Dong (Workers) Party was officially inaugurated. A day or two later came the announcement that the Viet Minh and the Lien Viet had been merged into a single United Front under the name of Lien Viet Front. At the same time, with a view to forming a Joint United Front with Laos and Cambodia, the Joint People's Committee of Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia had been established. All this and much else besides, it seems, had been approved in February at a National Congress of the nominally defunct Communist Party which, in addition to 'transforming its Vietnam branch' into the Lao Dong, had drawn up a new political platform and a new Constitution [2]. Unlike the former Communist Party, therefore, the Lao Dong covered only Vietnam instead of the whole of Indo-China; but it was very much the senior partner in the whole area and had virtual control over the embryo Communist parties set up in Laos and Cambodia. The main significance in the general reorganization, however, was the amalgamation of the two main 'transmission belts', the Viet Minh and the Lien Viet, together with the open revival of the Communist Party in the guise of the Lao Dong and the equally open tie-up of the Party with the Vietnam government and with the whole government apparatus. As in China and North Korea, and as also in Russia and all other Communist countries, each of the outstanding Communist leaders from this time onwards was to hold leading positions in the Party, in the government, and in one or more of the 'transmission belts' at one and the same time.

It was significant that, after their integration into the Viet Minh scheme of things, Laos and Cambodia, which hitherto had received but little mention in the Communist Press outside Indo-China, began to feature in the context of world Communism as a whole. In May 1952 the Cominform journal published its first article on the Cambodian and Laotian 'struggle for liberation' [3], and before the

year was out Laotian and Cambodian delegates had, for the first time, attended international Communist Front gatherings abroad. Souphavong himself was present at the Peace Conference of Asian and Pacific Regions in Peking in October that year and at a meeting of the World Peace Congress in Vienna.

From this time onwards the situation in both Cambodia and Laos became increasingly complex. After six years' exile abroad, Son Ngoc Thanh had been pardoned and in November 1951 had returned to Cambodia; but four months later, in March 1952, he rejoined the *Khmer Issarak*s and, with them, threw in his lot with the Viet Minh. Then, in October that year, came the establishment of a new 'resistance government' of Pathet Lao, with the 'liberation' of Laos, the expulsion of the French 'imperialists', opposition to intervention by other powers, and the constitution of 'an independent and prosperous state of Pathet Lao' as its main tasks [4]. The Communist hand behind the scenes was reflected in the emphasis on the United States as the main power whose intervention was to be opposed. Six months later, in April 1953, came the Viet Minh invasion of Laos and the accompanying Viet Minh radio broadcast declaring that the Lao Dong and the Vietnam people had the mission of creating a revolution in Laos and Cambodia and uniting them with Vietnam. Subsequently the Viet Minh camp attempted to make out that the invasion had been carried out by the Free Laotians with the aid of Viet Minh 'volunteers'; but it was clear that the Laotians formed but a minute portion of the total force and that the 'volunteers' were no more acting on their own than were the Chinese 'volunteers' who had flooded into North Korea in the closing weeks of 1950.

Although the advance into Laos was halted after about three weeks of fighting and the invaders began to withdraw, the main object of the operation had been achieved. This was to seize and retain a foothold in Laotian territory for the purpose of installing in it the new 'resistance government' of Pathet Lao as the first step towards the eventual 'liberation' of Laos and its absorption into the Communist camp.

The foothold obtained in the provinces of Sam Neua and Phongsaly in the spring of 1953 was to prove a serious stumbling block to the execution of the agreement reached at Geneva in June the following year. The Free Laotians agreed in November 1954 to recognize the Royal Government of Laos and to place the provincial administration of Phongsaly and Sam Neua under its control 'in

principle'; but, when it came to the point, they would not permit its officials to function in that area. Similarly, Pham Van Dong, when representing the Viet Minh at the Bandung Conference in April 1955, gave an undertaking that the Royal Government of Laos and the Pathet Lao were free to reach a political settlement without outside interference [5]; but this had not prevented the Viet Minh from forcibly recruiting 4,000 young Laotians and taking them to Northern Vietnam for Communist training, arming, and indoctrination with a view to using them later for revolutionary activities in Laos.

The developments in Laos in the spring of 1953 and their implications were not lost on the King of Cambodia who, at the height of the invasion, came out with a strong warning about the probable fate of his own country if invaded in the same way. Speaking in New York on 18th April on his way back from negotiations in Paris, he declared that there was a real danger of the Cambodians rebelling against their own government and joining the Viet Minh if the French failed to grant a greater measure of independence without delay. If Cambodia were invaded like Laos, he doubted if he would be able to call for a general mobilization as the Royal Government of Laos had done. The French, however, remained obdurate, so the King withdrew into voluntary exile in Siam on 16th June in protest against 'French tergiversation' over the independence negotiations which were still in progress. At the same time, in a declaration to his subjects, he expressed the hope that the United Nations would intervene. Failing that, he declared, they must be prepared to fight and die for independence. Although he returned unexpectedly to Cambodia from his exile in Siam a week later, he refused to re-enter the royal capital, Phnom Penh, until 'real independence' had been granted. By this time, however, his warnings and actions had had their effect and on 3rd July the French gave a solemn promise of 'complete independence and sovereignty', not only for Cambodia but for Vietnam and Laos as well. Four months later King Norodom returned to his capital.

It was little more than three weeks after the French had given this promise that the long-drawn war in Korea was brought to an end. With it came fears that the Chinese would withdraw some of their forces from that area and transfer them to Indo-China. Speaking at an American Legion Convention in St Louis on 2nd September, Duiles accordingly warned Peking that the sending of Chinese troops into Indo-China might bring the United States into the conflict.

If this happened, the conflagration might spread to other areas. Whether the Chinese ever had any such intentions may never be known. Judging by his interview published nearly two and a half years later in January 1956, Dulles clearly considered they had [6]; but as far back as December 1949 the Viet Minh had declared that Chinese troops would never penetrate Vietnam territory and it seems clear that Ho Chi-Minh, though ready enough to accept Chinese training, arms and equipment, always had the wisdom to see that the entry of Chinese forces into the fighting would lose him the support of many of his own people. It was significant, however, that the first real call for a peaceful settlement and a cease-fire came from the Chinese in the form of an appeal by Mao Tun, the minister of culture, at a meeting of the World Peace Congress in Vienna in November 1953. This was followed a week later by a Moscow radio report quoting Ho Chi-Minh as having told a Swedish press correspondent that his government was ready to discuss French proposals if France was prepared to sign an armistice and negotiate a settlement. On 3rd December Moscow indicated its support of Ho's statement. The statement itself was confirmed a week later in a Viet Minh radio message which reaffirmed his willingness to negotiate an end to the fighting, provided that the French government was 'sincere and respects our genuine independence'. Another eight months were to pass, however, before the cease-fire was sounded and the intervening period was marked by a number of alarms and excursions, some of which threatened to extend the area of conflict to an alarming extent.

A revealing example of the way in which world Communism operated was seen on 19th December, when Communist parties throughout South-East Asia and the Far East celebrated the seventh anniversary of the war in Indo-China as a 'Day of International Solidarity in Support of the Viet Minh'. The directive for this had come in the form of a resolution passed at the Third World Congress of the WFTU held in Vienna in October, calling on its 82,000,000 members to show their support of the Vietnam struggle for independence in this way. It was just one week after this 'Day of International Solidarity' that the Viet Minh launched the two-day offensive—ostensibly carried out by 'the Lao People's Forces'—which cut across the waist-line of Indo-China and ended up on the Siamese border at Thaklak on the Mekong.

The dangerous implications of the situation thus created were clear to all and developments followed quickly. In Southern Vietnam.

Prince Buu Loc, on being sworn in as prime minister in the opening days of 1954, declared that his first task would be to negotiate with the French for total independence for the Bao Dai régime in order to encourage the people to fight the Communist forces of the Viet Minh to the death. A month later, after the fiery South Korean president Syngman Rhee had offered to send troops to Indo-China to join the fight against the Communists, Nehru made an urgent plea to all concerned to agree to a cease-fire without more ado; but on 13th March the Communists launched the attack which was to end two months later with the fall of Dien Bien Phu. Their object seemed clear. The five-power meeting at Geneva to discuss the questions of Korea and Indo-China was due to open shortly and it was hoped to influence its decisions by overwhelming the French garrison under de Castries before the discussions were completed. Dulles's plea of 29th March for 'united action' against the Communists in South-East Asia was understandable, as the imposition of the Communist system on Vietnam and South-East Asia generally would, as he said, be a grave threat to the free world; but his implied threats of retaliation against the Chinese mainland, which he uttered a few days later in his warning to China against technical aid to the Viet Minh, opened up such prospects of a world-wide conflagration that he failed to obtain the support which he sought on his hurried visit to London. On 27th April, Churchill announced that there could be no new military or political commitments and no decision taken before the Geneva Conference had shown whether or no a political settlement was possible.

While the conference was in progress, Dien Bien Phu fell and the situation went from bad to worse; but, following the opening of cease-fire talks between French and Viet Minh staff officers on the spot after the French had been compelled to evacuate the whole southern zone of the Red River delta, a general agreement was reached at Geneva on 20th July. Three weeks later came the cease-fire. The civil war, which had lasted eight and a half years, was over, but the restoration of peace brought fresh troubles and difficulties in its train. The Ho Chi-Minh régime, now firmly established by international agreement in the north, quickly set to work to consolidate its hold still further; but in the south a state of internal strife and instability quickly developed, which played into Communist hands. Ngo Dinh Diem, who with American backing had succeeded Prince Buu Loc as prime minister in June, was soon

at loggerheads with his chief of staff and other South Vietnam personalities, and the general chaos was further aggravated by the arrival of hordes of refugees, who had been induced, for political and religious reasons rather than from humanitarian motives, to quit the north and flee southwards to Saigon. No preparations had been made for their reception and Communist agitators, who had smuggled themselves into their ranks, had no difficulty in exploiting their feelings of resentment and distress. By the spring of 1955 the situation had deteriorated still further as a result of head-on collisions between the government forces and the private armies maintained by a number of curious but powerful religious sects, notably the Cao Dai, the Hoa Hao and the Binh Xuyen, which had sprung up in the past twenty or thirty years.

Throughout April there was heavy fighting in and around Saigon and at the close of the month the situation was made still more complicated by the action of a non-Communist revolutionary committee, which seized power in Saigon. While asking Diem to form a new government, it demanded the deposition of Bao Dai. Of the extremely complex situation which followed we need not concern ourselves here beyond noting that the increasing friction between Bao Dai, who had remained throughout in France, and his prime minister, Diem, finally led, late in October, to the holding of a referendum. This resulted in an overwhelming vote in favour of Diem as head of state in place of Bao Dai. Three days later, on 26th October, Diem proclaimed a new Republic of Vietnam. Its recognition by Britain, the United States and others in the Western camp followed soon after.

Closely linked with these developments was Diem's refusal to enter into preliminary talks with the Ho Chi-Minh government in preparation for the country-wide elections due to be held before July 1956 in accordance with the Geneva agreement. In addition to contending, with no small justification, that free elections in North Vietnam were impossible so long as it was under Communist rule, Diem adopted the attitude that South Vietnam had no obligation to carry out the agreement, as she had not signed it. His refusal to be bound by it, however, placed its Western signatories in a quandary and seemed likely to postpone the unification of the country indefinitely, unless the Communists in the north decided to bring it about by armed force or staged a rising among the sects and other dissident elements in the south to overthrow the Diem government.

Meanwhile important developments had taken place in Communist policy since the emergence of the Lao Dong Party and the creation of the Lien Viet Front by the amalgamation of the Viet Minh and Lien Viet. Both the manifesto and the new party programme issued by the Lao Dong in 1951 reflected clearly the policy which had brought the Chinese Communists into power and, as in China, the misleadingly moderate policy then announced has since developed along increasingly totalitarian lines. The peasants were promised great prizes, the intellectuals, the petty bourgeoisie, the 'national' bourgeoisie and the 'patriotic landlords' were encouraged to believe that they had everything to gain by supporting the régime, the bait of equality with men was held out to women, the national minorities were promised assistance and equality of rights, Vietnamese in foreign countries were promised protection, and freedom of religious belief and worship, together with protection of the lives and property of foreign residents, was guaranteed. In brief, the programme was one of 'popular democratic socialism' rather than Communism, coupled with 'the mission of liberating the people of Vietnam' from foreign oppression and the evils of feudalism. At the same time the external policy was 'to fight for the defence of world peace and democracy . . . and against the imperialist aggressors', to 'consolidate friendly relations with the Soviet Union, China and other People's Democracies', and 'to actively support the national liberation movements of colonial and semi-colonial countries' [7]. The external policy was therefore fully in line with the aims of international Communism, while the domestic policy followed closely that laid down in Mao Tse-Tung's *New Democracy*.

Although the programme enunciated in February 1951 had offered encouragement to the peasantry, it was apparently considered subsequently that it was necessary to woo them still further, as they formed 90 per cent of the population. This was clearly reflected in an article which appeared in the Cominform journal in December 1952 on the occasion of the sixth anniversary of the civil war [8]. After preening itself that the people of Vietnam 'are led by a Marxist-Leninist Party, the Party of the Working People, which has a membership of 700,000',¹ the article went on to stress the importance

¹ By August 1953, however, while proudly comparing this figure with the total of a mere 3,000 Communists eight years previously, the Party was admitting that its growth had been too rapid for its ideological health and that no new members would be accepted until this health had been restored by political education [9].

of carrying out agrarian reform and distributing the land to the peasants as 'the essential pre-requisite to the consolidation of the patriotic forces of Vietnam'. A month later the Central Committee of the Party adopted a new five-point programme, which emphasized that 'the Vietnam democratic and national revolution' was 'basically a peasant revolution' [10]. This was followed in September 1953 by a Central Committee decision to work for alliance between poor and rich peasants. The policy, it was announced, would be to depend on the poor and landless peasants, unite with the middle peasants, form alliance with the rich peasants, and overthrow 'reactionary traitors and cruel and powerful notables'—a clear echo from China.

Before the year was ended, Ho Chi-Minh, who had declared 'our force resides in the tens of millions of labouring peasants', had announced a 'political achievement of extremely great importance'. The National Assembly of the DRV had 'unanimously and enthusiastically sanctioned the law of agrarian reform so as to put into effect the slogan "Land to the tiller".' Nine months later Ho was to be quoted by the Cominform journal as stressing the implementation of that slogan [11]; but before another year had passed, Ho himself, early in May 1955, was throwing out hints of eventual resort to collectivization, and in June that year the Party organ was declaring, 'After the land reform policy has been implemented, the peasant farmers must follow the road, which, step by step, will lead them to collectivization' [12].

It was not only in the use of force to acquire power, the modified form of capitalism, the ostensible coalition government, and the wooing of the peasants with the slogan 'Land to the Tiller' that the Chinese model was reflected. It was seen, too, in the subsequent gradual weakening of promises and hardening of attitude towards those who failed to toe the line. Thus, when the Lien Viet Front was transformed in September 1955 into the all-embracing Fatherland Front to contact, indoctrinate and control the people at large, it was clearly indicated that it was intended to embrace South Vietnam as well as the North, and that those who held aloof from it would be regarded and treated as traitors.¹

The debt owed to the Chinese Communist leaders was gratefully

¹ In this there was an interesting parallel with what had happened in North Korea in June 1949, when the Korean People's Democratic Front, equivalent to the Lien Viet Front, was reorganized as the Korean Fatherland Front, which claimed to cover South Korea as well.

acknowledged in January 1954, when Ton Duc Thang, chairman of the Lien Viet Front, described Mao's theories as 'an ingenious application of Marxist-Leninist-Stalinist ideology to the practice of China' and declared that his precepts had been 'ingeniously applied' by President Ho Chi-Minh and the Lao Dong to 'the concrete conditions in Vietnam' [13]. At the same time, he hailed the Soviet Union as the 'bastion of world peace' and China as the 'pillar of peace in the East'.

The occasion for these eulogies was the launching of a Vietnam-Soviet-China 'friendship month'. No doubt the Vietnam Communist leaders were genuinely grateful to both Moscow and Peking; but it was not so certain that the country as a whole was. The friendship month with all its mutual back-patting, and such bodies as the Sino-Vietnam-Soviet Friendship associations which had been formed in 1950 after the recognition of the Ho Chi-Minh régime by the Soviet Union and Communist China, were aimed, therefore, at whipping up enthusiasm among the people at large for closer and more friendly relations with the two 'big brothers'. That such enthusiasm did not come naturally was indicated in September 1955, when Ho deemed it necessary to emphasize, even to the Party cadres, that they must 'co-operate with the experts of friendly countries' and 'renounce their pretentious conceptions about work' [14]. The implied reproof appeared to show that Ho's subordinates were apt to be averse to foreign advice and interference, the 'foreign' advice in this instance being mainly Chinese and Russian.

As in Korea, so in Vietnam there were by that time growing indications of some rivalry between Moscow and Peking in the wooing of the Northern régime. In December 1954 an agreement had been signed for Chinese help in restoring communications, services and water conservancy works. Six months later, in June 1955, Ho was given a great reception on his arrival in Peking at the invitation of the Chinese government. When he left on 7th July he took with him an agreement for substantial Chinese economic and technical aid. He then proceeded to Moscow, where the Russians, in addition to allocating 400 million roubles towards the restoration of the national economy in North Vietnam, promised technical training and aid on a substantial scale. The technique of wooing and spreading influence by promises of technical and economic assistance was to be applied to non-Communist as well as Communist countries in Asia before the year was out. In the former, however, it was to be accompanied

by conscienceless propaganda designed to create the maximum of mischief between the non-committed countries and the Western powers and to play on national vanity, national susceptibilities, and national desire for peace and neutrality as between the two world camps.

One of the countries likely to be affected most by future developments in Vietnam is Siam which, in addition to being faced with the problem of some three million Chinese in its midst, has for long been worried by the presence of large numbers of Vietnamese in its north-eastern regions. Already by January 1951 the Viet Minh radio was attacking the Thailand government for its alleged persecution of the Vietnamese community. A month later this was followed by similar attacks in the Peking papers for alleged Siamese discriminations against Chinese communities. Warnings and denunciations of a like nature have been repeated since, one issued in January 1953 declaring: 'We warn this reactionary government that the Chinese residents in Siam . . . have a mighty Motherland and that hostility to them means hostility to the Chinese people' [15]. Accusations of helping French 'aggression' in Indo-China, 'creating tension on the frontier', and permitting Siamese territory to be used as a United States military base in South-East Asia were thrown in for good measure three months later [16].

While such warnings have probably been intended primarily to deter the Thailanders from committing themselves too far to 'Western machinations', they cannot be wholly ignored. The Siamese have, moreover, professed considerable perturbation ever since the creation of a Thai Autonomous Area in Yunnan was announced by Peking in January 1953. Their belief that this was to be used as a base for organizing and training bodies of 'Free Thais' for an eventual attack on Siam was further strengthened when, in July 1954, Pridi, whose whereabouts had long been uncertain, turned up in the Chinese capital and, in an article published in a Peking paper, called for 'a Thai struggle against the American imperialists and their puppets in the Thai government'. It was in order to calm these fears that the Chinese prime minister, Chou En-Lai, in his statement at the Afro-Asian Conference in Bandung in April 1955, categorically denied that Pridi was supervising the training of Thais and Chinese in Yunnan for infiltration or subversion in Siam.

While Pridi has been a thorn in the flesh of the Thailand authorities

ever since he was driven out of power and into exile by the *coup* staged by Pibul in November 1947, it is doubtful, even now, that he has committed himself wholly to the Communists. In like manner it has never been clear to what extent the frequent attempted *coups* and the discovery of alleged Communist plots in Siam since early 1948 should be taken at their face value. Many of those concerned in them and of those arrested have been described as 'Communist suspects' or 'subversive elements', and no doubt there have been actual Communists or Communist sympathizers among them. There seems little doubt, however, that in many, if not most, instances the term 'Communist' has been applied primarily as a useful label to blacken the names of persons hostile to the present régime.

That there are Communists in Siam is beyond doubt; but the great majority of them are Chinese rather than Thais, and the somewhat elusive Communist Party of Siam, like the inappropriately named Malayan Communist Party, appears to be composed almost wholly of Chinese. The first definite reference to the Party by Moscow since the war was made in a broadcast in November 1950 and repeated in the Cominform journal a few days later [17]. This contained the text of a Party manifesto calling on 'all classes, parties and organizations in Thailand' to establish a 'national democratic united front to shake off the shackles of colonialism and feudal oppression' and to drive out 'the American imperialists and their Fascist lackeys', whose aim, it was asserted, was 'to turn Thailand into a military base for American aggression in Asia'.¹ The anti-American theme was a clear reflection of international Communism.

Eighteen months later the same Moscow mouthpiece published a somewhat cryptic account of 'the recent Second National Conference' of the Party, at which Prasong Vong-Vivat, described as the secretary-general, spoke on the theme, 'Mobilize the Millions of the People in the struggle for Independence and Democracy' [18]. The size and composition of the Party, however, have never been made clear and there are conflicting reports even as to the date and circumstances of its birth. What is certain is that, although the thirteen-year ban on Communism was lifted at the end of 1946, the increasing hostility to Communist activities evinced since then by the present régime

¹ This manifesto had first appeared in the Siamese Communist journal *Mahachon* on 29th October and had been repeated by Peking radio on 21st November and then by Moscow radio. A similar manifesto was published in *Mahachon* in April 1951 and again repeated by both Moscow and Peking radio.

culminated six years later, in November 1952, in the passage of an Anti-Subversive Activities Act providing sentences of from ten years to life imprisonment for persons belonging to the Communist Party. Certain it is, too, that although the Party itself must perforce, in these circumstances, remain underground, delegates from Siamese labour unions and youth organizations have attended World Communist Front gatherings abroad organized by such bodies as the World Federation of Trade Unions, the World Federation of Democratic Youth, the International Union of Students and the World Peace Council.

CHAPTER XXXVI

Burma and Malaya

WHILE Siam has ranged itself openly on the side of the West and taken a strongly anti-Communist stand, Burma has refused to take sides in the Cold War. Like India, she has sought to remain neutral. Meanwhile she deals firmly with her own domestic Communist troubles. And of these she has had plenty.

Thakin Soe, it will be recalled, had broken away from the BCP (Burmese Communist Party) in February 1946 after a quarrel with its leader, Than Tun, and had set up a Communist Party of his own known as the Red Flags. Eight months later came the break between the AFPFL (Anti-Fascist People's Freedom League) and the BCP, the latter being expelled from that organization—of which it had hitherto been a component part—because of its anti-government propaganda and its fomenting of labour unrest. A year later, however, in October 1947, the BCP sought to ingratiate itself with its old friends by pledging its support to the campaign, in which the government was then engaged, for stamping out murder and terrorism. But the period of co-operation was brief. The Cominform was formed shortly after the pledge was given, and although, on 11th December, the Party declared its support of the interim government, which had been formed as a result of the recently-concluded Nu-Attlee agreement,¹ and on Christmas Eve had expressed its welcome for the coming implementation of Burmese independence granted by that agreement, the arrival of Cominform directives at the turn of the year ensured a complete reversal of policy almost overnight.

On 4th January 1948 independence was declared; but the Party, which only a few days before had welcomed it, now denounced the

¹ The Attlee-Aung San agreement of January 1947⁹ provided for a general election for a Constituent Assembly. If this Assembly voted for complete independence, Britain agreed to abide by the decision. The Nu-Attlee agreement of October provided for the implementation of the Assembly's vote for independence. Nu had by then succeeded Aung San, who had been assassinated in July.

Anglo-Burmese agreement which had brought it about, and declared that it was a fake independence which merely imposed a military and economic stranglehold on Burma. In its suddenness and completeness this reversal of policy recalled the similar somersault of the Korean Communists on the question of trusteeship just two years previously. It was to be repeated very soon after in India.

By January 1948 the Communist leaders were busy studying the thesis on revolutionary possibilities in Burma which Ghosal, who had visited India the previous month, had brought back with him. This thesis advocated the reorientation of BCP policy on lines similar to those which the Indian Party had just adopted in Bombay. As a result, the BCP Politburo decided to adopt a policy of open resistance, and in February Than Tun himself went to Calcutta. There he attended the Indian Communist Party Congress and the South-East Asia Youth Conference, at which the final plans for insurrections in Burma and other countries of South-East Asia were discussed by delegates from the various South and East Asian countries and from Soviet Russia and Yugoslavia.

The insurrection in Burma was preceded by Communist-inspired strikes. As a result of these the government, on 27th March, ordered the arrest of the BCP leaders, who promptly went underground. The insurrection then began in earnest. Since the close of 1950 the revolt has degenerated into localized warfare in remote areas; but for the first two years it faced the government with a serious political and military threat. The government's firm handling of the situation at the outset produced dissension among its more extreme left wing supporters, and its attempt to mollify them by adopting a 'Leftist Unity' programme to which all were invited to subscribe failed to achieve its purpose. The Communist sympathizers broke away and were joined soon after, in open rebellion, by elements from the Army and military police. To make matters worse, this was followed by revolts among the Karens and among Moslems and Arakanese separatists, and by March 1949 a People's Democratic Front had been set up in the north by a combination of the White Flag (orthodox) Communists, White Band PVOs (Communist sympathizers), and the Army mutineers.

Fortunately for the government, the various elements among the insurgents were by no means united in their aims and views. Following a split in the People's Democratic Front caused by the PVOs objecting to its domination by the Communists, fighting broke out

amongst them in Prome, where the Front had but recently set up, on the Chinese model, a People's Democratic Government of its own under the Communist leader Than Tun. The Communists emerged as victors; but a few months later, in May 1950, they were themselves driven out of their capital by government forces. There followed a succession of regroupings; but not since then has the government of the country been in real peril from the rebel elements. It was not, however, until October 1953 that the Burmese Communist Party and its associated organs were formally outlawed.

The White Band PVOs, who figured so prominently in this rebellion, had originally formed part of a larger body, the PVO (People's Volunteer Organization), which had been formed by Aung San shortly after the war from members of the war-time resistance movement for the purpose of obtaining immediate independence for Burma. In November 1947 this PVO had merged with the Burma Socialist Party (which, like itself, was one of the mainstays of the AFPFL) to form a Marxist League. Marxism, though not Communism, was in fact a doctrine favoured in varying degrees by most of the political parties and organizations in post-war Burma and remains so to this day. In this, however, Burma is not alone. In all the countries of South-East Asia which have achieved independence since the war, Marxist doctrine is prominent.

Up to the time of the outbreak of the Communist insurrection in March 1948, the PVOs had supported the government, but a few months later a split occurred in their ranks on the question of seeking a compromise with the Communists. It was the left wing seceders who thereupon became known as the White Band PVOs and joined in the revolt. The remainder, now known as the Yellow Bands, made their terms with the government and gave it their support.

Almost simultaneously the Karens broke out into rebellion. With them, however, there was no question of sympathy with the Communists, although later on some of them accepted a limited amount of co-operation from the Communists after they had given up all hope of sympathy and support from any other quarter. The Karens, with bitter memories of the cruelties to which they had been subjected by the Burma Independence Army during the war years, had strongly objected to being placed under direct Burman control when the grant of independence to Burma first became a probability as a result of the Aung San-Attlee agreement of January 1947. Aung San himself sought to meet their more reasonable demands, but for

geographical and other reasons their claim to set up a separate independent Karen state was not considered a practical proposition. Had Aung San lived to take over the reins of government when Burma finally achieved independence, his sympathetic understanding of the Karens might have led to a compromise which would have left them reasonably satisfied. But it was not to be. Aung San was dead by the time independence was granted and, when the autonomy which they demanded was refused by the Nu government, they broke into rebellion. Nine months later, in June 1948, they set up their Kawthulay government, controlling areas in the Irrawaddy Delta and North Tenasserim which were populated by Karens. They had little in common with the Communists, but their revolt served to weaken the government's position still further.

That the Communist rebellion, like that in Malaya, was all part of a co-ordinated plan for World Revolution was clear from the start. Apart from the inflammatory nature of the speeches delivered at a meeting in Prome, shortly before the outbreak, by British, Chinese and Yugoslav delegates who had gone direct to Burma from the South-East Asia Youth Conference in Calcutta in February 1948, the details given by the Burmese prime minister, U Nu, four months later provided striking evidence. These showed that Ghosal, on his return from his visit to India, had brought with him a written programme. This, as we have already seen, had been adopted by the Party. The armed rising soon followed.¹ If further proof was required, it was provided in July 1950 when the Burmese Communist secretary-general, Than Tun, publicly announced that the revolution in Burma was part of the world 'New Democratic' movement. To this it may be added that the programme adopted by the Party three years later, in July 1953, clearly reflected the influence of Mao Tse-Tung's teachings and the use of the Chinese Communist Party as a model.

While the Burmese Communist Party itself, together with its old rivals the Red Flag Communists, were in open rebellion, developments favourable to their cause were taking place in the Burmese capital. Both the BSP (Burmese Socialist Party) and the TUC(B), which was closely linked with that party, included strong left wing elements and by October 1949 a Burma branch of the Communist-

¹ It may be noted that Nu also revealed that documentary evidence showed that orders had been issued to overthrow the government by force and to seize power by the middle of June. This may be compared with Malcolm MacDonald's broadcast in August, which disclosed that the establishment of a Malayan Soviet Republic had been planned for 3rd August.

controlled World Peace Council had been formed under the auspices of the TUC(B). On May Day the following year the TUC(B) itself decided to link up with the world Communist Front movement and applied for affiliation with the WFTU.

In his speech advocating this affiliation, Thakin Lwin, the TUC(B) president, made a slashing attack on Britain and the United States and denounced Burmese co-operation with them. This was followed a few months later, on 5th September, by a speech in the Burmese parliament in which the TUC(B) vice-president, Thakin Hla Kywe, came out strongly in support of the North Koreans in the Korean War which was then raging. In government circles, where the aim was to keep Burma strictly neutral in the Cold War, these two speeches were viewed with alarm. On 21st September, therefore, both Lwin and Hla Kywe were expelled from the executive council of the government's mainstay, the AFPFL, and were asked to resign from parliament on the grounds that they were undermining the prestige and policy of the League.

The flurry caused by this episode was followed three months later, on 8th December, 1950, by an open split in the BSP when the left wing elements broke away and formed the BWPP (Burmese Workers and Peasants Party). It soon became clear that, in all but name, the new body was nothing less than an unofficial Communist Party, acting for the Burmese Communist Party in the government-held areas. It faithfully followed the Moscow line and under its auspices were established the regular Communist series of mass organizations linked with their corresponding world Communist front bodies.

In so far as trade unions were concerned, the new party set up an organization of its own, which in February 1951 adopted the name of Burmese Trade Union Congress (BTUC) and promptly applied for affiliation to the WFTU. Into this body went the more extreme elements of the TUC(B), who had made themselves conspicuous at its Congress earlier the same month by their open support of the Moscow line. They had, too, loudly applauded when the British Communist, MacWhinnie, who with Liu Ning-Yi of the Chinese Communist Party was present as a representative of the WFTU, declared, 'Truman's Point Four,¹ like the Marshall Plan, will result

¹ Truman, in his inaugural speech as President in January 1949, had outlined a Four-Point programme for strengthening the free countries. Point Four was to make available for the improvement of under-developed areas the benefits of American scientific and industrial advances.

in intensified exploitation of the Asian peoples'. From that time onwards, the BTUC and other organizations sponsored by the BWPP were pitched in rivalry against the now relatively moderate TUC(B) and other organizations under the wing of the Socialist Party. In November 1951 the BWPP took the step of uniting the left wing opposition into one bloc known as the Triple Alliance, later renamed the Burma Patriotic Alliance.

Unperturbed by these developments, the government went steadily ahead with its domestic policy of putting down the armed rebellion, extending its control over the country, and carrying out land and other reforms. At the same time, in the international field it showed itself determined to pursue its neutral course between the two great opposing world camps. Unlike India, Pakistan and Ceylon, which had freely opted to remain in the British Commonwealth after achieving independence, Burma had elected to withdraw from it. She showed considerable resentment, therefore, when, in February 1949, after Nehru had made a personal appeal to the Burmese to end the armed strife which was rending their country apart, the representatives of the Commonwealth governments then meeting in New Delhi offered to mediate. She regarded this proposal as interference in her internal affairs. She continued, however, to maintain correct and friendly relations with the various Western countries, but she was equally intent on establishing amicable relations with the Communist states. In December 1949 she accordingly led the way by being the first Asian country to recognize the newly-established Peking government, and by April 1951 Rangoon could boast of having a Soviet Embassy as well as a Chinese Embassy in its midst. The former incidentally constituted the second Soviet diplomatic mission to be established in South-East Asia and, like its Chinese counterpart, has been strongly suspected of activities outside its normal diplomatic functions.

Although opposed to Communism and to their own domestic brand of Communists, the majority of Burmese have always been far more attracted to the nationalism of Ho Chi-Minh and Mao Tse-Tung than to that of Bao Dai or Chiang Kai-Shek. The government therefore had a double reason for objecting to the presence and operations of Chinese Nationalist forces in the Burma border regions of Kengtung, to which they had withdrawn from the neighbouring Chinese province of Yunnan. Not only were these remnants of Chiang's armies violating Burmese soil; they were also, by the threat

they constituted, providing Communist China with a ready excuse, if a pretext was needed, for sending troops into Burma. Reports that the United States were aiding these Chinese Nationalist forces under General Li Mi were denied by the State Department in Washington in January 1952, but the reports continued and engendered considerable ill-will in Burma towards both the Chinese Nationalists and the United States. The outcome was that in March the following year, after referring the matter to the United Nations on the grounds that the Nationalists were guilty of aggression against Burmese territory, the government announced its decision to terminate its Economic Co-operation Agreement with the United States on account of its annoyance with American failure to induce Chiang to put a stop to Li Mi's activities.

Burma's decision to forego any further American economic aid appears to have been dictated to some extent by a desire to stand on her own feet. At this point, therefore, a digression on the matter of economic aid to the South-East Asian countries in general and of the conflicting factors of anti-colonialism, anti-Communism, and neutralism, may be permissible.

As far back as March 1947 an Asian Relations Conference had been held in Delhi. The main object was to promote Asian unity, but the general impression given by the talks was that the countries of South-East Asia were united only in their distrust of Indian and Chinese ambitions. China, at that time, was still under Nationalist rule, and India and the South-East Asian countries themselves were still under Western domination. With the advent of independence soon after for most of these countries and the establishment of a Communist régime in China, the situation changed. India sought to stabilize and strengthen itself by democratic means; China strove by the more spectacular and forceful methods of Communism. Overshadowed by these two giants, the countries of South-East Asia could only wait to see which form of government produced the better results and which of the two held out the more hopeful prospects for solving their economic problems.

In the meanwhile, under President Truman's Four-Point programme of January 1949 and the Colombo Plan of November 1950, the under-developed countries of South and East Asia were receiving substantial economic and technical assistance. The cry of anti-colonialism served to offset to some extent the gratitude expressed for the aid received, but the general attitude of those benefit-

ing from this aid was reflected at the ECAFE Conference held in February 1953. There the Asian delegates refuted Russian assertions of 'imperialist' influence and interference and accused the Russians of hindering rather than helping the economic health of Asia. The practical assistance given to South-East Asia under the four-point programme and the Colombo Plan were contrasted with the absence of any Soviet aid, apart from unfulfilled promises to pay for raw materials by delivery of machinery and capital goods.

Criticism of Russia had been expressed in another context at the Asian Socialist Conference held in Rangoon the previous month. Colonialism and imperialism were strenuously denounced, but it was explicitly stressed that Russian colonialism and imperialism were regarded as being just as repugnant to the peoples of Asia as the Western version. Even more outspoken denunciations of Soviet imperialism were to be made at the Afro-Asian Conference in Bandung two years later. The great desire, however, was to remain neutral and the Asian Socialist International, created at the Rangoon conference, was regarded by those present as the best safeguard against Communism and against the use of Asia by either 'camp'.

It was perhaps in part due to the criticisms made at the Asian Socialist Conference in January 1953 and at the ECAFE Conference the following month that, a few months later, the Soviet Union launched a new policy aimed at countering United States' aid to under-developed countries and encouraging the neutralization of the non-Communist Asian powers. This was the offer of friendship to Asian governments as a whole, non-Communist as well as Communist, and of economic and technical assistance.

The first indication of the coming change was seen in July, when Moscow made an offer of four million roubles (about £369,000) towards the United Nations technical assistance programme. This was followed in August by the much-publicized grant of one thousand million roubles (about £92,250,000) and technical assistance to the North Koreans for reconstruction and rehabilitation and in September by the equally publicized large-scale economic and technical aid offered to Communist China to assist the work of industrialization. •

Apart from the relatively trifling grant made to the United Nations technical assistance programme in July, Soviet munificence had, up to this stage, been confined to Asian peoples under Communist government; but on 19th September, at a dinner given in honour of

the visiting North Korean delegation, Malenkov took occasion to drive home to Asians in general the advantages to be derived from co-operation with the Soviet Union and China. The large-scale aid just granted to North Korea and China was presented as an example of what the neutral Asian powers might hope to obtain for themselves by such friendly co-operation, and inducements of trade as well as economic and technical assistance were dangled before their eyes. Economically backward nations, it was stressed, could only hope to achieve economic independence by industrialization, and Soviet aid would enable them to expedite industrialization and therefore economic independence.

It was a tempting bait; and the fact that the Soviet Union itself had, by its own efforts and methods, which included industrialization, transformed Russia within the space of thirty odd years from an economically weak and backward country to a position of outstanding strength and power, made the proposition all the more tempting.¹

So far as Burma was concerned, the gradual working out of this policy was seen in the reception given to the Burmese prime minister, U Nu, on his visit to Moscow in October 1955 and in the return visit paid by Bulganin and Khrushchev to Burma a few weeks later. U Nu's anxiety to remain neutral was reflected in his ready retraction and rephrasing of the view expressed by him in Moscow that 'Russia, as an Asian power, must be represented at conferences . . . handling Asian problems' [1]; but his joint statement with Bulganin on 6th December on the questions of 'nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons' and armaments came perilously near to support of the Moscow line. The implementation of the policy enunciated by Malenkov in September 1953 was seen, moreover, in the new economic agreement signed by Bulganin in Rangoon before his departure, promising agricultural and industrial aid to Burma, mainly in the form of the loan of technical and economic experts in return for Burma's surplus rice. For good measure he threw in the construction and equipment of a technological institute in Rangoon as a free gift to the Burmese people.

The Bulganin-Khrushchev visit was part of a clear attempt to woo

¹ The credit for this transformation was, of course, given to the Communist system of government. Thus Khrushchev, on his return to Moscow from his Asian trip on 21st December 1955, boasted that the Soviet people, *under Communist Party leadership*, had turned their country 'from a backward Russia into the most advanced and powerful state in the world'.

the neutral and uncommitted countries of Asia by the offer of economic advantages, by flattery and by the open exploitation of national fears, grievances and prejudices. It was thus hoped to drive out Western influence and cause friction with the West. Stalin had never paid personal visits of this kind to any Asian country, nor had he ever invited heads of non-Communist Asian states to Moscow. Instead, through the medium of the Communist press, he had berated Nehru, Nu and the rest of them as 'imperialist puppets and running dogs' and had sought their overthrow by encouraging Communist subversion and revolution in their countries. The Bulganin-Khrushchev technique was, therefore, something entirely new and far more subtle, the technique of personal visits as honoured guests and the utilization of the opportunities presented at public functions during these visits to put forward the Soviet versions of history to the national leaders as well as to the masses. This was done in such a way that the former, as hosts, hesitated to counter this graceless propaganda, clothed as it was in half-truths, while the unsophisticated masses swallowed it whole on the assumption that, as the Soviet leaders were honoured guests, their statements must be accepted unquestioningly.

As a man of deeply religious convictions, U Nu has a natural repugnance for the atheistic creed of Moscow. He draws, however, a distinction between Communist activities in Burma and Burma's relations with the Communist countries. The former must be suppressed; the latter, in so far as they are consistent with the maintenance of neutrality, are to be encouraged. The joint statement issued by him and Chou En-Lai in June 1954 on the occasion of Chou's visit to Rangoon was a model of rectitude. His talks with Ho Chi-Minh in Hanoi on his way to China five months later and his subsequent talks with Mao Tse-Tung and other Chinese Communist leaders in Peking appear likewise to have been unimpeachable. Like his joint statement with Chou, they merely served to reflect Burma's determination to work for peaceful relations with China irrespective of her own Communist troubles. His visit to Moscow a year later and the return visit of Bulganin and Khrushchev to Burma which followed, at his invitation, were clearly intended to assist his aim of ensuring peaceful relations with Russia. That his visitors abused his hospitality by the way in which they indulged in such gross propaganda was his misfortune rather than his fault. It remains to be seen whether, in the long run, they did more harm to their own

cause than to Burma's. That the immediate effect was harmful, however, is beyond dispute.

What also seems certain is that, until but a short time before the Bulganin-Khrushchev visit, Moscow had shown surprisingly little interest in Burma and appeared to place but little reliance on the Burmese Communists. It was apparently only after the change in policy towards the uncommitted countries of Asia had been formulated that the Burma experts in Moscow were called upon to carry out a thorough study of the situation in that country with a view to seeing how it could be exploited to the best possible advantage.

While Burma as an independent state has sought to remain neutral in the clash between the two great world camps, Malaya as an integral and not yet self-governing part of the British Commonwealth has been ranged on the side of Western democracies. Like Burma, however, its continued existence under a democratic form of government was, for a time, seriously threatened by Communist revolt within its own borders. This open insurrection was launched in June 1948, only a few months after the final plans for a Communist armed offensive in South-East Asia had been discussed at the South-East Asian Youth Conference in Calcutta.

Its outbreak had been preceded in the closing months of 1947 by industrial strife and unrest of an ever-increasing severity. In part this was due to legitimate grievances; but the Communists were quick to exploit the situation for their own purposes and to stir up the violent demonstrations which accompanied the more serious troubles. Having already gained control in a number of the trade unions, they were well placed to do so. It was significant, too, that the Communists in Malaya were making increasing use of contacts with foreign Communists and Communist sympathizers. Not only had representatives of the Malayan Communist Party attended the British Empire Communist Conference in London in January 1947; two of them had gone to the WFDY Convention in Prague in July of that year and others had contacted the WFDY delegation which had visited Singapore a month or two previously. Even more significant were the talks held with the Australian Communist, Sharkey, when he was passing through Singapore on his way to Calcutta to attend the South-East Asian Youth Conference in February 1948.

It was shortly after the return of their own delegates from that conference that the Party gave its final approval to the plans for an

armed revolt. By early April, labour unrest in Singapore was being fomented and seditious pamphlets were coming to notice. Banishment warrants were issued against the principal offenders and police raids were carried out; but the trouble only got worse and spread to the mainland where, by early May, cases of arson, assaults on estate managers, and intimidation of workers were being freely reported. By mid-June the Communist campaign of violence had come fully into the open and, following a series of murders, the government was compelled to declare a state of emergency. The Communist-controlled Pan-Malayan Federation of Trade Unions and ten other trade union bodies had been outlawed a few days previously; the outlawing of the Malayan Communist Party and its armed auxiliary, the MPAJA, which had issued a manifesto calling the Malayan peoples to arms against the British, followed soon after.

The three to four thousand Communists and terrorists who took to the jungles at that time¹ have continued ever since to cause the maximum trouble and disturbance for the authorities in Malaya; but they have failed in their two-fold purpose of disrupting the country's economy and of setting up a Malayan Soviet Republic in 'liberated areas' on the Chinese model. In spite of their claims to be striving for the liberation of the Malayan people from imperialist subjugation, they have failed, too, to win the support of more than a minute fraction of the peoples of Malaya for the 'national liberation struggle'. Such aid as they have been able to obtain has come, largely through intimidation, from the isolated communities of Chinese squatters which existed at the outset and from the *Min Yuen*, an underground Communist-controlled organization for supplying food, services, and information, an organization similar to that used by the Chinese Communists in the 1930's.

In order to convey the impression that they were fighting a war of national liberation, the Communists in Malaya, who at the start of the revolt called their jungle guerrillas the Malayan People's Armed Forces, changed the name to Malayan Races Liberation Army in February 1949. This change followed hard on the adoption of a new Party programme, aimed at 'driving out the British imperialists from Malayan soil . . . and the establishment of a People's Republic . . . based on the dictatorship of the revolutionary classes of all races in the country' [2]. Apart from captured docu-

¹ Despite heavy losses through death, disease and capture, this total has been kept more or less constant by replacements.

ments indicating that this was one of their aims, articles appearing since then in the Cominform journal and other Communist organs have shown clearly that the armed struggle in Malaya is part and parcel of the international Communist plans for World Revolution [3]. While, however, the moral support of international Communism is clear beyond all doubt, actual material aid from outside appears to have been but slight. In addition to the trickle of arms that has come from the Siamese side of the border, Peking claimed in June 1952 that aid had been given by Russia and other Communist countries [4]; but neither the nature nor the extent of the aid was specified. Chinese influence, however, has been clearly reflected in the tactics employed. Apart, too, from the fact that the guerrillas consist almost entirely of Chinese, Peking's concern with the revolt has been indicated by its periodic fulminations against the 'brutal policy of mass slaughter by the British colonial authorities' and the 'persecution and deportation' of Chinese from Malaya.

With regard to the trickle of arms coming from Siam, it should be noted that the hilly jungle country in the southernmost border region of Siam provided a sanctuary for Malaya's Communists when in need of rest and retraining. Late in 1949, therefore, the Thai government agreed to allow Malayan Federation police to cross the frontier in pursuit of these terrorists to a distance of three miles. Even so, the border has never been effectively sealed and in 1953, according to press reports, the Malayan Communists had control of some 300 square miles on the Siamese side of the Kedah border. From this base they passed arms into Malaya [5].

While the jungle terrorists, despite their numerical weakness, continued to provide a disturbing problem for the authorities in Malaya, a Communist document which fell into government hands early in 1952 showed that by September 1951 the Party leaders had decided that their policy of violence was merely antagonizing the peasants and workers and damaging the Communist cause. A directive had therefore been sent out reminding members that the duty of expanding and consolidating the organization of the masses must take precedence over the purely military objective of destroying the enemy. This, it was emphasized, could best be achieved by creating a united front of all communities and classes and by avoiding murder and intimidation [6]. It was indicative of the difficulties of communication between the Communist headquarters and the scattered jungle units that the effect of this directive did not become noticeable

until nearly a year after its original issue. On the contrary, within a few days of its issue Sir Henry Gurney, the British High Commissioner for Malaya, had been ambushed and killed and a new phase of terrorism and intimidation of workers on rubber estates, aimed at disrupting the economic life of the country, had opened. By the latter part of 1952, however, the number of terrorist incidents and murders had fallen and another year was to go by before, late in 1953, a return to armed aggression and terrorism was ordered. The reason for this was that many persons who had formerly been intimidated into supporting the Communists had ceased to help them. With funds, food, and active assistance seriously curtailed in consequence, Communist morale had fallen and a more active, aggressive policy was required to raise it once more.

As is the Communist practice everywhere, the Communists in Malaya have always paid special attention to attracting students and other youthful elements to their cause. Thus a document captured from Communist terrorists in June 1954 put forward suggestions for improving work among students and children. Another, issued by the South Malayan Bureau of the Party, remarked: 'Students and children are generally the potential force of our revolutionary power. They are pure in heart and can easily accept the teachings of the Party.' In line with this thesis, in which 'pure of heart' is a pleasant euphemism for 'unsophisticated', attempts were made in 1955 to gain control of secondary schools in Singapore. For the purpose of undermining the authority of teachers, intimidation was used and two teachers who resisted were killed. Five others had acid thrown in their faces. And here it may be observed that, in the use of young children and in the way in which those between eight and sixteen years of age are organized into leagues of 'Young Devils' for carrying messages, spreading propaganda and giving warning of the approach of enemy patrols, the influence of the Chinese Communist model is clearly reflected. They, too, employed bands of youngsters under the designation of 'Young Devils' in the days when they were struggling for power.

Some indication of the success of these efforts to attract the young to their cause was seen in the serious riots which broke out in Singapore in May 1955. Preceded by a bus strike which was exploited by Chinese Communist students, these riots were deliberately provoked by the students after a clash between the strikers and the police. Before they were suppressed, four people, including an American

journalist, had been killed, many injured and a large number of arrests had been made. Some months later, when referring to these riots as having been due to Communist work in the labour unions and schools of Singapore, the chief minister of Singapore, Mr David Marshall, aptly described the Communists as 'a group of hardened persons, loyal to a foreign ideology of tyranny who, without regard to human suffering, seek to create chaos and the violent overthrow of democratic government'.

It was shortly after these riots that the Communist Party, tired of its seven years of jungle warfare and hoping to achieve its aims by more lawful methods, announced its readiness to negotiate a peaceful settlement. The offer was rejected, but the Communists were reminded that the surrender terms announced in September 1950 still held good. Three months later, on 9th September 1955, the government offered an amnesty to end the fighting, and military operations were suspended in order to facilitate the arranging of talks with the Communist leader, Chen Ping. Towards the end of November, however, while the preliminary arrangements for these talks were in progress, fresh terrorist attacks were launched. The government was forced to order the resumption of operations; but finally, in the closing days of December, Tengku Abdul Rahman, head of the Federation of Malaya government, and David Marshall, chief minister of Singapore, were able to meet Chen Ping for talks in Baling, a village close to the Siam border.

The Communist leader intimated that his party was not prepared to surrender under the amnesty terms but wished to negotiate for peace. The reason was obvious. The amnesty required all those surrendering to renounce their Communist activities. The Communists, on the other hand, planned to continue the work of subversion under the guise of a legal political party and demanded freedom from restrictions if they agreed to stop fighting. It was clearly for the purpose of implementing these plans that Peking, in its propaganda broadcasts, had been calling for the recognition of the Malayan Communist Party as a legal political party, and it was in order to prevent this that Marshall and the Tengku rejected Chen Ping's demands for the recognition of his Party and for freedom from all restrictions. The meeting therefore proved abortive and Chen Ping returned to the jungle. Before doing so, however, he had made three admissions of no small significance. He admitted that he had only agreed to meet Abdul Rahman and Marshall after

satisfying himself that they were freely elected leaders and not just 'running dogs of the British imperialists'; he admitted that the Communist aim was not just to liberate Malaya but to preserve and propagate Communist ideology; and he admitted that many of the guerrillas wished to return to China. By the first two admissions, therefore, he exposed the myth that the Communists were fighting for the peoples of Malaya, to liberate them from the oppression of British colonialism and of British-imposed leaders. By his last admission he served to confirm that the Communists in their jungle war were being directed and supplied by China.

CHAPTER XXXVII

Indonesia

IN Indonesia the unavoidable hiatus of forty-five days between the date of Japan's surrender and the arrival of the British to take over the duties of occupation resulted in a situation very different from what had been contemplated. The prime task allotted to the British troops was that of disarming and repatriating the Japanese forces; along with this went the releasing and succouring of prisoners-of-war and the 200,000 or so Dutch civilian internees. Although, somewhat ironically, it became necessary to employ some of the Japanese as an auxiliary fighting force in military operations against the Indonesians before proceeding with the work of disarmament and repatriation, the Japanese part of this programme caused little difficulty. The trouble came from the Indonesians. That friction should quickly develop between the nationalists, who were determined to retain their new-won freedom, and the Allied commanders, who had no authority to recognize the new régime, was inevitable. The opening phase of the British occupation was therefore marked by frequent armed clashes, with heavy casualties on both sides.

To the credit of the responsible nationalist leaders it must be said that they did their best to curb the excesses of the wilder elements and showed genuine concern at the brutalities perpetrated; but they themselves were severely handicapped. On the one hand, their own position and the continued existence of the machinery of government which they had set up were increasingly threatened, not only by the Dutch, with whom they were attempting to establish a *modus vivendi*, but also by irresponsible elements and political opponents among the Indonesians who, through greed for power or through belief that the government leaders were preparing to compromise with the Dutch, were the cause of serious internal dissension. On the other hand, the responsible leaders were handicapped by having no armed forces of their own and no other means of

controlling the disturbances, which were largely the work of excitable youths and criminal elements who had armed themselves with weapons and equipment taken from the Japanese.

This, however, was but a passing phase. Of far more lasting consequence was the way in which the political organization of the future Republic of Indonesia was being built up. The last two months of 1945, in fact, saw the birth or rebirth of all the main political parties which contend for power in Indonesia today—the *Masjumi* with its essentially Islamic basis; the PNI (Nationalist Party) with its secular and nationalist basis and leftist leanings; the Socialist Party, whose offspring, the Indonesian Socialist Party, like its Indian counterpart, was to attract some of the best brains in the country but was to prove sadly sterile by virtue of having too little following among the masses; and last, but by no means least, the PKI, the Indonesian Communist Party. Each of these parties reflected one or more of the outstanding and often conflicting features of Indonesian life and thought—the teachings of Islam and Marx and the exuberance of nationalism. Until the long-postponed elections in September 1955, the *Masjumi* was always thought to be the largest of these parties. It remained for the 1955 elections, the first ever held in Indonesia, to show that the PNI commanded a larger following, although this was due mainly to a split which had occurred in the *Masjumi* in April 1953, when the more right wing Moslem elements had broken away to form a separate party of their own, the *Nahdatul Ulama*.

These early months also saw the birth of a number of those organizations which, with their portmanteau names, present such a bewildering array of seemingly incomprehensible initials to the uninitiated. Most of them had fissiparous tendencies and were constantly splitting up and forming new bodies; but some of them, like the PESINDO and the BKPRI and, later, the SOBSI and SARBUPRI, were destined to play an all-important part in the trade union, youth and Communist movements.¹ The PESINDO (Indonesian Socialist Youth), which was founded at a congress held in November 1945 and was reorganized as the *Pemuda Rakjat* (People's Youth) five years later, was headed by a Communist, and

¹ The name SOBSI is derived from the initial letters of the Indonesian rendering of this body, *Sentral Organisasi Buruh Seluru Indonesia*. BKPRI is likewise composed of initial letters. PESINDO, on the other hand, is a shortened form of *Pemuda Socialis Indonesia*, and SARBUPRI is a similar portmanteau word.

at the outset was composed largely of graduates of the war-time Japanese-sponsored youth schools. The BKPRI (All-Indonesian Republic Youth Congress), which came into existence about the same time, was later to become the Indonesian affiliate of the WFDY, the World Communist Front youth organization. SOBSI (Central Organization of All-Indonesian Labour), though not formally inaugurated until November 1946, was to outrank all other organizations in strength and importance and, coming increasingly under Communist control, has been affiliated to the WFTU since May 1947. By that time it claimed a membership of 1,200,000, and it was later to attain more than double that strength. The SARBUPRI (Estate Workers' Union) came into being shortly after SOBSI and, like it, soon came under strong Communist influence.

One other body which was established about the same time calls for mention because of its link with the World Communist Front organizations. This was the National Union of Indonesian Students. Created as the result of a resolution passed at a students' congress in Malang in March 1947, it became an affiliate of the IUS shortly after its formation. By the time, therefore, that the Cominform was created in October that year, three of the four principal World Communist Front organizations, which that mouthpiece of Moscow was to use as 'transmission belts', already had their branches in Indonesia. The fourth, the WIDF (Women's International Democratic Federation), was to have its Indonesian affiliate later.¹

Whilst nationalist exuberance was reflected in the creation of all these political parties and organizations the Communists were taking full advantage of the situation brought about by the collapse of Japan, the declaration of independence, and the general aftermath of close on four years of war. Opinion among them, it is true, was divided, the more orthodox being opposed, at that stage, to the use of violence to achieve their aims. War-time concentration on anti-Fascism to the virtual exclusion of anti-capitalism still lay heavy upon them and, lacking a direct lead from Moscow, they were slow to readjust themselves to the changing situation. The fact that Sukarno and Hatta, who now headed the new Republic, had collaborated with the Japanese 'Fascists' during the war made most Communists hesitant to support them fully in their struggle against the Dutch. Amongst the less orthodox Communists, however, there

¹ The WPC (World Peace Council), which today may be said to rank above all four of these in importance, is not included here, as it was not formed until later.

was no such hesitation. On the contrary, they wanted the Republican leaders to oppose the Netherlanders more vigorously.

Most active of these unorthodox elements at the start was the former Communist leader Tan Malaka who, though looked on askance by his orthodox comrades on account of his break with Moscow, had lost none of his enthusiasm for proletarian revolution or for getting rid of the Dutch. To assist his purpose he attempted to persuade Sukarno and Hatta, who had been selected as president and vice-president respectively, to nominate him as sole political heir in the event of their being either killed or imprisoned. On their refusal to do so, he proceeded to forge their signatures to a document which he himself drew up, transferring all power to him alone in such an eventuality [1]. Armed with this spurious authority, he spread reports that both Sukarno and Hatta had been arrested by the British and sought to persuade those with influence that it was his duty, therefore, to assume the presidential powers.

In view of the way in which Communists in Eastern Europe paved their way to power by obtaining key posts in coalition governments, it was not without significance that Tan Malaka, after informing the Socialist leader, Sjahrir, of his alleged nomination as political heir, outlined a plan under which Sjahrir was to be president while he himself would head the government and hold the key ministries of the Interior and Labour. Tan Malaka's radical proposals for securing mass support for the revolutionary struggle by such methods as seizing all foreign properties without compensation, were flatly rejected by Sjahrir, who saw that the only result would be to alienate Britain and America and rally them to the support of the Dutch in crushing the Republic.

Foiled though he had been in his attempts to achieve power, Tan Malaka's ardour for revolutionary activities remained unabated. In addition to organizing a 'People's Front' which, by using nationalism as a bait for Communist aims, was intended to embrace all revolutionary and republican groups, he had earlier put forward an ambitious plan for a proletarian republic of Indonesia, Malaya, Burma, Siam, the Philippines and Northern Australia, a kind of enlarged proletarian version of the Greater Indonesia which was being advocated by a section of nationalists in both Indonesia and Malaya. While, however, he failed in this as he had failed in his attempt to achieve power by forgery and intrigue, he continued to plot and to plan and had the support of the PKI, which had been

nominally re-established by Mohamed Jusuf, a former member of a Japanese-sponsored political organization. But again success eluded him. By March 1946 his intrigues for the overthrow of the Republican leaders and his increasingly aggressive demands had made the Nationalist Government so thoroughly apprehensive that they had him arrested and jailed, together with a number of his principal supporters. In prison he remained, except for a brief interval, until released nearly two years later.

Jusuf, whose followers had been indulging in anti-government terrorist activities, was arrested at the same time and the party he had set up under the name of the PKI had its claim to be the legal successor of the pre-war Communist Party repudiated by the more orthodox Communists, who disapproved its terrorist methods. Jusuf had, in fact, never been a member of the pre-war PKI, nor had he taken part in the anti-Japanese underground movement of the war-time Party. It was only the absence of the real Communist leaders abroad that had enabled him to assume the Communist leadership and to claim the title of PKI for the party he had created. It was not, therefore, until about May 1946, when the old pre-war leaders began to return from exile, that what may be called the true PKI was re-established. Sardjono, who, after being imprisoned since 1926 for his part in the Communist rebellion of that year, had spent the war years in Australia, was amongst those who returned to Indonesia in the spring of 1946 and it was he who replaced the discredited Jusuf as chairman and set the party on a more orthodox course. Under his guidance it increased both in numbers and prestige. This was more particularly noticeable after he had been joined by the veteran Communist, Alimin, who returned in August 1946 after twenty years in exile abroad, mostly in Moscow, but more recently in Yenan.

By no means all of the many Indonesian Communists who returned from abroad during these early days of the post-war period entered the PKI. Some had served in the 'underground' in the Netherlands during the war and on their return home decided for one reason or another to join a non-Communist Marxist body instead. Some, such as Abdul Madjid and Tan Ling Djie, joined Sjahrir's Socialist Party; Setiadjit joined the Labour Party; others sought to hide their Communist affiliations by joining the PESINDO. It was not until 1948 that they, like Amir Sjarifuddin who had spent the war years in Indonesia itself, reappeared as openly-declared

Communists. By that time the Cominform had been brought into existence and the word had gone forth that the days when Communists were free to collaborate with bourgeois nationalist governments in the cause of independence and unity were ended. Up to the time when this new phase was introduced, however, the PKI, while building up its strength and organizational apparatus, had adhered to the Marxist programme it had adopted under Sardjono's guidance. This looked to the maintenance and consolidation of the Republic as the first step towards the Communists' own eventual assumption of power. The second step would be to obtain key posts in a coalition government.

Apart, therefore, from the opening phase under Jusuf, when it was indulging in terrorist and other anti-government activities, the PKI subordinated its ultimate aims during this period to the task of supporting the Republican government in its struggle to maintain and consolidate the independence it had proclaimed. In this struggle the Republic had, from the autumn of 1945 onwards, the full backing of Soviet Russia, which was quick to appreciate the opportunity for mischief-making offered by the situation in Indonesia. First came the Moscow newspaper denunciations of Britain for helping to restore Dutch rule. Then, in January 1946, followed the demands of the Soviet delegate in UNO for the withdrawal of the British forces and the recognition of Indonesian independence. A month later came the proposal of the Ukrainian delegate at the Security Council meeting for the dispatch of a commission of investigation.

By the time of the first Dutch 'police action' in July 1947, which followed the breakdown of the Linggadjati Agreement¹ of March, the Russians were hitting out right and left in righteous indignation. Both the Renville Agreement, which ended the resultant dispute in the Security Council, and the Committee of Good Offices, which helped to bring about the signing of that agreement in January 1948, came under their scathing denunciation. The agreement was stigmatized by Gromyko in the Security Council as a Dutch victory and attributed by him to the fellow-feeling of the Western 'imperialists', while his Ukrainian colleague bitingly referred to the Committee of Good Offices as the 'Committee of Good Offices for the Netherlands Usurpers'. By that time, however, the Cominform had been formed; and while Moscow continued to make the maximum trouble

¹ Under this agreement the Dutch had accorded *de facto* recognition to the Indonesians.

for the Western powers by playing to the Asian gallery in its role as the champion of Asian freedom in general and of Indonesian independence in particular, the Communist line in Indonesia as elsewhere in South-East Asia was, under Cominform direction, on the point of changing from the policy of united front to that of revolutionary tactics.

Russia's championship of Indonesian independence during the discussions in the Security Council following the Dutch 'police' action of July 1947 were not without effect on the more politically immature and left wing elements in Indonesia. Sukarno, Hatta, Sjahrir and others of their calibre may not have been deluded, but to many others it seemed that Russia was actuated solely by altruism and had shown herself to be the one true friend. Pro-Soviet sentiment began to spread in consequence and there was a corresponding growth of anti-Americanism.

For this latter phenomenon, which was to play an important part in the years ahead, there was a two-fold reason. Not only had the United States, hitherto regarded as the great proponent of self-determination and critic of colonial rule, caused disappointment and disillusionment by seeming to show more regard for the Dutch than for the Indonesians in their struggle for independence; there was also the further consideration that the two 'camps' into which the world was by then divided were, in Indonesian eyes, an anti-imperialist camp led by Russia and an imperialist camp led by the United States. From this it was but a short step to the somewhat naïve conclusion that, if Russia was Indonesia's friend, America must be her enemy.

Amongst those who, in the latter part of 1947, were inclining increasingly towards this view, was Sjarifuddin who, together with Sjahrir, led the Socialist Party, which was linked with the PKI (Communist Party), Labour Party, and PESINDO in a left wing coalition known as the *Sajap Kiri*. His increasing alignment with Russian policy, however, antagonized Sjahrir, who had no illusions about the Soviet Union and took the view that Indonesia's interests could best be served by standing clear of both camps and adopting an attitude of strict neutrality. This conflict of views reached its climax in February 1948, when Sjahrir decided to break away from the Socialist Party and form a new party of his own under the name of Indonesian Socialist Party. A fortnight later the *Sajap Kiri*, with the rump of the original Socialist Party under Sjarifuddin as a com-

ponent part, carried out a reorganization and re-emerged as the FDR (*Front Democratic Rakjat* or People's Democratic Front), with the Army and labour as its main bases of strength.

In the meanwhile, the signing of the Renville Agreement in January had led to a cabinet crisis and Sjarifuddin, under whose premiership the agreement had been signed, had resigned after the PNI (Nationalist Party) and the *Masjumi*, which had opposed the agreement, had withdrawn their representatives from the government. In order to meet the situation, Hatta, the vice-president, was appointed to form a presidential cabinet. His attempt to make it a 'national government' with all the main parties represented in it, however, was frustrated by the impossibility of reconciling the conflicting demands of the *Masjumi* and the PNI as against those of the *Sajap Kiri*. The groups from the *Sajap Kiri* had therefore to be left out and were soon thrown into increasing opposition by Hatta's introduction of a rationalization programme, which aimed at greater economy of man-power and greater efficiency in its use, both in the armed forces and in the field of labour. As this involved the demobilization of large numbers of soldiers and militiamen and the transfer of labour to where it was most needed, considerable discontent and unrest was caused among the demobilized soldiery and the displaced workers, who thereupon turned to the newly-formed FDR and its trade union ally, SOBSI, for support. This support was given all the more readily because Sjarifuddin, during his tenure of office as prime minister and minister of defence, had taken the opportunity to build up a strong personal following in military circles. Many of the officers specially appointed by him at that time were among those now affected by the rationalization programme.

In conjunction with its growing hostility to the Hatta government came a reversal of the FDR's attitude towards the Renville Agreement. Sjarifuddin, it will be recalled, had been prime minister when it was signed, and the various components of the *Sajap Kiri* from which the FDR had been formed had supported the agreement at the time of its signature. By March 1948, however, they had decided to reverse their former stand and proceeded to demand the repudiation of the agreement and the cessation of all negotiations with the Dutch pending their withdrawal from Indonesia. At the same time they called for the nationalization of all foreign properties without compensation and, in general, adopted an increasingly leftist attitude.

In all this, it would seem, they were influenced by the Communists, who not only held a commanding position in the FDR but were, by then, beginning to fall in line with Cominform policy as expounded to the Indonesian delegates at the South-East Asia Youth Conference in February. Zhdanov, it is true, had enunciated the new policy of world Communism at the inaugural meeting of the Cominform in the previous October; but it was not until the return of the youth delegates from Calcutta some four or five months later that its effect upon the PKI became at all marked. The reversal of the attitude towards the Renville Agreement by the FDR, of which the PKI was the senior partner, was but one reflection of it. It is not without significance that by August the various component parts of the FDR, together with the closely allied SOBSI, were indulging in the characteristic Communist practice of beating their breasts in self-criticism of their former errors, especially for their part in supporting the Linggadjati and Renville agreements [2].

The fact was that, although the Renville Agreement of January 1948 had brought about the cessation of hostilities for which the Security Council had called, its signature had been obtained largely at the expense of the Indonesians. The situation therefore remained precarious. The resultant resentment and unrest were not unnatural, but unfortunately they provided conditions which seemed highly favourable to the new Moscow line laid down at the South-East Asia Youth Conference in February. The Soviet leaders decided to act accordingly. Taking advantage, therefore, of the recall of an Indonesian envoy with whom the Soviet consul in Prague had signed an agreement, they arranged that this envoy, a young man named Suripno, should take with him the veteran Communist exile, Muso, disguised as his secretary. In this guise, armed with an assumed name and a false passport, Muso returned to Indonesia after prolonged residence abroad, mostly in Moscow. Apart from a secret visit paid in 1935, it was his first time on Indonesian soil for twenty-two years.

Bad though conditions were, they were not, however, as ripe for Communist revolution as they had appeared to be; and although Muso, after revealing his true identity, did his best to whip up revolutionary ardour and was joined by Sjarifuddin and others who had hitherto hidden their Communist affiliations, the leaders of the young Indonesian Republic proved more than a match for them. Neither Muso nor Suripno, who was among those who revealed

themselves as Communists for the first time, was in favour of open rebellion at that precise moment. They realized all too well that more time was required for agitation and other necessary preparations before sufficient popular support could be assured. Muso's plans, in fact, were similar to those of the FDR—to acquire power without resort to force if possible, as Gottwald had recently done in Czechoslovakia, but to fall back on open insurrection if necessary.

Some of their more excitable followers, however, began to cause disturbances and the government took prompt steps to suppress them. Thrown into consternation by the speed and determination with which the government acted, and fearing the complete disruption of their plans, the Communists summoned an emergency meeting at Madiun, the trade union centre on which the loyalist forces were moving. As a result, it was decided to resort to open rebellion without delay and on 18th September a call to arms was issued by Muso. It was a fatal decision, as it meant that the Communist plan for revolt was put into action long before the ground had been properly prepared. In this, the Indonesians were merely repeating the mistake which had cost them so dear twenty-two years earlier. For that revolt, too, had gone off at half-cock, with serious results for the Communist cause.

The Dutch offered to assist the Republican government in suppressing the rebellion, but the offer was declined, and by 25th October Sukarno was able to declare, in an Order of the Day, that the insurrection had been quelled. Skirmishing, however, continued for some time after and it was in one of these affrays that Muso himself was killed. Other outstanding Communists who lost their lives in the fighting included Sjarifuddin and the veteran trouble-maker Tan Malaka, who, however, after being released from his two years in prison at the outset of the rebellion, had fought on the side of the government forces against his old enemy Muso. And here it should be mentioned that, on his release from prison, Tan Malaka had formed a new party, the *Partai Murba* or Proletarian Party. This was in effect a nationalist Communist party and differed from the orthodox PKI in placing what it considered to be Indonesia's interests before those of Moscow. Many of its members ranged themselves alongside Tan Malaka and the government against the rebels. It only remains to add, therefore, that an attempt to cover Muso's and Moscow's responsibility for the uprising and for its failure was made in November that year by the Dutch Communist leader de

Groot, who claimed that it had been deliberately provoked by the United States [3]; but this was as devoid of fact as was the contention put forward in the Cominform journal three months later, that the Communists were waging a 'national liberation struggle' [4].

In the meanwhile, negotiations had been proceeding between the Dutch and the Indonesian Republic with a view to bringing about the settlement of a number of outstanding issues. Far-reaching concessions were made by the Indonesians, but they failed to satisfy the Dutch. The negotiations finally broke down on 12th December and a week later the Dutch launched their second 'police' action. But the blow, which was intended to bring the Republic to heel once and for all, failed. A conference of Asian nations held in Delhi in January 1949 passed a resolution putting forward demands for a just settlement of the dispute and these were echoed in a Security Council resolution a few days later. At the same time, steps were taken to ensure that the resolution was implemented.

As a result of a Round Table Conference at The Hague in August 1949 the Indonesians were granted their independence. On 27th December sovereignty was transferred by the Netherlands, and Indonesia became an independent state. While, however, the long struggle for independence was over, the young Republic found itself faced from the outset with opposition, not only from the Communists and their allies but also from extremist religious and separatist groups within the state. Moreover, although political independence had been achieved, Dutch interests had been left in virtual control of a large part of the national economy, in particular the plantations, communications, oil and mining.

Although seriously incapacitated and disorganized for a time by the severe handling received at Madiun, the Communists were showing renewed activity by 1950 when they set to work together with other extreme left wing bodies to organize social and industrial unrest, thereby impeding the task of national consolidation and economic development. January 1951 witnessed widespread strikes in foreign enterprises, largely political in aim, and the interest taken in them by the directors of world Communism was reflected in an article in the Cominform journal [5]. Declaring that Indonesia could never become a 'slave state', it went on to say that Indonesia's 'democratic organizations' were reorganizing themselves to prepare a final blow against the imperialists and against their economic grip on the country.

Following the outbreak of serious riots in Jakarta in August that year, about fifty suspected Communists were arrested and a week later there was a round-up of subversive elements in Medan. Further Communist round-ups followed and on 29th October, after referring to the arrest of about 15,000 persons, Sukiman, who had succeeded to the premiership in March, announced that a 'foreign supported underground movement' had planned to kill the president, the vice-president and various government officials and to overthrow the Republic and proclaim a new state. By that time, however, the Communist leaders had retired for a while underground.

In February 1952 a fresh outburst of anti-American sentiment was caused by Sukiman's action in accepting United States' aid under the Mutual Security Act without the prior knowledge of the cabinet. In protest against this action, all his colleagues in the government resigned and it was not until May that a new government was formed under Wilopo to take its place. Its formation ushered in a new phase. By its emphasis on neutrality it encouraged the Communist leaders to re-emerge into the open and to offer their support for so long as its programme was based on 'democracy and world peace'. By July that year Aidit, the Communist secretary-general, was advocating a national front and reflecting Chinese Communist influence by declaring that his party was prepared to co-operate with the 'national industrialists'.

It was three months after this that there occurred the so-called 'October 17th Affair', a somewhat muddled and, at the time, enigmatic episode. It was marked by an abortive demonstration in Jakarta demanding the dissolution of the non-representative parliament and its replacement by an elected one. Certain Army elements had a hand in this and linked with it was a dispute revolving around the defence minister and the Dutch military mission, whose retention he favoured for the purpose of building up a smaller but well-disciplined Western-trained army. On the one hand there were those who wished to get rid of the Dutch altogether, even a friendly mission such as this one. On the other hand, Sukarno himself, the Indonesian president, was opposed to the idea of a small professional army and wanted instead a 'People's Army' of ex-guerrilla fighters. It is now an open secret that the mutinies which followed a few days later, when three divisional second-in-commands deposed their chiefs and affirmed their loyalty to the president, were instigated by Sukarno himself. The outcome of the dispute was that both the defence minister, the

Sultan of Djocjakarta, and the able chief of staff, Colonel Nasution⁹ resigned, while the officers and officials most closely connected with them were removed from positions of influence.

To all this there was, as usual, a Communist background. Not only were the Communists behind the agitation for the withdrawal of the Dutch mission, but also they supported the president's stand in the matter of a People's Army. Communist influence, they knew, would be far greater in an armed force of that type, composed in part of Communist ex-guerrillas, than in a well-disciplined professional army. It was not without significance, therefore, that the new defence minister appointed to succeed the Sultan was Iwa Kasuma Sumantri, who was strongly suspected of having Communist affiliations. In the circumstances it was not surprising that a year later, in December 1953, discontent in the regular army was brought to a head by Iwa's appointment of three of his own nominees to important military posts. The discontent was reflected in the action of Colonel Bambang Sugeng, the acting chief of staff, who tendered his resignation in protest against Iwa's failure to consult him concerning these appointments.

Even Sukarno himself was by then becoming alarmed by the growing signs that, under Iwa's administration, the armed forces were coming more and more under Communist control. At the same time, Indonesian moderates, especially Moslems, were becoming seriously disturbed by the government's left wing and anti-Moslem policies. These left wing tendencies had, in fact, become increasingly pronounced since the resignation of the Wilopo cabinet, which had been brought about in June by dissensions between its PNI (Nationalist Party) and *Masjumi* members, and its replacement by a government under the premiership of Sastroamidjojo. The main reason for this was that, as both the *Masjumi* and Sjahrir's PSI (Indonesian Socialist Party) were excluded from the new government, the PNI felt the need for a powerful ally. They accordingly turned to the Communists for the necessary support. This was readily promised and in October the PNI chairman had reciprocated by instructing all branches of his party to co-operate with the Communists to the full against the Socialists and the *Masjumi*.

By the opening months of 1955, however, there were signs that the PNI had become aware of the Communist danger and that the period of collaboration was nearing its end. In return for their support in parliament, the Nationalists had given the Communists a free hand

to woo the masses, but the Communists had been so successful in their wooing that the Nationalists were becoming seriously worried. With the long-postponed general elections in sight, however, the Communists decided in June to tone down the slogan, 'Establish a People's Dictatorship', which had been proposed at the PKI Fifth Congress in March the previous year, as they feared it might injure their electoral chances. Instead, they adopted the battle-cry of 'A National Coalition Government with a progressive programme under the Premiership of a non-Communist'. The idea was, by this means, to pave the way for a People's Democratic Government later, as they realized that stronger mass support would be needed for anything more ambitious at the moment.

It was, however, the Communist-tainted Iwa's action in once more flouting Army opinion that finally brought about the downfall of the Sastro government in July that year. This episode revealed the Army as a new latent factor in Indonesian politics. Undeterred by the outcry he had caused in December 1953, he nominated one of his own adherents as the new chief of staff; but this time the Army, which had meanwhile decided to bury its own past differences, acted with resolution and refused to accept his choice. The government fell, and on 13th August Burhanudin Harahap of the *Masjumi* formed its successor with the support of the Indonesian Socialist Party and other elements, but without the Communists and the PNI.

The annoyance felt by the Communists at this blow to their plans was reflected in a news item in the Cominform journal, showing that the SOBSI had denounced the establishment of the Harahap government as being contrary to the wishes of the worker and peasant masses [6]. A week later this was followed by an article in the same Moscow mouthpiece, in which Aidit, the Communist secretary-general, declared that the downfall of the Sastro government, which he claimed had been 'supported by the people', was due to political manoeuvres directed from abroad in order to wreck the forthcoming general elections [7]. Whereas, however, Moscow, Peking and Hanoi radio had, in the meantime, been violently attacking the *Masjumi* and the PSI for their part in the new government, Aidit in his article drew a distinction between these two parties and their leaders, and suggested that the PKI should offer to co-operate with both parties while seeking to isolate their leaders.

Communist annoyance was understandable, for Harahap was determined to reverse the pro-Communist policy of his predecessor.

Unless, however, one equated the masses with the Communists, the Cominform journal's contention that the establishment of the new government was contrary to the wishes of the masses was hardly borne out by the results of the long-postponed elections. These were finally held on 29th October. The Communist Party, it is true, obtained approximately one-fifth of the thirty million votes cast and the PNI, whom the Communists had supported during the Sastro régime, headed the polls with over eight million votes; but the moderate and 'modernist' Moslem *Masjumi* was but a short way behind the PNI in the number of votes obtained, while the *Nahdatul Ulama*, the right wing Moslem group which had broken away from the *Masjumi* in April 1952, also secured more than the Communists. Both of these Moslem parties, like the PSI and most of the smaller parties which accounted for the balance of the total thirty million votes, were supporters of the Harahap government.

Like the Socialists in the Indian elections, the PSI, it may be noted, fared badly. The reason for this was clear. It was due to what Sjahrir, its leader, once described as its main handicap, its failure to recognize the danger of the intelligentsia becoming alienated from the common people. This was unfortunate, as the party included some of the best and soundest elements in the country and was potentially fitted for the role of a constructive Opposition and ultimately for providing a responsible government.

The temporary eclipse suffered by the Communist Party as a result of the abortive rebellion of 1948 had by now become a thing of the past. Not only had the Party itself been rehabilitated, but the typical series of Communist Front bodies, affiliated with their international counterparts, had also been built up. Chief of these was the Communist-led trade union organization SOBSI which, by the time of its Second Congress held in January 1955, claimed a membership of over 2,600,000, while GERWIS, the women's organization which had become the Indonesian affiliate of the Women's International Democratic Federation, was sufficiently established by March 1954 to attract the attendance of a number of foreign delegates to its Second Congress, at which it changed its name to GERWANI. Those attending this meeting included the British Communist, Monica Felton, and three Russians.

GERWIS was not the only Indonesian Communist Front organization to be honoured in this way. WFDY and IUS delegates had attended a conference of the IPPI (Students' Youth League) in Solo,

in Java, in September 1951 and a students' congress in Jakarta in November the following year. This last-named meeting had been attended also by delegates from China, Vietnam, India and North Korea. Two months previously a SOBSI conference had been attended by WFTU and other foreign delegates, while in April 1954 the WFDY sent delegations of American, Indian, Chinese, West European, and Central Asian youth representatives to visit the principal towns and cities of Indonesia. Nor was it by any means a one-way traffic. Delegations from the various Indonesian Communist Front organizations were constantly being sent abroad to take part in congresses, conferences and junketings of all sorts arranged by the international bodies to which they were affiliated. The opportunities afforded by these contacts and meetings for learning and transmitting the Moscow line at any one time need no emphasis. It was all part of the 'transmission belt' system to which international Communism attaches so much importance.

In addition to the normal Communist Front organizations, a Communist-controlled body of ex-guerrillas, the PERBEPSI, had also been coming into prominence since early 1953 and it was widely predicted that, if the Communists decided at some future date to resort once more to armed force, this body would be found figuring as their military arm under the guise of a People's Liberation Army in accordance with the Chinese model. There were, in fact, increasing signs that the Indonesian Communists, like the Communists in other South-East Asian countries, were modelling their plans and policies on those which had proved so successful in bringing the Chinese Communists into power. Since the summer of 1953 this has been particularly revealed in the strenuous efforts made to win the support of the peasantry, who had previously been largely ignored. Following their exploitation of the campaign for squatters' rights in Sumatra,¹ which helped to bring about the fall of the Wilopo cabinet in June 1953, the Communists played the leading part in arranging the fusion of the two principal peasant organizations in September, and by March 1954, when the Party held its Fifth National Congress, the encouragement of peasant support had become a major factor in Communist calculations. As clearly stated by Aidit, the Party's secretary-general, some months later, the Congress defined its 'basic and most immediate tasks' as being 'to mobilize the peasants and

¹ In this they used the technique of deliberate provocation in order to force the police to fire and thereby create 'martyrs'.

draw them into the struggle to eliminate the remnants of feudalism and to develop the anti-feudal agrarian revolution' [8]. To this he added the words: 'Apart from concentrating the main attack on work among the peasants, apart from giving priority to the work of building the alliance of peasants and workers, the Communist Party of Indonesia must also develop the united national front' with the 'intelligentsia, urban petty bourgeoisie, and national bourgeoisie'. Not only therefore did the Indonesian Communists follow the Chinese line in regard to the peasantry but also in the matter of the 'national bourgeoisie'. In a subsequent article in the Cominform journal, Aidit held out the usual Communist bait when, after stressing that 'agrarian revolution is the very essence of the people's democratic revolution of Indonesia', he went on to assert that the land taken from the landlords would go to the peasants instead of becoming state property [9].

It was in this article that Aidit claimed a total of 49,042 members and 116,164 candidate members in the Party at the time of the Fifth Congress in March; but by November that year Moscow was quoting him as saying that the figures had risen to 500,000 in all by the end of October. If these figures were to be taken at their face value, they would seem to have indicated a temporary relaxing of the normal Communist principle of quality rather than quantity.

That the attempt to attract the peasantry to their support was not proving as successful as the Communists had hoped was indicated in two further articles by Aidit in the latter part of 1955. Writing in the Cominform journal in September he stressed that better work among the peasants was required in order to win them over [10], and two months later he was expressing perturbation at the relative weakness of Communist agitation among the peasants [11]. In the first of these two articles he had taken occasion to refute such 'slanders' as that the Communists were opposed to religion and that the Party itself was not a national party but was directed from Peking and Moscow. The poor results may therefore have been attributable in part to these 'slandorous' contentions. It is possible, too, that the peasants had been dubious of the land-to-the-tiller bait dangled before their eyes, as Aidit had found it necessary to repeat this promise in February. In doing so, he had even had the temerity to make invidious comparisons with the Soviet Union. The PKI, he was quoted as saying, 'seeks to make the peasants have their own land, whereas in Russia the land is nationalized. We do not agree

with the Soviet system, because the peasants' sense of land property is great in Indonesia' [12].

Of other outstanding Indonesian developments in the past few years it must suffice to note the relegation of the veteran Communist leader Alimin to a position of obscurity 'for health reasons' as the result of decisions taken by the Party's Central Committee in October 1953; the expulsion of another leading Communist, Tang Ling-Djie, at the same time, on the grounds of 'subjectivism' and 'favouring parliamentary means for achieving aims'; the establishment of a Soviet Embassy in Jakarta in September 1954, the third Soviet diplomatic mission to be opened in South-East Asia; and the conclusion of a treaty with China in April 1955 to settle the vexed question of dual nationality for the two million Chinese in Indonesia. Each of these developments has had, or is likely to have, its repercussions; but the last of the four seems likely to produce the most beneficial effect, not only on Sino-Indonesian relations but, if followed by similar treaties with other South-East Asian countries, throughout the whole area of South and East Asia.

Communist China had indeed established an Embassy in Jakarta some time before the Russians opened theirs, and close contact appears to have been maintained from the start between the Chinese Embassy and the Indonesian Communists, who have also been in close touch with the large Chinese communities controlled and organized by that Embassy. It is an open secret, too, that after the fall of the Sastro government in July 1955, the PKI consulted Zhukov, the Soviet ambassador, as to the attitude they should adopt. It was said to be on his ruling that they decided to follow a moderate line, as both the internal and the international situation prevailing at the time made this advisable. This is but one more example of the way in which the PKI, like all orthodox Communist parties other than the Russian and perhaps the Chinese, work under foreign direction, Aidit's show of righteous indignation notwithstanding.

Of the developments in the other two island nations in this area, both now independent, only the briefest outline need be given.

In the Philippines, where the semi-feudal system of land tenure gave so much cause for peasant grievance, the Hukbalahaps who, together with the PKM (National Peasants Union), had been declared illegal two years previously, were named the People's Liberation Army in March 1950 and have, since then, been firmly

under Communist direction. Adopting the policy of armed struggle, they proceeded to carry out raids on small local centres and to engage in terrorism of all sorts until early 1953 when, increasingly weakened by the resolute action taken against them by Ramon Magsaysay,¹ they sought a truce in order to consider the government's surrender terms. Their request, however, was rejected on the grounds that it was merely an attempt to obtain a 'breather'. Minor raids were resumed; but the surrender of their leader, Luis Taruc, in May 1954 and the death in action of the Communist secretary-general, Mariano Baggoss, six months later, had a demoralizing effect. The rebellion has not yet been wholly suppressed and the possibility of its revival cannot be ignored, but for the time being it has ceased to offer a serious threat to the government.

In Ceylon, the other island country in question, the existence of three separate Communist parties has helped to keep the Communists from offering a unified front against the government. The Fourth Congress of the orthodox Communist Party, which was held in August 1950, agreed to form a 'People's United Front against the Imperialists', but the attempt to do so does not appear to have been very successful. In March 1952 Keuneman, the joint assistant secretary-general of the Party, described the revised aims of the Party as being the formation of a coalition of all parties opposed to the government, with the defeat of imperialism as the immediate task.

The only serious Communist disturbance since Ceylon achieved independence within the Commonwealth in February 1948 was in August 1953, when a one-day strike inspired by the Communists led to acts of terrorism, violence and arson and compelled the government to declare a state of emergency and to impose a curfew. The Communist-dominated Colombo Municipal Council, which supported the strike, was dissolved by the government, over 200 casualties, including twenty-one killed, were reported, and a month passed before the state of emergency was finally ended.

¹ At that time secretary of defence. Elected president in November 1953.

CHAPTER XXXVIII

The Indian Sub-Continent

THE year preceding the transfer of power to the newly-created independent states of India and Pakistan in August 1947 had been marked by serious communal riots, particularly in Bengal [1]; but the tragic communal disorders which followed hard on the partition of this great sub-continent exceeded, both in violence and in scope, anything of the kind that had happened before. It might have been expected that the Communists would have exploited the resultant situation to their own advantage; but they did not. On the contrary, their immediate reaction was to denounce these outbursts of violence and bloodshed and to offer their support to the Nehru government in bringing the situation under control. But their support of the government was fated to be of short duration. By the close of the year the government was being accused by them of 'pandering to Anglo-American imperialism'. A complete reversal of policy was indicated and the repercussions of the recent formation of the Cominform soon became clear.

The first rumblings of the coming storm were heard soon after the return of Dange, one of the leading Indian Communists, from a long spell abroad in the USSR and other parts of Europe. From November onwards, articles and news items in *People's Age*, the Communist Party organ,¹ showed ever more clearly that a drastic change in policy was imminent and, after a ten-day session of the Party's Central Committee in Bombay in December, it was announced that the policy of support for the government was to end. This was in accord with a paper, 'On the Present Policy and Tasks of the Communist Party of India', which had been adopted by the Central Committee at its meeting earlier in the month. In it the Party's

¹ This paper was replaced in July 1949 by the *Indo-Soviet Journal*, which only lasted till April 1950, when it was succeeded by *Cross-Roads* as the Party organ. After a run of three-and-a-half years, *Cross-Roads* was renamed *New Age* in October 1953.

former 'opportunistic illusions' had come under strong criticism and the need for a 'New Democratic Front' had been stressed. It only remained for the necessary preparations to be made to ensure that the policy would be endorsed at the Party's Second Congress, which was to open two months later in Calcutta.

The Congress was to prove a momentous one, as it was immediately preceded by the notorious South-East Asia Youth Conference in the same city and was attended by a number of outstanding foreign Communists, who had come to India professedly to take part in the ostensibly innocuous youth conference. Amongst those who addressed it were Sharkey and Than Tun, secretary-generals of the Australian and Burmese Communist parties respectively. The new policy of opposition to the Nehru government was approved by the Congress; the policy of moderation followed by the Party since 1942 was vehemently criticized; and Joshi, the secretary-general, after vainly attempting to justify his former tactics, was replaced by Ranadive, whose policy of violence, which he had advocated ever since 1946, was now to be implemented. The political thesis put forward re-echoed the Zhdanov interpretation of the international situation and, while condemning the Indian socialists and all other 'reformist' elements, called for the establishment of a Democratic Front, the hard core of which was to be 'the Communist Party together with the mass organizations led by the Party, the trade unions, the Kisan Sabhas, and students and youth organizations' [2]. It was at this Congress, too, that the decision to organize a separate Communist Party of Pakistan was taken and to transfer the Indian Party's headquarters from Bombay to Calcutta.

The new policy of violence was quickly brought into action. In the Telengana area of Hyderabad, where the Communists had entrenched themselves for some time past and had already resorted to murder and intimidation on a large scale, the campaign was heightened in intensity. In other parts of India, notably in Western Bengal, Madras, Manipur, Travancore-Cochin and parts of the Punjab, the United Provinces and Bombay, Communist terrorism spread rapidly. For the next eighteen months it was to be of almost daily occurrence in many districts. That the Communists were aiming to paralyse the government and bring about an armed rising with a view to seizing power was abundantly clear.

Counter-action by the provincial governments concerned was not long in coming. By the first week in April the Party had been out-

lawed in Western Bengal and seven leading Communists had been arrested in Bombay, among them Dange, president of the All-India Trade Union Congress and vice-president of the WFTU. Similar action was taken later in other provinces, although too late in some instances to prevent the more important leaders from evading arrest by going underground. It was only by firm measures and elaborate precautions that the government was able to prevent a country-wide railway strike in March 1949, by which the Communists had hoped to create chaos and bring about a mass uprising by paralysing the railway system.

The campaign of violence called forth a strong denunciation of Communist policy from Nehru, who characterized it as one of hostility to the government 'bordering on revolt'. From that time onwards, while tending to differentiate between the native brand of Communism and the exponents of world Communism, he denounced the former so frequently and with so much vigour that Ajoy Ghosh, the CPI (Communist Party of India) secretary-general, was led, only as recently as January 1956, to remark ruefully that 'he seldom speaks without attacking us' [3].

It was his foreign policy, based on his determination to keep India neutral in the Cold War, that made him draw this distinction between the Communists in his own country and the leaders of world Communism in Moscow and Peking. It was in the realization that this ardent desire for neutrality might be turned to their own advantage, however, that the Russians and their camp followers, who had hitherto attacked Nehru and his government almost as virulently as they had denounced Britain and the United States, began about the end of 1949 to soften their criticism of the Indian prime minister. While, therefore, the Indian Communists continued to hurl abuse at him for another six years, Moscow's policy from 1950 onwards was, quietly and gradually, to lure India and other non-committed Asian countries away from the Anglo-American bloc and bring them eventually, if possible, into the Russian orbit.

By the time that this policy had been initiated, the Indian Communists had begun to realize that their own policy of violence was not only failing to produce the results they had anticipated but, on the contrary, was harming their cause. Crude terrorism and the constant call for strikes was merely alienating the workers and forcing the government to adopt repressive measures. The membership of the Party itself had, in consequence, dropped from 90,000 in 1948

to 20,000 two years later; that of the All-India TUC, which it controlled, had been reduced from 700,000 to 100,000 during the same period. Clearly a change was called for and, like that in 1948, it was marked by a further change of secretary-general.

The main significance of the change, however, was its connection with the rise of Communist China to the position of the model prescribed for the Communist parties of all South and East Asian countries. In June 1949 Ranadive had published an anonymous article strongly critical of Mao Tse-Tung's unorthodox methods [4]. Six months later an editorial in the Cominform journal directed that Mao's 'path' was to be followed by all these Communist parties, the Indian party being specifically mentioned by name [5]. It was as an outcome of this rejoinder that in July 1950 Ranadive was replaced as secretary-general by Rajeshwar Rao, whose interests were, as Mao's had been, in the countryside rather than in the towns and urban districts where Ranadive's lay. Abject apologies were made by all concerned, including the whole editorial board of the magazine which had published the offending article, and a change of policy was announced. Like the Japanese Communist Party, whose leaders had been reprimanded by the Cominform journal three weeks before, the CPI was also torn by internal dissension. Rao himself was to be replaced as secretary-general a year or so later by Ajoy Ghosh when a further change of policy took place.

When Joshi had been replaced in 1948, the charge brought against him had been that he was guilty of 'right reformism'. This was because he had failed to oppose the Nehru government, which was accused of co-operating with capitalists and imperialists. Ranadive, on the other hand, was now charged with 'left deviationism', which was defined in this instance as pushing the policy of violence too far, before strengthening the Party adequately by broadening its base to include the 'middle bourgeoisie' and those rich peasants who did not indulge in feudal exploitation. The Central Committee of the Party, having recognized the 'left adventurist mistakes' of which it had been guilty under Ranadive's leadership, accordingly published a communiqué on the revision of its policy on 21st July [6]. At the same time, it set to work to follow the Chinese path 'wherever and whenever possible' as directed in the Cominform journal editorial six months earlier. Amongst other things, this enjoined resort to armed struggle on the Chinese pattern; but as this would have entailed new suicidal adventures at a time when the Party organization was weak

and disrupted, it was intimated to the Party leaders through the medium of the British Communist Party that the instructions regarding the Chinese 'path' should not be taken too literally [7]. Eventually, after a period of recuperation and reconstruction of the Party, resort to armed struggle would be necessary, it was stressed, if the revolution in India were to succeed; but the time for that had not yet come.

Despite the intimation of Palme Dutt of the British Communist Party, that the directive in the Cominform journal concerning armed struggle need not be taken too seriously, Dange, Ghosh and Rao returned from a visit to Moscow early in 1951, bringing with them a document described as the 'Tactical Line' [8]. The two opening paragraphs of this document, under the unambiguous heading, 'Not Peaceful But Revolutionary Path', went straight to the point by declaring that the Party's objectives 'cannot be realized by a peaceful, parliamentary way. These objectives can be realized only through a revolution, through the overthrow of the present Indian state, and its replacement by a People's Democratic state'. Armed revolution, it went on to say, would be a combination of partisan war in the rural areas and armed workers' risings in the cities. The way in which the ultimate goal was to be achieved was laid down. Subsequently the new draft programme of the Party was published on 11th May in the Cominform journal, which also, in its issue of 15th June, carried a lengthy policy statement issued by the Politburo showing that the immediate aim was to build up a People's Democratic Front as a preliminary to eventual armed struggle on the Chinese pattern. Based, as it was, on the Tactical Line, this statement only thinly veiled the more explosive sections, which were kept secret for the time being.

Although the Party was in no fit state at the time to implement these policies, the government's hand had, in the meanwhile, been weakened by a ruling given in the Calcutta High Court necessitating the release of Communists placed under detention in various parts of India since 1948. The ban imposed on the Communist Party and allied organizations by the Madras government had therefore to be lifted in November 1950, the Communist *détenus* in Western Bengal were released in January 1951, and other provincial governments were compelled to adopt similar measures. Not only was the work of the police in rounding up Communist leaders undone; it also meant that these leaders re-emerged with heightened prestige, for in

India a politician's standing, like that of a political terrorist, is always enhanced by political imprisonment.

It was shortly before the issue of the policy statement in June 1951 that the Politburo had been reconstituted so as to function as a secretariat of the Central Committee, with Ajoy Ghosh as secretary. In line with this it was announced on 4th June that the secretary-general, Rajeshwar Rao, had resigned. Although, temporarily, no successor was appointed, it was not long before Ghosh himself succeeded to this all-important post. By then, preparations for the coming general elections were in train and on 31st August the Cominform indicated its approval by publishing in its journal the full text of the Party's election manifesto. In view, however, of Moscow's plans for wooing Nehru, it is deserving of note that his 'so-called independent policy of neutrality' was subjected to stinging criticism. Three-and-a-half years later, during the Andhra election campaign early in 1955, this criticism was to be repeated with dire results for the Party, as *Pravda* came out at the height of the campaign with a fulsome eulogy of the Indian prime minister to the great embarrassment of the Indian Communists.

It was in order to improve their own chances in the coming general elections that, at a six-day All-India Party Conference held in Calcutta in October 1951, it was decided to call off the guerrilla warfare which, although already abandoned elsewhere, was still being waged in the Telengana area of Hyderabad in accordance with Rao's belief in agrarian upheavals. The wisdom of this decision was seen when the final results of the elections were published early in March 1952. These showed that the main successes of the Party were achieved in Hyderabad, Tripura and Manipur, where the terrorist campaigns had recently been abandoned.

It was at this All-India conference that the draft programme and statement of policy, published in May and June respectively, were adopted with but minor amendments. They were finally endorsed in December 1953 by the Party's Third Congress. Amongst other assertions, this programme laid down that India was not yet ready for 'a socialist transformation' but was sufficiently mature for 'a new government of People's Democracy'. The statement of policy, for its part, like the election manifesto of August, paid tribute to China as a model; but it also stressed the considerable difference existing between conditions in India and those in China prior to the Communist seizure of power in that country. Of these, the main differences

listed were that the Chinese Communists already had an army before they 'began to lead the peasantry in the liberation struggle'; that China lacked good communications, 'which prevented the enemy from carrying out concentrations and swift attacks on the liberation forces'; and that the Chinese Communist Army had the inestimable advantage of a secure territorial base, with the Soviet Union in its rear, while preparing for its final offensive. These were all great assets for the Chinese Communists in their armed struggle; the Indian Communists had no such factors in their favour.

Meanwhile, the election campaign went forward and, thanks to having called off the use of violence and adopted a relatively moderate line in their election manifesto with a view to attracting support for a United Front policy against the government, the Communists, who had never before figured as a parliamentary party, emerged from the general elections as the second largest single party. The advantage gained, however, was soon diminished by their crude and obstructive tactics in the central parliament, which brought them into disrepute and disclosed the real significance of their aims. Moreover, the openly expressed contempt of some of their leaders for parliamentary practice showed that no confidence could be placed in their adherence to constitutional methods.

The harm they did to their own cause in this respect, however, was counterbalanced to a large extent by the skilful use they made of their parliamentary membership for agitation and propaganda. This aimed not only at bringing about the downfall of the government. It sought, too, to win support from the intelligentsia for the Soviet Union and Communist China, for the spurious peace campaign, and for much else besides in accordance with the Moscow line. The peace campaign in particular was intensified and was very effective, as Indians, both in their general disposition and by virtue of their adherence to neutralism, were peculiarly receptive to the peace appeal. That this appeal had been pressed forward in 1950 and 1951 at the height of the terrorist campaign in Telengana, Andhra, Tripura and Manipur did not appear to matter, since Communists everywhere draw a subtle distinction between civil wars and war for 'liberation' on the one hand and 'imperialist warmongering' on the other.

As stated with brutal frankness in the tactical line document brought from Moscow by Ghosh and his friends early in 1951, 'The Peace Movement is not a pacific movement, not a movement mainly for recording abstract support for peace. It is a fighting move-

ment for concrete action in defence of peace and against the imperialistic warmongers, including those waging colonial wars.' From the time of its inception, therefore, the All-India Peace Council, the Indian affiliate of the World Peace Council, had waged an active campaign for peace as defined in this curiously qualified definition. Conferences, congresses, and peace festivals had been held under their auspices, celebrations with such resounding titles as 'Hands Off Kashmir Day', 'Asia Week' and 'Defence of Korea Day' had been organized, and everything possible had been done to stir up hatred against the United States and other 'imperialist' countries by meetings of protest against the alleged resort to germ warfare by the American forces in Korea, the atom bomb, colonialism and the like. As in other sectors of the Communist world, the trade union, youth, students', women's and other such Communist Front organizations were all brought in to play their part and to subordinate their own particular functions to the demands of the peace campaign. In view of the success achieved, it was perhaps not surprising that both Dr Kitchlew, president of the All-India Peace Council, and Major-General Sokhey, his active second-in-command, were later awarded the Stalin Peace Prize.

One further outcome of the general elections which calls for mention was that the Party's headquarters, which had meantime been transferred from Calcutta to Bombay, were moved once more, this time to Madras. This was because the election results had appeared to indicate that the centre of gravity was shifting from Bombay where, as in other industrial areas, the Communists had failed in the elections, to the South, where the prospects of setting up a territorial base on the Chinese Yenan pattern seemed increasingly favourable. A few months later, however, in September 1952, the headquarters were shifted once more, this time to Delhi. This, it would seem, was due to the realization that guidance from the Soviet Embassy, from the *Tass* Agency, and from their own leaders in parliament would be easier to obtain in the Indian capital than in far-away Madras. It offered better opportunities, moreover, for directing activities in the northern areas and border districts, where a territorial base, if established, would have the advantage, lacking in the south, of a safe rear.

Before the year had ended, two more articles from the pen of Ajoy Ghosh, indicative of the secretary-general's line of thought, had appeared in the Cominform journal [9]. In the first of these two, in addition to playing on the theme, 'The Party grows by raising the

ideological political level of its cadres', he defined the peasants as 'the granite foundation of the proletariat'. In the second, he set out to analyse Stalin's contribution to the recent Nineteenth Congress of the CPSU in Moscow and, in accordance with the Soviet leader's pronouncement, played up the peace campaign by hammering out the line that war was avertible and at least postponable.

The increasing emphasis laid on the importance of the peasantry—especially on the agricultural workers and poor peasants—and the attempts made to woo them, were probably in part due to the need to counter the movement for the voluntary distribution of land initiated by Vinobha Bhave, that Gandhian figure of the contemporary Indian scene. This movement was showing far better results from the peasants' point of view than were the Communists' forceful methods. It had the advantage, moreover, of achieving these results by friendly persuasion instead of by violence and bloodshed. To the Communists this was as deplorable and reactionary as Gandhi's methods had been. It had to be denounced with vehemence and countered. In the years that have passed since then, the Communists have pressed on with their attempts to win the support of the peasantry. In May 1954, for example, this policy was reflected in a further article by Ghosh in the *Cominform* journal urging the rallying of the agricultural workers to the Communist cause and the establishment of a separate organization for them [10]; and in January 1956, while advocating 'Land to the Tiller', he declared that, although collectivization would come eventually, it would come 'much later and voluntarily' [11]. It was the old, old cry, and probably no more likely to prove valid in a Communist India than it has in China, North Korea or North Vietnam.

It was not only to peasants and urban workers, to youths, women, and the intelligentsia that the Communists were directing their attention. The bourgeoisie engaged in commerce and industry also became the target of Communist propaganda. This sought to gain their support by dangling before their eyes the advantages that would accrue to them if British and American economic and financial competition were eliminated or at least severely curtailed. As had happened in China, so in India the virtues and advantages of economic nationalism and national capitalism were preached. To help on the good work, Indian industrialists and businessmen were invited to take part in the World Economic Conference held in Moscow in August 1952. The real object of this meeting was to set up an inter-

national trading agency, through which it was hoped to break down the Western embargo on strategic and war materials for the Soviet bloc and Communist China, and to create trouble and friction in the international business world. It also aimed at playing up 'national capitalism' against Anglo-American 'economic colonialism'.

This policy was to be strongly reflected in one of the decisions taken at a meeting of the Party's Central Committee held in Calcutta during the first ten days of January 1953. 'National industry,' it declared, 'must be protected against the competition of foreign goods' and foreign concerns. Other points of interest in this meeting included the stress laid on the importance of 'working relentlessly' for the formation of a united front with all democratic parties, organizations, groups and individuals; a discussion on the significance of the CPSU Nineteenth Congress held three months previously; the lauding of Stalin's 'Economic Problems of Socialism in the Soviet Union', which had been published on the eve of that congress and had promptly been given the status of holy writ by Communists throughout the world;¹ and decisions to popularize the resolutions passed at the Vienna Peace Congress a few days previously² and to work for Indo-Pakistan friendship.

The Third Party Congress, which the Central Committee had resolved to convene, opened in Madura in the last days of December³ and proved to be a stormy one. Ajoy Ghosh, who had returned from Moscow earlier in the month after one of his prolonged 'medical' visits there, presided. The meeting was conspicuous, not only for the bitter internal dissensions which it brought to light, but also for the severe scolding given to the assembled delegates by the British Communist Party secretary-general, Harry Pollitt, who attended it as Moscow's representative. After endorsing the programme adopted at the Party Conference in October 1951, rejecting terrorist methods and advocating a broad-based united front for the purpose of establishing a 'government of democratic unity', the Congress went on to

¹ Since this chapter was drafted, this thesis, together with Stalin's *History of the CPSU(B)* which also had been treated hitherto as 'holy writ', has been attacked by Mikoyan at the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU held in February 1956.

² In particular, a call had been made for a 'People's Congress for Peace', and great efforts had been exerted to conceal the fact that the gathering was Communist-controlled. As had happened at the Wrocław Congress of Intellectuals in August 1948, resort was had to trickery in 'electing' the Praesidium. When, moreover, the report of the Congress was published later, it was found that all criticisms by non-Communist delegates had been omitted.

³ The Party Congress lasted from 27th December 1953 to 3rd January 1954.

emphasize the need 'to further strengthen the bonds of friendship and brotherhood between the peoples of India and the Soviet Union'. (The Party was clearly looking to Moscow rather than to Peking as the focus of control and support. Mao and his party were largely ignored in the discussions.) Then followed a resolution to 'judge specific issues on their merits' and to support the Nehru government in its attitude towards world peace, Korea, atomic weapons, the recognition of Communist China and, to a limited extent, in its economic policy as well. This was certainly a change from the Party's previous stand and reflected Moscow's approval of the Government's foreign policy and the Kremlin's aim to draw Nehru further towards the Soviet camp. The hand of Moscow was also seen in a resolution denouncing the military pact alleged, quite incorrectly, to have been concluded between the United States and Pakistan, which was claimed to have 'brought the war danger to the very threshold of India'.

The storm which shook the Congress almost throughout its deliberations arose over the so-called Andhra Thesis, whose proponents contended that the main enemy was 'British imperialism and its stooges' as represented by the Nehru government, and not American imperialism. Pollitt, on behalf of Moscow, argued strongly against this thesis and sought to persuade the Congress to accept an anti-American and relatively pro-British line in accord with the foreign policy being pursued by the Soviet Union at that time. In this he finally had his way, but his attempt to heal the serious breach in the Party revealed by this and other points of dispute failed and he berated all present in no uncertain terms.

Although the Congress had endorsed the rejection of terrorist methods, this did not exclude the exploitation of grievances for the purpose of stirring up riots and bloodshed. Barely a month after the meeting had closed, Communist-instigated riots broke out in Calcutta and the police were compelled to open fire. More recently, in November 1955, Bombay was the scene of similar rioting and bloodshed encouraged by the Communists, and two months later that same city was subjected to a week of rioting which, though not initiated by the Communists, was soon being led by them and resulted in a death-roll variously estimated at between two hundred and fifty and four hundred.¹

¹ The local Mahrattas had been demanding Bombay City as part of a Mahratta State. The riots arose from the indignation caused by the announcement that

In its constitutional capacity the Communist Party has met with varying degrees of success since the close of its Third Congress in January 1954. Although only moderately successful in the Pepsu elections two months later, it had, in conjunction with the Communist-controlled United Front of Leftists and other allied groups, defeated the Congress Party in the Travancore-Cochin elections and secured the largest number of seats in the local legislative assembly. The formation of a Communist-dominated government in that state was only prevented by the action of the Praja Socialist Party which, though it had fought the Congress Party in the elections in alliance with the Communists, took over the reins of government after being assured of Congress Party support if they did so. One year later, in March 1955, came the Andhra elections in which, though they polled nearly 2,700,000 votes or 30 per cent of the total number cast, the Communists had their hopes of victory shattered when, in contradistinction to their own campaign of deriding Nehru, *Pravda* came out at a critical stage with an article in his praise. The article, which was published for reasons of Soviet foreign policy, was a striking example of the way in which the Kremlin leaders are prepared to subordinate local Communist policy to Soviet interests. A contributory cause of their failure to win was, admittedly, their own pre-election promise to expropriate the lands of the large landowners without compensation. This had served to frighten the smaller landowners as well. But it was the embarrassment caused by the *Pravda* article which lost them the most votes. At this point, therefore, it seems apposite to consider the developments which had been taking place during the past few years in India's external relations in general and her relations with the countries of the Soviet bloc in particular.

Although electing to remain within the British Commonwealth of Nations after achieving her independence in August 1947, India made it clear from the outset that she had no intention of basing her foreign policy on that of Great Britain. Within a month of becoming independent she had entered into diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union and, before the year had closed, a Soviet Embassy, the first Soviet diplomatic mission ever to have been established in the Indian sub-continent, had been opened in Delhi. Two years later, at the end of December 1949, this was followed by India's recognition

Nehru had decided to place it under central government administration. The Bombay government has since denied the accuracy of the estimated deathroll and has given the number of deaths as seventy-six.

of the newly-established régime in Peking. The Chinese Communists, for their part, responded readily to these friendly overtures and, apart from a temporary rift caused by the Chinese advance into Tibet in October 1950, Sino-Indian relations have been marked by increasing friendship almost ever since. In January 1951, it will be recalled, it was the Indian representative who sought to dissuade the United Nations from condemning China; and although the Chinese foreign minister, Chou En-Lai, supported the rebuff administered to India by Vishinsky on the question of mediation in Korea in November the following year, this placed no great or lasting strain on Sino-Indian relations.

While freely condemning Communist activities in his own country, Nehru has sought to maintain the most friendly relations with Communist governments compatible with the maintenance of Indian neutrality. In particular he has shown sympathy towards the Communist régimes in China and North Vietnam, not because they are Communist, but because he views them from a nationalist angle as fellow-Asian countries which have struggled for freedom from Western domination.

By April 1954 the last bit of ill-feeling engendered by Chinese actions in Tibet had been seemingly removed by the signature of a Sino-Indian Agreement on that formerly hermit country, and two months later relations between Delhi and Peking were further cemented by the talks between Nehru and Chou En-Lai in the Indian capital. These ended with a joint statement suggesting that the five principles¹ laid down in the recent agreement on Tibet as a guide to Sino-Indian relations, should be applied to relations with other Asian countries as well as to international relations in general. Nehru's personal visit to Peking in October that year and his talks with Ho Chi-Minh in Hanoi on his way to China served to emphasize the friendly relations he had established with both régimes.

While the initiative for improving relations with China had come largely from India, the cementing of friendly relations with the Soviet Union, which had been taking place simultaneously, had been largely due to Moscow. The attempt to draw India towards the Soviet orbit had started as far back as the close of 1949; but it was not until the arrival of Menshikov in Delhi as the new Soviet ambassador

¹ Mutual respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty; non-aggression; non-interference in each other's internal affairs; equality and mutual benefit; and peaceful co-existence.

in October 1953 that the wooing of India appears to have begun in earnest. A reflection of this policy was to be seen in the qualified support of Nehru's foreign policy given at the Third Congress of the CPI some three months later. It remained for the *Pravda* bombshell, which so disconcerted the Communists at the time of the Andhra elections early in 1955, to bring this wooing into the full light of day.

During the Pepsu and Travancore-Cochin elections a year before, Nehru himself had criticized Moscow by implication in a slashing attack on the Indian Communists, whom he accused of being mere 'stooges' of Soviet Russia; and in October 1954 he had shown irritation with the Kremlin on account of derogatory remarks on Gandhi appearing in the latest edition of the Soviet Encyclopaedia. The *Pravda* article may therefore have been intended to mollify him and when, a few months later, in June 1955, he arrived in Moscow on a visit, he was given an ovation such as no non-Communist visitor had ever before been accorded. Eulogies and flattery were poured out upon him and nothing was left undone to emphasize the warmth of the welcome and of Russia's friendly feelings towards India and its great leader. The climax came with Nehru and Bulganin appearing together on the television, when each was shown agreeing with the other, although Nehru took advantage of the occasion to put in a few tactfully-worded remarks about non-interference in the internal affairs of foreign countries.

Influenced by this friendly welcome in the Soviet capital and by the embarrassment inflicted on themselves by the *Pravda* article earlier in the year, the Indian Communists' Central Committee adopted an interim resolution, for confirmation by the Fourth Party Congress in March 1956, approving the Nehru government's foreign policy; and on 6th November the Party organ, *New Age*, published an article by Ghosh supporting the government in everything which could 'weaken the position of the main enemies of the Indian people at this stage—imperialism and feudalism'. The principal task, he went on to say, was to oust British capital from the Indian economy and to eradicate feudalism. It was on these two foes that the main attack would have to be concentrated 'in accordance with the Leninist strategy of isolating the chief enemy by forging the broadest united front against it'. His emphasis on the 'broadest united front' was clearly a reflection of a rebuke received from Moscow a month earlier for the Party's deviation from a 'Popular Front' policy.

That the factionalism within the Party, which had been so ruthlessly exposed at its Third Congress in January 1954, was as strong as ever was shown at the 'All-Party discussions' held in January 1956, when the question of supporting Nehru's foreign policy was put to the meeting. Opinions were violently divided, the official leaders being strongly in favour of it, while the opposing faction denounced it with vehemence. By the time these pages are published, the Fourth Congress will have been held and will no doubt have brought the bitter feud among the Party leaders into the open once more.

Ghosh's demands for the ousting of British capital, like his advocacy of support for Nehru's foreign policy, were seen to be fully in line with Moscow's aims when the two Soviet leaders, Bulganin and Khrushchev, arrived in India two weeks after the publication of his article. Although it was their graceless propagandist speeches and pronouncements which attracted the greatest attention and served to evaporate any diluted fumes of the Geneva spirit which might still have lingered after Molotov's exhibition of intransigence at the Foreign Ministers' Conference a few days previously, it seems probable that their most substantial and lasting achievement was seen in the trade agreement announced on the last day of their visit. In effect, this was the culmination of the politico-economic offensive waged by Moscow since September 1953 to counter American aid to under-developed countries and encourage the neutralization of the non-committed Asian powers. While, in fact, the world's attention was being distracted by the fulminations of the two Soviet leaders against the West and against Pakistan, Russian economic experts attached to their mission¹ had been quietly and unobtrusively carrying out discussions in the background and drawing up the necessary plans for the conclusion of this trade pact. Under this agreement the Russians, who, earlier in the year, had granted a long-term credit to India estimated at between one hundred and one hundred and fifty million dollars for the erection of a steel plant, undertook to supply a million tons of steel within the next three years. Oil, mining and other equipment required by India for her second Five-Year Plan, on which she placed such store, were also to be provided in return for raw materials and manufactured goods.

¹ Bulganin and Khrushchev had brought with them an entourage numbering about one hundred persons in all. These included the Chief of the Soviet Security Service, General Serov, and thirty security men. Somewhat incomprehensibly, three 'ladies' maids' also accompanied the party.

This is not meant to imply that the anti-Western diatribes with their gross distortion of historical facts, or the constant harping on Russia's alleged efforts in the cause of world peace and on the baulking of those efforts by the West, were not an important part of Soviet policy. They certainly were; and to no small extent they were successful, although close observers of the scene were divided in opinion as to the lasting effects of this propaganda. By posing as the champions of India and of Asia as a whole on such matters as colonialism, the H-bomb, disarmament, world peace, and colour discrimination; by the flattery paid to Indian achievements and the appeal to her prejudices; and by skilful, albeit unscrupulous, resort to half-truths and distortion of facts, they did their best to achieve their aim of arousing Indian suspicions of the West and Western suspicions of Indian neutrality, of increasing Indo-Pakistan tension, of weakening the Baghdad Pact and, in general, of making everyone thoroughly suspicious and resentful of everybody else.

As shown by the joint communiqué issued at the close of the visit, calling for the relaxation of international tension by disarmament, the banning of nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons, the admission of Communist China to a seat in the United Nations, and opposition to military alliances and blocs, much of this propaganda had been in line with India's own way of thinking and was in agreement with almost everything on which Nehru differed from the West; but at one stage of the visit there had been indications that the Soviet leaders had gone too far in their abuse of Indian hospitality and that the Indian leaders were becoming annoyed by their blatant propaganda. The announcement of the executions in Georgia and the report of further purges among Malenkov's leading supporters, moreover, seemed hardly consonant with Khrushchev's lyrical description of the Bolshevik Revolution as 'the most bloodless' of its size in history and with his assertion that it had resulted in 'real freedom' and the welding of the Soviet Union into 'one happy family'. The announcement of the hydrogen bomb explosion in Siberia during the visit and the gleeful boastings of its immense size served likewise to raise doubts in Indian minds as to the sincerity of the Soviet leaders' professed love of peace. Further doubts were aroused by the leakage of reports that Shepilov, the editor of *Pravda*, had passed on secret instructions to the CPI Central Committee to support Nehru 'for the time being' on the grounds that economic circumstances were forcing him in his development plans

to adopt methods similar to those of the Communists and that his foreign policy was helpful to world Communism [12].

For these and other reasons it seemed for a time that the Soviet leaders were outstaying their welcome. It was unfortunate, therefore, that, just at that stage, Mr Dulles issued his joint statement with the Portuguese ambassador criticizing the Indian stand on the question of Goa. The reaction was immediate. The flagging enthusiasm for the Russian visit was given a tremendous fillip by the consequent upsurge of national sentiment and by the visitors' prompt espousal of India's cause in the dispute.

Although it is all but inconceivable that Nehru will ever let India join the Soviet bloc, everything points to his becoming increasingly suspicious of Western motives. Furthermore, the fact has to be faced that, unless some other equally firm and magnetic leader emerges in the meanwhile, the national unity, which he has done so much to bring about and maintain, may well be shattered when death removes him. No potential successor has come to the fore since Patel died in December 1950. Should Nehru die and India tire of Congress Party rule, the danger of the Communists proving to be the only party with sufficient coherence and organization to profit from the resultant situation cannot, therefore, be ignored. Even as it is, the two Soviet leaders showed that they bore in mind Lenin's axiom that if India and China could be brought into the Communist fold, they, together with Russia, would form a solid bloc of more than half the total population of the world on the side of World Revolution. Khrushchev might, for the moment, have been thinking only of bringing India into the Soviet orbit rather than into the Communist fold; but it is significant that, on his return to Moscow on 21st December, he recalled this saying and declared that India was 'a great and good friend of our country . . . and India, China and the Soviet Union, as Lenin taught, constitute an invincible force'. That he hoped to line up India, Burma and Afghanistan in support of Russian policy was clear from his subsequent reference to them as 'our allies in the struggle for peace' and explained that his purpose in visiting them was 'simple and clear', namely, to 'strengthen friendship and co-operation with them'.

One way in which he and Bulganin sought to achieve this was by openly inciting Indian intransigence over Kashmir. By declaring that the whole of Kashmir was an integral part of India, the two Soviet leaders not only helped to win Indian goodwill for themselves and

their country; they also undermined the prospects of a peaceful settlement of the Kashmir question and inflamed national sentiment in Pakistan. In taking sides in this way, however, they were thinking primarily in terms of the war of nerves which they had launched against Pakistan in retaliation for its adherence to the Western camp and, more particularly, for its recent entry into the Baghdad Pact.

Pakistan had elected to remain within the British Commonwealth on becoming independent; she had shown her fidelity to the United Nations by sending troops to Korea in 1950; she had accepted American aid for rearmament in February 1954;¹ and she had joined the Baghdad Pact in September 1955. All these actions were abhorrent to Moscow; and ever since the alleged talks, late in 1953, for a military alliance with the United States and the establishment of American air bases in Pakistan, the Russians and their Communist allies throughout the world have denounced the Pakistan government and professed inability to believe the stout denial that any such negotiations had ever taken place. But it was the Baghdad Pact that caused the greatest offence, and it was during their visit to Kashmir in December 1955, when the two Soviet leaders went out of their way to support the Indian claim to that territory, that Khrushchev delivered his greatest broadside against Pakistan, berating that country for denying India's ownership of Kashmir, for joining the Baghdad Pact and, quite untruly, for allowing the United States to establish bases on its territory. For good measure he accused Britain of having created Pakistan in order to split the peoples of the Indian sub-continent in accordance with her policy of 'divide and rule'. When, a few days later, the two Soviet leaders went on to visit Afghanistan, they bestirred themselves to cause further trouble for Pakistan by expressing sympathy with the Afghan attitude towards the question of Pushtunistan and by declaring that the Pushtuns were entitled to the right of self-determination and that Pakistan had no right to claim them for herself. This open encouragement of Afghanistan in its claims against Pakistan, like the incitement of Indian intransigence over Kashmir, was all part and parcel of the war of nerves, aimed at stirring up trouble for Pakistan and con-

¹ President Eisenhower, in a personal letter, had sought to reassure Nehru regarding this aid and had, at the same time, offered similar military assistance to India if she cared to have it. Nehru, however, had expressed doubts concerning American assurances and declined the proffered aid.

sequently weakening her effectiveness as a member of the Baghdad Pact. With this support of Afghanistan in her dispute with Pakistan, it should be added, went a long-term loan of one hundred million dollars on easy terms in order further to predispose its rulers towards the Soviet Union.

Support for India and Afghanistan on the Kashmir and Pushtunistan questions respectively was stressed still further by Bulganin and Khrushchev when addressing the Supreme Soviet after their return to Moscow; but on that occasion they combined blandishments with threats. If Pakistan should decide to pursue an 'independent policy' and revise its attitude to the Baghdad Pact, they said, it would be assured of Soviet friendship. Whether, in this event, the Soviet Union would, in turn, revise its attitude towards the questions of Kashmir and Pushtunistan was not stated.

With the rights and wrongs of the Indo-Pakistan dispute over Kashmir we need not concern ourselves here. What is important to bear in mind is the serious effect it has had on the peace and stability of the Indian sub-continent in general. Ever since the Kashmir question was brought into prominence by the invasion of that territory in October 1947 and the developments that followed, relations between India and Pakistan have been sadly bedevilled. The unhappy state of those relations has served to distract the attention of the leaders of both countries from other urgent matters and to prevent a unified front by the two great neighbours against the common menace from without and within. Nehru's intransigent speech in March 1951, in which he claimed Kashmir as an integral part of India, merely increased the difficulties of finding a solution. The mischievous speeches of the two Soviet leaders in December 1955 added fresh fuel to the fire.

In the circumstances it was perhaps inevitable that the Communists should have exploited the situation to the full and, while penetrating even the highest administrative organs in Kashmir and giving limited support to the ruling party in the state, had sought to build up 'a united front from below' against the Kashmir leadership [13]. Kashmir they regarded as a potential Indian Yenana which, unlike their base in South India, would have the great advantage of facilitating contact with Soviet Russia and Communist China. It was, in fact, by concentrating their forces in the Punjab¹ and Pepsu in the

¹ In the Punjab they had been strengthened in 1952 by the accession of the Lal (Red) Communist Party, a relic of the Ghadr Party whose activities during and

North-West, in Manipur, Tripura and Assam in the North-East, and in Kashmir in the far north that they saw the greatest possibilities for a successful rising in the years ahead. The arrest, in August 1953, of the Kashmir prime minister, Sheikh Abdullah, who had originally been regarded as India's protégé, must therefore be seen within this context. It was generally interpreted at the time as due to Nehru's annoyance at his action of a few weeks earlier in declaring opposition to a merger with India. This may have been the immediate cause; but Sheikh Abdullah had for long shown leanings towards the Communists and the main reason for his arrest would seem to have been the increasing concern of the Indian government at the progress of Communist penetration and infiltration in Kashmir.

Apart from the serious handicap imposed by its strained relations with India over the question of Kashmir and other matters, Pakistan, for its part, has had to face a series of internal troubles and losses from the start. The death of Jinnah, its architect and creator, in September 1948 was a serious blow at a critical juncture, and three years later came the assassination of the able Liaquat Ali Khan. The revelation of the Rawal Pindi conspiracy case in March 1951, with its Communist bearing, was an indication of the fires smouldering beneath the surface. Since April 1953 a succession of troubles in the internal administration of the country, necessitating government action, has added further to its problems. The Communist Party of Pakistan, which was called into existence at the time of the Indian Communists' Second Party Congress in February 1948, has exploited the situation in the way common to Communist parties in all non-Communist countries and, since July 1954, has been outlawed in both East and West Pakistan. Compared with its Indian counterpart it is weak and seemingly lacking in organization, but it has the advantage of operating in a country calling for land reform and still, in large sectors, in the grip of feudal abuses. Recognizing the opportunities that this state of affairs offers for Communist exploitation of grievances, the government has drawn up plans for the necessary reforms but, in doing so, has aroused the ire of powerful and reactionary landed interests. An instance of this was seen in March 1955, when six members of the Sind Assembly were arrested and eight others, including some former ministers, were sought for their part in an alleged assassination plot by big landlords and estate

immediately prior to the First World War have been recorded earlier in these pages.

holders to thwart recent land reforms and prevent their implementation.

It was not only in the matter of land that the Communists were provided with grievances to exploit. In April 1953 speculation, nepotism and provincialism, in conjunction with economic difficulties, scarcity of food and lax control of public order, were spreading with such alarming rapidity that the governor-general of Pakistan was compelled to order the prime minister and cabinet to relinquish office. This drastic action was necessary in order to end a situation which was playing into the hands of the Communists. A year later, following anti-government riots in which nearly a thousand persons lost their lives, the chief minister of East Pakistan was replaced in order to 'forestall a threat to the security of the state'. Six Communist leaders were arrested in connection with these riots and, in Karachi, fifteen alleged Communists were arrested and given a year's detention for activities 'likely to disturb public peace and tranquillity'.

From all this it will be seen that the rulers of Pakistan were, and still are, faced with the dual internal problem of having to carry out reforms to remove grievances which lay themselves open to Communist exploitation and, at the same time, to deal sternly with their own reactionary elements, who are determined to oppose the enforcement of such reforms. The Communists, on their part, show their usual readiness to follow the Moscow line and to build up the customary Communist Front organizations geared to the corresponding international bodies in Europe. The ready acceptance by the Pakistani Communists of the directive to 'follow the Chinese path', given to Asian Communists in general in the Cominform journal of 27th January 1950, and their denunciation of Pakistan's alleged military pact with the United States in December 1953, are but two examples of ready obedience to the Moscow line.

No account of Communist developments on the Indian sub-continent since the war would be complete, however, without at least a passing reference to the emergence of one other new Communist Party. In the autumn of 1950 the Nepali National Congress Party, which had been in exile, forced its way back into Nepal from India. Thereby they set on foot the developments which have since destroyed the old stability of what had hitherto been almost a hermit kingdom. Taking advantage of the disorders that followed, a Communist Party of Nepal was formed a year later. Although out-

lawed in January 1952, it has continued its activities ever since and has increased considerably in strength and influence, especially among the student class. It appears to be well organized, with fully-fledged Communist Front organizations in support. The Katmandu Municipality and civic administration are already dominated by the Communists, who have close contacts with the CPI and with Tibet.

It was to Tibet that Dr K. I. Singh, in company with thirty leading Nepali Communists, fled in January 1952 after the armed intervention of India had caused the failure of a revolt he had launched against the royal government. From Tibet he made his way to Peking, where his presence was revealed in July 1954 together with that of Pridi, the former Siamese prime minister. Another year passed and then, in July 1955, the Peking government suddenly announced its intention of handing him back to the Nepalis. Two months later, after being promised an amnesty by the young King,¹ he returned by the way he had gone, accompanied from Tibet by twenty-seven followers, and soon after formed a political party of his own.

Dr Singh, who is a Nepali of Indian origin, has always denied being a Communist. Perhaps he is not; but his flight to Communist territory in the company of leading Nepali Communists and his subsequent sojourn of three and a half years in Tibet and Peking, where he was received as an honoured guest, would seem to indicate at least a friendly attitude towards the Communist world. According to his own account, the Chinese Communists had offered to reinstall him in Nepal by force, but he had declined. This, too, may be true; but what seems more likely is that his return at that particular juncture, just two months before the visit of Bulganin and Khrushchev to India, was a calculated move in Moscow's game to woo India, who had been greatly concerned about Nepal ever since the upset caused by the return of the Nepali National Congress Party in the autumn of 1950. This interpretation finds support in the fact that, after his return to Nepal, Dr Singh went out of his way to commend India for her friendly, generous and 'selfless' assistance to Nepal. Previously, while in Peking, he had made numerous broadcasts urging the people of Nepal 'to win democratic rule and throw off India's overlordship', a slogan entirely in line with Nepali Communist policy at that time.

¹ King Tribhuvana, who had died in March, had been succeeded by his son, Mahendra.

If India had felt concern regarding developments in Nepal since the autumn of 1950, she had shown even greater perturbation about Tibet ever since September the previous year when it was reported that the Chinese People's Liberation Army intended to 'liberate' that country [14]. In view of its strategic position and the potentiality it possessed for infiltrating Communist agents and others into India, this was hardly surprising. The developments of the next twelve months fully confirmed the report and increased India's apprehensions. Finally, late in October 1950, came the announcement that Chinese troops had been ordered to advance into Tibet 'to free the three million Tibetans from imperialist aggression'. Delhi showed its alarm by dispatching a Note to Peking expressing 'surprise and regret'. There followed a Tibetan request for India's support against the threatened invasion and an exchange of acerbities between Delhi and Peking; but by May 1951 Peking had announced the signing of an agreement for the 'peaceful liberation of Tibet'. India being in no position to oppose it by force, the 'liberation' was duly carried out and it was not until April 1954 that an agreement was signed restoring India's trading rights in Tibet and allowing China to have certain trading and other facilities in India in exchange. This was followed four months later by Chou En-Lai's visit to Delhi. The outcome of his meeting there with Nehru was the issue of a joint statement enunciating the five principles centring around non-aggression and non-interference, which have since been accepted as a guide to their relations with China by a number of other countries as well.

Finally it must be noted that in both India and Pakistan there is a Soviet embassy; in India since December 1947; in Pakistan since March 1950. No such diplomatic listening posts had ever before been available to the Russians in this vital area. To what extent they have concerned themselves with matters outside their legitimate duties is largely a matter of surmise. What seems clear beyond doubt is that the embassy in Delhi has maintained contact with Indian Communists and has flooded India with propagandist literature at a price within reach of the most slender purse. Whether the large sums of money available to the Indian Communists on such occasions as the general elections of 1952 came from the embassy or through other channels is open to question. Certain it is that such lavish expenditure would not have been possible if the Communists had had to depend solely on their own very slender resources.

CHAPTER XXXIX

Conclusion

THE main evolutionary and revolutionary developments in South and East Asia during the past hundred years or so have now been outlined. To indicate how and why they have occurred, and to set them within the framework of world events in general and of Moscow's plans for world revolution in particular, has been one of the primary objects of this book. Apart from throwing out occasional suggestions as to possible future trends, the role of prophet has been deliberately eschewed. In these closing pages it remains to record certain final observations and conclusions of a general nature.

Compared with the years immediately following the Bolshevik Revolution and the creation of the Comintern, the situation throughout these Eastern regions has undergone a fundamental change. Gone are the days when the whole vast area, with the exception of Japan and Siam, was wholly or partly under Western or Japanese domination. Instead, out of the twelve hundred and fifty millions now living within its compass, only the relative handful dwelling in Malaya, Singapore, Hong Kong, Macao and Goa remain under foreign control; and before 1957 has ended Malaya, too, will have become independent. Asian nationalism, with its strident demands for political independence, can no longer be exploited, therefore, by the Communists on the same lines as before and, as shown at the Bandung Conference in April 1955 and on other occasions, Soviet imperialism is now, at least in principle, just as suspect and abhorrent to large sections of Asia as Western or any other imperialism ever was. Sir John Kotelawala, who, as prime minister of Ceylon, led the attack on Soviet imperialism at Bandung, expressed himself succinctly on this matter in a book of reminiscences published early in 1956. 'The colonialism from which we have progressively escaped,' he wrote, 'was in no sense worse than the new colonialism which has emerged in the form of aggressive and subversive Communist expansion. The old colonialism had at least the redeeming virtue of a

democratic basis. The new colonialism is nakedly totalitarian in intention and effect' [1].

Moscow, however, is never long at a loss for fresh lines of attack and has adapted itself to the changing circumstances by stirring up and exploiting new nationalist grievances and aspirations aiming at economic as well as purely political independence. The old battle-cry of anti-imperialism continues to be raised, but it is coupled with the slogan of anti-colonialism and is directed primarily at weakening Western influence by the encouragement of economic nationalism. The Russians are then, in effect, adapting rather than adopting the Marxist precept that political freedom is meaningless so long as the worker is exploited and suffers from economic insecurity. Marx was thinking in terms of socialism and the proletariat. Moscow is applying his precept in a nationalist context, substituting 'nation' for 'worker' and inciting the Asian nations formerly under foreign domination to feel that the political freedom they have achieved is only half the battle. Until they have obtained economic independence as well, they will be subject to economic exploitation by the West and their national economy will remain insecure. So runs the Soviet theme.

The attainment of political independence by all these countries of South and East Asia and the consequent change in Moscow's line of attack, however, are by no means the only transformations that have taken place in the Asian scene since the upsurge of Asian nationalism and Communism caused by President Wilson's advocacy of self-determination and by the Bolshevik Revolution. They are new and vitally important factors in the present situation, but no more so than the spectacular rise of India and China, the removal of Japan from the leadership of South and East Asia, or the diminution of Western prestige and influence.

As far back as 1805, Napoleon forecast that the destinies of Europe would one day be decided in Asia and he likened China to a sleeping giant, which would change the course of history if ever aroused from its slumbers. The sleeping giant has now awakened and, together with India, is exerting an incalculable influence on world affairs. If India, like her neighbour Pakistan, had elected to side with the Western camp, the contest between her and China for the leadership of Asia left vacant by Japan's defeat would have been largely in the nature of a projection of the world-wide struggle between the two ideological camps of Western democracy and

Communist autocracy. But India did no such thing. Instead, she has sought to remain neutral and, when circumstances presented themselves, to adopt the role of mediator. In regard to Korea, in regard to Indo-China, and in regard to Formosa, she has, at one time or another, attempted to mediate; and although it concerned other countries besides those of Asia, it was seemingly on India's initiative that the Soviet Union reversed its veto on the 'package deal' for the admission of new members to the United Nations in December 1955.¹

In addition to setting herself up as the main exponent of neutralism and as a mediator between the two world camps, India has, since 1947 when she acted as host to the conference for Asian unity held in Delhi, shown her ambition to assume the leadership of Asian nationalism. Two years later, in January 1949, it was India who took the initiative in rallying Asian opposition to Dutch military action in Indonesia by inviting thirteen other Asian nations to Delhi to consider ways and means of supporting the Indonesians in their struggle for independence. On numerous occasions since then, she has taken the lead in denouncing Western colonialism in both Asia and Africa and, though activated by the highest principles, has inevitably played into Communist hands at times by doing so.

If India's emergence as an independent nation in August 1947 may be said to have marked the advent of a new era in Asia, it is equally true that the birth of the Cominform two months later—with its emphasis on Asian revolution—and the establishment of the Chinese People's Republic in October 1949, served to mould the shape and affect the course of the new era to an incalculable extent. While India has sought by democratic means to assume the leadership of Asian nationalism, China, with Soviet acquiescence and in full support of the Soviet camp, has set herself up as the model and leader for Asian Communism. Between these two great giants, both of whom are seeking to solve the same basic problems of poverty

¹ Although the veto was reversed for all the other countries sponsored by the West, the Soviet Union maintained its veto on Japan, ostensibly as a counter-weight to Outer Mongolia, whose admission had been vetoed by Nationalist China. This action would seem to have been a calculated move to turn Japan's resentment against her Western friends for acquiescing in this deliberate snub. There was irony in the fact that it was Nationalist China who, by vetoing Outer Mongolia, brought this about and that its ability to do so was due to her being still accorded that status of one of the 'Big Five', who alone have the right of veto. Barely a week later, India recognized Outer Mongolia, the first non-Communist country to do so.

and backwardness in their own respective ways, lie the countries of South-East Asia. Future trends in that area seem bound, therefore, to depend to no small extent on which of the two systems shows the quicker and more effective results, as the peoples of those countries are more interested in results than in ideologies, and democratic tradition is still relatively weak.

Poverty, disease and ignorance, like landlordism which is gradually being overcome in many areas by land reform, are features common to all Asian countries in varying degrees. Until these have been eliminated or at least eased very considerably, they will always provide fertile soil for the spread of Communism. If India is able to overcome these conditions by democratic methods, the moral effect on the countries of South-East Asia should be wholly beneficial. Compared, however, with the relatively slow-moving methods of democracy, the regimentation and compulsion employed by Communist régimes for the attainment of economic aims are apt to produce results far more rapidly and spectacularly. Therein lies the danger, for these are the means employed by the Chinese rulers. But here it may be interpolated that, while hostile to Communist activities within its own borders, India has undoubtedly been impressed by what the Communists have already done for China. The irony of this is that, apart from the great impression made on Nehru during his visit to China in October 1954 by the discipline, industriousness and achievements of the Chinese, Indian admiration has been aroused to no small extent by the way in which Communist China has won the respect, though hardly the liking, of the West; yet this respect has been won largely in the same way as it was won by Japan half a century ago, by strength resting on armed force.

Nothing succeeds like success. The South-East Asian countries may have no more love for Communism than they had for Pan-Asianism under Japanese leadership; but if China, in addition to winning the respect of the West by its strength, is able to produce more rapid and seemingly more spectacular results by the forceful means of Communism than India is able to show by the more plodding, albeit less painful, ways of democracy, the example may prove catching. The possibility, moreover, that China, like Soviet Russia, may also employ territorial expansion as an instrument for the spreading of social revolution cannot be ignored. While, therefore, many of the Asian countries look askance at the South-East Asia Treaty Organization because of its implications and imperfections,

some sort of guarantee of immediate and effective action by the leading democratic countries of the world—Asian as well as Western—would seem to be required in order to ensure that fear of further Chinese aggression and consequent readiness to come to terms with the Communists does not become a more compelling force than dislike of Communism.

In so far as active opposition to those countries already under Communist domination is concerned, it is one of the tragedies of the contemporary scene in the Far East and South-East Asia that the only apparent alternatives to the Communist régimes in China, North Korea and Northern Vietnam would have to be supplied by the discredited Chinese Nationalists, by the intemperate Syngman Rhee, and by the disunited elements in Southern Vietnam respectively. The Communists may be tyrannical, but they are reasonably efficient and are led by men of ability. The Chinese Nationalists and the South Koreans, on the other hand, are tyrannical and corrupt without the redeeming virtue of competence. The Southern Vietnamese, though seemingly more democratic, are lacking in unity and ability. It is hardly surprising, therefore, that the idea of liberation from Communist domination fails to arouse much enthusiasm among the peoples of these territories when they realize what this would imply.

This is perhaps the greatest weakness of the anti-Communist camp in the Far East and South-East Asia, but it is by no means the only one. There are, too, the running sore of Kashmir, which keeps India and Pakistan at loggerheads instead of co-operating for the common good; the hostility between Karens and Burmans, which helps to increase the unrest in Burma; the anti-Japanese sentiment of so many Indonesians and the economic instability which exists in the former Netherlands East Indies; the constant friction between Japan and Southern Korea; the problems raised by Japan's increasing pressure of population;¹ religious, racial and other communal tensions which disturb the tranquillity of so many countries in the whole area. These and other factors wholly independent of Communism, some of them of more direct concern to the non-committed nations than to the anti-Communist countries,

¹ Pressure of population is not, of course, confined to Japan and there are close observers, like Guy Wint, who regard the tremendous yearly increase of population in China (12,000,000), India (5,000,000) and Japan (1,500,000) as 'the supreme and most sinister force likely to be at work in Asia in the next half-century' [2].

nevertheless help to produce the conditions on which Communism thrives.

To speculate on China's future intentions would be out of place in these pages; yet China and India between them, for good or for ill, would seem to hold the key to the future of these regions. A forecast made by Manjilsky thirty years ago has already proved well-founded. 'Revolutionary China,' he declared in 1926, 'can become, in alliance with the USSR, the greatest world factor in the Far East.' What was no more than a speculative piece of rhetoric at the time it was uttered is now an established fact. As such it is the outcome of 'the victory of the Chinese people's revolution', which Khrushchev in September 1954 described as being 'next to the great October Revolution . . . the most outstanding event in world history' [3].

When, as a result of the Bolshevik October Revolution in 1917, the application of Lenin's thesis on imperialism became a practical proposition, Asia emerged as a major factor in the struggle for World Revolution. Now, as a result of 'the victory of the Chinese people's revolution' and the alliance of Communist China with Soviet Russia, China has become the outstanding factor in the Far East and South East Asia. As for potential points of future friction between Moscow and Peking, these have been noted elsewhere; but as yet no signs of serious strain are apparent. It was perhaps significant, nonetheless, that Bulganin and Khrushchev made little reference to China during their tour of India and Burma and appeared to be making a definite bid to extend Russian influence in an area which China had hitherto regarded as coming within, or at least bordering on, its own preserves. Even, however, if the alliance should break down eventually, China seems likely to remain the dominant factor in that vast sector of Asia for a long time to come.

While India and China are attempting by different methods to solve the same basic problems of poverty and backwardness, they are at one in their hostility towards colonialism. And here we come to one of the curious paradoxes of the present time. The Americans, with their traditional dislike of colonialism, are now the main target of Communist attack on the grounds of alleged imperialism. They have, too, incurred the outspoken criticism and suspicions of the former colonies and dependencies to which they have extended so much moral, economic, and technical aid. There is irony, moreover,

in the fact that if the United States, as represented at the time by Roosevelt, had had their own way, Hong Kong would now almost certainly be under Communist administration. While Churchill's firm stand prevented the restoration of that strategically placed colony to China, it is nevertheless hardly too much to say that anti-colonial sentiment in anti-Communist America, by undermining French authority in Indo-China and Western influence in other Eastern territories as well at a crucial period, contributed unwittingly to the Communist cause. A strong Britain, a strong France and a strong Holland are wanted by the United States, yet this largely irrational hatred of colonialism could end only in depriving them of some of their sources of strength. The pre-war paradox of anti-Western Japanese nationalists, the most bitter opponents of Communism, assisting the Communist cause by encouraging Asiatic nationalism on which Communism battered in those days, is therefore paralleled to some extent by the unintentional support given to Communist machinations by the American exponents of anti-colonialism.

It is, however, the anti-colonialism of India and the other non-committed countries of South and East Asia that provides Moscow with such an invaluable target for exploitation. To these peoples the suspicion that the Western powers are seeking to reimpose their grip on them in a new form is far more real and frightening than are the dangers of Communist subversion or the expansionist ambitions of China and Soviet Russia. Washington in particular is more suspect than either Moscow or Peking. Yet paradoxically, as Mr Macmillan, at that time British foreign secretary, pointed out in a broadcast in December 1955, the Russians, 'by their conquests and annexations' are 'one of the greatest colonial powers, not in the good sense either' [4]. In view of the way in which Bulganin and Khrushchev, during their visit to India and Burma, made concerted attacks on British colonialism which, they declared, 'formerly doomed India to existence without rights' and 'robbed and plundered the Burmese', he might have added, as an illustration, that Russians and Ukrainians now account for about a quarter of the total population of the Central Asian Republics. Had the British 'imperialists' colonized India and increased the number of their officials to the same extent, India would have had to make room for about one hundred million British within its confines.¹

¹ Even as far back as 1904, there were less than 6,500 British employed in the

Despite these demonstrable facts, anti-colonialism, directed primarily against the West, remains a powerful force among the peoples of South and East Asia and, through the medium of the IUS (International Union of Students) and the World Federation of Democratic Youth in particular, is exploited to the full by the forces of world Communism. The non-committed countries in that area are, however, mainly concerned with seeking to remain neutral and have no wish to align themselves openly with either camp. Yet it is in this very desire to remain neutral that they have unwittingly played into Moscow's hands. Should a shooting war replace the present cold war, their strategic position would almost inevitably result in their becoming involved in it, willy-nilly, on one side or the other. Their anxiety to remain neutral has therefore led them to adopt a stand entirely in accord with the policy pursued by Moscow for very different reasons. The Communist peace campaign, with its demands for disarmament and the banning of nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons, makes 'a natural appeal to them as seeming to offer the best means to reduce the prospects of a shooting war in which they could not hope to maintain their neutrality. Like the implications of the Russians' idea of disarmament, the Western contention that the hydrogen bomb provides the best deterrent against aggression leaves them unmoved. Similarly, they are alarmed by and distrustful of such developments as SEATO and the Baghdad Pact which, in their eyes, tend to increase the risk of large-scale war in South and East Asia by provoking Moscow and Peking. Russia and Communist China, for their part, are equally opposed to these essentially defensive measures, because they act as a curb to their own plans and actions. And so it comes about that countries like India and Burma, with a genuine desire to remain neutral and undisturbed, are brought into line with the Communist bloc on some of the outstanding questions of the day, although Moscow's primary aim in advocating these seemingly peace-loving objectives is to deprive the Western powers of their only means of holding the Russians and their Communist allies at bay.

By playing on these sentiments of the uncommitted Asian coun-

•

administration of India [5]. Thirty years later this figure had been reduced to under 3,000. By 1947, on the eve of Indian independence, the progress of Indianizing the Services had resulted in the number of British officials being reduced to approximately 1,600, including 350 in the Indian Police. The total number of European British subjects in India at that time was given as 'about 100,000'.

tries and, since September 1953, carrying out its political economic offensive, Moscow has, as we have seen, sought to draw them into the Soviet political and economic orbit. That they have met with no small success in their attempt to divide the East from the West and to eliminate, or at least weaken, Western influence in South and East Asia by stirring up ill-feeling for, and suspicion of, the West and its motives is all too apparent. The exploitation of colonialism past and present, together with the peace campaign and the political economic offensive, must therefore now be regarded as the principal weapons in the Kremlin's armoury, aided by its machinery for conducting propaganda and subversion. That there is no question of seeking to solve problems is equally clear. To do so would be to act against long-established Communist principles, which regard compromise and 'reformism' as deadly sins. On the contrary, as seen by its open support of Indian intransigence in the disputes over Kashmir and Goa and of Afghanistan in the matter of Pushtunistan, Moscow has sought to make these problems still more insoluble.

In so far as the Soviet political economic offensive is concerned, her economic system enables Soviet Russia to offer more favourable terms than the West and her own economic achievements provide a most telling argument for inducing the under-developed countries of South and East Asia to imagine that Soviet methods of industrialization may provide the solution to their own problems. It is significant, therefore, that Japan, though far more advanced industrially than any other country in Asia, has recently expressed views common to those held in other Asian countries, contrasting American aid unfavourably with Soviet aid. A Japanese government pamphlet, issued at the end of January 1956, contended that, although American aid was on a greater scale than that given by Russia, it was of such a nature that it might, in the end, cause more resentment than gratitude amongst its recipients. This, according to the pamphlet, was because the form in which this assistance was given was dependent on the stocks that were surplus to the requirements of the United States rather than on the needs of the recipients. Russian aid, on the other hand, was given in forms best suited to the requirements of the countries receiving it. As an example it quoted the recently concluded agreement in Rangoon, under which the Russians undertook to purchase surplus Burmese rice in exchange for Soviet heavy machinery and construction materials. In contrast to Russian credit, which could be repaid in raw materials, the loans proposed by the

Western powers 'would have to be repaid in cash at a much higher rate of interest' [6].

Although this criticism was couched in moderate terms, it was indicative of an underlying resentment. Coming, as it did, from Japan, it called to mind that one of the principal aims laid down at the CPSU Nineteenth Congress in October 1952 was to provoke and exploit dissensions among the countries of the 'imperialist' camp, setting Britain against Japan, France against Germany, and all four against the United States. Dissensions, or 'divisions' as the Communists prefer to call them, in the 'imperialist' camp there are bound to be, for honest differences of opinion are the strength as well as the weakness of the free world as against the monolithic unity imposed by the totalitarian system of the Communist world. In view, therefore, of the categorical statement of aims made at the CPSU Nineteenth Congress, the importance of ensuring that their differences with one another are not aggravated in such a way as to serve Moscow's avowed purpose should be clear to all the countries concerned.

This final chapter is being written on the eve of the CPSU Twentieth Congress, which is to be followed by the Eighth Congress of the Chinese Communist Party, the Fourth Congress of the Communist Party of India and the North Korean Workers' (Communist) Party Congress. These are important milestones in the progress of world Communism and will lay down the policy and tactics to be followed, especially in South and East Asia, during the immediate years ahead. Without indulging in any crystal gazing, it is safe to say that the pace and direction for the last three parties will be set by the decisions taken and the resolutions passed at the Moscow gathering. It is probably safe to say, too, that the peace campaign, with its stress on the alleged efforts for peace made by the Soviet bloc and nullified by the West, will continue to feature as one of the main weapons in the Communist armoury. It seems appropriate to note, therefore, that, by aiming to spread discontentment with Western defence measures and their economic consequences, and to divide and weaken the free world, this campaign is subserving the purpose of the Cominform.¹ Apart from guiding and enforcing Communist orthodoxy among Communists throughout the world, that body seeks to

¹ Since this was written, the Cominform has been dissolved, but the WFTU and other international Communist front organisations remain and provide the necessary 'ties and contacts' for the guidance and co-ordination of Communist activities throughout the world.

co-ordinate Communist strategy directed against European recovery by the disruption of Western economy. World Revolution and the downfall of Western democracy and capitalism therefore remains the ultimate objective, and the strategy of the indirect approach through what Stalin used to call 'the far imperialist rear' continues to be employed. Even if the former 'colonies and semi-colonies' of South and East Asia cannot be brought into the Communist fold, their use as basic markets and sources of raw material for the Western world can be so greatly curtailed that Western economy will be seriously affected if the now independent states can be wooed away sufficiently from the Western camp. It is by means of its political economic offensive in conjunction with the peace campaign that the Soviet hopes to bring this about. These Asian territories are, in fact, regarded by Moscow and the Communist world at large in much the same way as Churchill, in his plans for the downfall of Nazi Germany, regarded what he called 'the soft under-belly of Europe'.

While Soviet wooing has been mainly directed at India and Burma, it should not escape notice that in Indonesia President Sukarno has of late been showing increasing distrust of the West and admiration for the achievements of Communist China. His was the master-mind, according to the Indonesian press, in the attacks made on the pro-West Harahap government which, in January 1956, lost the support of some of its adherents in consequence. It was significant that, only a few days previously, he had addressed an anti-colonial rally in Jakarta and had recommended Communist participation in a new Indonesian government. It should be clear, however, to all these non-committed countries that the present Soviet policy of wooing their non-Communist leaders is but a passing phase in the traditional Communist policy of temporary alliances. The Communists in their more expansive moments make it clear that such policies as the current 'peaceful co-existence', which the writer of an article in a Soviet publication in October 1954 stressed was not intended to last 'for ever' but merely 'for a prolonged period' [7], are no more than temporary expedients in accordance with the 'zigzag course' advocated by Lenin. This was described by him as meaning 'sometimes retracing our steps, sometimes giving up the course once selected and trying various others', a policy which Stalin said involved 'manœuvring the reserves with a view to effecting a proper retreat when the enemy is strong'. It is a policy followed by international Communism from the outset, a policy which leaves the

final strategic objective, World Revolution, untouched, but provides wide scope for the shifts and changes in tactics required to suit the changing conditions and circumstances of national and international developments.

It was in line with this resort to temporary expedience that Shepilov,¹ as noted in the previous chapter, instructed the CPI to support Nehru 'for the time being'. The constant reiteration of the promise, 'Land for the Tiller', and the subsequent gradual trend towards collectivization in Communist China, North Korea and Northern Vietnam are but different aspects of this same Communist practice of temporary expedients. Temporary friendship and moderation are but a passing phase in the zigzag course leading to eventual Communist control; and here it may be recalled that on 4th November 1955 *Pravda* proudly announced 'the completion of the building up of socialism and of the gradual transfer from socialism to Communism' in the Soviet Union. Recent pronouncements by Mao Tse-Tung would seem to indicate that China hopes to reach that same stage before long. 'Communism', however, is different from Communist control and is, of course, only made possible after Communist control has been established.

An attempt has been made to show how Moscow, through its followers in the various countries of South and East Asia, has sought to impose Communist control in those widespread, densely-populated territories. Many of those who figured in the early days of the Communist movement, when the upsurge of Asian nationalism at the close of the 1914-18 war seemed to offer such promising material, are now dead, either through natural causes or through violence. Others have become disillusioned and quit the Communist cause; but some there are who remain alive and active in the cause of World Revolution. It may be not without interest, therefore, to consider the fate of some of those who have figured most prominently in these pages.

Of non-Asians who played all-important parts in striving to set Asia ablaze, Lenin, Trotsky and Stalin, all now dead, have left indelible marks. Leaving aside the unconfirmed reports and suspicions that Lenin's and Stalin's deaths may not have been wholly due to natural causes, it is certainly true that Trotsky died the victim of Moscow-inspired assassination. Zinoviev, Bukharin, Radek, and Karakhan, who likewise played important roles in stirring up revolu-

¹ Since this was written, Shepilov succeeded Molotov as foreign minister.

tion in Asia, met their deaths at the hands of Soviet executioners, and Joffe committed suicide. Borodin, Marshal Blucher, *alias* Galen, and Heinz Neumann, who all figured prominently in the early stages of the Chinese revolution, are also dead, Borodin dying in a Siberian prison camp, Blucher falling foul of the Kremlin and 'disappearing', and Neumann shot in prison by his former Moscow masters. Sneevliet, *alias* Mahring, who played so active a role in the early days of the Communist movement in both Indonesia and China, appears to have died in exile. Such is the price paid by so many of those non-Asians who sought to carry out the dictates of Moscow in setting the Asian world ablaze. One of the few who remains alive today, though long since bereft of all illusions about the virtues of Communism, is Philip Spratt, who served as a Comintern agent in India in the 1920's and as recently as 1955 published a book describing his activities in those days [8].

Of Asians who strove to stir up Communist revolution in their own and other Asian countries, M. N. Roy, the 'father of Indian Communism' and the Comintern agent who caused the final drastic split in the CCP-KMT alliance in the 1920's by revealing to Wang Ching-Wei the instructions sent by Moscow to the Chinese Communists, died peacefully in January 1954 long after becoming disillusioned and breaking away from his former Soviet masters. Tan Malaka, another Comintern agent in the 1920's and 'father of Indonesian Communism', is believed to have met his death in action in 1949;¹ but although still a fiery revolutionary at the time, he too had fallen into Moscow's bad graces many years previously. His former rival, Muso, also fell in battle during the Madiun rebellion, but was still fighting for the orthodox Communist cause. Of other Indonesians prominent in the early days of the Indonesian Communist movement, Alimin, Darsono and Semaun are still alive, but Alimin has been removed from the Party 'for health reasons', Darsono has become disillusioned, and Semaun continues his long exile in Moscow. Of formerly prominent Japanese Communists, Tokuda is dead, although his death in Peking in 1953 was only announced two years after it occurred, and Sano Gaku has defected long since; but Nozaka and Shiga now lead the Party. It is, in fact, only in Japan,

¹ Although there have been reports from time to time since then that he is still alive, it seems reasonably certain that he was, in fact, killed. Having become an almost legendary figure, his former followers are probably responsible for the recurring legend that he escaped death.

China and Indo-China that members of the Old Guard continue to guide the movements in which they have been conspicuous from the outset—Nozaka and Shiga in Japan, Mao Tse-Tung, Chou En-Lai and Chu Teh in China, and the veteran Ho Chi-Minh in Indo-China. In Burma, it is true, Than Tun and Thakin Soe can make a similar claim; but the BCP only dates back to 1938 and Thakin Soe, though still an ardent Communist, is in opposition to the orthodox Party.

And so we come to the outstanding leaders of that Asian nationalism which the Communists sought to exploit for their own purposes in the days following the nationalist upsurge at the close of the First World War. Gandhi, Jinnah and Patel are no more, but Nehru remains as the outstanding figure in India and indeed, in Asia with the possible exception of Mao Tse-Tung. Sun Yat-Sen is long dead, but his widow now plays an active part in Communist China, though not herself a member of the Communist Party. Her brother-in-law, Chiang Kai-Shek, too, continues to figure prominently, but as a rather pathetic shadow of his former self. In Indonesia Sukarno, Hatta and Sjahrir occupy leading positions in the country which they led to independence, with Sukarno, in the capacity of president, showing increasing anti-Western and leftist leanings. In South Korea the fiery intransigent octogenarian Syngman Rhee plays the leading role. In Burma, U Nu occupies a similar outstanding position; but Aung San is dead, the victim of assassination, and U Saw, who planned his murder, has paid the price of his crime. In Siam, where nationalism was never such a dynamic force as in other parts of South-East Asia, Pibul remains supreme while Pridi, with whom he played Box and Cox for so many years, stays biding his time in exile abroad. And Japan, where nationalism among its more extreme exponents took the form of distorted patriotism and espoused the cause of Pan-Asianism under Japanese leadership? The enigmatic Toyama Mitsuru, the great high priest of the ultra-patriotic cult, is no more. He died during the war, as also did the former Indian terrorist, Rash Behari Bose who, under the protection of Toyama and his Black Dragon Society, played so baleful a part in stirring up anti-Western, and more particularly anti-British, sentiment in Japan. The old dynamic leaders are gone; but the cult, though lessened in influence, is by no means dead and some who played direct parts in the political assassination plots of the 1930's are still alive and active. But here we must end this review of what has happened to those who figured so prominently in the Asian nationalist and Communist

movements in the years immediately following the Bolshevik Revolution and turn to other features of the situation as it is to-day.

Of how Moscow, by injecting the idea of 'new colonialism' has sought to arouse suspicions of Western policies towards the now independent countries of Asia, enough has already been said; but the new technique employed for this purpose merits emphasis. Not only have Soviet diplomatic missions been set up in India, Pakistan, Burma, Siam and Indonesia, in which none existed before, as well as in the Communist states of China, North Korea and North Vietnam; there has also been a constant exchange of 'cultural' and other missions with these countries, culminating in the personal visits of the two Soviet leaders to India and Burma in the closing weeks of 1955. Never, in Stalin's days, had such methods been used. Comintern agents, in the years between the two world wars, had been sent to incite and direct Communist activities and, with the coming of the Cominform in 1947, Communist Front organizations and 'fraternal delegates' started to play their part in subversive agitation and propaganda. But these have all been part of the traditional Communist practice of working for the downfall of existing social, political and economic systems. It required Stalin's death and the consequent replacement of individual dictatorship by the principle of collective leadership to enable the two topmost figures in the Soviet hierarchy to introduce the new technique. This entails the making of personal visits as honoured guests in order to woo the heads of governments by flattery and promises of aid instead of sending covert agents to work for their downfall by subversion. Subversion continues, but for the time being it is relegated to a subsidiary role.

Since the Russians finally completed their control of the Comintern apparatus in 1927, however, subversion has always been subordinate to the requirements of Soviet foreign policy. The new technique is merely another means of serving those requirements. Tactics change, conditioned as they are by the current needs of Soviet foreign policy, but the ultimate strategic aim of World Revolution remains unaltered. The zigzag course laid down by Lenin, with its temporary alliances and its use of 'transmission belts' for ensuring that the ever-changing Moscow line is communicated to the masses in palatable form, continues. It is still directed, moreover, by a small group of highly-trained, efficiently organized and strictly disciplined men dedicated to the revolutionary theories of Marx, Lenin and Stalin. Africa and the Middle East are now added to South and East

Asia as the target of Communist anti-colonial propaganda and are being subjected to similar techniques, although the tactics employed vary according as to whether the countries are subject to the old forms of colonialism, as in the case of much of Africa, or to 'new colonialism' as in the Middle East. It is a chastening thought in regard to all these countries, but more particularly in regard to those of Asia, that much of the recruiting and training for the respective Communist parties is started in England, where the British Communist Party has always made a point of befriending and indoctrinating coloured students and others. There is no colour bar in the United Kingdom and no curbing of the normal freedoms; but the majority of Asian or African visitors or temporary residents find few English homes open to them and many of them are refused quarters by British landladies. Feeling humiliated and homesick, they present an easy target for Communist propaganda with its denunciation of colour discrimination, colonialism and the like.

The ability and the readiness of the Communists to exploit the colour question cannot be too strongly emphasized. Its bearing on the whole question of colonialism must be clear to all; but what is apt to be overlooked even now is the increasing necessity on the part of the Western camp to heed the voice of Asia. This need has been brought more and more into evidence since the outbreak of the Korean war, but more particularly since April 1954 when, coincident with the Five-Power meeting in Geneva to discuss the questions of Korea and Indo-China, the prime ministers of India, Pakistan, Ceylon, Burma and Indonesia met together in Colombo to decide how best the moral weight of united Asian opinion could be used to tip the scales in favour of peace as between the two great power-blocs struggling for supremacy. As shown by Sir John Kotelawala, on whose initiative the Colombo Conference was called, the deliberations of these Asian statesmen and the conclusions set forth in the communiqué issued at the close of their meeting had a 'very salutary effect on the negotiations at Geneva' and 'tipped the balance in bringing about the settlement in Indo-China' [9]. From their subsequent meeting at Bogor in Indonesia in December that year there emerged the decision to convene the far wider-embracing Afro-Asian Conference at Bandung in April 1955, a meeting which was to bring about a definite change in the world balance of power.

The Asian countries still have their differences with one another, but the voice of Asia is now backed by a unity unknown before.

As such it can no longer be disregarded with impunity. Moreover, by their show of sympathy for Asians and Asian aspirations and by their professed love of peace, the Communists are able to curry favour among the Asian peoples in contrast to the Western powers who, even in their most generous offers of aid, appear in Asian eyes to be actuated more by anti-Communist motives than by pro-Asian sentiment and to think and speak in terms of war rather than strive for the cause of peace.

It was noticeable that, following the Afro-Asian Conference in Bandung in April 1955, both the Soviet Union and Communist China took up the anti-colonial theme with increasing vigour, and Chou En-Lai, underlining the 'common experience' of the Asian and African countries, declared that it could serve as a basis for mutual 'sympathy and support'. The relative moderation shown by Chou at that conference, however, when taken in conjunction with the enunciation of his 'five principles' and with the signing of the agreement with Indonesia for abolishing dual nationality, gave rise to hopes that the Peking leaders were beginning to appreciate the need for a more flexible foreign policy than was possible under a rigidly dogmatic, doctrinaire Communist approach.

Pertinent to this possibility was a study of Chinese Communist behaviour and its causes which had recently been published by Michael Lindsay, who had had close war-time associations with many of the present Chinese leaders [10]. The conclusion he reached was that its undoubted deterioration since about the summer of 1946 had been due to Communist irrationality rather than to bad faith. This may not have afforded much satisfaction for those who had suffered from it, but first-hand acquaintance with these leaders led the author of this study to assert that the Chinese Communist Party was rather more rational than most Communist bodies. From this he deduced the belief that China's present rulers might, in certain specified circumstances, prove more amenable to reason and less doctrinaire than most Communists, at least in so far as their relations with foreign countries were concerned. Claiming equality with the Soviet Union as China does, and being less subject to Moscow than are the satellite countries, it might therefore be that the interests of the state would be given precedence over those of the Party.

If these deductions should prove justified, there seems room for hope that increasing contact between such outstanding Chinese

leaders as Chou En-Lai and the statesmen of the democratic countries of Asia and the West may help to remove some of the delusions and misunderstandings responsible for Chinese Communist behaviour since 1946 and lead to a more rational outlook. It seems possible, moreover, that the Bulganin-Khrushchev visit to India and Burma, with its accompaniment of lavish promises of material aid to those two countries and to Afghanistan, has aroused some misgivings and even resentment in Chinese minds. If this is so—and Chou En-Lai's recent warning that China must not rely on Soviet experts indefinitely may be a pointer [11]—it might conceivably dispose China to show greater readiness to seek a better understanding with the Western powers, especially if a favourable response was forthcoming. This may seem verging on wishful thinking, for, even if the Chinese should feel so disposed, the Russians are in a position to hold them in check by threatening to curtail, or even withhold, the material aid which they will require for many years to come; but it is a possibility to be borne in mind.

Could Chinese delusions and misunderstandings be removed, the effect on the existing situation would be wholly beneficial; but there would clearly have to be a reasonable amount of give and take on both sides and a readiness on the part of the Western powers to remedy China's more legitimate grievances, on such matters as Peking's admission to the United Nations and the question of Formosa, if a real and lasting improvement is to be obtained. Failing this, the outlook for the future must remain gloomy indeed, with both China and the Soviet Union continuing their attempts to confirm the truth of Zinoviev's aphorism of 1925, that the road to World Revolution lies through the East.

Bibliography and Note on Sources

ONLY those books and other material used in the preparation of this volume have been included in the bibliography.

Without going into the varying degrees of reliability and merit of each of the publications mentioned, they may be divided into five main groups:

1. *Documentary Material*

Most important are: Stalin's *Problems of Leninism*, *Marxism and the National and Colonial Question*, and *History of the CPSU(B)*, Lenin's *Selected Works*, Mao Tse-Tung's *Selected Works* and other writings, Liu Shao-Chi's *On The Party and Internationalism and Nationalism*, Dona Torr's *Marx On China*, the Cominform journal (officially entitled *For a Lasting Peace, For a People's Democracy*), *Imprecor*, NCNA (New China News Agency) despatches, Jane Degras' *Soviet Documents on Foreign Policy*, and Brandt's *Documentary History of Chinese Communism*.

In Communist eyes most of these have the authority of Holy Writ. Being primary sources, they are essential material for the study of Communist thought and practice. In so far as they relate to historical events, however, the bias and distortion of facts in which their authors indulge have to be borne in mind. The struggle for power among the Communist leaders themselves, especially in Russia, has led to some strange re-writing of history in order to show that the victors of these struggles were always right while the vanquished were unprincipled blackguards and traitors.

2. *First-hand Works by former Communists*

Under this heading come the writings of Agabekov, Borkenau, Margarete Buber, Deutscher, Louis Fischer, Ruth Fischer, Douglas Hyde, Harold Isaacs, M. N. Roy, Trotsky, and Jan Valtin.

All these are invaluable sources, as the authors are writing from first-hand knowledge and experience. Allowance must, however, be made for the varying degrees of bias and prejudice which tend to colour their writing, from the strongly prejudiced outpourings of Trotsky at one end of the scale to the commendable objectivity of Deutscher and Douglas Hyde at the other.

3. *First-hand Works by Others*

These include the works of Sir Winston Churchill, Deane, Etherton, Hilton, Thakin Nu, Onraet, Snow, Spencer Chapman, Stettinius, and Stilwell. Although varying in merit, they all provide valuable material and useful background.

4. *Scholarly Studies*

Chief amongst those listed are the works of Sir Olaf Caroe, Edward Carr, Dallin, Deutscher, Fitzgerald, Carew Hunt, Jones, Kahin, Mitrany, North, Purcell, Sir George Sansom, Schwartz, and Swearingen and Langer. All of these call for high commendation.

5. *Miscellaneous*

There are also many other books and publications that cannot be placed under any of the four previous heads. Most of them are of real value for the study of Communism and Nationalism in South and East Asia, but among those calling for special mention are the works by the anonymous 'American Sociologist', Leonard Barnes, Beloff, Blumberger, Owen Chapman, Christian, Colbert, Sir John Cumming, Elegant, Elsbree, Furnivall, O. M. Green, Hall, Hanrahan, Michael Lindsay, Masani, Millar, Mills, Van Mook, Payne, Philips, Sokolsky, Tanin and Yohan, Virginia Thompson, Willoughby, and Guy Wint.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

1. *Periodicals*

Akahata, *Asian Horizon*, *British Survey*, Chatham House periodicals (Fortnightly *Chronology of International Events*, *International Affairs*, and *The World Today*), *China Year Book*, *Cominform Journal*, *Cross-Roads*, *Daily Worker*, *Eastern World*, *Economist*, *Foreign Affairs*, *Imprecor*, *Japan Advertiser*, *Japan Chronicle*, *Japan Year Book*, *Keesing's Contemporary Archives*, *Manchester Guardian*, NCNA (New China News Agency) *Nhandan*, *Observer*, *Pacific Affairs*, *People's China*, *Pravda*, *The Times*, and *Times Literary Supplement*.

2. *Books and Pamphlets*

Agabekov, *OGPU* (Brentano, 1931)
 American Sociologist, *The Socialist and Labour Movement in Japan* (Japan Chronicle Press, 1921)
 Bailey, Colonel, *Mission to Tashkent* (Jonathan Cape, 1946)
 Ball, W. Macmahon, *Nationalism and Communism in East Asia* (Melbourne University Press, 1952)
 Barnes, Leonard, *Soviet Light on the Colonies* (Penguin, 1944)
 Beloff, Max, *Soviet Policy in the Far East 1944-51* (Oxford University Press, 1953)
 Bessedovsky, G. Z., *Revelations of a Soviet Diplomat* (Williams & Norgate, 1932)
 Blumberger, J. T., *Le Communisme aux Indes Neerlandaises* (1929)
 Borkenau, Franz, *The Communist International* (Faber & Faber, 1938)
 Brandt, Schwartz & Fairbank, *A Documentary History of Chinese Communism* (George Allen & Unwin, 1952)
 Bruce-Lockhart, Sir Robert, *Memories of a British Agent* (Putnam, 1932)
 Buber, Margarete, *Under Two Dictators* (Gollancz, 1949)

- Butow, Robert, *Japan's Decision to Surrender* (Oxford University Press, for Stanford, 1955)
- Byas, Hugh, *Government by Assassination* (Allen & Unwin, 1943)
- Calthrop, Captain, *The Book of War* (John Murray, 1908)
- Carew Hunt, R., *The Theory and Practice of Communism* (Geoffrey Bles, 1950)
- Caroe, Sir Olaf, *Soviet Empire* (Macmillan, 1953)
- Carr, E. H., *The Bolshevik Revolution 1917-23* (Macmillan, 1952)
- Chapman, H. Owen, *The Chinese Revolution 1926-27* (Constable, 1928)
- Chatham House Study Group, *Defence in the Cold War* (1950)
- Christian, John Le Roy, *Burma and the Japanese Invader* (Thacker, Bombay, 1945)
- Churchill, Sir Winston, *The Second World War* (Cassell, 1948-54)
- Clinard, Outlen Jones, *Japan's Influence on American Naval Policy* (University of California Press, 1947)
- Colban, Alfred, *National Self-Determination* (Oxford University Press, 1944)
- Colbert, Evelyn, *The Left Wing in Japanese Politics* (IPR, 1952)
- Colvin, Ian, *The Life of General Dyer* (Blackwood & Sons, 1929)
- Crankshaw, Edward, *Russia by Daylight* (Michael Joseph, 1951)
- Crossman, R. H. S. et al., *The God That Failed* (Hamish Hamilton, 1950)
- Cumming, Sir John, *Political India 1832-1932* (Oxford University Press, 1932)
- Cumming, Sir John, *Modern India* (Oxford University Press, 1932)
- Dallin, David, *Soviet Russia and the Far East* (Yale University Press, 1948)
- Dallin, David, *The Rise of Russia in Asia* (Hollis & Carter, 1950)
- Davies, Joseph, *Mission to Moscow* (Victor Gollancz, 1942)
- Deane, Major-General John, *The Strange Alliance* (Viking Press, 1947)
- Dedijer, Vladimir, *Tito Speaks* (Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1953)
- de Francis, John, *Nationalism and Language Reform in China* (Princeton University Press, 1950)
- DeGras, Jane, *Soviet Documents on Foreign Policy* (Oxford University Press, 1951-3)
- Deutscher, Isaac, *Stalin* (Oxford University Press, 1949)
- Deutscher, Isaac, *The Prophet Armed* (Oxford University Press, 1954)
- Elegant, Robert, *China's Red Masters* (Twayne Publishers, 1951)
- Elsbree, Willard, *Japan's Role in South-East Asian Nationalist Movements* (Harvard University Press, 1953)
- Etherton, Colonel, *In the Heart of Asia* (Constable, 1925)
- Fall, Bernard, *The Viet Minh Régime* (Cornell University and IPR, 1954)
- Fischer, Louis, *The Soviets in World Affairs 1917-29* (Jonathan Cape, 1930)
- Fischer, Ruth, *Stalin and German Communism* (Harvard University Press, 1948) •
- Fitzgerald, C. P., *Revolution in China* (Cresset Press, 1952)
- Forman, Harrison, *Report From Red China* (Holt, 1945)
- Furnivall, J. S., *Netherlands India* (Cambridge University Press, 1944)
- Gelder, Stuart, *The Chinese Communists* (Gollancz, 1946)
- Green, O. M., *The Story of China's Revolution* (Hutchinson, 1945)

- Hall, D. G. E., *Burma* (Hutchinson's University Library, 1950)
- Hanranhan, Gene, *The Communist Struggle in Malaya* (IPR, 1954)
- Harvey, G. E., *British Rule in Burma* (Faber & Faber, 1946)
- Hashimoto, M., *Sunk* (Cassell, 1954)
- Hill, Christopher, *Lenin and the Russian Revolution* (Hodder & Stoughton, 1947)
- Hilton, Richard, *Military Attaché in Moscow* (Hollis & Carter, 1949)
- Hladun, John, *They Taught Me Treason* (Maclean's Magazine, 1st October to 1st November, 1947)
- Hu Chiao-Mu, *Thirty Years of the Communist Party of China* (Lawrence & Wishart, 1951)
- Hyde, Douglas, *I Believed* (Heinemann, 1950)
- Isaacs, Harold, *The Tragedy of the Chinese Revolution* (Secker & Warburg, 1938)
- Johnston, Sir Reginald, *Twilight in the Forbidden City* (Victor Gollancz, 1934)
- Jones, F. C., *Japan's New Order in East Asia 1937-45* (Oxford University Press, 1954)
- Jones, Borton and Pearn, *The Far East 1942-46* (Oxford University Press, 1955)
- Kahin, George, *Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia* (Cornell University Press, 1952)
- Karaka, D. F., *Betrayal in India* (Gollancz, 1950)
- Kato, Masuo, *The Lost War* (Alfred Knopf, 1946)
- Kennedy, M. D., *The Changing Fabric of Japan* (Constable, 1930)
- Kennedy, M. D., *The Problem of Japan* (Nisbet, 1935)
- Kent, P. H. B., *The Twentieth Century in the Far East* (Arnold, 1937)
- King-Hall, Stephen, *The Communist Conspiracy* (Constable, 1953)
- Kotelawala, Sir John, *An Asian Prime Minister's Story* (Harrap, 1956)
- Laski, Harold, *The Communist Manifesto: Socialist Landmark* (Allen & Unwin, 1948)
- Lenin, *Collected Works* (Lawrence & Wishart, 1938)
- Lenin, *Selected Works* (Martin Lawrence, 1936-9)
- Lindsay, Michael, *China and the Cold War* (Melbourne University Press, 1955)
- Liu Shao-Chi, *On The Party* (Foreign Languages Press, Peking, 1950)
- Liu Shao-Chi, *Internationalism and Nationalism* (Foreign Languages Press, Peking, 1951)
- Lyons, Eugene, *Assignment in Utopia* (Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1937)
- Lyons, Captain Gervais, *Afghanistan, the Buffer State* (Higginbotham, Madras, 1910)
- Mao Tse-Tung, *The Turning Point in China* (New Century Publishers, New York, 1948)
- Mao Tse-Tung, *People's Democratic Dictatorship* (Lawrence & Wishart, 1950)
- Mao Tse-Tung, *Selected Works*, Vols. I to IV (Lawrence & Wishart, 1954 and 1956)
- Masani, M. R., *The Communist Party of India* (Verschoyle, 1954)

- Mendelssohn, Peter, *Japan's Political Warfare* (Allen & Unwin, 1944)
- Millar, Harry, *Menace in Malaya* (Harrap, 1954)
- Mills and Associates, *The New World of South-East Asia* (Minnesota Press, 1949)
- Mitrany, D., *Marx Against The Peasants* (Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1951)
- Mook, Van, *The Stakes of Democracy in South-East Asia* (Allen & Unwin, 1950)
- Napier, J. P., *Survey of the Japanese Communist Party* (Nippon Times Ltd, 1952)
- Nicolson, Harold, *The Congress of Vienna* (Constable, 1946)
- North, Robert, *Moscow and the Chinese Communists* (Stanford University Press, 1953)
- Nu, Thakin, *Burma Under The Japanese* (Macmillan, 1954)
- O'Dwyer, Sir Michael, *India As I Knew It* (Constable, 1925)
- Oliver, Robert, *Syngman Rhee* (Robert Hale, 1955)
- Onraet, René, *Singapore: A Police Background* (Dorothy Crisp & Co., 1947)
- Orwell, George, *Animal Farm* (Secker & Warburg, 1949)
- Panikkar, K. M., *Asia and Western Domination* (Allen & Unwin, 1953)
- Panikkar, K. M., *In Two Chinas* (Allen & Unwin, 1956)
- Pares, Sir Bernard, *History of Russia* (Jonathan Cape, 1926)
- Payne, Robert, *The Revolt in Asia* (Gollancz, 1948)
- Payne, Robert, *Mao Tse-Tung* (Secker & Warburg, 1951)
- Philips, C. H., *India* (Hutchinson's University Library, 1948)
- Purcell, Victor, *The Chinese in South-East Asia* (Oxford University Press, 1951)
- Purcell, Victor, *Malaya: Communist or Free?* (Gollancz, 1954)
- Roth, Andrew, *Dilemma in Japan* (Gollancz, 1946)
- Roy, M. N., *Revolution and Counter-Revolution in China* (Renaissance Publishers, Calcutta, 1946)
- Sansom, Sir George, *The Western World and Japan* (Cresset Press, 1950)
- Schwartz, Benjamin, *Chinese Communism and the Rise of Mao* (Harvard University Press, 1951)
- Schwarzschild, Leopold, *The Red Prussian* (Hamish Hamilton, 1948)
- Sharpley, Cecil, *The Great Delusion* (Heinemann, 1952)
- Snow, Edgar, *Red Star Over China* (Gollancz, 1946)
- Sokolsky, George E., *The Tinder Box of Asia* (Allen & Unwin, 1932)
- Spencer Chapman, F., *The Jungle Is Neutral* (Chatto & Windus, 1949)
- Spratt, Philip, *Blowing Up India* (Sita Ram Goel, Calcutta, 1955)
- Stalin, *History of the CPSU(B)* (Foreign Languages Publishing House, Moscow, 1943)
- Stalin, *Problems of Leninism* (Foreign Languages Publishing House, Moscow, 1947)
- Stalin, *Marxism and the National and Colonial Question* (Lawrence & Wishart, 1947)
- Stein, Gunther, *The Challenge of Red China* (New York, 1945)
- Stettinius, Edward, *Roosevelt and The Russians* (Jonathan Cape, 1950)
- Stilwell, General, *The Stilwell Papers* (Macdonald, 1949)

- Swearingen & Langer, *Red Flag In Japan* (Harvard University Press, 1952)
- Tanin & Yohan, *Militarism and Fascism in Japan* (Martin Lawrence, 1934)
- Temperley, Major-General, *The Whispering Gallery of Europe* (Collins, 1938)
- Thein Pe, *What Happened in Burma* (Published 1943 in Allahabad)
- Thompson, J. M., *Robespierre and the French Revolution* (English Universities Press, 1952)
- Thompson, Virginia, *The Left Wing In South-East Asia* (William Sloane, New York, 1950)
- Thomson, Gladys Scott, *Catherine the Great and the Expansion of Russia* (English Universities Press Ltd., 1947)
- Torr, Dona, *Marx On China 1853-60* (Lawrence & Wishart, 1951)
- Trotsky, *Stalin* (Hollis & Carter, 1947)
- Tuker, Lt.-Gen. Sir Francis, *While Memory Serves* (Cassell, 1950)
- Vambery, Arminius, *The Coming Struggle For India* (Cassell, 1885)
- William, Maurice, *Sun Yat-Sen Versus Communism* (Williams & Wilkins Co., Baltimore, 1932)
- Willoughby, Major-General, *Sorge: Soviet Master Spy* (William Kimber, 1952)
- Wilson, Edmund, *To The Finland Station* (Secker & Warburg, 1941)
- Wint, Guy, *The British In Asia* (Faber & Faber, 1947)
- Wint, Guy, *Spotlight on Asia* (Penguin Special, 1955)
- Woodhead, H. G. W., *Adventures in Far Eastern Journalism* (Hokuseido Press, Tokyo, 1935)
- Woodman, Dorothy, *The Republic of Indonesia* (Cresset Press, 1955)
- Valtin, Jan, *Out Of The Night* (Heinemann, 1941)
- Yim, Louise, *My Forty-Year Fight For Korea* (Gollancz, 1952)
- Young, Morgan, *Japan Under Taisho Tenno* (Allen & Unwin, 1928)
- Zacharias, Captain Ellis, *Secret Missions* (Putnam, 1946)
- Zacharias, Captain Ellis, *Behind Closed Doors* (Putnam, 1950)

REFERENCES AND NOTES

Except where more than one work by the same author has been shown in the Bibliography, only the author's name is given in these References. 'Deutscher', however, refers to that writer's *Stalin* unless otherwise noted.

In order to avoid unnecessary repetition, Stalin's name as author has been omitted from the frequent references to his *Problems of Leninism*, *History of the CPSU(B)*, and *Marxism and the National and Colonial Question*. For the same reason, the last of these three works has been shortened to *Marxism and the Colonial Question*.

CHAPTER I

- (1) Carew Hunt, p. 161. See also Lenin's *Selected Works*, Vol. V, p. 112
- (2) Lenin's *Collected Works*, Vol. IV, p. 160. The original article appeared under the title *The China War* in the first issue of *Iskra* on 24th December 1900.

- (3) Christopher Hill, p. 139
- (4) *Marxism and the Colonial Question*, p. 18
- (5) *A Few Theses*, published in *Sotsial Demokrat* of 24th October 1915, see Lenin's *Selected Works*, Vol. V, p. 156
- (6) Lenin's *Selected Works*, Vol. V, p. 316
- (7) *Problems of Leninism*, p. 98
- (8) *Marxism and the Colonial Question*, p. 186
- (9) Schwarzschild, p. 136
- (10) *Ibid*, p. 162
- (11) *Ibid*, p. 93
- (12) *Problems of Leninism*, p. 97
- (13) Carew Hunt, p. 132
- (14) *Problems of Leninism*, p. 191
- (15) *History of the CPSU(B)*, pp. 233-4
- (16) NCNA Peking, 12th May 1950
- (17) Cominform journal editorial, 27th January 1950
- (18) Lenin's *What Is To Be Done?*
- (19) Deutscher, p. 70
- (20) *Ibid*, pp. 51-3 and *History of the CPSU(B)*, p. 39
- (21) Deutscher, pp. 58-9
- (22) Liu Shao-Chi's *On The Party*

CHAPTER II

- (1) Mills, p. 25
- (2) Karaka, p. 36
- (3) Philips, p. 100
- (4) Cumming's *Political India*, p. 227
- (5) *Ibid*, p. 49
- (6) Mills, p. 26
- (7) Article in *The World Today*, November 1948
- (8) Van Mook, p. 95
- (9) Quoted by Kimaze Seizo in *Mitsuru Toyama Fights for Greater Asia*
- (10) Mills, p. 109
- (11) Deutscher, p. 44
- (12) Karaka, p. 37
- (13) Cumming's *Political India*, p. 228
- (14) *Ibid*, p. 231
- (15) *Ibid*, p. 232
- (16) Sir Michael O'Dwyer, pp. 169, 185, 197 and 201-3
- (17) Lenin's *Collected Works*, Vol. XII, p. 306
- (18) Mills, p. 32
- (19) Van Mook, pp. 113-14

CHAPTER III

- (1) *American Sociologist*, pp. 8-9 and 11
- (2) Roy, p. 113
- (3) Kent, p. 174

- (4) *See* p. 4
- (5) Roy, p. 215
- (6) NCNA 11th January 1951

CHAPTER IV

- (1) Lenin's *Selected Works*, Vol. 5, p. 139. In article published 23rd August 1915
- (2) *See* p. 19
- (3) *Japan Chronicle*, 27th January 1938
- (4) *Ibid*, 18th November 1937
- (5) *See*, for example, Kennedy's *The Problem of Japan*, pp. 212-13 and 275

CHAPTER V

- (1) Furnivall, pp. 243-4
- (2) *Ibid*, p. 249
- (3) Payne's *The Revolt of Asia*, p. 35
- (4) Furnivall, p. 250
- (5) Van Mook, p. 114
- (6) Clinard, pp. 155-7

CHAPTER VI

- (1) Philips, pp. 105 and 112
- (2) *Indian Statutory Commission* (HMSO), Vol. IV, Part I, pp. 96-7
- (3) Etherton, pp. 162-3 and 233
- (4) Lenin's *Selected Works*, Vol. V, p. 156
- (5) Ruth Fischer, p. 275
- (6) Dallin's *The Rise of Russia in Asia*, p. 154
- (7) Etherton, p. 225
- (8) *Ibid*, p. 163
- (9) Cumming's *Political India*, p. 242
- (10) Onraet, p. 111

CHAPTER VII

- (1) In compiling this chapter, I have relied mainly on the following works: Borkenau's *Communist International*, Brandt's *Documentary History of Chinese Communism*, Elegant's *China's Red Masters*, Louis Fischer's *The Soviets in World Affairs*, Green's *Story of China's Revolution*, Isaacs's *Tragedy of the Chinese Revolution*, Roy's *Revolution and Counter-Revolution in China*, Schwartz's *Chinese Communism and the Rise of Mao*, and Sokolsky's *Tinder Box of Asia*.
- (2) Borkenau, pp. 300-2
- (3) *Communism and Nationalism in China* by C. M. Chang in *Foreign Affairs*, July 1950
- (4) Ruth Fischer, p. 575
- (5) Isaacs, pp. 72-3
- (6) Elegant, p. 45

CHAPTER VIII

- (1) See p. 27
- (2) See 'American Sociologist'
- (3) For fuller details see Tanin and Yohan
- (4) *The World Today*, 1st April 1946

CHAPTER IX

- (1) J. M. Thompson, p. 59
- (2) See p. 21
- (3) See his *Left Wing Communism*
- (4) Degras, Vol. I

CHAPTER X

- (1) See p. 21
- (2) See, for example, Harold Nicolson's *Congress of Vienna*, p. 119
- (3) Borkenau, p. 419
- (4) Deutscher, p. 529
- (5) Ruth Fischer, p. 637
- (6) Chatham House Study Group's *Defence in the Cold War*, p. 13
- (7) Article by V. Wolpert in *Eastern World*, February 1948
- (8) George Orwell's *Animal Farm*
- (9) *History of the CPSU(B)*, p. 214
- (10) Ruth Fischer, p. 309

CHAPTER XI

- (1) Manuilsky
- (2) Dona Torr, pp. 48 and 51
- (3) *Ibid*, pp. xvi and xvii of Introduction
- (4) *The World Today*, May 1952
- (5) See p. 4
- (6) See p. 21
- (7) See p. 105
- (8) See p. 23
- (9) Vol. V, p. 112
- (10) NCNA report of 13th November 1952 quoting speech by Yefimov in Peking on 7th November on the history of the development of Sino-Soviet friendship
- (11) Lenin's *Selected Works*, Vol. IV, pp. 305-11
- (12) *Ibid*, pp. 312-13
- (13) Article in *New York Daily Tribune*, 12th December 1859, see Dona Torr, p. 88
- (14) *Marxism and the Colonial Question*, p. 18
- (15) Article on Rosa Luxemburg in *Times Literary Supplement*, 9th November 1951
- (16) Lenin's *Selected Works*, Vol. V, p. 130
- (17) *Ibid*, p. 275

- (18) *Ibid*, p. 156
- (19) *Problems of Leninism*, p. 160
- (20) *Marxism and the Colonial Question*, p. 74
- (21) For the full text see Degras Vol. I, p. 15
- (22) Quoted in Dallin's *The Rise of Russia in Asia*, p. 180
- (23) Degras, Vol. I, p. 92
- (24) *Marxism and the Colonial Question*, p. 76
- (25) Swearingen, p. 8
- (26) *Ibid*, p. 7
- (27) Virginia Thompson, p. 221
- (28) Etherton, pp. 158-9
- (29) Brandt, p. 67. *See also Marxism and the Colonial Question*, p. 234, where Stalin quotes Lenin's proviso
- (30) Colban, p. 107
- (31) *Marxism and the Colonial Question*, p. 79
- (32) Leonard Barnes, p. 242
- (33) *Ibid*, p. 244. Other details are given on pp. 243-6
- (34) *Marxism and the Colonial Question*, p. 206
- (35) For details of the former, see Ruth Fischer pp. 218 and 574; for details of the latter, see John Hladun
- (36) *Marxism and the Colonial Question*, p. 115. Italics are mine
- (37) *Ibid*, p. 117
- (38) Swearingen, p. 11
- (39) Virginia Thompson, p. 222
- (40) *Problems of Leninism*, pp. 137-8
- (41) Crossman, p. 82
- (42) Deane, p. 207
- (43) Carew Hunt, p. 161
- (44) Schwarzschild, p. 177
- (45) Swearingen, pp. 12-13
- (46) Virginia Thompson, p. 223
- (47) *See* p. 125

CHAPTER XII

- (1) *Marxism and the Colonial Question*, p. 156
- (2) *Ibid*, p. 168
- (3) *Ibid*, p. 148
- (4) *Manchester Guardian*, 10th November 1952
- (5) *Marxism and the Colonial Question*, pp. 194-5
- (6) Virginia Thompson, pp. 170 and 223
- (7) *Problems of Leninism*, p. 16
- (8) *Marxism and the Colonial Question*, p. 192
- (9) Agabekov, pp. 16-27
- (10) Etherton, p. 237
- (11) Dallin's *The Rise of Russia in Asia*, p. 164
- (12) *Bolshevik*, 2nd October 1952
- (13) Dallin's *The Rise of Russia in Asia*, p. 166
- (14) *Ibid*, p. 167

- (15) Quoted in a review of Gallacher's *The Rolling Thunder* in *The Times Literary Supplement*, 6th May 1949
- (16) Ruth Fischer, p. 480
- (17) *Marxism and the Colonial Question*, p. 223
- (18) Crossman, pp. 251-2

CHAPTER XIII

- (1) The main sources used in compiling this and the next two chapters have been Borkenau's *Communist International*, Brandt's *Documentary History of Chinese Communism*, Owen Chapman's *The Chinese Revolution 1926-7*, Hu Chiao-Mu's *Thirty Years of the Communist Party of China*, Dallin's *Soviet Russia and the Far East* and *The Rise of Russia in Asia*, Elegant's *China's Red Masters*, Isaacs's *Tragedy of the Chinese Revolution*, North's *Moscow and the Chinese Communists*, Payne's *Mao Tse-Tung*, Roy's *Revolution and Counter-Revolution in China*, Schwartz's *Chinese Communism and the Rise of Mao*, Edgar Snow's *Red Star Over China*, and Sokolsky's *Tinder Box of Asia*.
- (2) Owen Chapman, p. 107
- (3) Schwartz, p. 100
- (4) Chatham House *Chronology of Events in China 1911-27*

CHAPTER XIV

- (1) Brandt, p. 131
- (2) NCNA 7th February 1951

CHAPTER XV

- (1) *Marxism and the Colonial Question*, p. 237

CHAPTER XVI

- (1) The main sources used in compiling this chapter have been *The Socialist and Labour Movement in Japan* by an anonymous American Sociologist, Evelyn Colbert's *The Left Wing in Japanese Politics*, Kennedy's *The Changing Fabric of Japan*, Napier's *Survey of the Japanese Communist Party*, and Swearingen and Langer's *Red Flag in Japan*.

CHAPTER XVII

- (1) Apart from the specific references given below, the main sources used in compiling this chapter have been Hugh Byas's *Government by Assassination*, Kennedy's *The Problem of Japan*, and Tanin and Yohan's *Militarism and Fascism in Japan*. Much of it, however, was written before any of these three works were available and appeared originally in the form of an article I wrote for the March 1933 issue of *Contemporary Japan*, the publishers of which kindly gave me permission to reproduce it in whole or in part.
- (2) Article by Aono Suyekichi in *Chuo Koron* of April 1932

- (3) Kennedy's *Changing Fabric of Japan*
- (4) *Ibid*, p. 122
- (5) See his *Nihon Ayaushi (Japan in Danger)*
- (6) *Japan Advertiser*, 17 December 1927, article by Dr. Washio.
- (7) Kennedy's *Changing Fabric of Japan*
- (8) *Ibid*, p. 94

CHAPTER XVIII

- (1) The main sources used in compiling this chapter have been Dallin's two works, Mills's *The New World of South-East Asia*, Van Mook's *The Stakes of Democracy in South-East Asia*, Payne's *Revolt in Asia*, Purcell's *The Chinese in South-East Asia*, and Virginia Thompson's *The Left Wing in South-East Asia*. For the section on Indonesia, I have relied largely on Blumberger's *Le Communisme aux Indes Neerlandaises*, Furnivall's *Netherlands India*, and Kahin's *Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia*.
- (2) Article in *The World Today*, 1st April 1946
- (3) Dallin's *Soviet Russia and the Far East*, p. 52
- (4) *Imprecor*, 12th March 1931

CHAPTER XIX

- (1) The main sources used in the three principal sections of this chapter are:
 Malaya: Onraet, Millar, Purcell, and Spencer Chapman
 Burma: Christian, Hall, Harvey, Mills, Thakin Nu, and Virginia Thompson
 India: Cumming, Masani, and Philips
- (2) Onraet, p. 113
- (3) Thein Pe's *What Happened in Burma*

CHAPTER XX

- (1) Stettinius, p. 28
- (2) Dedijer, p. 331
- (3) Edgar Snow, p. 223
- (4) *Ibid*, p. 23
- (5) *Ibid*, p. 417
- (6) *Ibid*, p. 446
- (7) *Pravda*, 18th December 1950
- (8) Cominform journal, 5th January 1951
- (9) *Ibid*, 27th January 1950
- (10) NCNA 27th March 1950
- (11) Deutscher's *The Prophet Armed*, p. 155
- (12) Jones, p. 160

CHAPTER XXI

- (1) Brandt, p. 37
- (2) Stilwell, p. 296

CHAPTER XXII

- (1) Degras, Vol. II, p. 289
- (2) *Ibid*, p. 26
- (3) *Ibid*, p. 57
- (4) *Ibid*, p. 65
- (5) *Ibid*, pp. 322-3
- (6) North, p. 124⁹
- (7) For the text of the decree, *see* Degras, Vol. II, p. 391
- (8) *See* p. 72
- (9) Degras, Vol. III, pp. 168-70
- (10) *Ibid*, pp. 187-8
- (11) Snow, p. 102
- (12) Brandt, p. 64
- (13) Degras, Vol. III, p. 487
- (14) Jones, p. 175
- (15) Degras, Vol. III, p. 109
- (16) Jones, p. 175
- (17) Dallin's *Soviet Russia and the Far East*, p. 362

CHAPTER XXIII

- (1) Kennedy's *The Problem of Japan*, p. 76
- (2) *Ibid*, pp. 77-9 and 110
- (3) Degras, Vol. II, p. 516
- (4) *Ibid*, p. 514
- (5) *Ibid*, pp. 519-21
- (6) *Ibid*, p. 529
- (7) *Ibid*, p. 532
- (8) *Ibid*, p. 552
- (9) Degras, Vol. III, pp. 2-4
- (10) *Ibid*, pp. 17 and 122
- (11) *Ibid*, pp. 441-7. *See also* Mao Tse-Tung's *Selected Works*, Vol. I, p. 120
- (12) *Ibid*, p. 45
- (13) *Ibid*, p. 89 and Temperley, p. 76
- (14) *Ibid*, p. 100
- (15) Joseph Davies's *Mission to Moscow*
- (16) Deutscher, p. 419
- (17) Crankshaw, p. 26
- (18) Degras, Vol. III, p. 139
- (19) *Ibid*, p. 165. Interview with Roy Howard, 5th March 1936
- (20) Jones, p. 177-8
- (21) Degras, Vol. III, p. 321
- (22) Jones, p. 180⁹
- (23) *Ibid*, p. 184
- (24) Degras, Vol. III, p. 399
- (25) *Ibid*, p. 373-4
- (26) *Ibid*, p. 399
- (27) *Ibid*, pp. 486-7

- (28) Churchill, Vol. I, pp. 286-7
- (29) Jones, p. 128
- (30) Degras, Vol. III, pp. 363-71
- (31) *Ibid*, p. 390

CHAPTER XXIV

- (1) *History of the CPSU(B)*, p. 288 and Deutscher, p. 311
- (2) Deutscher, p. 316
- (3) *Ibid*, p. 321
- (4) *Ibid*, p. 317 and King-Hall, p. 513
- (5) E. Lyons, p. 279
- (6) Deutscher, p. 321
- (7) Directive issued by Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party on 23rd April 1953, as reported by the NCNA
- (8) Deutscher, p. 328 and Cranshaw, p. 106
- (9) Deutscher, pp. 338-9
- (10) *History of the CPSU(B)*, p. 321
- (11) *Problems of Leninism*, p. 369
- (12) Deutscher, p. 358
- (13) *Ibid*, p. 357
- (14) *Ibid*, p. 379
- (15) Churchill, Vol. I, p. 225
- (16) Trotsky, p. 418
- (17) *Ibid*, p. 416
- (18) Deutscher, p. 471
- (19) NCNA 2nd October 1952
- (20) Masani, p. 33
- (21) Willoughby, p. 251
- (22) Reuter despatch of 30th October 1954, from New Delhi
- (23) Cominform journal, 29th November 1949, and King-Hall, pp. 122-3
- (24) *British Survey*, 15th July 1941, p. 15
- (25) Article on the Comintern in *The Times* of 3rd May 1938
- (26) *Observer*, 7th November 1954

CHAPTER XXV

- (1) Elsbree, p. 3
- (2) Kennedy's *Problem of Japan*, p. 1
- (3) Hashimoto, p. 46
- (4) Jones, p. 409
- (5) *Ibid*, p. 411
- (6) Beloff, p. 20 and Deane, p. 226
- (7) Churchill, Vol. VI, pp. 206-7 and Deane, pp. 146-7
- (8) *Ibid*, p. 340
- (9) Zacharias's *Behind Closed Doors*, p. 63
- (10) Zacharias's *Secret Missions*, p. 364

- (11) Jones, p. 429
- (12) Churchill, Vol. VI, p. 555
- (13) Zacharias's *Secret Missions*, p. 387
- (14) Kato, *The Lost War*, p. 240

CHAPTER XXVI

- (1) Philips, p. 139
- (2) Payne's *Revolt in Asia*, pp. 115-16
- (3) Masani, p. 80
- (4) Thakin Nu, p. 106
- (5) Purcell's *Malaya: Communist or Free?* p. 45
- (6) Millar, pp. 39 and 69
- (7) *Ibid*, pp. 66-71
- (8) *Ibid*, p. 46
- (9) *Ibid*, p. 44
- (10) Spencer Chapman, pp. 168-75

CHAPTER XXVII

- (1) Kahin, p. 104
- (2) Payne's *Revolt in Asia*, p. 254
- (3) Vietnam News Service, 22nd December 1950

CHAPTER XXVIII

- (1) NCNA 19th December 1949. Text issued
- (2) North, p. 198
- (3) For text of this statement see Stuart Gelder, pp. 169-73
- (4) Stilwell, p. 296
- (5) *Ibid*, pp. 292-3
- (6) Elegant, p. 220
- (7) Payne's *Mao Tse-Tung*, p. 262
- (8) Full text given in Gelder, pp. 1-60
- (9) Stettinius, p. 28
- (10) For more detailed accounts, see Swearingen and Langer, Chapter IX, and Colbert, pp. 58-70
- (11) *Pravda*, 18th January 1950
- (12) Hugh Deane in *The China Weekly Review* of 26th July 1947

CHAPTER XXIX

- (1) See Vyshinsky in *Questions of Philosophy*, No. 2 of 1948, quoted by King-Hall, p. 59
- (2) Stettinius, pp. 22-23
- (3) Deane, p. 207

CHAPTER XXX

- (1) Deane, pp. 278 and 281

- (2) *The World Today*, August 1953 and *Pacific Affairs*, March 1947 and December 1950
- (3) Oliver, p. 204
- (4) *Ibid*, p. 214
- (5) *Ibid*, pp. 194 and 210
- (6) Masani, pp. 87-88
- (7) Tucker, p. 86

CHAPTER XXXI

- (1) Cominform journal, 10th November 1947
- (2) Dedijer, p. 367
- (3) Cominform journal, 29th November 1949
- (4) Published in Peking *People's Daily*, 19th December 1954
- (5) NCNA 16th November 1949

CHAPTER XXXII

- (1) *The Present Situation and Our Tasks*, published in pamphlet form under the title, *Turning Point in China*
- (2) Full text given in pamphlet under that title published in 1950 by Lawrence & Wishart
- (3) For full text see Stuart Gelder, pp. 1-60
- (4) NCNA 24th March 1949
- (5) *Ibid*, 6th May 1949
- (6) *Ibid*, 23rd June 1953
- (7) Mao Tse-Ting's *People's Democratic Dictatorship*
- (8) *Ibid*
- (9) NCNA 13th March 1949
- (10) *Ibid*, 29th December 1951
- (11) Cominform journal, 25th July 1952
- (12) NCNA 27th September 1949
- (13) See, for example, the despatch from New Delhi in *The Times* of 31st December 1954

CHAPTER XXXIII

- (1) Leonard Constantine in *Manchester Guardian* of 17th November 1950
- (2) Mao Tse-Tung's *The Turning Point in China*
- (3) Liu Shao-Chi's *Internationalism and Nationalism*
- (4) Liu Shao-Chi, 16th November 1949
- (5) Malenkov's message to Mao, reproduced in Cominform journal of 2nd October 1953
- (6) *Pravda*, 26th August 1952
- (7) Tass despatch of 19th October 1953
- (8) NCNA 5th November 1952
- (9) *Ibid*, 7th February 1953
- (10) Liu Shao-Chi, 13th February 1953
- (11) Cominform journal, February 1953
- (12) *Ibid*, 19th February 1954

- (13) NCNA 30th September 1954
- (14) *Ibid*, 23rd July 1950
- (15) Cominform journal, 26th September 1952
- (16) NCNA 10th February 1954
- (17) Full text in Cominform journal of 24th September 1954
- (18) NCNA 23rd September 1954
- (19) *Ibid*, 4th February 1953
- (20) *Ibid*, 10th May 1953
- (21) Lai Jo-Yu, 10th May 1953
- (22) NCNA 15th September 1953
- (23) *Ibid*, 27th March 1953
- (24) *Ibid*, 5th March 1954
- (25) Cominform journal, 10th September 1954
- (26) NCNA 2nd February and 27th March 1953
- (27) Peking *People's Daily*, 15th November 1953
- (28) *Ibid*, 10th October 1955
- (29) *Ibid*, 12th January 1956

CHAPTER XXXIV

- (1) Cominform journal, 6th January 1950
- (2) See Foreword to T.U.C. pamphlet, *Free Trade Unions Leave the W.F.T.U.*, issued March 1949
- (3) Jones, Borton & Pearn, p. 318
- (4) Peking *People's Daily*, 18th December 1950
- (5) Text given in NCNA of 10th January 1952
- (6) See, for example, Cominform journal of 14th April and 29th September 1950, and 10th August 1951
- (7) Cominform journal, 7th October 1955
- (8) *Akahata* of 30th July 1955
- (9) *Ibid*, 23rd August 1955
- (10) Cominform journal, 19th August 1955

CHAPTER XXXV

- (1) Bernard Fall, p. 13
- (2) Vietnam News Agency, 9th January 1954, quoting *Nhan Dan* editorial of 6th January 1954
- (3) Cominform journal, 23rd May 1952
- (4) *L'Humanité*, 14th April 1953
- (5) NCNA 23rd April 1955
- (6) *Life*, 12th January 1956
- (7) See *The Manifesto and Platform of the Vietnam Lao Dong Party*, published as a supplement to *People's China*, 1st May 1951
- (8) Cominform journal, 19th December 1952
- (9) *Ibid*, 21st August 1953
- (10) NCNA 25th February 1953, and Cominform journal, 3rd April 1953
- (11) Cominform journal, 3rd September 1954
- (12) *Nhan Dan*, 6th June 1955

- (13) NCNA 18th January 1954
- (14) Ho Chi-Minh in a speech on foreign aid delivered on 20th September 1955
- (15) NCNA 19th January 1953
- (16) NCNA 24th April 1953
- (17) Cominform journal, 1st December 1950
- (18) *Ibid*, 27th June 1952

CHAPTER XXXVI

- (1) *Manchester Guardian*, 10th November 1955
- (2) Cominform journal, 3rd August 1951
- (3) Notably in the Cominform journal of 27th January and 1st September 1950, 3rd August 1951, and 29th February 1952
- (4) *The Times*, 23rd June 1952
- (5) *Observer*, 22nd March 1953 and *The Times*, 23rd March 1953
- (6) *The Times*, 1st December 1952

CHAPTER XXXVII

- (1) Kahin, p. 150
- (2) *Ibid*, pp. 277-80
- (3) *Daily Worker*, 5th November 1948
- (4) Cominform journal, 15th February 1949
- (5) *Ibid*, 5th January 1951
- (6) *Ibid*, 2nd September 1955
- (7) *Ibid*, 9th September 1955
- (8) *Ibid*, 27th August 1954
- (9) *Ibid*, 15th October 1954
- (10) *Ibid*, 9th September 1955
- (11) *Ibid*, 4th November 1955
- (12) Interview in *Pedoman*, 17th February 1955

CHAPTER XXXVIII

- (1) A fully documented and detailed account of these is given by Lieut.-General Sir Francis Tuker, who was C-in-C Eastern Command India at the time, in his *While Memory Serves*
- (2) Masani, p. 283
- (3) *Observer*, 15th January 1956
- (4) June/July 1949 issue of CPI magazine, *Communist*
- (5) Cominform journal, 27th January 1950
- (6) Published in *Crossroads*, 21st July 1950
- (7) Masani, pp. 108-9
- (8) Reproduced in full by Masani, pp. 252-63
- (9) Cominform journal, 7th November and 12th December 1952
- (10) Cominform journal, 21st May 1954
- (11) Delhi despatch from Philip Deane in *The Observer*, 15th January 1956
- (12) *The Observer*, 27th November 1955
- (13) Masani, pp. 200-202

(14) NCNA 4th September 1949

CHAPTER XXXIX

- (1) Kotelawala, p. 8
- (2) Guy Wint's *Spotlight on Asia*, p. 215
- (3) Khrushchev in speech in Peking, 30th September 1954
- (4) Broadcast, 17th December 1955
- (5) Cumming's *Modern India*, p. 88
- (6) *Manchester Guardian*, 1st February 1956
- (7) Article by Leontyev in *Kommunist*, quoted in 19th October 1954 issue of *The Times*
- (8) Philip Spratt's *Blowing Up India*
- (9) Kotelawala, p. 122
- (10) Michael Lindsay's *China and the Cold War*
- (11) Chou En-Lai's report to a meeting of the Central Executive Committee: see *The Observer*, 12th February 1956

Indexes

General Index

- AEBUS, 216
- Afghan War (1919), 58, 120
- Afghanistan, 39, 60, 102-3, 491-3, 506, 515
- Afro-Asian Conference, *see* Bandung Conference
- Aigun Treaty, 101
- Akahata*, 402, 407
- Aligarh University, 56
- All-Burma Peasant Union, 222, 307
- Youth League, 218
- All-China Federation of Labour, 163, 373-4, 388
- Federation of Trade Unions, 163, 365, 388-9
- Soviet Congress, 160-1
- All-India Federation of Labour, 229
- Peace Council, 482
- Trade Union Congress, 62, 226, 229, 478
- All-Japan Proletarian Youth League, 176
- Alma Ata, 260, 270
- American economic aid, 446, 467, 492, 506
- Immigration Law, 38, 40, 88, 184
- Security Pact with Japan, 400, 403, 406
- Security Pact with S. Korea, 417
- White Paper on China, 322
- Amritsar, 57, 120
- Amur, 101
- Anarchists, 26-7, 82-3, 85, 92, 181
- Andaman Islands, 296
- Andhra Elections, 480, 486, 488
- Thesis, 485
- Anglo-Japanese Alliance, 104, 184
- Annam, 50, 295, 317, 419-20, 422, 423
- Annamite Revolutionary Youth League, 51, 196-7
- Anti-Americanism, 29, 44, 368, 388, 392, 401-6, 410, 414-15, 437-8, 462, 467, 482
- Anti-Chinese Riots, 47
- Anti-Colonialism, 43, 404, 414, 446, 498-500, 503-6, 508, 513
- Anti-Comintern Pact, 266
- Anti-Fascist People's Freedom League (AFPFL), 305-6, 355, 440, 442, 444
- Anti-Feudalism, 8, 31, 66-7, 87, 163, 324, 342, 472
- Anti-Imperialism, 8, 26, 29-31, 38, 53, 67-8, 87, 93, 105, 116, 163, 290, 335, 342, 499
- Anti-Indian Riots, 47
- Anti-War Campaign, 96, 178-9
- Congress, 278
- League, 326-8
- Anti-Western propaganda, 292, 314, 343, 511
- Arcos Raid, 251
- Armed Struggle, 75, 77, 138-9, 147, 227-8, 366, 370, 405, 474, 478-9
- Aryan Army, 295
- Asian and Pacific Regions Peace Conference, 278, 365-6, 429
- Trade Union Conference, 143, 365-6, 373, 382
- Asian apprehensions and suspicions, 391, 414, 490, 504, 506
- bloc, 413
- Nations Conference (January 1949), 466, 500
- neutralism, 440, 446-7, 462, 477, 480-1, 487, 489-90, 500, 505
- Relations Conference (March 1947), 446, 500
- Socialist Conference, 447

- Atlantic Pact, 375
 Atom Bomb (*see also* Nuclear), 299-300, 342, 363
 Attlee-Aung San Agreement, 440, 442
 Australian Communist Party, 204, 312, 450, 476
 Autumn Harvest Insurrection, 77, 156, 167
 Awakening League, 326
 Azerbaijan, 122

 Baghdad Pact, 490, 492-3, 505
 Baku Congress, 60, 83, 120-4, 130, 135
 Bandung Conference, 381, 430, 437, 447, 498, 513-14
 Basle Congress, 96
 Bastille, Capture of, 93
 Bengal Partition, 22, 56
Binh Xuyen, 433
 BKPRI, 457-8
 Black Dragon Society, 19, 36-7, 39, 187, 193, 511
 Bokhara, 102, 107, 135-6
Bolshevik, 237, 359
 Bolshevik Revolution, 16, 89, 95, 98, 106, 236, 336, 490, 498-9, 503, 512
 Bolshevik Sama Samaj Party, 304
 Bolsheviks, 14, 94, 113, 115, 118, 135, 137, 240
 Boxer Rebellion, 4, 28-31, 104, 113
 Brain-Washing, 416-17
 Brest-Litovsk Treaty, 98, 136, 330
 Britain as Communist Target, 43, 60-1, 122, 130, 148-9, 215-16, 451-2
 British Communist Party, 204, 303, 479, 513
 British Empire Communist Conference, 355, 450
 Buddhism, 52, 355
Budi Utomo, 24, 49
 Bukharin Thesis, 84, 174, 177
 Burma (*see also* All-Burma), 43, 51-2, 216-23, 291, 304-7, 355-6, 440-50, 491, 502-3, 505, 508, 511-12, 515
 Burma, Communism in, 218, 220, 355, 359
 — Communist Party, 52, 221-3, 304-7, 355, 440-4, 476, 511
 — Defence Army, 296, 305
 — Independence, 355-6, 358, 440-1
 — Independence Army, 305, 442
 — Insurrection, 441-2, 445
 — Japanese Invasion of, 220, 304-5
 — National Proletarian League, 305
 — National Revolutionary Party, 219, 221, 306-7
 — Nationalism, 47, 51, 217-23, 305-6, 355
 — Resistance Movement, 305-6
 — Socialist Party, 306-7, 442-4
 — Trade Union organizations, 443-445
 — Workers and Peasants' Party, 224, 445

 Cairo Conference, 292-4, 300
 Cambodia, 195, 201, 295, 317, 353, 423-30
 Canadian Spy Case, 345
 Canton Commune, 156-7, 164, 169, 208
Cao Dai, 433
 Cawnpore Conspiracy Case, 62
 Central Asia, 60, 81, 101-3, 107, 135
 Central Asian Republics, 107, 130
 Ceylon, 43, 62, 229-30, 358, 445, 474
 — Communist Party, 62, 229-30, 304, 474
 Changkufang, 266-7
Cheka, 110, 139
 China (*see also* All-China), 15, 23, 27-34, 86, 97, 107, 112-15, 119, 292, 320-6, 350-2, 368-92, 500-5, 508-10, 512
 — as Model and Guide, 380-92, 365, 382-4, 434-6, 442-3, 451, 453, 467, 471-2, 478-9, 480, 495, 500, 514-15
 Chinese Communism (*see also* Chinese Communist Party), 28-9, 33, 68-70, 380

- Chinese Communist Army, 75, 155, 160, 236, 244-7, 293-4, 309-10, 321, 323, 368-88, 481
- — Common Programme, 70, 376-8, 387
- — Constitution, 14, 159, 325, 376-9, 387
- — Party, 64, 70, 75-6, 129, 131-133, 147-57, 158-64, 196, 213, 216, 231-43, 247-9, 254, 320-326, 350-2, 368-79, 389-90, 514-15
- — Party Congresses: 1st—70; 2nd—129, 257; 3rd—73, 131-132; 5th—76, 153; 6th—158-9, 280; 7th—323, 325; 8th—390, 507
- — Régime, 376-9, 380, 385-92, 446
- — Relations with KMT, 30, 33-34, 46, 65, 71-4, 121, 129, 132, 147-57, 165-9, 235, 243, 249, 251, 270, 322-4, 368, 373, 510
- Chinese disliked, 308
- Democratic League, 370-1
- Eastern Railway, 253-5, 261, 263-4, 385
- Eighth Route Army, 155, 245, 310, 321, 326
- Five-Year Plan, 387
- Imperialism, 107, 379
- Labour Organization Secretariat, 162-3, 166
- National Labour Congress, 154, 161-4, 373
- National People's Congress, 381
- National Revolution, 31, 67-9, 120, 165, 381
- Nationalism, 28-9, 33, 63, 66-70, 253, 380
- Nationalist Government, 245, 257, 294, 300, 368-9, 445-6
- Overseas, 31-2, 63, 68, 381-2
- People's Political Consultative Conference, 371
- People's Republic, 152, 238, 369, 375, 382, 417, 500
- Revolution (1911), 19, 27-30, 32-3, 67, 106, 114, 381
- Chinese Soviet Government, 156, 160-1, 231, 233, 235, 244, 248, 369
- Choren*, 410
- Cochin-China, 419-20, 422-3
- Collective Leadership, 408, 512
- Collectivization, 10, 239-40, 271-2, 390, 435, 483, 509
- Colombo Conference, 513
- Plan, 446-7
- Colonial Revolutions, 118, 366
- Colonialism, 362-3, 438, 490, 498-499, 503-4, 513
- Colonies, 15, 35, 116-17, 119, 121-122, 124-5, 132, 134, 279-80, 284
- Colour Question, 38, 88, 109-10, 342, 490, 513
- Cominform, 12, 108, 140, 282, 328, 358, 360-4, 375, 383, 397, 402, 405, 440, 464, 475, 500, 507, 512
- Cominform journal, 9, 108, 237-9, 360, 363-4, 370, 372, 376, 378, 389-90, 399-400, 405-7, 417, 428, 434, 438, 466, 470, 472, 478-80, 482, 495
- Comintern, 53, 59, 65, 70-3, 76, 93, 97-8, 108, 116, 120, 140, 142, 153, 158-9, 167, 170, 172-3, 176-178, 180, 208, 214, 265, 321, 325, 332, 358, 361, 498, 512
- World Congresses: 1st—27, 57, 59, 81, 120, 130; 2nd—73, 121-122, 130, 139, 333; 3rd—83, 125, 130, 138, 205; 4th—61, 84, 129-30, 205; 5th—129, 133, 203; 6th—11, 62, 108, 158, 203-4, 206, 279-84, 331; 7th—139, 178, 180, 198, 211, 233, 249, 265, 268, 279-80, 282-3, 321
- agents, 64, 69, 149, 157, 168-9, 172, 174, 200-1, 205, 213, 215, 224, 510, 512
- dissolution, 331-3, 358, 361
- funds, 81, 83-4, 171, 180, 192, 206, 224
- interference, 160, 165-70, 177-8, 180
- Commission of Overseas Chinese Affairs, 31, 381

- Communalism, 47-8, 55-6, 225, 227-8, 356, 475
- Communist Front Organizations, 118, 126-8, 130, 277, 334, 355, 361-7, 374, 415, 421, 424, 429, 439, 444, 457-8, 470, 482, 495, 507, 512
- Communist League, 91
- Communist Manifesto, 16, 81, 91, 112, 117, 128
- Communist University of Toilers of the East, *see* KUTV
- Contradictions, 137, 262-3
- Coral Sea, Battle of, 291
- Counter-revolutionary elements, 372, 385
- CPI, 62, 134, 221-4, 226-7, 278, 280-1, 303-4, 357, 359, 476-97, 509
- Congresses: 2nd—441, 476, 494; 3rd—480, 484-6, 488-9; 4th—488-9, 507
- CPSU, 5, 72, 237
- Congresses: 14th—142, 251; 15th—251, 270-1; 16th—272; 17th—274; 18th—266; 19th—137-8, 142, 237, 359, 392, 404, 483-4, 507; 20th—273, 484, 507
- Crimean War, 102
- Cross-Roads*, 475
- Czechoslovakia, 465
- Das Kapital*, 3, 80, 82, 92
- Dawes Plan, 140, 263
- Dien Bien Phu, 423, 432
- Disarmament Conference, 126, 252-3, 264
- Dobama*, *see* Thakins' Party
- Dogmatism, 236, 323
- Dominion Status, 55, 222, 225, 228-9, 302
- DRV, 344, 419-20, 435
- Dual Nationality, 381, 473
- Durand Agreement, 102
- Dutch East Indies, *see* Indonesia
- Dyarchy, 55, 218
- ECAFE Conference (February 1953), 447
- Economic Aid, 382-3, 417, 436, 446-9, 489, 514-15
- Economic Nationalism, 483
- Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR*, 404-5, 484
- Extraterritoriality, 292
- Factionalism, 171, 180, 489
- Far Eastern Bureau, 63, 84, 90, 134, 176, 196, 198, 204-5, 213-15
- Far Eastern Conference (Irkutsk), 83, 128
- Far Eastern Labour Conference, 121
- Far Eastern Socialist Party, 78
- Farmers' Death Band, 189
- Fascism, 190-1, 233, 281, 283-4, 332
- Fatherland Front, 435
- FDR, 463-5
- Feudalism, 87, 324
- Finland, Soviet invasion of, 268
- 'Five-Antis Campaign', 386
- Five Principles, 487, 514
- Formosa, 26, 293, 371, 387, 392, 412, 500, 515
- Free Cambodia Movement, 424-5, 427
- Free India Movement, 296
- Free Laos Movement, 424-8
- Free Thai Movement, 200, 316
- French Communist Party, 51, 283
- French Revolution, 91, 93, 386
- Friendship Associations, 279
- Fukumoto-ism, 174
- Fulton Speech, Churchill's, 346
- GPU, 110, 139
- General Council of Buddhist Associations, 216, 219
- Geneva Conferences: (June 1954)—317, 416-17, 423, 429, 432-3, 513; (July 1955)—399; (October 1955)—489
- Genyosha*, 35-6, 40, 183-4
- Gerindo*, 211
- Germ Warfare Allegations, 363, 414-15, 482

- German Communist Party, 96, 98, 157
 Germany, 137, 140
 GERWANI, 470
 GERWIS, 470
 Gestapo, 111, 157
 Ghadr Conspiracy, 36
 — Party, 22, 61, 223, 493
 Goa, 491, 498, 506
 Government of Burma Act (1921), 217
 Government of India Act (1919), 217, 219
 Government of India Act (1935), 55, 219, 226
 Great Han Nationalism, 274
 Greater East Asia, 290–2, 295
 Guerrilla Warfare, 13, 75, 237, 245–246
 .
 Hailams, 63–4
 Hankow, 148, 150–1
 Hindu-Moslem Relations (*see also* Communalism), 47, 55–8, 356
History of the CPSU(B), 10, 272–3, 392, 484
 Hitlerism, 186–7, 191
 Hoa Hao Sect, 433
 Hokkaido, 294, 347, 394
 Hong Kong, 498, 504
 — Strike, 71, 148–9
 Hukbalahaps, 202, 318–19, 352, 473–4
 Hydrogen Bomb (*see also* Nuclear), 490, 505
Hyogikai, 181
 IKKI, 123, 133, 139, 165–6, 168–9, 174, 204–5, 208–9, 226, 249, 283
 ISDV, 45–6, 50
 ISH, 142, 279
 IUS, *see* International Union of Students
 Imperialism, 3, 9⁸, 113–14, 116–17, 124–5, 132, 134
 India, 17, 22–4, 38, 41, 43, 54–62, 113, 123, 223–9, 301–4, 356–7, 413, 445, 475–97, 499–505, 508, 512, 515
 Indian Communist Party, *see* CPI
 — Communism, 59, 61–2, 223–7, 280–1, 301, 357
 — Congress Party, 24, 210, 219, 223–6, 229, 302, 356, 486, 491
 — Elections, 480–2, 486, 488
 — Five-Year Plan, 489
 — Independence, 356, 358
 — Independence League, 41, 295–6
 — Mutiny, 113
 — National Army, 295–6, 303
 — National Congress, 17, 42, 48, 52, 54–7, 59, 61, 227, 281
 — Nationalism, 17, 52, 59, 61
 — Naval Mutiny, 357, 404
 — Socialist Party, 486
 Indies Association, 25, 45
 — Party, 45, 48
 Indo-China (*see also* Vietnam), 43, 50–1, 195–9, 317, 343–5, 419–22, 424–37, 500, 504, 513
 — Communism, 51
 — Communist Party (*see also* Lao Dong), 51, 195–9, 344, 420–1, 428
 — Independence, 317
 — Nationalism, 23–4, 51, 195–6
 — Religious Sects, 433
 Indonesia, 43, 45–50, 52, 202–12, 291, 295, 311–15, 343–5, 419, 456–73, 500, 511–12, 514
 — Army, 463, 467–9
 — Communism, 46–9, 64, 311–12, 314–15, 359, 457
 — Communist Party, *see* PKI
 — General Elections, 470
 — Independence, 43, 314, 461–2, 456, 466
 — Japanese Invasion, 210–12, 311–312
 — Labour Party, 460, 462
 — National Party (*see also* PNI), 45, 457
 — Nationalism, 17, 24, 45, 313–14
 — Social-Democratic Party, 45
 — Socialist Party, 456–7, 460, 462–463, 468–70
Indo-Soviet Journal, 475
 Indo-Soviet Relations, 475

- Industrialization, 132-3, 262, 271-273, 373, 379, 386, 388-9, 391-2, 448
- Inner Mongolia, *see* Mongolia
- Insulinde*, 45
- International, First, 91-2, 112
- Second, 21, 93, 97-8, 112-13, 116
- Third (*see also* Comintern), 16, 93, 98, 108, 116
- Fourth, 229, 304
- International Association of Dockers and Seamen, 142, 279
- International Commission of Scientists, 415
- International Congress of Writers, 143
- International Juridical Association, 279
- International Lawyers' Commission, 415
- International Union of Students (IUS), 126, 334, 361-2, 364, 374, 404, 439, 458, 470, 505
- International Union of Revolutionary Writers, 142-3
- IPPI, 470
- Irkutsk Party, 89
- Japan, 15, 26-7, 78-88, 126, 138, 346-7, 393-411, 498-500, 502, 506-7, 510-11
- and Greater East Asia, 289-297
- compared with Russia, 290
- Communism, 21, 80-6, 171-81, 346-7, 393-411
- Communist Party, 81-5, 87, 129, 131, 193, 326-9, 359, 383, 394, 400
- General Elections, 399-400, 409
- Labour-Farmer Party, 175
- Labour Union Council, 172, 175
- National Socialism, 182, 192-3
- Peace Treaty, 400, 403, 406
- Security Pact, 400, 403, 406
- Social-Democratic Party, 394-6, 398, 409
- State Socialist Party, 192-3
- Japan, Trade Union Movement, 346-7, 394-5, 408
- Ultra-Nationalism, 36, 40, 82, 86-8, 179, 190, 346, 400-1, 416, 511
- Japanese Army, 188-91, 401
- Constitution, 399
- National Defence Force, 401
- Peasants and Workers' School, 327
- People's Emancipation League, 326, 328, 348
- Population Question, 293, 300, 502
- Prisoners-of-War, 326-7
- Rearmament, 401, 403, 409
- Relations with Communist China, 405, 409-10
- Relations with National China, 410
- Rice Riots, 79-80
- Soviet Relations, 258, 267-8, 292, 295, 297-300, 405, 409-10
- JFLU, 395-6, 408
- Juichin, 160-1, 232, 369
- Kabul, 19, 39, 61
- Kamchatka, 138
- Karen Revolt, 441-3
- Kashmir Dispute, 482, 491-4, 502, 506
- Kazakhstan, 102, 107
- Kellogg Pact, 252-4
- Kenkokukai*, 82
- Khmer Issarak, 425, 427-9
- Khilafat Movement, 58-60
- Khiva, 102, 107, 135
- Kirghizia, 107
- Kirti Kisan*, 223
- Kisan Sabha*, 228, 476
- KMT, 30-4, 45, 52, 63, 70-4, 76, 149, 370-1
- National Congresses: 1st-34, 73, 147; 2nd-149
- Revolutionary Committee, 370-371
- Kokand, 102
- Kokuhonsha*, 187
- Kommunist*, 237, 359

- Korea, 26, 35, 47, 88-90, 194-5, 293, 300, 337, 347-50, 383, 388, 392, 410-18, 500, 502, 512
 Korean Armistice, 415-16
 — Army, 411-12
 — Communist Party (*see also* Korean Workers' Party), 89-90, 134, 194, 347-50
 — Independence Movement, 89, 120
 — Labour Union, 418
 — Nationalism, 26, 89
 — Peasant League, 418
 — Riots, 410, 414
 — War, 402, 410, 412-17, 430, 444
 — Workers' Party, 348-50, 417-18, 507
 Kotoku Plot, 27, 78, 82
 Krestintern, 142-3
 Kuomintang, *see* KMT
 Kuriles, 100, 105, 294, 298, 403
 Kutien Military Conference, 160, 244
 KUTV, 118, 124-5, 130, 172
Kyodo, 401

 Land Reform, 412
Lanka Sama Samaj, 229, 304
 Lao Dong Party, 344, 424-5, 428, 434, 436
Lao Issarak, 425-6
 Laos, 195, 201, 295, 317, 353, 423-430
 Lausanne Treaty, 137, 253
 League Against Imperialism, 128, 203, 208, 277-9
 League of Nations, 252-3, 262; Germany and, 250, 264; Japan and, 41, 191, 264; Soviet Union and, 110, 126, 252, 264, 266, 268
 Lenin University, 125, 204-5
 Liberation Movements, 3-4, 8, 12, 35, 53, 57, 72-3, 93, 116, 121-2, 124, 129-30, 134, 211, 358-9, 382
 Lien Viet, 421, 428, 434
 Lien Viet Front, 424, 428, 434-6
 Linggadhati Agreement, 461, 464
 Locarno Pact, 140, 250, 252
 London Naval Conference, 184
 London Naval Treaty, 40, 189
 Long March, The, 161, 233, 241, 244, 249, 369
 Lytton Commission, 262

 Macao, 498
 Madiun Rebellion, 206-7, 359, 465-466, 510
 Mahachon, 438
Mahasabha, 225
 Malaya, 63-5, 213-16, 266, 307-10, 353-5, 450-5, 498
 — Communism, 63-5, 353-5, 359
 — Communist Party, 65, 200, 213-216, 236, 307-10, 353-5, 438, 443, 450-5
 — Communist Youth Corps, 64, 214-15
 — Nationalist Party, 354
 — People's Anti-Japanese Army, 310, 353
 — Races' Liberation Army, 451
 — Soviet Republic, 443, 451
 — Trade Unions, 214, 451
 Manchu Dynasty, 27, 29-32
 Manchukuo, 178, 257-8, 263-4, 267
 Manchuria, 26, 47, 67, 72, 88-90, 103-6, 159, 191, 253-5, 259, 261-263, 293-4, 298, 300, 325, 337, 350-1, 385-6
 Manchurian Incident, 38, 41, 90, 178-9, 182, 185, 192, 195, 248, 253, 261
 Manchurian Operations, 178, 262
 Manchurian Trade Agreement, 375
 Manipur, 296
 Mao's Writings, 236-9, 245-6, 383-384
 Marshall Plan, 140, 346, 358, 360, 364, 444
Masjumi, 457, 463, 468-9, 470
 Meerut Conspiracy, 224, 226-7
 Mensheviks, 14, 94, 113, 115, 141, 240
 Mexico, 61
 Midway, Battle of, 291
Min Yuen, 451
 Minsk Congress, 94
Minsei, 411

- Minsen*, 411
 Mongolia, Inner, 106
 — Outer, 5, 72, 103, 106–7, 111, 255–8, 294, 298, 300, 335–7, 350, 500
 Mongolian People's Republic, 256–258, 266–7, 336–7
 Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party, 256–7
 Montague-Chelmsford Reforms, 55, 217–18, 225
 Moplan Rebellion, 58
 MOPR, 142
 Morley-Minto Reforms, 54
 Moscow Conference, 345, 349, 351
 Moscow Oriental University, 61
 Moslems, 24, 46–7, 50, 55–8, 60, 65, 107
 Moslem League, 54, 56, 225, 228–9, 302, 356
 MPAJA, 310, 451
 Myochit Party, 220, 306
- Nagani Book Club, 219, 221
Nahdatul Ulama, 457, 470
 Nanchang Insurrection, 155–6, 158
 Nanking Outrage, 152–3
 Nanking Treaty, 28
 National Liberation Fronts, 333
 Naval Ratios, 40
 NCIO, 395–6, 408
 NCNA, 29, 162–3
 NEP, 138, 141, 251–2, 271
 Nepal, 595–7
 — Communist Party, 495–6
 Neutralism, *see* Asian Neutralism
 Netherlands Communist Party, 203, 211, 465–6
New Age, 475, 488
 New Democracy, 11, 77, 234, 237–240, 324, 370, 434
 New Democratic Youth League, 374
 Nicobars, 296
 Nine-Power Pact, 184
 NKVD, 110
 Nomanhan Operations, 266–7
 North Atlantic Pact, 140, 375
 North China Incident, 193, 215, 266, 328, 414
 Northern Expedition, 150
 Noulens Defence Committee, 128, 143
 Nu-Attlee Agreement, 440
 Nuclear and Thermo-Nuclear Weapons, 404–5, 448, 485, 490, 505
 Nuremberg Trials, 276
- Ochrana*, 110
 October Revolution, 10, 118–19, 236, 370, 376, 503
 October 17th Affair, 467
 Opium War, 27–8, 112
 OGPU, 110–11
 Outer Mongolia, *see* Mongolia
- Pacific War, 243, 285
 Pakistan, 43, 55, 228, 356, 358, 475, 492–5, 497, 499, 502, 512
 — and United States, 485, 492
 — Communist Party, 476, 494–5
 Pan-Asia, 16, 19–22, 34–44, 66, 82, 87–8, 206, 289, 511
 Pan-Bokhara Congress, 135
 Pan-Islam, 60, 129, 205–6
 Pan-Malayan FTU, 354, 451
 Pan-Pacific Syndicalist Congress, 133
 Pan-Pacific Trade Union Conference, 214
 Pan-Pacific Trade Union Congress, 203
 Pan-Pacific Trade Union Secretariat, 65, 142, 172, 198, 214, 277
 PARI, 206
 Paris Commune, 92
 Paris Congress, 93, 96
 Parliamentaryism, 333
Partai Murba, 465
Partindo, 209–11
 Pathet Lao, 425–6, 429
 Pau Conference, 423
 Peace Campaign (*see also* World Peace Campaign), 264, 283–4
 Peace Preservation Law, 85, 173, 176

- Peaceful Co-existence, 251-2, 284, 487, 508
- Peasant Unions, 127, 150, 163
- Peasantry, 9-12, 29-31, 76-7, 95-6, 126, 133, 143, 147, 149, 156, 161-163, 167, 170, 237-9, 271-2, 324-325, 370, 372-3, 389-91, 434-5, 471-3, 478, 483
- Peking, 368, 382-3, 385
- Pemuda Rakjat*, 457
- People's Age*, 475
- Pepsu Elections, 486, 488
- Perbepsi*, 471
- Perhimpunan Indonesia*, 25, 45, 209, 211
- Persia, 60, 67, 86, 102-3, 119, 123, 136
- PESINDO, 457, 460, 462
- Peta*, 313
- Philippines, 17-18, 52-3, 201-2, 292, 297, 317-19, 352, 473-4
- Communist Party, 52-3, 201-2, 318-19, 352, 359, 473-4
- Independence, 318, 352
- Japanese Invasion, 52, 202, 318
- Nationalism, 23, 52, 317-19
- PKI, 50, 131, 202-3, 205, 207-9, 211, 224, 457-73
- 5th Congress, 469, 471-2
- PLA, 155, 158, 245, 369
- PNJI (*see also* Indonesian National Party), 209-10, 456-7, 460, 463, 468-70
- Poetara*, 312-13
- Police State Methods, 385-6
- Polish-Russian Dispute, 332-3
- Popular Front, 126, 139, 180, 198, 211, 233, 265, 268, 283-4
- Population, 8-9, 293, 371, 380-1, 502
- Port Arthur, 103-5, 385
- Portsmouth Treaty, 105
- Potemkin Mutiny, 95
- Potsdam Conference, 399-300
- Pravda*, 81, 122, 125, 237, 272, 328, 345, 391, 399, 480, 486, 488, 490, 509
- Profintern, 142-3, 277
- Psychological Warfare, 326-7
- PVO, 441-2
- Purges, 141, 153, 264-5, 274-5, 336
- Pushtunistan, 492-3, 506
- Pyeongyang, 348, 383, 402, 417
- Racial Equality, 38, 40-1, 43-4, 184, 342, 377, 380
- Racial Independence, 359, 400
- Radio Free Japan, 404, 407-8
- Renville Agreement, 463-4
- Resistance Movements, 13, 285, 333, 341
- Rights Recovery Movement, 248, 254
- Rowlatt Bills, 57
- RSDLP, 4, 14, 92, 94, 115, 120
- Russian Communist Party (*see also* CPSU), 59, 72, 74, 92, 99, 142, 237
- — — Congresses: 7th—120; 8th—120; 10th—141; 12th—132; 14th—140, 142
- Russian Expansionist Policy, 99-109, 136
- Foreign Policy, 59, 138-42, 486
- Imperialism, 36, 100-9, 122, 255-60, 268, 337, 447, 498-9, 504
- Revolution, 46, 70, 80, 95, 107
- Russo-Japanese War, 16, 21, 26, 31, 51, 78, 88, 96, 103-5, 107, 113-14
- Russo-Turkish War, 102
- Saghalien, 26, 100-1, 105, 298
- Sajap Kiri*, 462-3
- San Francisco Conference, 345, 403
- Sanbetsu*, *see* NCIO
- SARBUPRI, 457-8
- Sarekat Islam*, 24, 45-50, 202-3, 208
- Saya San Rebellion, 217-18
- SCAP, 393-4, 396, 401, 405-8, 411
- Seisanto*, 187, 189, 193
- Self-determination, 4, 16-17, 50-2, 499
- Shakai Minshuto*, 192
- Shameen Affair, 21, 149
- Shan States, 316
- Shanghai Incident, 21, 133-4, 148-149, 166
- Shantung, 66-7, 350

- Shimonoseki Treaty, 104
 Showa Restoration, 188, 191-2
 Siam, 65, 86, 199-201, 206, 315-16,
 352-3, 425, 427, 430, 437-9, 452,
 498, 512
 — Communism, 65, 199-201, 316,
 353, 438
 — Communist Party, 438-9
 — Japanese Invasion, 201, 315
 Sian Incident, 234, 247
 Singapore, 498
 Sinkiang, 103, 106-7, 255, 257-60,
 335-6, 350-1, 376, 385
 Sino-Indian Relations, 487, 497
 Sino-Japanese War, 26, 29, 31
 Sino-Soviet Alliance (1950), 70,
 385, 410
 Sino-Soviet Relations, 67-8, 70-1,
 108, 157, 165-6, 266-7, 373, 376,
 384-5, 414, 417, 436, 503
 Sino-Soviet Treaty: (1924)—256-7;
 (1945)—325, 336-7, 350-1
 SOBSI, 457-8, 463-4, 470-1
 Social Democracy, 265, 281, 283,
 376
Sodomei, *see* JFLU
Sohyo, 408
 South-East Asia Treaty Organiza-
 tion (SEATO), 501, 505
 South-East Asia Youth Conference,
 355, 359, 362, 441, 443, 450, 464,
 476
 South Seas Communist Group, 64-
 65, 196, 200, 213, 218, 277
 Soviet (*see also* Russian) Diplo-
 matic Missions, 345, 353, 445,
 472, 482, 486, 497, 512
 — Economic Aid, 385, 417, 436,
 447-9, 489, 506-7, 515
 — Far Eastern Army, 255, 261, 266
 — Foreign Policy, 362-3, 405, 512
 — -German Pact (1939), 198, 216,
 268, 284
 — -German Treaty (1926), 250
 — -Japan Neutrality Pact, 258, 267,
 295, 297-8, 331
 — -Manchurian Agreement, 257
 — -Mongolia Mutual Assistance
 Pact, 257, 266
 — Monitor, 333
 — -Outer Mongolia Treaty, 255-6
 — Plans, 330-7
 — Trade Unions 11th Congress,
 366
 Soviet Union, defence of, 109, 179,
 266, 281, 283, 331
 Soviets, 95, 156, 159-61, 169
 Spanish-American War, 18
 Spanish Civil War, 266, 283, 414
 Stockholm Peace Appeal, 363
 Students, 66-9, 370, 453, 458
 Stuttgart Congress, 96-7
 'Sugar-coated bullets', 378
 Sun Yat-Sen University, 125
 Syndicalism, 84
 Tadjikistan, 107
 Taiping Rebellion, 29-31
 Tannu Tuva, 107, 257, 336-7
 Tashkent, 120, 260
 — Propaganda Schools, 60-1, 124
Tass, 418, 421, 482
 Teheran Conference, 297
 Telengana, 476, 480-1
 Terrorism and Violence, 17-18, 22-
 23, 57, 62, 227-33, 451, 474, 476-
 477, 481, 484-5
 Thai Autonomous Area, 437
 Thailand, *see* Siam
 Thakins' Party, 218-19, 221
 'Three-Antis Campaign', 386
 Tibet, 5, 103, 257, 369, 382, 487,
 496-7
 Toilers-of-the-East Congress, 83,
 128, 203
 Toilers-of-the-East University, *see*
 KUTV
 Tonking, 316-17, 419, 422-3, 426
 Trade Unions, 47, 70-1, 91-2, 133,
 137, 161-4, 203, 365-6, 388-9
 'Transmission Belts', 127, 129, 334,
 361, 434-5, 374, 388, 421, 426,
 428, 458, 471, 512
 Trans-Siberian Railway, 101, 104,
 255
 Triple Intervention, 26, 40, 104
 Trojan Horse Tactics, 126, 283
 Truman's Point Four, 444, 446

- Turkestan, Chinese, *see* Sinkiang
 — Russian, 60, 102, 107, 122, 135
 Turkmenistan, 107
 Turkey, 49, 54, 56–60, 67, 114, 119,
 123, 135, 137
 Turk-Sib Railway, 255, 260
 Twenty-One Demands, 34
 •
 UMNO, 354
 Unequal Treaties, 28, 35, 40, 183
 United Front, 139
 United Nations, 323–4, 331, 345,
 353, 411–16, 446–8, 461, 487,
 490, 492, 500, 515
 — — Security Council, 345, 461–2,
 464, 466
 USSR, 110, 142
 — German Invasion of, 269, 276,
 284–5
 Uzbekistan, 107
 •
 Versailles Peace Conference, 50,
 184, 263
 Versailles Treaty, 38, 40, 66–7
 Vienna Peace Congress, 484
 Vietnam (*see also* Indo-China), 317,
 423–4, 426–37, 502, 512
 — Confederation of Workers, 421
 — Nationalist Party, 23
 — News Service, 421
 — People's Army, 317, 424
 — Revolutionary League, 316
 — Women's Union, 421
 — Youth Group, 421
 Viet Minh, 199, 224, 266, 316–17,
 344, 353, 419–32, 437
 Violence, *see* Terrorism
 Vladivostok, 101, 103–4
 VOKS, 142–3, 278
Volksraad, 48–9, 211
 •
 Washington Conference, 138, 184
 Washington Naval Treaty, 40
 West European Bureau, 134, 205
 Whampoa Military College, 74–5,
 149
 Women's International Democratic
 Federation (WIDF), 126, 334,
 363–4, 371, 374, 415, 421, 458
 Women's Movement, 280
 Workers' and Peasants' Party
 (Burma), 223–4; (India), 224, 278
 World Economic Conference, 483
 World Federation of Democratic
 Youth (WFDY), 126, 285, 334,
 361–2, 364, 374, 404, 421, 450,
 458, 470–1, 505
 World Federation of Trade Unions
 (WFTU), 126, 142, 230, 334, 361,
 397–8, 364–7, 373–4, 382, 421,
 431, 439, 444, 458, 471, 477, 507
 World Federation of Trade Unions
 Asian Liaison Bureau, 365–6, 373
 World Peace Campaign, 117, 143,
 176, 282, 327, 362–7, 404, 481–8,
 505, 507–8
 World Peace Congress, 126, 362–3,
 404, 429, 431, 484
 World Peace Council, 176, 282,
 363–4, 371, 415, 439, 444, 458,
 482
 World Peace Council Asian Liaison
 Committee, 365–6
 World Revolution, 4, 8–10, 13, 23,
 26, 91–4, 97, 99, 108–9, 112–14,
 116, 118–19, 121, 123, 125–6,
 129–30, 132, 134, 136, 141, 148,
 158–9, 165, 203, 214, 234, 242,
 251, 265, 268–9, 276, 284–5, 300,
 330–4, 346, 358, 362, 364, 393,
 443, 452, 495, 498, 503, 508–9,
 512, 515
 World War I, 5, 51, 53, 56, 59, 80,
 87, 89, 93, 97, 107, 116, 184, 190,
 195–6
 World War II, 13, 89, 109, 126, 160,
 171, 219, 242, 247, 263
 Wroclaw Conference of Intellec-
 tuals, 143, 362, 484
 Wuhan Government, 150, 153–4,
 168, 243
 •
 Yalta Conference, 72, 100, 105, 107,
 113, 293–4, 298, 300, 325, 337,
 350
 Yen-an, 233, 237, 245, 323, 326–7,
 348, 350, 368, 395
 — Independence League, 348

- Yenbay Revolt, 197
Young Communist League, 127
Young Plan, 263
Young Turk Movement, 114
Youth Movement, 280, 285, 355,
361-2, 374
- Zaibatsu*, 399
Zaigo Gunjinkai, 189
Zenkoku Rono Taishuto, 192
Zenroren, 408
Zevern Provinciën, 210
Zigzag Course, 508-9

Index of Persons

- Abdul Ghaffar Khan, 227
 Abdullah, Sheikh, 494
 Acheson, Dean, 411
 Agabekov, 60, 135
 Aguinaldo, 17-18, 290-1
 Aidit, 9, 467, 469, 471-3
 Akamatsu, 192-3
 Akao Toshi, 82, 186
 Alexander I, 109 •
 Ali Brothers, 58
 Alimin, 46, 64, 202-7, 209, 326,
 460, 473, 510
 Amakasu, Captain, 85
 Amanullah, King, 60
 An Tzu-Wen, 378
 Arahata Kanson, 171, 173
 Arita Hachiro, 268
 Atcheson, George, 394
 Attlee, Clement, 440, 442
 Aung San, 20, 220-2, 290-1, 296,
 305-6, 355-6, 440, 442-3, 511

 Bā Maw, 219, 221-2, 296, 305
 Ba Sein, 222
 Bahol, Colonel, 201
 Bailey, Colonel, 60
 Bakunin, 92
 Balgoss, Mariano, 474
 Bambang Sugeng, 468
 Bao Dai, 16, 423-4, 432-3, 445
 Bela Kun, 123
 Beloff, Max, 170
 Beneš, 264, 276
 Beria, 406
 Besant, Mrs, 54-8, 57-8
 Bhave, Vinobha, 483
 Blanqui, 10
 Blucher (*see also* Galen), 254, 266-
 267, 510
 Borkenau, 68, 108

 Borodin, 72, 74-5, 77, 133, 147-8
 150, 154-5, 166, 251, 510
 Bose, Rash Behari, 19, 22, 36-9,
 41-2, 290, 295-6, 302, 511
 Bose, Subhas Chandra, 296-7, 303
 Browder, Earl, 204, 214
 Brandt, Conrad, 72
 Buber, Margarete, 111, 157
 Bukharin, 73, 84, 137, 177, 206,
 270-1, 275, 509
 Bulganin, Marshal, 448-50, 488-9,
 491, 493, 496, 503-4, 515
 Buu Loc, Prince, 432

 Calthrop, Colonel, 246
 Carew, Major, 306
 Caroe, Sir Olaf, 135
 Catherine the Great, 102
 Chang Hsueh-Liang (the Young
 Marshal), 234, 254
 Chang Kuo-Tao, 240-2, 249
 Chang Tso-Lin, 123, 152, 166, 251,
 254
 Chapman, Lieut.-Col. Frederick
 Spencer, 216, 307
 Chen Chiung-Ming, 71
 Chen, Eugene, 154
 Chen Ping, 309, 354, 454-5
 Chen Po-Ta, 320, 376
 Chen Tu-Hsiu, 69-70, 73, 76, 129,
 150, 156-7, 167, 241, 254
 Chen Yi, 378
 Chen Yun, 321, 390
 Chiang Kai-Shek, 16, 74-5, 150-4,
 157, 161, 163, 166, 168, 232,
 234-5, 241, 246-7, 249, 251, 266,
 321-2, 351, 368, 370, 392, 414,
 419, 445-6, 511
 Chiang Kai-Shek, Mme, 335
 Chicherin, 62, 74, 119, 250, 252-3

- Chin Peng, *see* Chen Ping
 Chin Shu-Jen, 259
 Chou En-Lai, 20, 69, 151-2, 155, 158, 170, 204, 234-5, 249, 292, 323-5, 327, 381, 385, 387-8, 415, 437, 449, 487, 497, 511, 514-515
 Chu Chiu-Pai, 70, 156, 167
 Chu Teh, 69, 155, 160-1, 233, 376, 388, 511
 Churchill, Sir Winston, 276, 297, 299, 325, 331, 346, 432, 504, 508
 Citrine, Lord, 397
 Clark, General Mark, 414
 Clementi, Sir Cecil, 65
 Clinard, Outten Jones, 52
 Colbert, Evelyn, 174
 Colvin, Ian, 57
 Crankshaw, Ernest, 265
 Cripps, Sir Stafford, 229, 301, 303
 Cromwell, 74
 Cuong De, Prince, 50
 Czar, The, 95-6

 Dallin, David, 59, 66
 Dan, Baron Takuma, 183
 Dang Xuan-Khu, *see* Truong Chinh
 Dange, 475, 477, 479
 Darsono, 46, 203, 205, 207, 510
 Davies, Joseph, 265
 Dawes, General, 140, 263
 de Castries, 432
 de Groot, 465-6
 de Lattre de Tassigny, 424
 Deane, Maj.-Gen. John R., 334
 Dekker, 48
 Deshpande, 226
 Deutscher, Isaac, 3, 98, 109, 141, 265, 271, 275-6
 Diem, Ngo Dinh, 432-3
 di Vittorio, 366
 Dimitrov, 111, 126, 283, 321
 Djocjarkarta, Sultan of, 468
 Ducroux, 198, 214-15
 Dulles, Foster, 403, 430-2, 491
 Duranty, 264
 Dutt, Palme, 479
 Dyer, General, 57-8
 Dzerzhinsky, 110

 Eden, Sir Anthony, 264, 298
 Eisenhower, President, 492
 Emperor (of Japan), 194, 298, 300, 393, 395
 Engels, 9, 112
 Enver Pasha, 135-6
 Etherton, Colonel, 60

 Fall, Bernard, 317, 420
 Federenko, 384
 Fedeyev, Alexander, 375
 Felton, Monica, 470
 Feng Yu-Hsiang, 154, 371
 Fischer, Louis, 74
 Fischer, Ruth, 109, 111
 Frunze, 275, 276
 Fukumoto Kazuo, 171, 174-5, 177
 Furnivall, J. S., 24

 Galen (*see also* Blucher), 74, 154, 510
 Gandhi, 57-9, 62, 113, 221, 225-6, 281, 302, 483, 488, 511
 Gapon, 21
 Ghate, 223-4
 Ghosal, 221, 441, 443
 Ghosh, Ajoy, 477-84, 488-9
 Gide, André, 143
 Gokhale, 54
 Gondo Seikyo, 188
 Gorky, 275
 Gottwald, 465
 Gouzenko, 345
 Gracey, General, 419-20
 Green, O. M., 66
 Gromyko, 265, 403, 461
 Gurney, Sir Henry, 453

 Habibullah, Amir, 39, 60, 120
 Hakamada, 180
 Hall, 47
 Hamaguchi, 182
 Har Dayal, 39
 Harada, Baron, 268
 Harahap, Burhanudin, 469-70, 502
 Hardinge, Lord, 36
 Harriman, Averell, 297-8, 331
 Hatta, 16, 209-10, 312, 314, 458-9, 463, 511

- Hay, John, 29
 Herzen, 9
 Hilferding, 3, 113-14
 Hirayama, Baron, 187
 Hitler, 20, 117, 187, 263, 282, 296,
 303, 307, 374, 415
 Hla Kywe, Thakin, 444
 Ho Chi-Minh, 20, 50-1, 64, 123,
 196-200, 215, 266, 292, 316, 344,
 383, 419, 422-4, 431-3, 435-6,
 445, 449, 487, 511
 Ho Chien, 154
 Ho Lung, 155, 160
 Hobson, 3, 113
 Hodge, General, 347
 Hsiao Keh, 233
 Hsu Shu-Tseng, 106
 Hu Chiao-Mu, 162
 Hu Shih, 69
 Hull, Cordell, 297, 331
 Hume, Allan, 17
 Hunt, Carew, 127
 Hurley, General, 231, 323, 325
 Hyde, Douglas, 333

 Inouye, Junnosuke, 183
 Inukai Tsuyoshi, 32, 183, 188
 Ito Ritsu, 406
 Iwa Kasuma Sumantri, 468-9
 Iyeyasu, 85

 Jao Shu-Shih, 241
 Jebb, Sir Gladwyn, 413
 Jinnah, 228, 494, 511
 Joffe, Adolph, 34, 72, 132-3, 165,
 256, 270, 510
 Johnston, Sir Reginald, 104
 Joshi, P. C., 20, 304, 476, 478
 Jusuf, Mohamed, 460-1

 Kahin, George, 203, 207, 209, 315
 Kaji Wataru, 326
 Kamenev, 275
 Kamiyama Shigeo, 406
 Kao Kang, 241, 375, 386-7
 Karakhan, 165, 275, 509
 Karttunen, Miss Raden Adjeng, 49
 Kasuga Shoichi, 406, 408
 Kasuga Shojiro, 180

 Katayama Sen, 21, 27, 81, 113, 128,
 178, 326
 Katayama Tetsu, 398
 Kautsky, 80-1
 Kazama Jokichi, 177-9
 Kemal, Mustapha, 137
 Keuneman, 304, 474
 Khrushchev, 384, 448-50, 489-93,
 496, 503-4, 515
 Kim Il-Sung, 348, 416-18
 Kim Koo, 349
 Kirov, 264, 274-6
 Kisch, 278
 Kita Ikki, 188
 Kitchlew, Dr, 482
 Koestler, Arthur, 127
 Kondo Eizo, 81-3, 171
 Kotelawala, Sir John, 498, 513
 Kotoku, 26-7
 Kravchenko, 157
 Kropotkin, 82
 Kuo Mo-Jo, 415

 Lai Jo-Yu, 365, 389
 Langer, Paul, 84
 Laval, 264
 Lawrence of Arabia, 75
 Lenin, 3-5, 8-10, 12-14, 22-3, 28,
 29, 35, 38, 59, 61, 67, 70, 73-4,
 93-9, 112-17, 120-1, 123, 128-9,
 135, 137-9, 141-2, 147, 166, 178,
 240, 251, 271, 273-5, 302, 320-1,
 325, 330, 345, 491, 503, 508-9,
 512
 Lefranc, Serge (*see also* Ducroux),
 213-14
 Li Chai-Sum, 153, 164, 370
 Li Chi-Sen, *see* Li Chai-Sum
 Li Li-San, 11, 20, 69, 148, 158-60,
 167, 231, 241, 254, 372
 Li Mi, General, 446
 Li Min-Jen, *see* Li Li-San
 Li Ta-Chao, 123
 Li Teh-Chuan, 154, 371
 Liao Chung-Kai, 72
 Liaquat Ali Khan, 494
 Lindsay, Michael, 514
 Litvinov, 252-3, 262-4, 268
 Liu Ning-Yi, 444

- Liu Shao-Chi, 14, 20, 121, 159, 249,
 321, 366, 373-4, 376, 378-9, 382-
 384, 387, 389, 405
 Liu Ting-Yi, 352
 Loi Tek, 309, 354
 Lominadze, Besso, 168
 Luxemburg, Rosa, 4, 96, 116
 Lwin, Thakin, 444
 Lyuh Woon-Hyung, 349

 Ma Chan-Shan, 262
 Ma Ching-Yin, 259
 MacArthur, General, 294, 298, 347,
 386, 393, 399, 413
 Macartney, Lord, 27
 MacDonald, Malcolm, 443
 Macmillan, Harold, 504
 MacWhinnie, 444
 Madjid, Abdul, 460
 Magsaysay, Ramon, 474
 Mahendra, King, 496
 Mahring (*see also* Sneevliet), 45, 69,
 71-2, 165-6, 510
 Makino, Count, 182
 Malaka, Tan, 19-20, 63-4, 129,
 200-2, 204-9, 315, 459, 465, 510
 Malenkov, 138, 448, 490
 Mamiya Rinzo, 100
 Manuilsky, 112, 345, 503
 Mao Tse-Tung, 11, 20, 67, 70, 75-7,
 156, 158-60, 162, 167, 170, 231-
 241, 245-6, 249, 257, 274, 320-1,
 323-5, 328, 331-2, 351, 360, 369,
 370-2, 375-6, 378, 381-5, 387-
 392, 434, 436, 443, 445, 449, 478,
 485, 509, 511
 Mao Tun, 384, 431
 Marshall, David, 454-5
 Marshall, General, 323, 346, 351-2
 Martov, 96
 Marx, 3, 5, 8-9, 80, 82, 91-2, 112-
 113, 116-17, 128, 325, 345, 457,
 499, 512
 Mayhew, Christopher, 265
 Menshikov, 487
 Merlin, Governor-General, 196
 Mif, Pavel, 125, 169
 Mikoyan, 273, 484
 Miyamoto Kenji, 407

 Molotov, 178, 231, 252, 260, 262,
 267-9, 298-9, 325, 335, 347, 375,
 405, 489, 509
 Montalembert, 127
 Morse, 28
 Mountbatten, Lord, 306
 Munzenberg, Willi, 127
 Muso, 203-7, 359, 464-5, 510
 Mussolini, 187, 190
 Mya, Thakin, 222

 Nabeyama Sadachika, 82, 180, 398
 Nagata, General, 192
 Nakanishi Ko, 328-9
 Namba Daisuke, 85
 Napier, Lord, 27-8
 Napoleon, 74, 499
 Narayan, Jaya Prakash, 303
 Nasution, Colonel, 468
 Nehru, 16, 221, 225, 277, 292, 356-
 357, 359, 432, 445, 449, 475-8,
 480, 485-94, 501, 509, 511
 Neumann, Heinz, 157, 510
 Nguyen Ai-Quoc, *see* Ho Chi-Minh
 Nguyen Tat Thanh, *see* Ho Chi-
 Minh
 Nomura, Admiral, 195
 Norodom, King, 430
 North, Robert, 128
 Noulens, Hilaire, 128, 143, 198,
 215, 279
 Nozaka Sanzo, 20, 83-4, 128, 172,
 175, 178, 180, 204, 326-8, 348,
 395, 405, 407, 408, 510-11
 Nu, Thakin U, 16, 219, 292, 294,
 306, 313, 440, 443, 448-9, 511

 O'Dwyer, Sir Michael, 19, 36
 Okada, Admiral, 182
 Okano Susuma, *see* Nozaka
 Onraet, René, 214
 Ordzhonikidze, 275
 Orwell, George, 110, 283
 Osugi Sakae, 81, 84, 171
 Oyama Ikuo, 176

 Pak Heung-Yung, 349, 418
 Panchen Lama, 382

- Panikkar, K. M., 413
 Patel, 491, 511
 Pearn, Professor, 420
 Peng Pai, 75
 Perry, Commodore, 28
 Petsarath, Prince, 425-6
 Pham Van Dong, 430
 Pibul, 200-1, 316, 353, 438, 511
 Plekhanov, 9, 21, 92, 94, 113
 Pollitt, Harry, 204, 303, 484-5
 Prasong Vong Vivat, 438
 Pratap, Mahendra, 19, 39, 61, 295
 Pridi Phanomyong, 200-1, 313, 316, 352-3, 383, 436, 496, 511
 Prince Regent (Japanese), 85
 Pu Yi, Henry, 27
 Purcell, Victor, 47, 50, 65
 Putiatin, 100

 Quezon, Manuel, 23, 202
 Quirino, 16

 Radek, 123, 125, 139, 275, 509
 Rahman, Tengku Abdul, 454-5
 Ranadive, 357, 372, 383, 476, 478
 Rao, Rajeshwar, 478-80
 Rhee, Syngman, 16, 89, 348-9, 411, 414-17, 432, 502, 511
 Roosevelt, Franklin D., 297-9, 325, 504
 Roy, M. N., 20, 29, 61-2, 64, 121, 153, 168, 214, 226-7, 510
 Rykov, 270-1, 275

 Saburov, Maxim, 284
 Saionji, Prince, 268
 Saito, Admiral Viscount, 182, 189, 191
 Sakai Toshihiko, 171-2
 Sano Gaku, 82, 171, 173, 176, 180, 398, 510
 Sansom, Sir George, 21, 41, 79
 Sardjono, 460
 Sastroamidjojo, Ali, 468-9, 473
 Sato Naotake, 298-9
 Saya San, 217-18
 Saw, U, 219-20, 222, 306, 356, 511
 Semaun, 20, 46-8, 50, 202-7, 209, 224, 510

 Serov, 489
 Setiadjit, 460
 Sharkey, 204, 450, 476
 Shen Shih-Tsai, 259-60, 335
 Shen Yen-Ping, 384
 Shepilov, 490, 509
 Shiba Shiro, 41
 Shidehara, Baron, 261
 Shiga Yoshio, 175, 346, 407, 510-11
 Shigemitsu Mamoru, 194-5, 295, 298
 Shimonaka, 192-3
 Shirakawa, General, 194
 Shvernik, 366
 Singh, Dr K. I., 383, 496
 Sisavang Vong, King, 426
 Sivaji, 17
 Sjahrir, Sutan, 19, 210, 312, 315, 459-60, 468, 470, 511
 Sjarifuddin, Amir, 311-12, 460, 463-5
 Sneevliet, Hendricus (*see also* Mah-ring), 45-7, 69, 510
 Snow, Edgar, 234, 248
 Soe, Thakin, 219, 306, 355, 440, 511
 Sokhey, Major-General, 482
 Son Ngoc Minh, 427
 Son Ngoc Thanh, 427, 429
 Soong Ching-Ling, 154, 278, 511
 Sorge, Richard, 181, 328, 406
 Souphavong, Prince, 425-6, 429
 Souvanna Phouma, 426
 Spratt, Philip, 510
 Stalin, 5, 10-14, 16, 21, 70, 73, 83, 92, 94, 108-10, 113, 116-19, 121-2, 124-5, 127, 130, 132-4, 136-7, 140-1, 143, 153, 168-9, 175, 178, 232, 234, 240, 251, 259, 263-6, 270-7, 292, 297-9, 320-1, 325, 330-1, 345, 358, 383, 390-1, 401, 404, 408, 449, 483-4, 508-9, 512
 Stilwell, General, 249, 320, 322-3
 Stolypin, 142
 Sugiyama, General, 295
 Sukarno, 16, 20, 208-10, 312, 314, 458-9, 465, 467-8, 508, 511
 Sukiman, 467
 Sun Tse, 246

- Sun Yat-Sen, 18-19, 30-5, 37, 64,
 66, 70-2, 74, 115, 119, 132-3, 147,
 165-6, 205, 238-40, 243, 256,
 270, 511
 Sun, Mme, *see* Soong Ching-Ling
 Suripno, 464
 Suzuki, Admiral Kantaro, 182
 Suzuki Kyo, 188
 Swearingen, Rodger, 84, 124, 171,
 174

 Tachibana Kosaburo, 188
 Tai Li, 322
 Takabatake, 80-1, 186
 Takahashi, 182
 Tan Malaka, *see* Malaka
 Tanaka Seigen, 176-7
 Tan Ling-Djie, 460, 473
 Taruc, Luis, 318-19, 474
 Teng Tse-Hui, 239, 390
 Than Tun, 219, 222, 305-6, 355,
 440-3, 476, 511
 Thein Pe, 220-1, 304
 Thorez, 204
 Thornton, 366
 Tilak, 17, 22, 56, 58, 62
 Tito, 348, 360, 375
 Tjokro, 48-50
 Tojo, General, 328
 Tokai Sanshi, *see* Shiba Shino
 Tokuda Kyuichi, 83-5, 128, 171,
 173, 175, 346, 400, 402, 404, 406-
 408, 510
 Tomskey, 271-2
 Ton Duc Thang, 436
 Toyama Mitsuru, 19, 36-41, 511
 Tran Van Giau, 198
 Tribhuvana, King, 496
 Trotsky, 9, 14, 70, 74, 98, 136, 141,
 143, 167-8, 175, 229, 240, 251,
 270, 274-6, 304, 372, 444, 509
 Truman, President H. S., 299, 351,
 412
 Truong Chinh, 197
 Tu Yueh-Sen, 152

 Tun Oke, Thakin, 305
 Tukhachevsky, 267, 275-6
 Tydings, Senator, 202

 Ungern-Sternberg, Baron, 106

 Valtin, Jan, 111, 142
 Vasilievsky, 347, 394
 Vishinsky, 487
 Vo Nguyen Giap, 317, 423
 Voitinsky, Gregory, 69-71
 Vong-Vivat, Prasong, 438
 Vorovski, 252

 Wang Ching-Wei, 150, 153, 168,
 243, 247, 292, 510
 Wang Min, 249, 284
 Washio, Dr, 189-90
 Watanabe, General, 182
 Wellington, Duke of, 28
 Willoughby, Major-General, 181
 Wilopo, 467-8, 471
 Wilson, President, 4, 16, 50-1, 89,
 499
 Wint, Guy, 502
 Wu Pei-Fu, 71, 162
 Wu Tse, 246

 Yakub Beg, 258
 Yamakawa Hitoshi, 171-2, 174-5
 Yamamoto Masami, 179
 Yang Tsen-Hsin, General, 258-9
 Yeh Ting, 155, 160, 247
 Yoshida Shigeru, 396
 Yoshida Shoin, 35, 41
 Yoshihara Taro, 83
 Young, Morgan, 85
 Yuan Shih-Kai, 19, 32-4
 Yudin, Pavel, 236, 383

 Zhdanov, 332, 358-60, 362, 464,
 476
 Zhukov, 359, 473
 Zinoviev, 8, 59-60, 83, 122-3, 126,
 128, 134, 270, 274-5, 509, 515

लाल बहादुर शास्त्री राष्ट्रीय प्रशासन अकादमी, पुस्तकालय
Lal Bahadur Shastri National Academy of Administration Library

मुससूरी

MUSSOORIE

यह पुस्तक निम्नांकित तारीख तक वापिस करनी है ।

This book is to be returned on the date last stamped.

दिनांक Date	उधारकर्ता की संख्या Borrower's No.	दिनांक Date	उधारकर्ता की संख्या Borrower,s No.

GL 335.43
KEN



108448
LBSNAA

335.43
Ken

वर्ग संख्या

Class No.

लेखक

Author Kennedy, Malcolm D

शीर्षक

Title A short history of Communism

अवाप्ति संख्या 106448

Acc No. 6472

पुस्तक संख्या

Book No.

335.43

Ken

LIBRARY

LAL BAHADUR SHASTRI

National Academy of Administration

MUSSOORIE

Accession No.

106448

1. Books are issued for 15 days only but may have to be recalled earlier if urgently required.
2. An over-due charge of 25 Paise per day per volume will be charged.
3. Books may be renewed on request, at the discretion of the Librarian.
4. Periodicals, Rare and Reference books may not be issued and may be consulted only in the Library.
5. Books lost, defaced or injured in any way shall have to be replaced or its double price shall be paid by the